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Urbanization and poverty: 
The African context 
 
 
 
 
Poverty remains an enormous challenge confronting policymakers in Africa. This 
chapter provides an overview of the current situation in Africa and the response to it as 
narratives have emerged in the development discourse. Factors leading to the rapid 
growth of the urban population in Africa and the way it impacts on cities’ abilities to 
meet the growing demand for employment, housing and urban services are highlighted. 
The second part of this chapter gives an introduction to the study area, namely Sudan, 
and presents some characteristics of the country. The last part outlines the objectives 
and methodologies of the study. 
The challenge of poverty in Africa 
Africa’s predicament, and particularly its failure to curb severe and prevalent poverty, is 
seen as one of the biggest challenges of the 21st century. Africa stands out as the excep-
tion among all the regions of the world that are making progress in building their 
capacity to meet their people’s basic material needs. Statistics and reliable projections 
reveal that millions of Africans live below the poverty line (UN 2005a). For some parts 
of Africa, such as Sub-Saharan Africa, the number of those defined as poor (those who, 
according to the UN Millennium Project [2005a], are living on less than $1 a day) has 
risen from 227 million in 1990 to 313 million in 2001 (Chen & Ravallion 2004, cited in 
UN 2005a: 14). For the very poor in Sub-Saharan Africa, the average income is only 
$270 a year, a mere $0.71 cents a day (World Bank 2004, cited in UN 2005a: 18). 
The majority of the population in most African countries has to find a way of 
surviving in the context of exceedingly challenging constraints. Although the scale and 
specificity of these constraints vary considerably from one country to another, as do the 
livelihood outcomes of the populations, there are some important common challenges 
shared across the continent. These include, inter alia, environmental degradation, war 
and conflict, the AIDS pandemic, malaria and other killer diseases, the challenges of 
democracy, good governance and globalization, and the colonial legacy.  
Africa is characterized by diverse ecosystems that provide a wealth of goods and 
services for human consumption and also support vast biodiversity. Such systems, 
however, are increasingly facing global climate change and continued environmental 
degradation. In this context, the environmental degradation of arable land and water is 
resulting in the loss of livelihoods and exacerbating the poverty situation since many 
communities, due to a lack of resources, are not able to cope without seriously depleting 
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environmental resources (see Chapter 10). Traditional methods of conservation are no 
longer feasible and there is a total absence of institutions that encourage the sustainable use 
and management of natural resources. In such circumstances, poverty increases resource 
depletion and environmental degradation as well as making countries more vulnerable to 
cultural disruption, social instability and conflict (Salih 2001). 
Armed conflict prevails in several African countries with all the consequences it 
generates. A common outcome of these conflicts is the loss of livelihoods. War and 
conflict have led to a disruption of livelihood activities, displacement and death, as well 
as to the destruction of physical and social infrastructure. In addition, the effects of 
conflict have often spilled across national boundaries into neighbouring countries. In 
some, the state has collapsed completely and state resources are being channelled into 
warfare. These factors have prepared the ground for on-going food shortages and severe 
poverty, especially where conflict has run parallel to natural disasters such as prolonged 
drought, as is the case in Sudan. Conflicts in most of Africa have been the result of 
weak democratic institutions and the proliferation of armed groups. And some African 
countries have been successful in rebuilding their countries after appalling conflicts, 
such as those in Rwanda and Mozambique (DFID 2006: 21).  
In Africa today, millions of people die every year of preventable diseases. The 
prevalence of HIV/AIDS, malaria and other killer diseases, as well as a lack of safe 
drinking water reveals people’s vulnerability. The effects are multiple, frequently inter-
related, and often highly determined by context (UN 2005a: 77). An overall deteriora-
tion in health can lead to the impoverishment of individuals and communities, as well as 
to an erosion of the capacity of socio-economic systems through the loss of human 
resources and the threat of total economic breakdown. There are, however, variations 
between different regions and the countries within them: Sub-Saharan Africa has the 
highest prevalence of HIV/AIDS and TB in the world while North Africa has the lowest 
rates among African regions (UN 2005a). Some countries have made progress in 
reducing new HIV infections, for example Uganda which has reduced HIV prevalence 
from 18% in 1992 to 6.4% in 2005 (DFID 2006b: 2). In Ethiopia too, HIV infection 
rates in urban areas have dropped from 2.5 new cases per 100 adults in 1990-92 to 
below two new cases since 1995 (DFID 2006a: 2).  
When institutions that deal with the above-mentioned challenges are ineffective, 
weak or disrupted, people’s vulnerability to crisis, stress and shocks increases dramati-
cally. In addition, much of the structural change needed to lift the poor out of poverty is 
beyond the ability of African states themselves (Salih 2001). The importance of politics 
and governance stems from their capacity to establish the legal and political framework 
not only for designing poverty-reduction policies but also to strengthen the capacity of 
the poor to overcome social and economic exclusion. Since independence, there have 
been profound failings in terms of governance and politics in numerous African states 
(Salih 2001). Many of the economic and social policies pursued by Africa’s rulers have 
impoverished their people, widened inequality and increased exclusion, and human-
rights atrocities have been carried out against countless individuals and groups. How-
ever, while many of these African countries are still struggling to advance their govern-
ance system, there are others that have already made considerable improvements in 
governance in recent years. For example, Botswana, Ghana and Tanzania have made 
marked progress in strengthening their public institutions (DFID 2006: 22). Almost half 
of the African countries (26) have signed up to the African Peer Review Mechanism of 
the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), while three countries – 
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Ghana, Kenya and Rwanda – have completed their reviews (DFID 2006: 4). Political 
reform has been placed on the development agendas of an increasing number of African 
countries and it has emerged as a key catchword across the region that no government 
can afford to ignore under the increasing pressure of civil society (Hamdok & Kifle 
2000: 123). 
Africa has long suffered hostile terms of trade, volatile commodity prices, limited 
access to financial resources, a lack of internal capacity and appropriate policy frame-
works to compete on the global market. Some of the policies implemented during the 
colonial era have had lingering effects that are still manifest, ranging from the exploita-
tion of labour, unjust taxation and unfair terms of trade to the creation of artificial states 
and the siphoning off of the continent’s natural resources. Most African countries have 
been integrated into global finance and trade arrangements as exporters of raw materials 
and importers of industrial products. Although such outside intervention has always 
been present, its pace seems to have picked up in recent decades. The challenges of 
contemporary globalization are many, with economic, social, political, environmental 
and cultural ramifications that are impacting on the ways people utilize and combine 
their resources to pursue their livelihoods.  
The livelihoods of people in rural and urban areas are increasingly being shaped by 
decisions made internationally as well as at national and regional levels of government. 
For poor households in a small village in Africa, the challenge is not only in dealing 
with livelihood constraints within their immediate village, surrounding villages, their 
country or even the continent, but across the globe. In urban areas, cities are being 
remoulded as global networks and structured around new principles of technological 
space. Global mobility has increased and old community norms are being changed or 
abandoned, resulting in the weakening of community and inter-household trust and 
collaboration, the breakdown of households and ‘the erosion of communal solidarity’ 
(de Haan & Zoomers 2003: 3).  
Tackling the challenges of poverty in Africa is a long-term project that requires 
sustained effort and planning among African countries themselves and between them 
and the international community. The Millennium Development Goals form an impor-
tant development framework that was adopted by 189 countries at the UN Millennium 
Summit in September 2000 where an agenda was set to halve the number of people 
living on less than $1 a day by 2015. The Millennium Development Goals have high-
lighted the importance of countries’ efforts to improve policies, domestic resource 
mobilization, governance and accountability (HDR 2003: 76). Though many African 
countries have made significant progress on these fronts, this improvement may not be 
sufficient to halve poverty in the specified period. Evidence from the United Nations 
(UN 2005b: 1) indicates that most African countries will not achieve this objective by 
the target year and that, based on present trends, the situation is likely to worsen. The 
key challenges are related not only to conditions within the countries themselves but 
also to external forces as well. Several countries still owe billions of dollars to foreign 
lenders and steady, long-term economic planning will not be viable for some of the 
poorest countries unless it is coupled with ‘more systematic, sustained debt relief’ 
(HDR 2003: vi). Although many African countries have made significant progress in 
their fight against HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases, the battle cannot be won 
unless essential drugs are made available and accessible to the poor in a sustainable 
manner (Ibid.). Some countries have not been able to make visible progress due to 
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geographic isolation, an unfavourable environment or other obstacles that necessitate 
steady additional external support to overcome poverty (Ibid.).  
African leadership is vital in the fight against poverty. The revitalized Commission 
of the African Union (AU) and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD) have provided a viable framework in which to address the challenges of 
poverty reduction in Africa.  
 
The challenge of urban poverty 
Although the majority of Africans still live in rural areas, Africa currently has the 
world’s fastest urbanization rate. Natural population growth has contributed to large 
cities but the main factor driving urbanization has been rural-urban migration (World 
Bank 2001a) that is being fuelled by a lack of job opportunities and services, such as 
health care and education, in the rural areas.  
The rate of urban growth in Africa is averaging almost 5% a year. Africa’s urban 
population is thought to have doubled from under 90 million in 1980 to nearly 150 
million in 2000. It is estimated that by 2025 more than half of Africa’s population will 
be living in urban areas, almost the size of the continent’s entire population today 
(World Bank 2001, 2002a). Such phenomenal urbanization is taking place in a context 
of severe constraints. Urban poverty has, therefore, become one of the greatest chal-
lenges facing African countries, and one that might surpass rural poverty. Haddad et al. 
(1999: 190), for instance, argue that ‘for the majority of countries, not only has the 
absolute number of the urban poor and undernourished increased in the last 15-20 years 
but they have done so at a rate that outpaces corresponding changes in rural areas.’  
Increased urbanization poses challenges for city management, urban development 
and the provision of services. The concurrent challenges of rapid urbanization are the 
escalating demands for resources, shelter and employment and the urban authorities in 
Africa are hard pressed to provide opportunities, infrastructure, services and housing. 
Cities have limited resources to cope with such pressures and often ‘fail to create the 
jobs necessary for growth’ (UN 2005: 72).  
While urban migration has increased opportunities for the private sector to develop, 
both formally and informally, this is not yet being reflected in the quality of life of 
urban migrants. Growing evidence shows that urban labour markets and the informal 
sector are not capable of absorbing the increased urban populations (World Bank 2001b: 
17, Amis 1995: 151). Low wages characterize jobs in urban areas and relegate workers 
to a life of deprivation. Many workers can barely make ends meet, despite working long 
hours. A study of African poverty at the millennium noted that the ‘urban working poor 
have earnings below the poverty line’ and that there has been a secular decline, mainly 
in urban wages, in the formal sector in most African countries. The study also demon-
strated that it is highly likely that informal wages will move in the same direction and 
that ‘the function of this sector as an employer of last resort makes it intrinsically likely 
to generate low earnings, in the face of labour forces growing far more rapidly than 
formal-sector employment’ (World Bank 2001b: 17). 
African urban poverty is clearly manifested in the large number of poor people living 
in slums and slum-like conditions in cities across the continent. They lack access to 
secure shelter, basic services and to the political system. The UN Millennium Project 
(2005: 26) indicates that, except for North Africa, the slum population increased in 
every region between 1990 and 2001. In Sub-Saharan Africa more than 70% of the 
urban population is now estimated to be living in slums.  
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Research suggests that, to deal with urban poverty effectively, a thorough under-
standing of the factors that limit the capacity and power of the poor and constrain their 
efforts to develop appropriate strategies, is important (de Haan & Zoomers 2005: 1, 
Farrington et al. 2002: 9). By understanding the nature of urban poverty and recog-
nizing its multiple dimensions, appropriate policy responses – with approaches suitable 
to the specific physical and human environment and which will lead to a sustainable 
reduction in poverty – can be reached.  
Rapid urbanization in Africa took place in a context of reduced access to the labour 
market and a decreased role by the state in service provision. There is a need to under-
stand the way such factors impact on different segments of the population in order to 
devise meaningful targets for addressing poverty in urban areas. 
 
Factors that shaped responses to poverty 
Transforming poverty into prosperity and replacing exclusion with inclusion requires 
the crafting of effective methods and techniques. The history of development and action 
geared towards mitigating or reducing poverty has been characterized by the evolution 
of various theories and ideas, or the succession of (more or less) effective interventions. 
Each has a different understanding of what constitutes poverty as well as particular 
views about instruments of intervention. Each has its own perspective and models 
regarding the role of the market, the state and civil society in the process of poverty 
alleviation or reduction. Conventionally designed and delivered social policy in Africa 
has always been influenced by external processes that influenced the nature and struc-
ture of the indigenous African state itself. As a result, African countries have followed 
western concepts but with little consideration of the local reality. This has resulted in a 
failure to meet current social needs. Overall, it has been argued that concepts of 
development embodied in the main development paradigms have not helped to reduce 
poverty in Africa. It is widely believed that after decades of experimenting with 
development paradigms (concepts, categories, language and policies advocated), that 
these paradigms have not provided the solutions and instead have perhaps even become 
an integral part of the problem (Escobar 1995).1  
At independence, African countries gained the freedom to plan their own policies. 
However, modernization became the dominant development paradigm and guided 
development in the newly independent states. This paradigm assumes that the causes of 
underdevelopment in the Third World and within different societies are internal and that 
there is a linear process through which developing countries increasingly become 
industrialized. The development of poor countries was seen from the beginning as a 
function of the abundant provisions of capital to cater for infrastructure, industrializa-
tion and the general modernization of society (Escobar 1995: 40). Within this percep-
tion, poverty is viewed as an effect rather than a cause of underdevelopment, and it was 
around this central premise that the rhetoric and practices of development were fash-
ioned. Poverty became of less concern to social policy, and poverty reduction or social 
development has basically become a by-product of this reform (Storey et al. 2005: 32). 
It started to become clear that economic growth did not transcend to the poor or trans-
late into poverty reduction and in the 1970s there was an increase in models of 
development based on the dependency theory, which was seen as a possible way of 
                                                 
1  Some critiques have gone further to view development as a process of colonization. Escobar (1995), for 
example, argues that development policies provided by the West to ‘assist’ poor countries are actually 
self-reinforcing mechanisms of control that can be equated with the colonialism of the past.  
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explaining the persistent poverty of poor countries. The dependency theory relates 
global inequality to problems of distribution and politics, and emphasizes the interde-
pendency of the world’s societies. The advantage of this theory is its emphasis on social 
indicators more than economic indicators, and its premise that the market alone is an 
inadequate mechanism for distribution.  
Although the modernization and dependency paradigms have encapsulated different 
points of views, both have called for state-led development to drive the developmental 
agenda of a country. They positioned the means for achieving development through a 
‘top-down’ approach where development strategies are basically state strategies and 
often at variance with the real needs of the people (Wanyama 2005: 2). Development 
policies and programmes in the majority of African countries have been largely in-
formed by the modernization theory. However, due to the poor results of application of 
such development strategies, a different version of the modernization theory is currently 
arguing for market-led development following the rise of neo-liberalism (Ibid.). 
Governments of poor countries have no choice but to follow policies that are not neces-
sarily the right ones for their economies or their peoples but are acceptable to the 
markets.  
A number of indigenous plans for the continent have been put forward through the 
OMEGA Plan, the Partnership for the African Recovery Programme (MAP) and the 
latest New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). The common concern 
among these initiatives is increased development, combating poverty and corruption, 
and ending Africa’s conflicts. Over the decades, however, such initiatives, as well as 
efforts by the AU, have met with little success owing to the reduced capacity of 
governments to develop long-term policies and redefine the way these countries are 
incorporated in the global economy.  
In summary, western development interventions that were applied to reduce poverty 
have not provided the solutions but instead have perhaps become an integral part of the 
problem. Several indigenous initiatives have emerged but reduced government capaci-
ties continue to constrain their materializations. 
 
Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) 
The role of structural adjustment and associated policies deserves specific attention. 
Their impact has been seen as contributing to increased poverty in Africa (for example, 
Mkandawire 2002, UNCTAD 2001). In the wake of the oil-price shocks in the 1970s, 
several African countries faced severe economic crisis. High public spending, a rapid 
drop in primary commodity prices and a tight squeeze on global lending all led to the 
rapid escalation of foreign debts, forcing the majority of African countries to implement 
structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) during the 1980s. These programmes entailed 
the opening up of their economies to capital flows and trade, and decreasing the state’s 
role in the economy. However, poverty has worsened as many African countries fell 
into serious debt. Poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa worsened considerably and debt 
ballooned in a way that made it difficult for countries even to service their debts. Some 
African countries experienced negative growth rates and a reversal in development. 
Mkandawire (2002: 4) notes that economic growth in the adjustment years was 2.1% 
below that in the period between 1966 and 1980.  
A common consequence of SAPs has been the decreased capacity of governments to 
deliver social services, marked by decreased spending on health, education, housing, 
employment and social security, as well as increased poverty and unemployment 
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(Morales-Gómez 1993). The poorest sectors of the population have experienced a sharp 
fall in their per capita income compared to the population as a whole. For example, the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD 2001: 53) revealed 
that between 1980 and 1995 the poorest 20% of the Sub-Saharan African population 
suffered twice the decline in average per capita income as the population as a whole.  
Urban populations were affected more if they were part of a more monetized 
economy and more reliant on urban services and waged labour (Amis 1995: 146, 2002: 
12). Reductions in expenditure packages through a downsizing of the labour force 
created what is known in the literature as the ‘new poor’ (as opposed to the ‘chronic 
poor’). At the same time, research suggests that the assumption that mainly urban 
populations were hard hit by SAPs might not be very accurate. In some countries, rural 
populations were affected negatively too as a result of escalating costs of agricultural 
inputs, the lifting of agricultural subsidies and the state’s withdrawal from the market 
(Tacoli 1998b: 151). Although the burden of SAP has drastically affected the middle 
and popular classes, it has disproportionately affected poor women (Escobar 1995: 176) 
because of their limited access to resources such as education, employment, credit and 
technology.  
Criticism was eventually voiced against structural adjustment, which conditioned 
market liberalization reforms. It has been argued that the adjustment experiences of the 
1980s led to reduced social capacities among the people, an alteration in the authority of 
the state, decreased social and physical investment and increased income inequality. 
These, in turn, led to increased numbers of conflicts and have impacted negatively on 
the long-term development prospects of the countries affected (Stewart 1994, cited in 
Mkandawire 2002: 4). However, the relative failure of structural adjustment policies in 
most of Africa has renewed international concerns over the importance of the content of 
socio-economic policies and the way they are implemented. New issues such as govern-
ance, ownership and participation are increasingly forming the main elements of 
development programmes: poverty is increasingly being seen as a policy issue that falls 
within the political realm. 
In summary, while structural adjustment and its associated policies have contributed 
to increased poverty in Africa, they have created the space to promote and protect state 
legitimacy, democracy and human rights as part of the poverty-reduction agenda. 
 
Social movements for democracy 
A process of re-democratization started to gain ground in Africa following the intensifi-
cation of economic crises and poverty on the continent. Social movements have played 
a significant role in formulating and shaping social policy and making demands on the 
state based on social rights. The 1980s witnessed a renaissance of protests and resis-
tance by a range of social movements against oppressive regimes across the continent. 
The goal of several of these social protests was democratization, with their agendas 
often including the struggle for power resources as well as for cultural identity. The 
language of rights was used across the spectrum of social movements to make social 
demands, articulate needs and secure commitments from the government. Concepts 
such as ‘participation’ started to emerge and were framed within the equitable distribu-
tion of resource. These movements mobilized actors around social networks and the 
collective articulation of problems, and placed more weight on the ordinary people’s 
agency. Cornwall & Gaventa (2001) suggest that such orientation has provided an alter-
native identification of ‘the poor’ as individuals with agency and rights. It has also 
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contributed to raising people’s expectations of an enhancement in their living condi-
tions.  
The effect and influence of these movements was not confined to the boundaries of 
their originating countries but were disseminated around the world. Globalization has 
opened up the possibility of linking people around the world and offering a new global 
consciousness ‘as local communities and marginalized groups around the world strive to 
create their own self-identity’ (Mandon 2000: 4). An important issue remains, however, 
regarding circumstances and the extent to which social movements are able to make 
effective claims on the state and have a real impact on poverty.  
 
Emerging poverty issues and the World Development Report 1990 
An apparent shift in poverty thinking and policy direction was introduced with the 
publication of the 1990 World Development Report (WDR 90). The report emphasized 
the importance of poverty reduction in development and attempted to put forward 
strategies to attain these goals through growth. The policy agenda in the 1990 report 
was agreed by the wider donor community and resulted in a broad ‘convergence of 
donor policies, rhetoric and operational approaches in the direction of the WDR 90 
agenda’ (Brock et al. 2001: 15). The term ‘Washington Consensus’ came into existence 
to describe the apparent agreement among economists and the donor community with 
the 1990 World Development Report’s policy agenda.  
The WDR 90 conceptualizes poverty as low income and low attainment in health and 
education. Poverty was seen to result from bad economic management by developing 
countries’ governments, corruption, inefficient institutions and policy environments that 
do not favour broad-based economic growth. The report stressed the potential role and 
significance of governance and institutions in poverty reduction. A new emphasis was 
placed on issues of governance, holistic sector-wide programmes and coordinated donor 
actions. Investment in social services and safety nets were included to enhance benefits 
and offset negative outcomes for the poor (Storey et al. 2005: 33). Poverty reduction 
became a function of resource transfer; a certain amount of money could lift a certain 
number of the poor out of poverty.  
Later on, the WDR 90 came under increased criticism. It has been argued that 
although the report marked a shift in the focus of the World Bank (to poverty reduc-
tion), it did not make any paradigm shift from the Bank’s previous approach. Develop-
ment continued to be seen as an outcome of macro-economic growth for poverty reduc-
tion. However, reality indicates that economic growth and poverty may be contradic-
tory, as certain types of growth could increase inequality and economic growth could 
generate poverty rather than reduce it. Escobar (1995: 22) has argued that:  
Massive poverty in the modem sense appeared only when the spread of the market economy broke 
down community ties and deprived millions of people from access to land, water and other resources. 
With the consolidation of capitalism, systemic pauperization became inevitable. 
WDR 90 presented comprehensive estimates of level, distribution and trends in 
poverty for different regions and countries of the world. They have been taken for 
granted, used extensively in a wide range of policy analyses and evaluation, and 
employed to explain and evaluate the conditions of the world, to allocate resource, to 
determine priorities, and to set policies and programmes for poverty reduction. Poverty 
as defined by the Bank’s estimates has provided the base for the Millennium Develop-
ment Goals (Reddy & Pogge 2005: 3). Reddy & Pogge (2005: 3) have argued that, on 
the one hand, the World Bank’s approach may have driven it to play down the magni-
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tude of global poverty and assume, without sufficient evidence, that global poverty has 
sharply declined in recent years. On the other hand, previous experience and the impli-
cations of SAPs were neglected in the report, and the Bank policies continue to steer 
poor countries towards the same mix of free market macro-economic policies. 
WDR 90 has influenced the policymaking process of many other actors in develop-
ment across the globe and consequently influences poverty and the well-being of people 
in most African countries. 
 
The role of NGOs and CSOs in poverty reduction 
As poverty increased and government-run social programmes were reduced or vanished, 
governments, development agencies and donors turned to civil-society organizations 
(CSOs) to fill the gap. CSOs and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were given a 
greater role in service provisioning because they were seen to have the capacity to reach 
the poor and disenfranchised and because they are flexible, cost-effective, more 
participatory and less bureaucratic (Cornwall & Gaventa 2001: 13).  
Such a perception was to an extent a result of what is known as the ‘New Policy 
Agenda’ in development thinking and aid transfers. The agenda promoted different 
means and actors – such as the private sector and NGOs – as mechanisms to attain 
economic growth and efficient service delivery. There was increased emphasis on the 
participation of CSOs in the formulation of policy to such an extent that they were seen 
as substitutes for the state in social-service delivery, while the state role began to 
subside. The main role for the state was seen in the provision of a conducive environ-
ment for the private provision of social services and a reduction in public expenditure 
on social services (Edwards & Hulme 1998: 6). However, the reduced role of the state 
in social development has not served the cause of poverty reduction. In all the recent 
successes in poverty alleviation, it has been the state that has played the major role and 
not NGOs (Mkandawire 2002: 9). 
There are also essential concerns regarding NGO levels of poverty research. Edward 
& Hulme (1998: 9-10) indicated that although some NGOs operate on a large scale, 
their long-term comparative advantage in reaching the poorest is doubtful. An example 
given is that the largest NGOs in Bangladesh (including the Grameen Bank) are only 
able to ‘reach less than 20% of landless households in the country’. And as almost all 
service-delivery NGOs rely on funding from external donors and resources re-chan-
nelled from governments, a question might arise about the extent to which NGOs are 
still able to hold on to their mission and goals with their increased responsiveness to 
external concerns (Edward & Hulme 1998: 10-14). 
Over the past two decades there has been a newly established emphasis on poverty 
reduction within international development. The resource flow from bilateral and some 
multilateral agencies is increasingly linked to the poverty-reduction agenda as set by the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), with its target of halving the number of 
people living on less than $1 per day by 2015. Although this goal is a noble cause, such 
emphasis is believed to limit the autonomy of NGOs and ‘depoliticize the range of 
strategies’ open to them to promote development (Mitlin et al. 2006: 25). NGOs’ basic 
orientation towards poverty reduction configures their relationships to the social organi-
zations that they work with by coming closer to production and credit groups and away 
from representative social movements. The types of activities that NGOs undertake 
have also become directed by the demand to seek poverty-reduction results rather than 
redistributive outcomes (Ibid.). 
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African governments have come under increased pressure to delegate social policy to 
non-government bodies. As CSOs and NGOs have assumed a greater role in social 
policy, the result has been ‘an unintended convergence between the agenda of some of 
these networks interested in democracy and equality through “strengthening of civil 
society” and the agenda of neo-liberal institutions interested in reining in the state to 
facilitate the “free flow” of capital and other transnationalized resources’ (Mkandawire 
2002: 9). This issue has had far-reaching effects on the current role of non governmental 
bodies in donor or government-funded development projects and programmes in 
African countries. 
Though there is wide recognition that NGOs play a significant role in empowering 
the urban poor through socio-economic development programmes or projects, Edward 
& Hulme (1998: 12) have questioned many of the accepted wisdoms about the role of 
NGOs in this regard. Citing Fowler (1994: 28), they argue that there are doubts about 
whether NGOs in Africa can influence political reform. Firstly, many African govern-
ments have become skilful in restraining such a prospect through the regulation and 
disintegration of the NGO ‘movement’. Secondly, some NGOs have failed to develop 
effective strategies to promote democratization by sidelining politics to avoid standing 
against government while at the same time claiming to empower the poor. It has been 
argued that a different approach is needed to put pressure on systems, procedures, 
attitudes and behaviour within NGOs and to re-orientate them in the poor’s favour. For 
NGOs to be effective, their relationship with funding agencies from contractor to 
partner needs to be changed. In addition, ‘very careful management of expansion of 
NGOs is necessary to stop a face-off in quality’ (Edward & Hulme 1998: 11). 
However, there may also be a need for close cooperation between the state and non-
state providers including NGOs and the coordination of roles and functions ‘so as to 
share the burden of risk’ (Amis 1999: 41). This might require strong political decisions 
and changes in policies to place people at the centre of decision-making.  
Despite the important role that CSOs and NGOs played in the struggle for democ-
ratic change in Africa in the past, their current role is less clear within the present neo-
liberal environment. NGOs and CSOs have no real choice in defining their own agendas 
and are increasingly finding themselves driven away from grassroots activism and 
closer to social-service provision. This raises a question about how CSOs and NGOs 
can serve and represent the interests of the poor and disenfranchised on a political level, 
given their increased dependence on funding sources that have their own agenda.  
 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) 
In 1999 the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) announced a new 
anti-poverty framework, or what has come to be known as Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Papers (PRSPs). PRSPs are assumed to ensure debt relief through the provision of 
concessional loans from international financial institutions under the enhanced Highly 
Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC). To trigger such loans, poor countries are 
asked to prepare a PRSP highlighting poverty-reduction goals and their strategy for 
achieving these goals in a certain timeframe. Funds are released depending on the 
progress that countries make in the direction of the identified goals.  
The main objective of the PRSPs is to achieve a strategy that will be ‘locally 
generated and owned’ (Klugman 2002). The preparation of PRSPs involves a wide 
participatory dialogue of all sectors in society and discussions about policy at both 
micro and macro levels. Emphasis is placed on the capacity of governments to design, 
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formulate and put into practice policies for poverty reduction, and on involving CSOs in 
this process.  
Concerns have been raised regarding the extent to which PRSPs can be truly home-
grown and nationally relevant strategies considering the tight control and conditions 
imposed by donors. A country’s PRSP should draw on inputs from all sections of 
society and is expected to identify, in a participatory manner, the poverty-reduction 
outcome a country wishes to accomplish and the main public actions – policy and 
institutional reforms, programmes and projects – that are needed to achieve the speci-
fied goals. However, at the micro level across poor countries the issue of local owner-
ship has become more of a slogan than reality. When preparing their PRSPs, countries 
tend to be influenced significantly by what would be acceptable to donors, even if it 
does not match reality. For the donor agencies (e.g. the World Bank and IMF), country 
ownership of a PRSP is conditioned by the commitment of a country to implement a 
strategy and process that the Bank and Fund approve. In practice, therefore, no actual 
consideration is given to the country’s national socio-economic, historical or geographic 
peculiarities since it is the donors that set the terms. These issues were highlighted by an 
IMF/World Bank review of the PRSP experience: 
Some ... NGOs argue that PRSPs incorporate structural adjustment policies that ... have consistently 
failed, ... [and] this reflects the pressures on governments to conform to the policy expectations of the 
Bank and Fund ... Governments write into the PRSPs what they already know the donors want to hear 
... [and] this will be the case as long as the Bank and the Fund must endorse the strategy as a condition 
for concessional assistance. (IMF/World Bank 2002: 4-5 quoted in UNCTAD 2002: 12) 
The broad framework within which various key stakeholders such as government and 
civil society can discuss poverty reduction is the new liberal free market ‘growth’, 
which centres, among other things, on policies of privatization of the economy and the 
liberalization of trade. Despite its claims and the goal set, the current PRSP process is 
similar to SAPs in its overall emphasis on market-based pro-poor growth at the cost of 
the social and economic development of the more vulnerable groups within the imple-
menting countries (UNCTAD 2002: 11-12). This is obvious in the retention of policies 
from the SAP era, such as user fees and the privatization of public utilities and commer-
cial services, as well as the lack of consideration given to the social and economic 
impact on the poor, such as loss of access to basic health care and education services, 
and this at a time when poverty in Africa is continuing to increase partly as a conse-
quence of decreased public spending. 
In essence, PRSPs have become just another imposed instrument and conditionality 
for accessing aid from international financial institutions. 
 
The current situation and the challenge of globalization 
Globalization has intensified linkages between countries and reduced the line between 
what is ‘local’ and what is ‘international’. What takes place within one country is 
increasingly linked to events in another and therefore necessitates a different way of 
understanding local issues. De Haan & Zoomers (2003: 9) argue that ‘… globalisation 
is no longer a process of internationalisation, but rather the characteristic of a system 
spanning the globe, meaning that each particular entity has to be understood within the 
framework of the world as a whole’. 
The growing concentration of economic, political, cultural and military power is 
dramatically determining the present and future of countries. The collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall set the pace for new and powerful challenges to 
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the livelihoods of poor people around the globe. The United States (US) has become the 
world’s ideological reference and the only global superpower. A wide range of national 
public-policy decisions by African countries are being endorsed by the US and a 
number of governments from the industrialized world, as well as by international finan-
cial institutions. Although African economies have always been global, some authors 
suggest that the intensity of the phenomenon has increased during the last two decades 
with a trend towards globalizing governance at both national and local levels. ‘Much 
policy making has been intended to deliberately increase Africa’s participation in the 
global economy’ (Mkandawire 2005: 11). National governments are becoming power-
less in the face of global governance and economic integration and neo-liberal deregu-
lation (Ibid.). African states are being presented with the challenge of upholding internal 
political and social measures that ensure social cohesion and development while dealing 
with the pressures of globalization. Globalization has led to the undermining of their 
democratic governance and the erosion of national sovereignty and created states that 
are less committed to local interests (Mkandawire 2002: 6).  
In terms of form, globalization has been primarily a neo-liberal political project since 
the 1980s. Anti-poverty strategies are dominated by what has come to be known as the 
Post-Washington Consensus paradigm. Overall, the Post-Washington Consensus 
contains all the main elements of the first generation of economic reforms, with no 
fundamental shift to overcome the limitations of the neo-liberal policy agenda. The 
paradigm holds the assumption that liberalization and fast and close integration into the 
global economy form the basis of rapid and sustained growth (UNCTAD 2002: 6-7).  
The impact of globalization on poor people varies considerably, both between 
countries and within them, according to their initial circumstances and on the policies 
that governments are able to pursue. Some authors have argued for analytical connec-
tions between processes of globalization and social exclusion. According to de Haan 
(2000: 340), with globalization ‘the diversity in prosperity and welfare between and 
within countries has increased. It is still an inherent part of the development process that 
some groups are included and others are excluded’. 
Against this backdrop, poverty reduction becomes a central challenge in today’s 
global economy and society requiring specific actions to help address these challenges. 
National African governments are seen to be playing a major role in implementing 
policies to counteract the negative impact of globalization. ‘The role of government in 
these circumstances is to help manage the process of change to maximize economic 
opportunities for all, and to equip people, through education and active labour market 
policies, to take advantage of these opportunities’ (DFID 2000: 18).  
In summary globalization poses huge challenges for the livelihoods of the poor 
everywhere. However, the biggest challenge is the extent to which African countries are 
able to empower themselves to change the corporate-driven globalization process into 
more people-centred processes that support sustainable poverty reduction and equity. 
 
Conclusion on poverty in Africa 
In most African countries, the largest section of the population has to find ways of 
surviving in the context of exceedingly challenging constraints. These include environ-
mental degradation, war and conflict, the HIV/AIDS pandemic, malaria and other killer 
diseases, the challenges of democracy, good governance and the forces of globalization. 
These challenges have worked together to generate extreme poverty throughout the 
continent. Critical reviews of development paradigms applied in Africa show that 
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development efforts have not lived up to their stated goals. Most of the social policies 
applied equated development with economic growth. Structural adjustment policies in 
the past and now PRSPs have steered African countries towards the same mix of free-
market macro-economics. For the majority of the poor who are excluded from 
development, their position of extreme poverty is not altered by higher levels of 
economic growth. The allocation of resources has always been a political decision that 
is shaped by the interests of national and international policymakers. With the powerful 
forces of globalization in command, it is becoming crucial for African states to re-shape 
their economic systems and address the importance of sustainable poverty reduction. 
Poverty in Sudan 
Although Sudan is endowed with rich natural resources, the country has been unsuc-
cessful in using these in an efficient and equitable manner. Sudan’s Gross National 
Income per capita in 2001 was estimated at $340, which is the median value for Sub-
Saharan Africa (DFID 2005: 4). Comparing Sudan to other African countries, it seems 
to fall among the medium-level countries in terms of the Human Development Index 
(HDI).2 According to the Human Development Report (2006), Sudan’s per capita GDP 
(PPP $) was 1,949 in 2004, while it was 1,140 for Kenya and 9,945 for Botswana. Life 
expectancy at birth in Sudan was 56.5 years of age, while it was 47.5 for Kenya, 34.9 
for Botswana and 70 in Egypt. Between 2001 and 2003, malnutrition afflicted 27% of 
Sudan’s population compared to 31% in Kenya and 3% in Egypt.  
Looking back 40 years or so, the living conditions of larger numbers of people were 
much better than today (El-Batthani et al. 1998: 12-13, Abusin 2003: 1). During this 
period, larger numbers of people were affected by poverty regardless of their mode of 
living and although data on poverty trends and magnitudes is lacking or at best scanty,3 
preliminary studies show that the Sudanese economy has deteriorated steadily since the 
1970s. This is reflected in the decline of per capita income from $500 in the 1970s to 
$430 in 1980 to around $290 in 1998 (Abusin 2003: 1, Eltigani 1995: 1). Between 1986 
and 1996, the proportion of the population below the poverty line increased from 52.9% 
to 84.6% in urban areas and from 83.1% to 93.9% in rural areas (Kossaifi 1998: 24). It 
is worth noting that even in periods when the country was experiencing economic 
growth; poverty continued to escalate. For example, between 1991 and 1997 the 
economy had an average annual growth rate of 8% in real terms but poverty increased 
from 71% to 91% between 1990 and 1996 (Kossaifi 1998: 14). In recent years Sudan 
has experienced rapid economic growth but the effects of this growth on poverty have 
unfortunately not yet been documented. 
Poverty in Sudan is largely a result of structural factors that impact on the modes of 
ownership, production and distribution of productive assets, each with their own 
dynamics. Huge social, economic and political inequality exists between regions (and 
between groups within those regions). Such dynamics are determined by the choice of 
application of certain development policies. The declining forces of production in the 
country’s agricultural, industrial and service sectors have been a direct result of poor 
policy choices that left large segments of the population in dire poverty (El-Batthani et 
                                                 
2  The HDI is a summary composite index that measures a country’s average achievements in three basic 
aspects of human development: longevity, knowledge and a decent standard of living. 
3  Figures on poverty in Sudan should be treated with some caution as they may only cover some parts of 
the country due to the lingering conditions of war and insecurity in many regions. 
 
 
14 
al. 1998). Poverty conditions have been aggravated by the civil war, environmental 
deterioration and the low development of human capital (Eltigani 1995, Abusin 2003, 
El-Batthani et al. 1998).  
Until recently, poverty was synonymous with rural conditions but the rapid urbani-
zation of the country has given birth to a large class of urban poor. During the past few 
years, there have been high levels of rural-urban migration. Urban growth has been a 
direct result of government policies that tend to neglect the rural economy. As will be 
discussed in the next chapter, government policies have not only failed to improve rural 
problems, they have even undermined the peasant economic production system and the 
survival of natural resources for the majority of the Sudanese people (El-Batthani et al. 
1998: 20). The United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS 2006: 9) estimated the 
number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in the country to be more than five 
million in April 2006,4 making Sudan the country with the largest number of IDPs. 
Greater Khartoum alone is home to around two million displaced persons, while Darfur 
has around 1.8 million. The remaining 1.2 million IDPs are distributed over other urban 
centres around the country. Women and children constitute the majority of the 
displaced. 
Poor urban people face far more constraints in pursuing and maintaining their liveli-
hoods than the non-poor as the majority of them lack the necessary training and educa-
tion to compete for jobs in the formal sector. The informal sector thus becomes the 
major provider of urban jobs with self-employment becoming increasingly the major 
alternative to most of the poor. The informal sector often provides low wages and high 
job insecurity in casual work or micro-scale self-employment (SLGP 2004: 3-5). Poorer 
people and IDPs in Khartoum settle illegally on government land in informal squatter 
settlements. These settlements are continuing to grow, often on the outskirts of the city 
or in unsafe and hazardous zones. The informal land and housing market is exploitative 
and has a negative impact on their livelihoods as will be discussed in Chapter 8. 
Furthermore, the state policies – such as reductions in social-service spending, increases 
in tariffs and privatization – have a far-reaching impact on their livelihood strategies. 
The provision of social services in poor areas is usually left to residents to handle (El-
Batthani et al. 1998: 36). In addition, inhabitants in these areas of the city have to pay 
much higher costs for essential services like water than those in the main city (Abusin 
2005: 35). The idea of privatizing and making a profit from such fundamental services 
as water clearly points to the processes of disadvantage in operation. Local urban policy 
and its underlying assumptions about the poor have contributed significantly to under-
mining the livelihoods of the urban poor through harsh regulations in the informal 
sector, the increasing scarcity of land for housing and the regular demolition of informal 
shelters (Salih 1990: 124). Many of the urban policies have discriminated against 
women in regarding access to employment, housing and basic services (El-Batthani 
1998: 16). In addition, there are common limitations at local levels of government that 
are manifest in scarce resources, poor planning capacity and the weakness of institutions 
(Abusin 2004).  
The absence of practical and effective action to assist the efforts of the poor people 
living in cities leaves them with little option than to devise their livelihood strategies. 
 
                                                 
4  Most figures on IDPs in Sudan are estimates and projections since it is not possible to monitor the exact 
number of IDPs as most are not living in camps and there are no systematic mechanisms to monitor 
population movements in the country.  
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Research problem 
Poverty in Sudan was for decades viewed as largely a rural problem. However as the 
population has become more urban, rising deprivation in urban areas now presents a real 
challenge. The shift in institutions and ideologies has had a stark effect on poverty in 
the country as a whole and in the capital city in particular. As urban populations are 
more integrated into the cash and wage economies and are more dependent on food and 
other social-sector subsidies, changes to these have left them with few opportunities. 
This research investigates the options available to poor households to pursue their 
livelihoods and escape poverty. 
 
Research objectives 
The objectives of the research are to: 
• contribute to the understanding of urban livelihood systems in Khartoum within 
the wider context of socio-economic and political processes in Sudan;  
• examine and understand the underlying determinants of people’s vulnerability 
and the constraints that influence their decision to take a certain route; and 
• identify more clearly who is excluded, and the ways and means by which the 
processes leading to these outcomes are created and sustained (how and why 
certain groups are and remain excluded). 
The methodology employed in this research is the sustainable livelihoods approach 
using participatory data collection and analysis.  
 
Organization of the study 
The thesis is organized into eleven chapters including this one. Chapter 2 presents 
background information on Sudan, outlining the country’s people, its history, govern-
ment and political situation, while Chapter 3 provides details of the capital city, Khar-
toum, its historical development, population, administration, land issues, infrastructure 
and employment.  
Chapter 4 outlines key poverty concepts and the main approaches that are considered 
relevant, with Chapter 5 going on to explore the specific nature of urban livelihoods and 
the context-specific vulnerabilities of the urban poor. In doing so, it highlights the inter-
relationships between urban and rural livelihoods in order to understand the particular 
constraints that the urban poor face in maintaining their livelihoods.  
Discussions in Chapter 6 review the sustainable livelihoods approach and highlight 
the points that make it relevant for the study. Towards the end of the chapter a frame-
work for the analysis of poverty in Khartoum is formulated. Chapter 7 provides a brief 
comparative perspective of the study areas and analyzes the way different institutions 
shape the poor’s opportunities to make meaningful choices. The chapter also sets the 
stage for the detailed analyses in the subsequent chapters. 
Chapter 8 provides an in-depth overview of the basic characteristics of the sample 
households and the availability and quality of their capitals as well as the type of liveli-
hood activities they are able to pursue. Chapter 9 identifies the reasons that prevent 
poorer households from accessing important resources, hence determining the type of 
livelihood strategies they can pursue. Chapter 10 examines the historical pathways of 40 
different households to understand how they navigated their way through various insti-
tutional environments. It highlights major shocks and crises and the way people have 
coped with them, as well as the limitations of their coping strategies. Finally, Chapter 
11 draws some overall conclusions from the study and demonstrates that poverty is 
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embedded in social relations as well as in broader historical and political-economic 
processes at different levels. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
 
Sudan: The national context 
 
 
 
 
This chapter provides some background context to livelihoods in Sudan, focusing on the 
impact of various historical, legal and political factors on the current situation of the 
population. The discussion looks into the policies and factors that have determined 
people’s livelihoods through periods of significant transformation in economies and the 
political environment. Historically, the unequal distribution of national wealth and the 
monopolization of power have contributed to the outbreak and intensification of civil 
wars and poverty in Sudan. Land issues have always been an important element in both 
poverty and conflict. However, the process through which different regimes, including 
the present one, have tried to address the land issue has contributed further to the 
marginalization of a large section of the population. In addition, governments have been 
trying to meet the conditions of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) advocated by 
the international financial institutions since the 1970s. The combination of these factors 
has impacted on the ability of individuals to maintain an adequate livelihood. 
Geography, population and development policies 
Sudan is the largest country in Africa and is located in the northeast part of the conti-
nent. It covers a total surface area of 2.5 million km², of which 42% is suitable for cattle 
ranging and grazing, 33% is desert, 18% is covered in forest and 7% is agricultural 
(IFAD 2002: 1-2). Its main topographical features are the desert in the north and the 
Nile, which is the longest river in the world. The country is bordered by Egypt and 
Libya to the north, Chad and the Central Africa Republic to the west, Zaire to the 
southwest, Uganda and Kenya to the south, and Ethiopia and Eritrea to the east.  
Sudan’s total population was estimated at 32 million in 2001, with a population 
growth rate of 2.6% a year (UNDAF 2002: 9). The population is mostly young; 16% are 
under five years of age, and 45% are under the age of 15. Such a large proportion of 
young people implies a high rate of dependency and thus an overloaded social-services 
sector (UNDAF 2002: 9). Sudan’s population density varies considerably across the 
country: 33% are urban-based and 67% live in the rural areas. Since 1975, the urban 
population has grown by 75% and is predicted to grow by a further 50% by the year 
2015. The capital city, Khartoum, has the largest population with 3.5 million in 1993 
and 5.4 million in 2003 (UN-SUDAN 2003: 3). 
Although Sudan is an oil exporter, agriculture remains the most important sector, 
comprising 42% of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1999 and 
employing some 66% of the population. The major agricultural exports are cotton and 
gum Arabic, while sorghum (dura) and wheat are grown for domestic consumption. The 
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production of sesame seed and peanuts is mainly for domestic consumption but exports 
of these two crops are increasing.  
Sudan has experienced a severe economic and financial crisis since the mid-1970s. 
Per capita income has fallen from $430 in 1980 to $300 in 1990. The country’s foreign 
debt has risen from $308 million in 1970 to around $12 billion (including principal, 
interest and arrears) by the end of the 1980s. The country experienced higher inflation 
in 1988-1989 than at any other time and in December 1988 the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) estimated that the rate of inflation was 80%, which was double the average 
rate of 1987-1988. Towards the end of 1989, inflation reached 100% (Eltigani 1995: 1). 
Throughout the 1970s the government adopted an export-led, agro-industrial strategy 
that endeavoured to restructure the export sector by producing food, sugar, textiles and 
meat for export and to support import substitution. The assumption was that by 
developing Sudan’s huge unexploited agricultural resources, the country would be able 
to provide food security for the Middle East through a combination of Arab and 
Western funds. The essence of these plans was the expansion of large-scale agricultural 
projects – a strategy that led to a massive inflow of capital, primarily from oil-rich Arab 
countries. Public and private-sector resources were also geared towards the expansion of 
modern agricultural and industrial sectors. In all of this, the traditional sector, which 
provided employment and income for 70% of the population, was completely ignored 
(Eltigani 1995: 3). Instead of reforming land-tenure laws and providing credit and other 
technical inputs to enhance productivity and improve the living standards of the rural 
population, the development of a modern agricultural sector meant the decline of the 
traditional sector (Ibid.). As a result, the rural population, which had relied on the tradi-
tional sector for their main source of income, was pushed onto poor marginal lands and 
their livelihoods became vulnerable to environmental hazards (Eltigani 1995: 4). In 
addition, the government’s disregard of conservation measures as well as consecutive 
periods of drought further aggravated the vulnerability of traditional producers. Many of 
the displaced rural population migrated to the urban centres to join the growing informal 
sector, while others remained in their own areas and became agricultural labourers. 
Consequently, poverty and regional disparities started to escalate sharply and by 1985 
Sudan was not able to feed its own traditional producers, let alone have any prospect of 
feeding the Arab World (Shazali 2003: 44). 
By the end of the 1970s, stringent IMF/World Bank conditions were being applied to 
fund payments to Sudan from Arab countries and structural adjustment programmes 
became an important feature of the government’s economic policies. The essential condi-
tions of the stabilization packages in the 1980s included, among a plethora of conditions, 
liberalization, privatization, anti-inflationary policies and an adjustment and reduction of 
the exchange rate. Increased taxation and decreased access to social services have 
burdened the majority of the Sudanese and particularly the urban population and urban 
workers started to experience declining wages as a result of cuts in public spending. It 
has been argued that the government failed to put into effect the type of policies that 
should have gone along with liberalization policies in the 1980s. The results have been 
that the financial deficit skyrocketed, the national currency was further devaluated, and 
high inflation prevailed. It was estimated that the government budget deficit shot up 
from SP 9 billion (Sudanese pounds) in 1989 to SP 68 billion in 1993, while basic food 
prices rose by some 2,280% in the same period (El-Batthani et al. 1998: 26).  
Between 1992 and 1998, government expenditure was slashed by more than 50% 
relative to GDP, leading to significant cuts in social services and infrastructure 
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development (World Bank 2003a: xxx). These measures reflected negatively on the 
well-being of the Sudanese people, particularly on those who were already poor. 
However, at the same time, liberalization policies created a conducive environment for 
local business and foreign investors in Sudan (Shazali 2003: 49). The liberalization 
policies pursued from the 1980s onwards were favourable to the redistribution of 
national wealth and national income, aiding those pursuing non-productive activities 
while frustrating the efforts of workers and low-salaried job employees. El-Batthani et 
al. (1998: 26-27) noted that before 1989 there were only 730 registered companies. 
However, from 1989 (when the present government came to power) to 1993 the number 
of companies in operation rose to 4,230. This massive expansion of the commercial 
sector was coupled with a contraction of the industrial sector, as it was functioning at 
only 12% of its capacity (El-Batthani et al. 1998: 27). There was a large growth of 
small- and medium-sized enterprises and a concomitant increase in the ‘urban 
entrepreneur’ class. At the same time, two contradictory processes were generated and 
the comparatively strong and older urban middle class that existed before lost ground 
and political influence, while a new group emerged comprising traders and businessmen 
(Ibid.) with strong links to the political and military establishment. A huge gap between 
these classes was thus created and it threatened to tear apart the Sudanese social fabric 
and damage the existing harmony between the various social groups and classes.  
Since the mid-1990s, Sudan’s economy has witnessed a significant improvement. 
From 1997 onwards, growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has averaged over 6% 
annually, indicating firstly an expansion in the oil sector, agriculture and, industry. 
Inflation was brought down from over 100% in 1996 to single digit levels by 2000. This 
has been accomplished by cutting public expenditure to around 11% of GDP (1999-
2001). Compared to other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, this is considered to be 
‘very low’ (DFID 2005: 6). In an effort to restore macro-economic stability, the 
government introduced harsh market reforms in February 2003, which put an end to 
many of its interventions in the economy. These measures included eliminating fixed 
exchange rates for the Sudanese pound, removing all subsidies on fuel and basic food 
items, and privatizing state enterprises. Privatization has resulted in additional lay-offs 
and pay cuts for workers in privatized enterprises. Ordinary people – particularly those 
eking out a living in micro-scale self-employment – have seen a further deterioration in 
their standard of living. Their limited incomes have insured that they can hardly access 
essential services such as water, electricity, education, transportation, health, sanitation 
and housing. 
Urban service delivery 
Economic and financial volatility have caused significant changes in the resources 
allocated to urban services. Social expenditure – especially on education and health – 
has declined considerably over the years, while user fees have been introduced. Within 
total public expenditure, urban services accounted for around 1.5% of GDP, ‘much 
lower than many other African countries’ (DFID 2005: 6). Access to and adequate 
provision of education, health utilities, safe water and other services for many Sudanese 
people is, however, very limited. The government’s decentralization strategy that began 
in 1992 has seen the handing over of service delivery in such key areas as education, 
health, sanitation, local roads and agriculture to local communities but they lack 
adequate resources and the administrative capacity to undertake such tasks (Abusin 
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2003: 29). In addition, many international donor agencies, churches and NGOs have 
been involved in service delivery with varying coverage and capacities. There are also 
regional variations in access to different services. For instance, the majority of people in 
Blue Nile, North Kordofan, West Darfur, Red Sea and Western Kordofan are ‘unable to 
access electricity, safe drinking water and public health facilities’ (Abusin 2003: 19).  
 
Health 
Although health services have expanded rapidly over the past two decades, there has been 
a serious decline in the use of these services. Cost recovery for health care was introduced 
in 1992. Until then all public facilities used to offer free health care. Since the introduction 
of user fees, the private sector has grown significantly, particularly in the state of 
Khartoum. The Health Insurance System was introduced in 1994 based on a contribution 
of 10% from salaries and covers employees in the public and private sectors. In the 
absence of government support to health services, access to health care is now 
unaffordable for most Sudanese, particularly women (Abusin 2003: 35). For example, a 
consultation with a doctor in a government hospital for a common illness such as a cold 
can reduce the monthly income of a worker by about 7% (El Naayal 2002: 4). The Zakat 
and Welfare Funds were expected to help the poor cope with the cost but the procedures 
for applying for these funds are lengthy and their benefit is minimal (UNDAF 2002: 20; 
see also Chapter 8).  
 
Education 
In 1994 the responsibility for primary education was allocated to the states and localities 
even though the majority had no adequate resources and were unable to cover the costs. 
The decentralization of education in Sudan has occurred in a context of severe deficiencies 
in educational access, and quality. To counter reductions in financial spending by the 
federal government, user fees were introduced, together with contributions from local 
councils. Although some poor states have been allocated financial support from the 
national budget, this has been used for higher and secondary education instead of primary 
education. For example, 43.5% of total spending on education is allocated to higher 
education (UNDAF 2002: 25). It has been indicated that although expenditure on basic 
education has increased in absolute terms in recent years, it has decreased in real terms. 
This is explained by the general reduction in social-services expenditure that has 
accompanied economic liberalization policies (UNDAF 2002: 20). Adjustment policies 
have impacted negatively on school enrolment rates in Sudan, with primary-school 
enrolment dropping from 72% in 1990 to 52% in 1998 (El Naayal 2002: 4). 
Overall, the imposition of user fees for primary education has been associated with 
lower levels of school enrolment (Abusin 2003: 6) with the result being that only better-
off households are able to send their children to primary school. Although the govern-
ment announced an ambitious programme in 1990 to eradicate illiteracy within five 
years, the rate of illiteracy has remained high. According to Human Development 
Report (2006, based primarily on information for northern Sudan), adult (15 years and 
older) illiteracy stood at about 40% in 2004. This figure is worse among females and in 
different regions in the south and west of the country (Abusin 2003: 19). Compared to 
other regions, children in northern Sudan enjoy better education than their counterparts 
in other regions. The status of education in southern Sudan, and other regions affected 
by war is worse. In these regions there are few schools, a poor curriculum, a dire 
shortage of teachers with little or no training and there is no education system in place. 
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Even as NGOs undertake emergency relief, education is often left out of their emer-
gency response. The community therefore has to become the main provider of education 
by building schools, finding teachers and paying for their children’s education if they 
can. 
 
Drinking water 
Drinking water supply in rural and urban areas was the responsibility of the National Rural 
and Urban Water corporations until 1994. The central government provided full funding 
for both corporations, while the Ministries of Works and Health managed the sanitation 
utilities. The implantation of the federal system in 1994 led to major institutional changes, 
including the establishment of the National Water Corporation (NWC), a federal body to 
oversee nationwide policies. These changes also involved the establishment of State Water 
Corporations (SWCs) in all 26 states. Overall responsibility for the planning and 
implementation of state water projects as well as the maintenance of water sources has 
been assigned to ‘self-supporting parastatal water development companies’ (UNDAF 
2002: 21). 
It is estimated that about 69% of people could access safe drinking water in Sudan in 
2002. Disaggregating this figure along the urban-rural divide reveals disparities in 
access to safe water, with coverage of 78% in urban areas and 64% in rural areas (FAO 
2005: Para. 7). The displacement of people due to crises in rural areas increased the 
demand for potable water resources in the cities. Reduced expenditure in the social 
sector has negatively affected the quantity and quality of water reservoirs (haffirs), 
wells and dams (Abusin 2003: 31). 
Governance and institutional structures 
Since Sudan gained political independence in 1956, the country has endured instability 
at the hands of a series of military regimes and multiparty sectarian governments. The 
political leadership of national governments has failed to create a formula through 
which various segments of Sudanese society are able to enjoy fair political representa-
tion and an equal share of the national wealth. Many groups were left with one choice: 
to fight for their rights. The countryside thus gradually became a battlefield and a scene 
of brutal conflicts (Shazali 2003: 57).  
The basic problem for various Sudanese governments has been the centralization of 
power. Attempts have been made over the years to hand over some centralized functions 
to lower level administrators. Post-colonial governments in Sudan abolished the Native 
Administration system and introduced new forms of regional and local governance, 
which have remained highly centralized. In 1971, for example, the People’s Local 
Government Act was passed, effectively cancelling the 1951 system of local govern-
ment. The act was meant to build a system of integrated modern governance at local 
level but it did not last long as the 1972 Regional Self-government Act (Addis Ababa 
Accord) was applied to the southern region. Although this temporarily ended the war 
between the north and the south, it produced parallel structures for legislative bodies, 
ministries and civil-service administration (UN 2004: 7). By issuing the two acts, native 
administrators were stripped of their former authority and were denied participation in 
the new people’s councils. In addition, judicial, administrative and taxation functions 
were taken over by specialized officials. The principle of the tribal homeland was also 
 
22 
abolished and all unregistered government land was considered the common property of 
the state.  
The main consequences of these policies were the removal of customary usufruct 
rights of traditional producers, administrative chaos and widespread insecurity across 
rural Sudan. Rural people continue to resolve their disputes by customary and tradi-
tional means and consider the modern court system to be foreign and irrelevant. People 
have also refused to cooperate with administrative officers regarding tax collection, with 
the result that the government has had to abandon this effort in many regions (Shazali 
2003: 61). It has been argued that the decentralization efforts of the 1970s did not 
achieve any of the intended goals but instead dismantled several bases of law and order 
that governed the rural areas and continue to stifle development efforts at a national 
level. In addition, the powers and authority that were devolved to local administrators 
were insignificant: they were largely delegated inferior tasks, while the central authori-
ties maintained tight control over the major sources of power that directly affect 
people’s lives (Al-Assam 1983: 176).  
The Regional Government Act for northern Sudan was issued in 1980, thus creating 
two different systems of administration in the country: one for the south (regional self-
government) and one for the north (regional government). The last military coup in 
1989 put the National Salvation Revolution regime in power, and executive authority 
was placed in the hands of a 15-member Revolutionary Command Council of National 
Salvation. Since then the National Islamic Front (NIF) has exercised strong control over 
state organs and institutions. The Salvation government attempted to restore some form 
of native administration to support modern local governance and issued the Native 
Administration and the Local Government Acts in 1991 and 1994 respectively.  
The Fourth Constitutional Decree, issued in 1991, divided the country into nine 
states with more than 60 provinces to replace district and area councils. The nine states 
were further divided into 26 states in 1994. The structure of the state apparatus was 
expanded greatly,5 leading to an increase in public spending and fuelling inflationary 
pressures. Nonetheless, the relationship between the different levels of the government 
grew more complex as a result of regional and local political arrangements. There was 
no coordination between the various municipalities except between those that share a 
common political leadership. In addition, corruption became a serious problem, which 
raises concerns regarding governance and money management (UN 2004: 15). 
States are empowered to appoint a governor (Wali) as the head of each state; 
however, these6 appointments depend largely on the person’s political loyalty and 
commitment to the government programme, and citizens have no say regarding such 
appointments. The 2003 Local Government Act merged some localities into single local 
governments. Beneath the localities are voluntary efforts by the Popular Committees 
that denote the monitoring of local government services. The localities are allocated the 
responsibilities of service delivery of education and public health, environmental 
protection, neighbourhood policing and keeping order and tax collection in addition to 
some other tasks. As the localities lack financial resources, tough measures are put in 
place to collect taxes, dues and levies. In some rural areas, adjacent localities often 
                                                 
5  That is 97 federal ministerial positions, 41 at federal minister titles, 26 state minister titles, and 30 
persons appointed at the level of state minister. In addition, there were appointees to the executive 
positions in the Council of Ministers for each of the 26 states. With each state allocated 5-6 ministers, 
this brings the total to between 130 and 156 persons.  
 
6  Until early 2008 there had been no female Wali. 
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competed over common sources of potential returns, frequently turning into ethnic 
clashes that destroyed the harmonious relationships between groups with disastrous 
consequences to the community as a whole (Shazali 2003: 61).  
Localities rely almost exclusively on centralized planning and financing from the 
national government. As a result, local governments have little say in the development 
process and have often been unable to maintain projects after they have been con-
structed (see Chapter 7). They also suffer an imbalance between the authority and tasks 
assigned following the 2003 Local Government Act and available resources. Most of 
the localities’ resources are allocated to meeting salaries and wages in the first place and 
any remaining funds are assigned to development (Salih 2004: 6). This leads to 
burdensome taxes as well as poor service delivery. The locality is the tier of government 
that people come into contact with on a regular basis, for example, when they legalize 
their land for shelter, license their business; pay their property taxes or their water bill or 
when they send their children to school. However, one of the current stalemates in the 
system of local government relates to a lack of community participation (Abusin 2004: 
6, Salih 2004: 16). 
Despite such a gloomy background, the past three years have, however, witnessed 
the birth of some hope. The rally for democratization in Sudan was given a boost by the 
atrocities in Darfur. The signing of the peace agreement between the Government of 
Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/ SPLA) has injected 
new hope for a future based on principles of equity and social justice. In addition, civil 
society is increasingly emerging as a force that cannot be ignored and applying pressure 
for a better performance while the media is demanding transparency across all sectors of 
society.  
Historical development of land ownership 
There seems to be a confusing mixture of overlapping land laws in Sudan. Modern legal 
systems have co-existed with legally adopted customary land laws and the colonial 
regime instituted legal and tenure dualism by enforcing ‘settler interests and adopting 
minimalist approaches to land tenure and management by indigenous people’ (Adams & 
Turner 2005: 1). Independent governments have dealt with tenure dualism by restricting 
it through policies of nationalization and the conversion of freehold to leasehold. ‘The 
cumulative effect of these legal reforms has been that not only has political power been 
concentrated further in the central government, but control of the very land on which 
people live and depend has been transferred to those with access to that power’ 
(Johnson 2001: 2).  
During pre-colonial Sudan’s successive indigenous Islamic kingdoms, land tenure was 
based on communal ownership, with the right to control land allocation vested in tribal 
chiefs. Land was given by Sultans (kings) to tribal chiefs to ensure their loyalty and 
support. To prove their ownerships, tribal chiefs were issued with a seal bearing 
Wathiga, which delineated their authority to manage land that falls within the territory 
of their tribe, known as dar or homelands. The wathiga also indicated the boundaries of 
the land being granted. The power and authority of the tribal chiefs over livelihood 
means of their communities was therefore boosted (Shazali & Ahmed 1999: 4). How-
ever, the authority of tribal chiefs tended to be highly variable, with land often being 
used by the Sultans (kings) to settle scores with tribal chiefs through withdrawing the right 
to land from one chief and giving it to another. In addition, the grant of dar land was never 
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permanent and could be affected by changes in the monarchy, in tribal power centres or in 
tribal structures (Shazali 2003: 4).  
The first Titles to Land Ordinance in Sudan were issued in 1899, and stipulated that 
almost the all the land in Sudan was government property. The Land Settlement and 
Registration Act 1925 that followed continued to state that ownership must be proven by 
registration. In effect, the government is the discretionary owner of all land of Sudan. 
There have been several programmes of registration ever since and the process has still not 
been completed. The 1925 Act gave legal support to standard colonial legal principles and 
remains effective to this day (McAuslan 2006: 12). By law, only riverine land that was 
‘always farmed’ was considered the private property of the cultivators. 'Unsettled' and 
‘uncultivated’ rain lands of central, eastern and western Sudan and all lands in southern 
Sudan were categorized as government-owned lands. Government-owned land was 
divided into two categories; land subject to ‘no right’, and land subject to ‘usufruct rights’ 
of tribes. The category of land subject to no right was used by the government when it 
wanted to appropriate land for both public and private agricultural production schemes 
(Shazali & Ahmed 1999: 5). Leases and usufructs were primarily granted to ‘northern 
Sudanese and foreign investors from other countries in the region’. Such power has been 
exercised extensively in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States (McAuslan 2006: 12).  
The 1970 Land Act was issued at the dawn of the socialist military government and 
customary land was abolished and land was nationalized. The role of traditional leaders in 
local land management was also replaced by People’s Councils. Since land occupied by 
local communities thus belongs to the state, traditional land rights are in no way a form of 
land ownership. In many rural communities, people have retained their allegiance to the 
native authorities and disregard any decisions on land made by government 
representatives. This has often created tensions between state representatives or new land 
owners and those who traditionally have authority over decisions pertaining to land. 
Although the native administration made a comeback in the 1980s and 1990s, this time 
government representatives were mostly made up of corrupt and centrally appointed 
personnel (Rahhal & Abdel Salam 2002: 4).  
The Law of Criminal Trespass was issued in 1974 to strengthen the rights of 
leaseholders to their lands, further limiting the right of access by nomads and smallholding 
farmers. The 1990 Civil Transactions Act continued to state that all unregistered land was 
the property of the state and the state retained full right to allocate leases regardless of who 
was actually living on the land. The Act was amended to rule out the recognition of 
customary land rights in courts throughout county. The result has been the removal of vast 
areas of forests, swamps, villages and individually owned land previously owned under 
customary tenure by huge mechanized farms. These laws have had an unduly negative 
impact on the urban poor and internally displaced persons. In particular, the provision of 
Decree 941 of the 1990 Land Act which states that ‘the government “shall immediately 
destroy” temporary housing that has been built on land not owned by the people inhabiting 
it’ (Curtis Doebbler 1999: 6-7 cited in Global IDP/NRC 2005: 191).  
While these laws have compromised the livelihoods of the poor, women, the landless 
and traditional producers, they have on the other hand catered for the interests of 
commercial farmers and state development schemes (D. Johnson 2001: 2). The confis-
cation of land took place with the intention of transforming large areas for commercial 
farming. This has allowed ‘wealthy and powerful individuals, usually with connection 
to government’ to gain control over large areas of land (Rahhal & Abdel Salam 2002: 
2). It has been argued that subsistence farmers have experienced a steady process of 
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marginalization due to the rapid horizontal expansion of commercial farming. By the 
end of the 1970s, around 1.6 million hectares (4 million acres) had been turned into 
commercial farms, with the landholdings of each farm averaging 400 hectares (1,000 
acres). In 1982, this number had shot up to 2.5 million hectares (6 million acres). How-
ever, the land used for traditional farming remained constant throughout this time at 3.6 
million hectares (9 million acres) despite the fact that the population who depended on 
land for their livelihoods increased (Stephenson & DuFrane 2002: 174). The expansion 
of commercial farms was blamed for such problems as the reduction in area under forest 
cover and the reduction of land available for subsistence farming.  
Traditional farmers were displaced from the land they had once depended on as a 
major source of their livelihood. As mechanized farms started to concentrate on cash 
crops for export, subsistence farmers became more reliant on purchased food and 
became vulnerable to food inflation as well as job availability (Stephenson & DuFrane 
2002: 174). As a result and due to the scarcity of opportunity for livelihood diversifica-
tion beyond this sector, some farmers were relegated to land areas which are prone to 
climate related risk. Others become landless labourers or move to urban areas in search 
of informal-sector jobs there (Eltigani 1995: 4). 
Clearing large areas of land for commercial farming has also resulted in the further 
reduction of access for the poor to fodder, fuel wood and other forest products. For 
pastoralists, the result has been a clearing out of large areas of pastureland and the 
blocking off of their traditional corridors and access to watering points during the dry 
season (Stephenson & DuFrane 2002, Eltigani 1995, Shazali & Ahmed 1999). Recently, 
the demarcation of large tracts of land for oil exploitation has also resulted in the further 
forced removal of populations around the oilfields (Global IDP/NRC 2005: 22-23). 
Most conflicts in Sudan are subsumed into a broader dichotomy of ethnicity and 
dispute over access to land resource. Conflicts over the jurisdiction of land and compe-
tition over land issue often arise between traditional producers with different tenurial 
rights under different systems of land tenure. In most areas, livestock owned by pastor-
alists far exceeded the carrying capacities of the marginal land that the pastoralists 
occupy. In addition, a lack or deterioration of existing water sources has negatively 
impacted on the capacity of the grazing areas to support herds without encroaching on 
the cultivated area. This has often led to conflicts between farmers and pastoralists. On 
the other hand, there have also been conflicts amongst pastoralists as a result of competi-
tion for a dwindling 'stock' of grazing land as agriculture has expanded (Shazali & 
Ahmed 1999: 8-15). The increasing availability of modern weapons has increased the 
intensity and violence of these disputes. In recent years, the escalating civil strife that 
the country has witnessed, particularly across the ethnic divide, has reconfigured 
herder/farmer conflict in new and more brutal ways, with the Darfur crisis being a good 
example. 
In summary, the land-tenure regimes currently found in Sudan are a product of 
historical and socio-political forces whose effects vary between different regions and 
localities. Overall, the land law did not provide a solid platform for full tenure security 
for a large section of the population. The outcome has been increased conflict and social 
dislocation resulting from insecurity and the loss of land, rural employment, crops and 
lifestyle. 
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Women’s land rights  
The development of land tenure has been a complex process involving traditional 
leaders, the modern political and legal system as well as Islamic law. Women have very 
limited access to land under statutory, customary tenure systems and Islamic law. 
Customary rules have excluded women from access to land and impact negatively on 
their ability to make a living particularly in the rural areas. In recent years, with the 
increased commercialization of land and problems of land scarcity, local leaders have 
experienced increased pressure to protect the tribal system and have imposed greater 
constraints on women's access to land. In several communities around the country, the 
position of women with regard to customary land rights is inferior to that of men. Quite 
often ‘women cannot own land in their own right, or engage in land transactions, or 
inherit land’ (Rahhal & Abdel Salam 2002: 4). Furthermore, based on Islamic inheri-
tance laws, women face a wide-ranging denial of access to land (Rahhal & Abdel Salam 
2002: 8). 
The introduction of land registration and the privatization of land after independence 
represented a setback for women, leaving them in a state of even greater insecurity and 
with poorer prospects of accessing land. Modern legal reforms that attempt to formalize 
customary tenure systems have contributed to the erosion of women’s customary rights. 
Rahhal & Abdel Salam (2002: 4) note that ‘even in the relatively few cases where 
women have customary rights to land, women have extreme difficulty in having their 
rights recognized in the registration process’. They further note that the current system 
‘has been used to selectively preserve practices that ensure the loss of these rights’. For 
most women in Sudan access to land is via a system of explicit ownership through men: 
as husbands and fathers (Rahhal & Abdel Salam 2002: 3). In urban areas for example, 
while a male government employee is entitled to land allocation in the cities, his female 
colleague is not, as her allocation is given to her husband. At the same time, a family’s 
secure land rights do not necessarily translate into secure rights for a woman within that 
family. Not only does the husband retain full rights over any urban land owned by the 
family but on divorce a woman is not entitled to any of her marital home’s fixed 
property including land (Rahhal & Abdel Salam 2002: 12).  
In summary, the security of women’s land rights depends on whether these rights are 
legally and socially recognizable and enforceable. Within these contexts, women have 
extreme difficulty in having their rights recognized compared to men. 
Ethnicity and class 
Ethnicity has often played a crucial role in Sudan as identity axes for different groups 
and their mobilization. This has been complicated by the imposition of class distinctions 
both between and within various ethnic communities (El-Batthani et al. 1998: 14). 
Sudan has one of the most culturally and linguistically diverse populations in the world. 
It is believed that there are around 600 ethnic groups in the country who speak more 
than 400 languages and dialects (UNOCHA 2006: 1). This highly complex social 
mosaic has evolved over two-and-half centuries and through a process of assimilation 
and amalgamation of the diverse cultural influxes that came with the hordes of Arab, 
Turkish, Egyptian and British invaders. In this process, some ethnic groups have 
undergone significant changes, disappeared or become indistinguishable from the 
dominant group, and the different political regimes have (re)defined the characteristics 
of the ethnic scene. The current regime, for example, has re-emphasized ethnicity and 
 
27 
used identity as a powerful symbol of meaning and worth. This was an important factor 
leading to the flare up and rapid escalation of latent ethnic tensions in different regions 
of the country (Deng 1995).  
Most Sudanese are not Arab by racial origin; although northern and central Sudan 
were occupied by Arabs who entered the country through the north and eastern borders 
in the 13th century (Barbour 1961: 75-76). Arabs inhabited many of the most fertile 
lands along the Nile and mixed with the original occupants, the Nubians, imposing their 
language, religion and culture on them. Today, Arab culture – and the Islamic faith and 
the way of life that accompanies it – has been adopted by most northern Sudanese. 
Arabic is the main language for administrative, educational and general purposes, even 
among those whose mother tongue is not Arabic. Although other parts of the country 
have adopted a hybrid mix of Arab and indigenous culture, the influence of Arabic 
culture remains very strong in those areas. 
Consecutive governments have, through different means, worked to deepen ethnic 
asymmetries vis-à-vis money and power. For example, during the Condominium era 
tribal leaders were appointed to the colonial administration as native administrators, 
thereby strengthening their traditional authority. 
Traditional ethnic group leaders have always enjoyed significant power and author-
ity within their particular communities. The official education policy during the colonial 
regime, for instance, encouraged the education of tribal leaders’ sons in a bid to 
strengthen some ethnic groups and individuals within these groups (Salih 2003: 100). 
Many of today’s elite and political leaders are the descendants of these tribal leaders. 
History shows that several linguistic groups in Sudan were absorbed by accommo-
dation and others by force. Many small groups were absorbed by larger groups, and new 
groups also formed. However, an important and commonly accepted characteristic of 
the ethnic scene in Sudan is that it always has subordinate and dominant patterns 
between the various ethnic groups. The history of the country has featured conflict 
between two types of ethnic movements: one led by the dominant groups in power, or 
the movements of exclusion; and the other by subordinate groups, or the movements of 
struggle. The movements of exclusion have historically been led by Arab groups, who 
used force of one type or another to establish their superiority and domination. Coloni-
alism set up a good support base for the movements of exclusion. 
British colonialism enforced the economic and political power of Sudanese Arabs, 
while non-Arab (African) ethnic nationalities and communities were excluded from 
political power and positions of potential affluence. However, even after independence 
some of the national governments used similar methods to enforce and even legalize 
ethnic stratification in society. Deng (1995: 35) argues that: 
Arabization and Islamization progressed in the North, whose racially stratified society deemed the 
Arab people and culture superior. The Arabs in the North were propped up by military conquest, 
supported by material wealth, and elevated in status by the universal image of Islam and Arab civili-
zation. In contrast, the African Negro was considered inferior, an active or potential slave, the down-
trodden of the earth. 
The subordinate groups have sometimes adopted the culture and traditions of the 
dominant ethnic groups to survive in an environment characterized by exclusive 
politics, or due to the coercive power of the state. Many non-Muslims (and non-Arabs) 
in the North have converted to Islam because this enables them to live as ‘more respect-
able members of the community’ (Deng 1995: 35).  
 
28 
Many of the conflicts and wars waged in Sudan over the past 50 years have been 
described in terms of ethnic conflict. The most volatile conflicts are those currently 
being waged in southern Sudan, Darfur and eastern Sudan. Present-day ethnic conflicts 
have a scope and intensity that did not previously exist. 
There is a clear class structure in Sudan, although it is not as developed as in indus-
trial societies. Class structure is defined in terms of economic differentiation in the 
ownership of economic resources, which produces differences in earnings and incomes 
(El-Batthani et al. 1998: 14). These differences are more obvious in urban areas than in 
the rural areas. According to the World Bank (2003a: 31, citing data from the labour 
survey in the 1990s), inequality in the formal wage sector in Sudan is on the increase. 
The study indicates that the top 10% of government employees earned 51.6% of all 
incomes in 1990 and 64.3% in 1996, while the low- and middle-income groups have 
become poorer (World Bank 2003a: 31).  
In summary, historical social and economic exclusion of the majority of the popula-
tion and a lack of access to opportunities under both colonial and post-colonial regimes 
has always operated along ethnic and class lines. Some groups have, therefore, re-
mained at the bottom of society, locked into poverty or experiencing extreme difficulty 
in breaking out of it.  
Gender  
Sudanese culture in general and Muslim culture in particular are still basically patriar-
chal and traditional and have strong gender identities. Across all ethnic groups and 
classes, men and women are expected to follow their roles as outlined by their culture 
and designated to their particular gender group. As would be expected, women have 
almost always been disadvantaged compared to men. The magnitude of gender 
discrimination in Sudan can be seen in the following statistics. In 2001 the adult literacy 
rate in southern Sudan in areas beyond government control was estimated to be as low 
as 10% for women compared to 30% for men in the same area. Estimates for the rest of 
the country indicate a literacy rate of 42% for women compared to 60% for men. 
Women constitute only 26% of the total workforce in Sudan (Census 1993), and the 
percentage of women in top management positions is only 3.3%. Women hold 44% of 
technical and professional jobs in the public sector, but 87% of the economically active 
women in Sudan work in the traditional agro-pastoralist sector where their work is 
undervalued (Abusin 2003: 35).  
Generally the government pays only lip service to supporting women’s causes. Its 
actions in this regard do not challenge the fundamentals of discrimination and exclu-
sion. On the contrary, the government opposes any serious attempts at changing the 
status quo. Historically, gender biases against women were institutionalized as part of 
the social, economic and political structure but some progress did take place in the 
1960s when women obtained several important political and civil rights including 
‘equality before the law, equality in job opportunities, the right to vote, the right to 
equal pay, the right to maternity leave, the right of ownership and the right to hold 
public office’ (WLUML 1997: 1). The position of women has, however, regressed again 
in the hands of the consecutive authoritarian governments that came to power after this. 
By 1983, there were many signs of regression as the hard-line Islamic discourse 
prevailed, resulting in a reversal of all previously recognized women’s and human 
rights. Since 1989 and under the current regime, large numbers of women have been 
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dismissed from the civil service and institutions of civil society on the grounds of 
‘public interest’. Many professional women in the judiciary and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs have been laid off or forced to take early retirement. Such discriminatory 
policies have continued as privatization policies deepened, with women being 
retrenched on the grounds of economic austerity (WLUML 1997: 7). Women in the 
private sector have no or very little access to paid maternity leave, and experience 
discrimination and dismissal related to pregnancy and motherhood. This occurs even 
though Sudan is party to an international agreement against the dismissal of female 
workers on such grounds (WLUML 1997: 6). In addition, the current conflicts have 
increased the plight of large numbers of Sudanese women, whether they remain in the 
war zones or migrate to safer zones. By losing many of the supporting structures they 
used to enjoy, these women have become extremely vulnerable to all forms of abuse 
and violence.  
Women are currently under-represented in most elected and non-elected bodies in 
Sudan. Their role in political life and decision-making is very weak; for example, 
women hold only three (0.9%) of the 340 National Assembly seats. In the absence of 
formal political rights, women have obviously been restricted in exercising political 
influence and fulfilling their civic aspirations. Women also lack any viable form of 
political entity that could represent or facilitate their progress towards increased female 
representation in political life (SLGP 2004a: 2). In spite of acknowledging the provi-
sions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on women’s rights, policies need 
to be put into practice that will address and reverse the entrenched patterns of exclusion 
and economic inequality for women and encourage political reform and gender rights. 
Discrimination against women continues unabated. It is generated by a number of 
interlocking structural factors and is shaping women’s access to different resources. 
Conclusion 
Although Sudan is rich in natural resources and has had five decades of political 
independence, successive governments have not been able to utilize these resources in 
an equitable manner. An important feature that characterizes governance in Sudan is the 
centralization of power, which allows control over the economy and political system. In 
addition, governance is characterizes by a lack of coordination, an absence of the rule of 
law and a lack of participation of stakeholders in matters that concern their own liveli-
hoods.  
Ill-conceived development policies that neglect rural development, erratic macro-
economic polices and poor management of resources have set the Sudanese economy in 
a downward spiral. The scarcity and pressure on productive land involves sensitive 
ethnic, intra-ethnic and class issues and land-tenure systems have not been successful in 
facilitating equitable land distribution between the different groups.  
Ethnicity has always played a crucial role in Sudan as identity axes for different 
groups and their mobilization. This has been further complicated by the imposition of 
class distinctions both between and among ethnic communities. The interplay of 
ethnicity, class and gender is contributing to the social and economic exclusion of large 
sections of the population and resultant poverty and conflict. 
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Greater Khartoum 
 
 
 
 
Greater Khartoum is the largest city in Sudan, the country’s main industrial and 
commercial centre and a melting pot for most ethnic groups. Over the past three 
decades, the city has expanded to incorporate the older suburbs and satellite towns and 
several villages as well as extensive agricultural land. Migration has played a significant 
role in the growth of the State of Khartoum. And recently there has been an explosive 
population growth as a result of civil strife and the collapse of the peasant farming 
economy. This growth has placed huge strains on the city's traditional infrastructure and 
service delivery system. Along with the process of urbanization, poverty is becoming 
more apparent in the city. This chapter examines these issues and highlights the local 
context for an analysis of urban poverty.  
Demographic and geographical information  
Greater Khartoum is the centre of the national administration, with large bureaucracies 
in the public sector and expanding private-sector offices, trade and commerce and 
small-scale industries and services. Greater Khartoum covers a total area of 2.5 million 
km², between 5º26′ and 15º45′ N and longitudes 32º25′ and 32º40′ E, at an altitude of 
405.6 m above sea level. It falls in the arid region of Central Sudan and its topography 
consists of a semi-delta area that is characterized by a combination of sandy textured 
fertile and muddy soil. The terrain is mostly flat or gently sloping, broken by isolated 
rocky hills and low-lying sand dunes. This flat landscape is also dissected by the floors 
and terraces of the Nile valleys and the dry beds of seasonal rivers (wadis), (see Map 1). 
With its relatively higher gradient, the Blue Nile has more elevated terraces than the 
White Nile. Tuti Island lies in the middle of Greater Khartoum and was formed from 
depositional silt, clay and sand. The Niles are the major hydrological system, with 
several local drainage systems of wadis (dry riverbeds) or the seasonal khor which 
normally flows for short periods several times a year. These systems are more common 
on the western side of the Nile than to the east (El Tayeb 2003: 4). Khor and wadi have 
little value as resources in their own right and their main value lies in sustaining the 
shallow aquifer system. The climate is characterized by a short rainy season from July 
to September, a short winter from January to March and a long summer season.  
Greater Khartoum is made up of three towns: Khartoum, Khartoum North (Bahri) 
and Omdurman. The three lie in a triangle and are divided by the White and Blue Niles. 
The city of Khartoum is the capital city of Sudan, situated just south of the confluence 
of the Blue Nile and the White Nile. The city was founded in 1821 as an Egyptian army  
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        Map 3.1 Greater Khartoum 
 
 
         Source: Adapted from the Ministry of Housing, 2007  
 
 
 
camp and then developed as a trade centre. It is the main administrative and religious 
centre of Sudan and its second largest city. The city of Omdurman, situated on the 
western banks of the Nile, is the national centre of commerce and the largest city in 
Sudan. Between 1885 and 1898 (Mahdist era) Omdurman became the capital and the 
major economic and political centre but from 1898 to 1956, the British and Egyptian 
(Condominium) rule re- instated Khartoum as the capital and the main trade and cultural 
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centre (El Tayeb 2003: 2). On the other side of the Nile, Khartoum North (Bahri) grew 
up as an important industrial and railway centre. The building of the Blue Nile Bridge in 
1909 and the White Nile Bridge in 1928 linked the three cities to form Greater 
Khartoum. It has grown bigger since then and, in addition to the three main cities, it has 
incorporated several other rural centres in what is known administratively as the State of 
Khartoum.  
Greater Khartoum is usually referred to as ‘Khartoum’ and administratively it falls 
within the State of Khartoum. According to a 2003 law, the State of Khartoum is 
divided into seven localities: Khartoum, Khartoum Bahri, Omdurman, Jebel Awlia, 
Sharag el Neal, Karrarrie and Umm Bada. A commissioner heads each of the localities 
and the city of Khartoum is the capital of all the localities and is headed by the governor 
(Wali) and a cabinet. 
Population and urbanization 
Greater Khartoum represents a melting pot for the country’s ethnic groups and has a 
decidedly cosmopolitan flavour. The majority of the inhabitants have come from other 
parts of the country, bringing with them a mixture of dialects of Arabic and other 
languages, as well as their traditional foods and customs. The main ethnic groups are the 
Al Abdallab, Jumuaiyia and Batahin, all of which are Arabized ethnic groups. 
According to the 1993 population census, Khartoum State had a population of 
3,512,000 that was estimated to reach 5,352,000 in 2003 (UN-SUDAN 2003: 3). A 
more recent estimate by the European Institute for Research on Mediterranean and Euro 
Arab-Cooperation (MEDEA, May 2004) indicates that Greater Khartoum has a 
population of around 6-7 million people. Greater Khartoum has an annual growth rate of 
about 4%, compared to the national average of about 2.6% per year (World Bank 2003a: 
34). Although Greater Khartoum’s population has increased steadily since the colonial 
era, most of its growth has occurred in the last two decades. Comparing data from 
population censuses and estimates for 2002, El Tayeb (2003: 1) indicates that between 
1955 and 1993 the population of Khartoum increased sevenfold and was predicted to 
increase twelve-fold by 2002, compared to 1955.  
Migration has played a very significant role in Khartoum’s urban agglomeration. 
Historically the city was a haven attracting rural dwellers looking for a stake in 
industrialization, employment, better education, health services and modern life. 
However, in recent decades population growth has been a result of an increased influx 
of people pushed out of their home areas by civil strife, the collapse of the peasant 
farming economy and successive waves of drought and desertification (Abusin 2005: 1). 
In addition, between the early 1970s and the late 1990s, thousands of refugees from 
other African nations (especially Chad, Ethiopia and Uganda) took refuge in Khartoum. 
The vast majority of the immigrants were relocating from agro-pastoral rural zones and 
lacked the necessary skills for the urban context, for example having low rates of 
literacy. In addition, socio-cultural considerations played a significant role in restricting 
and hindering their integration into the urban economy (Abusin 2005: 6). 
As the population of Khartoum increases, the boundaries are extending too. The 
same number of people now requires far more land than they used to in 1956. The 
population density of Khartoum has dropped by more than 50% from 14,815 
people/km2 in 1955 to 6,013 people/km2 in 1998 (El Tayeb 2003: 4). The city has 
expanded horizontally, and to a lesser extent, vertically. The vertical expansion is more 
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apparent in the new neighbourhoods and marked by the arrival of apartment buildings 
for the affluent and upwardly mobile. Office buildings, shopping malls and commercial 
parks are cropping up on what once were tracts of farmland, green space and forests. 
The horizontal expansion was set into motion in 1956 but has been accentuated 
particularly over the last 30 years. Between 1955 and 1998 the area covered by the three 
cities has expanded 48 times. For example, between 1970 and 1980 the average annual 
rate of area increase hit 66.1% compared to 5.2% between 1955 and 1970. However, the 
three cities demonstrate different patterns of expansion with the city of Khartoum now 
covering 43% of the total area of Greater Khartoum (El Tayeb 2003: 2-3). 
Older parts of the city including the central city and the adjacent densely settled area 
have also grown. Concomitantly, classic slums are forming spontaneously on the edge 
of the urban spatial explosion on less-desirable land without proper urban planning or 
the conveniences of modern life. These areas are less stable and are prone to change as 
they are replaced with commercial up-market developments (Abusin 2004). The spatial 
expansion of the city took place through annexing adjacent townships and rural areas to 
the three cities. Many once-rural areas have been absorbed into the thriving city and 
now demonstrate the typical signs of urban zones (infrastructure mode of architecture 
etc.); others have kept their basic rural features while benefiting from the new 
connections to the city. There are also hybrid urban rural zones that may not fit the 
traditional classifications of urban or rural space. However, the extension of (some) 
urban infrastructure onto these zones has provided the population with the opportunity 
to benefit from services in the main city. The recent intensification of the urban land 
market, especially in some of the outer-ring suburban neighbourhoods, has had far-
reaching implications for the poor in these zones who have once more been pushed 
further out onto more marginal land. The city government also faces increased 
challenges in providing for these new areas because the current size and scope of the 
city is far beyond what was planned in the past and the demand for municipal services 
and infrastructure development has far outpaced the government's provision of them. A 
major problem in the expansion process in Greater Khartoum is the arrival of unplanned 
settlements with inadequate services and infrastructure as well as problematic sanitation 
(Abusin 2003: 36-37). An important challenge for developments is how to address these 
issues and make poor zones more inhabitable. 
Poverty in Khartoum 
Very few studies have examined poverty in Khartoum, Most of the studies that have 
been undertaken were intended to provide baseline information data on the situation of 
residents in poor urban settlements and identify their specific needs (IRC & WID 2001, 
PDS 2000, Abusin 2002, UN-SUDAN 2003). Two studies have emerged as being a 
very useful contribution to understanding poverty in Khartoum: Abusin (2005) and El-
Batthani et al. (1998). They both investigated the rapid growth of concentrated areas of 
poverty and the deterioration of social conditions since the 1970s and showed that the 
‘extremely poor’ in Greater Khartoum are concentrated in the notorious slums or 
Ashwaees as well as in those neighbourhoods that recently graduated from Ashwaees to 
formal settlements (Abusin 2004, 2005, El-Batthani et al. 1998). They argue that while 
‘extreme poverty’ is concentrated in those areas, ‘poverty’ is indeed widespread in 
every community in the city, and the poor are very diverse and heterogeneous.  
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Both studies see poverty in Khartoum not only through the spatial cleavages between 
people within different residential areas but essentially as a product of political 
marginalization and exclusion of the urban population (El-Batthani et al. 1998: 7, 
Abusin 2005: 1-2). They have linked poverty directly to the processes by which 
resources are allocated and these processes have afforded some access to the formal 
sector (land and activities), while confining others to the informal. For both authors, the 
basic characteristics that accompany being poor in Khartoum are identified as follows: 
having a low-paid job or being unemployed, a lack of tenure security, bad housing 
conditions, limited and poor-quality water and food, and limited access to education and 
health facilities.  
Using participatory methods, El-Batthani et al. (1998) identified the combined effect 
of underlying-structural causes of urban poverty and extreme poverty to be historical 
underdevelopment, imbalances and crisis; growing inequalities and differentiation; and 
prolonged conflict and war. Their analysis comes basically from a neo-Marxist 
perspective, meaning that the direct causes of poverty in Khartoum are believed to be 
created by the de-coupling between industry and urban growth, and proletarianization 
without the transformation of the peasantry. However, in the context of Sudan’s 
structural adjustment, civil strife, a shrinking urban labour market and a constant flow 
of migration and displacement are added to the ‘traditional’ process. All of these factors 
are seen to have resulted in four distinct categories of urban poor with different 
experience and strategies. These include first of all the ‘traditional urban poor’ who are 
found among unemployed, informal-sector workers and unskilled labourers; to which 
are added less traditional categories such as ‘displaced persons’ who took refuge in 
Khartoum from the mid-1980s onwards; ‘new urban poor’ or those former government 
officials who, due to economic liberalization and adjustment policies, were pushed into 
poverty. The last new category comprises poor urban women, particularly those heading 
households (El-Batthani et al. 1998: 22-23). The basic criteria that differentiate these 
categories from each other are their survival strategies and, more particularly, the way 
they manage their economic and social resources, which have been affected by govern-
ment policies The main argument is that all these categories were not able ‘to manage 
during time of crisis, conflict and transition from state-led to market-oriented economy’ 
(Ibid.).  
Amid extreme restriction of freedom of expression, the study provides a courageous 
account of the way government policies have contributed to poverty creation by 
promoting certain production and distribution patterns. However, the study has at least 
two drawbacks. The first relates to the grouping of the urban poor into four distinct 
categories. Although these categories are broad enough to include a significant 
proportion of the urban poor, they exclude some groups who became poor or extremely 
poor during the same period, such as all the small-business owners and some larger 
business owners, who became poor as a result of the disintegration of the industrial 
sector. The second drawback is that the study concentrates on poverty as a discrete 
phenomenon but did not cater for its continuous dimensions. Such a perspective focuses 
more on a person’s position and inherent vulnerability and how this leads to material 
deprivation. 
On the other hand, Abusin (2005) looked at the declining government role in urban 
poor communities and the expansion of the role of non-state providers in Khartoum. He 
argues that poor governance and the state’s inability to provide public goods, such as 
infrastructure and basic services, have undermined people’s livelihood strategies, thus 
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exacerbating negative demographic and socio-economic outcomes. This has been made 
worse because poverty has led to the erosion of familial and traditional networks of 
support among the poor. He further points out that NGO interventions have contributed 
significantly to the survival of the urban poor. Abusin (2005: 3-46), compares poverty 
across sub-groups and time, highlighting factors such as whether people have access to 
state or NGO-subsidized services, the costs of goods within their community, their 
membership in marginalized groups as determined by relations of power at different 
levels and their status within their household with regard to power and responsibility, as 
crucial determinants of poverty or well-being. His notion of poverty is, therefore, more 
likely to include all those who are actually poor. Such analysis is believed to have 
succeeded in generating a more dynamic understanding of poverty in the city.  
This present study will conceptualize poverty as a complex and multi-dimensional 
phenomena which results from pervasive processes, attitudes and institutionalized 
power structures that lead to the exclusion of some groups. It will be argued that 
breaking this cycle depends on the poor themselves, according to their various identi-
ties. Given their personal, social and environmental constraints, empowerment becomes 
an important tool in enabling the poor to overcome their exclusion. 
The economy of Khartoum 
The sectors contributing to Khartoum’s economic growth are agriculture, large-, 
medium- and small-scale industries and services that include trade and commerce, 
transport, telecommunications, management and consultancy services, education, etc. 
Government policies have often been tainted with urban bias, i.e. the placement and 
availability in urban areas of public services including infrastructure (transport, 
electricity, water and sanitation, communications and others), military bases and 
services which build human capital, manufacturing industries and urban-based activi-
ties. For example, Greater Khartoum’s share in the total national economy in 1990 was 
as follows: ‘73% of industries; 75% of the industrial labour force; 67% of electrical 
power from the national grid; 85% of commercial enterprises; 80% of banking services; 
85% of industrial bank loans; 71% of real-estate bank loans; 65% of currency 
exchanges; 70% of tax payers; 81% of the taxes collected; 70% of hospitals and health 
centres; 65% of doctors; and 80% of nurses’ (Ahmed 1997: 6 , quoted in El Tayeb 
2003: 5-6).  
With the discovery of oil and its eventual exploitation in 1999, Sudan entered the 
world of oil-exporting countries. Oil exports started to bring some positive and useful 
linkages to Khartoum’s economy; as is clearly seen in the improvement in the area’s 
infrastructure, particularly roads. Oil-related investment inflows into Sudan have 
increased significantly since 1996, primarily due to developments in the oil industry, 
while direct investments increased in 1998 with the start of the oil pipeline. A greater 
share of these investments is concentrated in the urban areas, with the State of 
Khartoum having the strongest growth of all the other states (World Bank 2003: 60-61). 
Recently, Khartoum has begun to manifest the typical signs of a boom, such as real-
estate development and traffic jams, which were not seen in the past (World Bank 2003: 
20). 
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Agriculture 
In the State of Khartoum, agriculture has continued to be one of the main activities for 
people living in rural localities. It is also practised around the three main cities, on the 
Nile terraces and islands. There is a large amount of land in and around the State of 
Khartoum where food can be or is being grown. It has been suggested that 97.8% of the 
State is suitable for cultivation; although the urban and peri-urban agricultural zones 
have been contracting considerably and experiencing significant land-use change (El 
Tayeb 2003: 6). This is basically because of population growth, the expansion of city 
boundaries; housing demands outprice farms and the expansion of commercial lands 
that are putting increased pressure on agricultural lands. Most agriculture now relies on 
intensive rotation due to limited land (UN-SUDAN 2003: 7).  
Agriculture in the State of Khartoum is characterized by large commercial estate 
farms, small-scale farming irrigated by pumps and poorly managed smallholders 
occupying more marginal areas of inherently lower productivity. Agricultural schemes 
produce staple food crops; vegetables and fruit and some traditional cash crops. Lack of 
access to land and water has made small-scale enterprises less than viable and increased 
competition for scarce water resource is leading to a reduction in the water supply for 
small-scale irrigated subsistence crops. Large irrigated agricultural schemes account for 
the lion’s share of water withdrawals an because of poor rainfall and low domestic 
water supplies, the growing season is usually brief and crops frequently fail (SLGP 
2005: 98). The increasing pressure on water resources may jeopardize the sustainability 
of the environment as a result of the depletion of groundwater reserves, salinization and 
water-logging.  
Small farmers’ agricultural activities are being hindered by the limited size of land 
holdings, low rates of productivity and an inability to improve incomes. Access and 
control over land for agriculture in the State of Khartoum are regulated through several 
different systems and arrangements that can be formal or informal, statutory or 
customary, and restrictive or open. The majority of smallholder farmers’ access to land 
is mediated by rent, sharecropping (musharaka), inheritance and purchasing (Abusin, 
2004: 56). The first two – rent and sharecropping – lack the long-term security that 
comes with secure access to land. This makes it difficult for farmers to invest in 
improvements that only produce returns over many years. In addition, the competing 
uses of land have become a source of continuous conflict amongst the various land 
users. These include conflicts among farmers; between farmers and animal herders and 
pastoralists, and between farmers and fishermen in some areas of the state. In addition, 
scarce water resources have provided another source of conflict such as those taking 
place in Abu-Delaig and El-Esaialat (SLGP 2005: 98). The present and future of 
smallholder farmers as well as farm workers are irreversibly bound up with these 
problems being resolved. 
Farm workers and their working conditions are largely determined by the production 
system at work. Farm workers generate low individual earnings from farm work and 
they are thus unable to keep pace with inflation, and it is impossible to afford the basic 
necessities of housing, food, health care and education for their children. One important 
reason for the decline in wages is the large surplus of labour in the farming sector. 
Although there are no statistics available on the conditions of farm workers, preliminary 
studies (PDS 2000, Abusin 2002) have shown that farm workers in Khartoum are 
among the extreme poor there. Commercial farm workers are mostly drawn from the 
IDPs and a large proportion of them are women (UN-SUDAN 2003: 5, PDS 2000: 27). 
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Agricultural livestock production includes beef, sheep, dairy and poultry farming. 
Khartoum has the largest concentration of large-scale companies with a national 
distribution system for its poultry products. Being a labour-intensive industry, livestock 
production provides jobs for a significant number of people, has benefits for the poor as 
it provides a way of diversifying their livelihoods and is a source of locally produced 
food for people living nearby. Within the city’s poor neighbourhoods, goats are the 
main livestock reared and utilize city and household waste. However, raising animals 
within the city has some externalities which require addressing such as environmental 
contamination. The major problems facing livestock rearing are a lack of pastures, water 
and medical facilities, the high taxes imposed by the locality and the sector’s weak 
purchasing power (Abusin 2005: 54, SLGP 2005: 99).  
 
Manufacturing industries 
The greatest concentration of manufacturing and service industries in Sudan is to be 
fund in the Khartoum area. This is partly due to the advantages offered by roads, the 
Nile port and Khartoum’s international airport on the one hand and the weak infra-
structure of the rest of the country on the other. Several industrial sites were set up in 
the Khartoum area including an oil refinery and units processing cement, tyres, food and 
other more durable consumer goods. Overall, Khartoum contributes 73% of industries 
and 75% of industrial employment in Sudan (El Tayeb 2003: 5). However, the share of 
industry in the country’s GDP as a whole was estimated at only 18.5% in 2002. The 
concentration of manufacturing industries in Khartoum, coupled with the consistent 
decline in traditional agriculture, has given rise to rapid rural migration towards the few 
places that offer industrial employment. However, ‘the industrial establishments could 
not match the increasing number of job seekers who are mostly unskilled wage earners’ 
(El-Batthani et al. 1998: 17).  
Many industries have been in decline since the late 1970s. The industrial sector has 
suffered a great deal due to lack of power and spare parts and bad infrastructure. 
However, the hardest blow the sector has received has been regarding national and 
global policy issues. As both public and private manufacturing industry depend for their 
full operation on the importation of essential raw materials, spare parts and machinery, 
the drastic devaluation of the currency has raised production costs dramatically. Even 
industries that were able to source some of their inputs locally have found that these are 
now extremely expensive. Industries such as edible oil that use local materials are 
experiencing increasing difficulties in competing on the export market and consumer 
purchasing power is declining considerably. On the other hand, industries that are 
geared towards the demands of the affluent sections of the population (i.e. air coolers, 
fridges, car assemblies etc.) are better equipped to face competition (Shazali 2003: 42). 
The imposition of excessive taxes on local industry has escalated their costs of 
production and impacted on the ability of local industry to compete with imports. The 
specific case of some locally produced materials such as iron nuts,7 and grinding-stone 
for flourmill can are examples. Custom duties on a locally produced flourmill grinding-
stone were Ls18,000 ($7.20), but custom duties on imported ones cost only Ls 5,000 
($2). A locally produced iron nut requires a payment of Ls800 ($0.32) in duties, while 
                                                 
7  A piece of metal, screwed on the end of a bolt as a fastening, used in numerous small indus-
tries. It has a particular importance for poor households as it is used to attach and fix roofs, 
doors, windows etc. 
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that on an imported one costs Ls443 ($0.18) (El Naayal 2002: 4). Many imports were 
able to avoid legal obligations by fraudulent corruption in the Customs service or other 
illegal means with the resultant manipulation of the market by those selling imports 
below the cost of locally produced goods (Shazali 2003: 42).  
As a consequence, average capacity utilization indicates a marked deterioration. A 
World Bank study (2003a: 20) noted that ‘around 85 percent of all factories in 
Khartoum’s main industrial area (Khartoum North) were operating below full capacity 
in 1998’. Many firms had to close down, while others have reduced their working day.  
The manufacturing industry has not been accorded the prominence it deserves, at the 
policy or facilitation level and therefore has had little impact on the economy or the 
employment situation in Khartoum. 
 
Employment 
About 81% of the working population of the State of Khartoum are employed in the 
economic and service sector (UN-SUDAN 2003: 7). The percentage of women in wage 
employment in the non-agricultural sector (excluding the nomadic and IDP population) 
was 9.3% while for males it was 20.9% (UN-SUDAN 2003: 8). An increasing number 
of women are now employed in the formal sector but formal wage employment in both 
the public and private sectors has offered relatively limited opportunities for women. 
Women are found mainly in the lower echelons of the formal sector. In addition they 
face discriminatory laws and practices in the labour force that hinder their participation 
and work-related benefits (Abusin 2004: 21, El-Batthani et al. 1998: 16). The formal 
sector remains an important sector for employment and it provides a large share of 
Khartoum’s formal employment. However, civil servants’ earnings are very low (World 
Bank 2003a: 34, Fergany 1998: 11). The civil service is organized into scales and 
grades. Each grade is assigned a salary scale, with incremental steps leading from a 
minimum salary to the maximum possible in that grade. The current salary structure is 
based on 17 grades, with the highest being G1 and the lowest permanent grade position 
being G14. Based on the pay scales that were in effect in March 2002, public employees 
at a G1 grade receive a basic salary and allowances equivalent to $61 per month. The 
lowest permanent grade position of G14 receives an equivalent amount of $25 (World 
Bank 2003a: 76). Real wages and salaries continued to fall significantly during the 
1990s and beyond, compared to previous decades. The real value of the pensions of 
large numbers of public-sector employees who are retired or have been laid off has 
eroded significantly over the same period (World Bank 2003a: 34). The continuous 
escalation of the cost of living since the early 1970s was documented by Fergany (1998: 
11) who observed that:  
[…] starting at the beginning of the 1970s, the cost of living in Greater Khartoum, as measured by the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI), rose to 10 multiples in 1983, to 100 times in 1989, to 1,000 times in 
1993, to a staggering 5,000 times in 1995, and to an astounding 11,263 times by 1996. Thus, the 
purchasing power of the national currency was reduced, exponentially, to almost one twelve 
thousandth of its value over a quarter century. In other words, twelve thousand Sudanese Pounds 
would be needed in 1996 to exercise the same command over commodities in the domestic economy 
as one Pound did in the early 1970s! Over the same quarter century, the exchange rate of the Sudan 
Pound against the US dollar plummeted by more than 5,000 times. 
More than three decades of inflation have eroded the minimum wage to its lowest 
level ever. While real wages have continuously declined, health, energy and educational 
costs have skyrocketed. Urban workers have had to deal with a phenomenal escalating 
cost of living alongside declining incomes and no family in Khartoum was able to 
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survive on the income derived from wages in the formal sector alone. For example, 
three decades ago, a university graduate joining the civil service made over $100 per 
month at a time when the purchasing power of the local currency was significantly 
higher. However, by 2002 this had shrunk to the equivalent of $31. Such an amount is 
not enough even to pay a typical monthly electricity bill for an average urban family 
home (World Bank 2003a: 34). Under the macro-economic stabilization programmes 
applied, unemployment also rose rapidly. A wave of public-sector retrenchments took 
place in the 1980s and continued into the 1990s bringing about a downturn in urban 
jobs. Some of the recent trends that have accompanied labour-market developments in 
Khartoum include a decline in rewarding jobs for low-skilled workers notably in 
manufacturing and in the public sector as well as an increase in open unemployment and 
part-time and contract employees.  
Informal-sector growth in Khartoum has been seen as a logical consequence of the 
country’s current economic downturn. Information on the size and employment struc-
ture in the informal sector is hard to obtain, but estimates suggest that the sector ac-
counts for around 45% of the urban labour force. Khartoum alone, hosts more than half 
of the urban informal sector in Sudan (El-Batthani et al. 1998: 66).  
Work in the informal sector usually involves high job insecurity, often in micro-scale 
self-employment or casual activities. Due to insufficient income, workers are often 
involved in multiple activities and jobs.  
Sudan’s massive urbanization took place in a context of declining employment 
opportunities in the formal sector and agriculture jobs and at a time when no industrial 
jobs emerged to fill the gap. In addition, the cost of living for families in Khartoum is 
continuing to rise substantially, tightening conditions for workers whose incomes on 
average are only a fraction of what they require for living costs.  
Provision of urban services 
The explosive sprawl Khartoum is experiencing is placing huge strains on the city’s 
traditional infrastructure and service delivery system. Several actors are involved in the 
provision of urban services. An increasing number of non-state providers across the 
different sectors have emerged in response to the inability of government services to 
effectively meet the population’s needs. On the other hand, there are also private 
providers who are emerging as a response to the ability of households to pay for better 
services especially in education and health. Non-state actors includes a wide range of 
NGOs, Community Based Organizations (CBOs), religious organizations, private 
companies, small-scale informal providers and individual service providers. NGOs and 
the private sector are the predominant non-state providers, especially in primary-school 
education health and water supplies to poor neighbourhoods (Abusin 2004). In poor 
neighbourhoods, communities are taking a lead role in service provision but access to 
services varies considerably between localities as well as among different neighbour-
hoods in the state. Most poor neighbourhoods and informal settlements lack access to 
public services or have access to services of lower quality (Abusin 2004, SLGP 2005). 
User fees are normally required and these vary between different providers. A key 
problem with service provision in Khartoum is that the poor are the least likely to 
benefit from any public services because of the cost imposed by different providers, 
placing their service beyond the reach of many (Abusin 2003: 51-54). 
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Roads and transport 
The three main cities that form Greater Khartoum are connected by tarmac roads. 
Khartoum is also connected to all the country’s major cities by paved highways running 
between Khartoum, Port Sudan, Atbara, Dongola, Medani and Gedarif. River naviga-
tion and air carriers also extend from Khartoum to Joba in the south and Wadi Halfa in 
the north. A railway network also connects Khartoum with various cities. Types of 
typical transportation in Khartoum include buses and mini buses, taxis and rakshat 
(rickshaws). 
The most visible aspect of the road network within Khartoum is that it is inadequate. 
Obviously, the city’s unprecedented and explosive growth has created great challenges 
for the authorities to keep up with. As the population has grown, the city's roads have 
become choked with vehicles of all kinds causing huge pressure on the system and 
increasing numbers of bottlenecks. The major roads have not been built to the planned 
width and have many bottleneck points and constraints due to the large number of 
intersections with major and minor roads. The quality of roads between and within the 
different areas in the state varies considerably. Within Greater Khartoum, the state of 
the roads that lead to poor neighbourhoods is appalling. Some roads in poor neighbour-
hoods are inaccessible except on foot. Some of the rural localities lie far away from the 
centre of the city, such as Sharga Al neel. The lack of adequate roads and transport 
services isolate these localities from each other and from the city where most services 
exist (SLGP 2005: 123). 
 
Water supply 
The main water sources for the State of Khartoum are underground water sources, the 
White Nile and the Blue Nile. The level of public water and sewerage coverage by the 
citywide networks is low. Around 40% of the population of the State of Khartoum lack 
any formal, household-based public provision of drinking water (Abusin 2003: 34). 
There are huge variations in terms of access between rural and urban localities within 
the State and among neighbourhoods within Khartoum. There is also variation in the 
quality of the water supplied for domestic consumption (World Bank 2003a: 136) and, 
in addition, there are important aviations in terms of the cost of water for different 
classes. ‘The displaced and poor communities in peri-urban Khartoum pay as much as 
40% of their income for poor quality and small quantities of water, while those who are 
better off often have plentiful supplies of cheap water’ (UNDAF 2002: 19).  
Poor neighbourhoods and rural localities have little or no access to safe water. For 
most of them, water sources are typically small-scale and serve a few hundred people 
and their livestock. These sources consist of unprotected shallow wells or groundwater 
that is pumped from wells drilled into aquifers. Some water systems consist of a water 
source, some type of tank for storage, and a system of pipes for distribution. Others 
have only the source where people collect water directly. The sources can be located 
anywhere from 0.5 to 5 km away from the people’s dwellings. Many surface sources 
and shallow-water aquifers fail to provide sufficient water for farms and communities. 
Irrigation requires large volumes of good-quality water that cannot be provided by 
groundwater. Some sources dry up at the end of the dry season forcing people, 
particularly those with livestock, to move to other places outside their localities in 
search of water (SLGP 2005: 67). Frequent problems with the system affect the users 
and it would appear that there is a deplorable failure of hand pumps due to inadequate 
provisions for maintenance. Although community management has become the leading 
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concept for implementing water-supply projects in most rural localities and poor 
neighbourhoods, such a concept faces several problems in sustaining services in the 
long term. Several communities cannot maintain their systems alone and require some 
form of external assistance. In addition, he cost-sharing arrangements of some water 
programme (based on community contribution) have not worked satisfactorily due to 
the poverty of the local people (SLGP 2005: 68).  
 
Primary education 
A large number of schools operate in the State of Khartoum compared to other states. 
However, not all the communities or individuals have equal access to them. In recent 
years, the State of Khartoum has grown both in terms of the numbers of schools and the 
number of pupils enrolled. The state has 1,528 primary schools and 106,500 pupils were 
enrolled in the 2000/2001 academic year. Girls represented 47.6% out of this number 
and the literacy rate for those over 15 years of age was 74.9% (UN-SUDAN 2003: 8). In 
other states, gender disparity in primary education is much higher, for example it was 
39.4 for girls and 49.8 for boys in Blue Nile State (Abusin 2003: 19). Enrolment rates 
within the State of Khartoum and between the State of Khartoum and other states 
display considerable variation. The State of Khartoum has the highest enrolment rate for 
primary education compared to other states. For example 87% of all children aged 
between 6 and 13 in the State of Khartoum were enrolled in school in 2003. This rate is 
extremely high compared to only 8% in B. El Ghazal State (UNC-LDC 2003: 28). 
Although there is insufficient data on enrolment rates for children in poor 
neighbourhoods or for internally displaced children, it was believed that the vast 
majority of school-aged children of IDPs are not enrolled in school. A recent study 
shows that 48% of school-aged children in Khartoum camps were not enrolled in 
primary school in 2006 (IDMC 2006: 124).  
The central government only finances teachers’ salaries and educational adminis-
trators. Abusin (2003: 42) indicates that 90% of the expenditures of a locality in the 
State of Khartoum are allocated to teachers’ salaries. The budget allocated to education 
by the government is extremely low and it is the parents who usually pick up the slack. 
All of a school’s on-site costs (building construction, maintenance, furniture, textbooks 
and supplies) are covered by parental contributions in the form of school fees or other 
contributions. This is a significant factor in restricting poor children’s access to primary 
education.  
Most public schools, particularly in poor neighbourhoods, lack water, sufficient 
numbers of toilets and desks, and recreational facilities. Many students sit on the ground 
unless they bring their own chairs (World Bank 2003a: 130) and teachers are badly 
paid, often under-qualified or/and over burdened with a much larger number of students 
than they should be catering for. In some rural localities, schools are located a long way 
from where pupils actually live, thus discouraging households from sending their 
children to school, particularly girls. Many schools in these communities are over-
crowded, have inadequate facilities, inadequate classrooms in terms of size and capaci-
ty, and have dilapidated buildings, forcing pupils to have their lessons under trees in 
some cases. In addition, they have problems adequately staffing classrooms with quali-
fied teachers (SLGP 2005: 1). 
Undue emphasis is placed on market mechanisms relying on across-the-board ser-
fees for primary education. The major problem that poorer people face relates to the 
affordability of education as well as its quality. 
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Health  
The State of Khartoum has the largest share of public health facilities and staff with far 
more medical specialists and technicians than any other state (WHO 2004: 29). There is 
a network of hospitals, health centres and dispensaries, thousands of staff and extensive 
training centres. Khartoum State has 35 general practitioners per 100,000 people, which 
is high compared with South Kurdofan State that has only 1.7 general practitioners per 
100,000 people (World Bank 2003a: 118). 
However, such facilities have had only a modest impact on the health of the vast 
majority of Khartoum’s poorer population. Abusin (2004: 36-38) has noted the adequate 
availability of health facilities including mother-and-child centres in the city’s poor 
neighbourhoods but a large section of the population, particularly women, has limited or 
no access to these services at all due to the costs involved. As a result, women get sick 
and die needlessly from treatable diseases and pregnancy-related problems. For 
example, although the overall Maternal Mortality Rate (MMR) in Sudan is high even by 
standards in other African countries (UNDAF 2002: 19), there are apparent variations 
between urban and rural areas and between different states. The World Bank (2003a: 
142) indicates that Maternal Mortality Rate (MMR) for Sudan, in 1999 was estimated at 
514 cases per 100,000 births for rural areas and 496 for urban. However, among squat-
ter settlements in Khartoum, the MMR was as high as 850 cases per 100,000 births 
(UNDAF 2002: 19). No study has been done specifically on poor neighbourhoods but 
the inaccessibility of health and antenatal care is expected to impact negatively on the 
health of women in these areas. 
Many of the poor remain prone to preventable diseases such as malaria. Despite the 
existence of effective intervention measures, malaria is still endemic and the major 
health problem in the State of Khartoum. Between 1998 and 2001 Khartoum suffered an 
annual mean malaria incidence of more than 700,000 cases (WHO 2004: 29). Malaria 
causes significant morbidity and mortality, and represents the leading cause of absentee-
ism in schools and the work place leading to a considerable drain on the city population 
and particularly those living on its fringes.  
Until recently, the national prevalence rate of HIV/AIDS was relatively low but there 
are now signs of a significant rise in HIV infection rates in Khartoum (UNAIDS 2006: 
59). In the absence of a massive prevention programme, treatment and care, it is 
expected that the spread of HIV will continue. The poor have a much greater chance of 
contracting the disease compared to the non-poor. For example, the Ministry of Health 
Sudan (2005, cited in UNAIDS 2006: 59) reveals that HIV prevalence among displaced 
pregnant women seeking antenatal care in Khartoum in 2004 was 1.6% compared to 
under 0.3% for other pregnant women in the city.  
Conclusion 
Greater Khartoum is the largest and most affluent city in Sudan. Its population has 
increased steadily since the colonial era, with most growth having occurred in the last 
two decades. Its population growth has been a result of an influx of people pushed out 
of their homes by civil strife, the collapse of the peasant farming economy and 
successive waves of drought and desertification. As in other cities affected by the crisis, 
the poor gravitated toward areas where there was some wealth. This massive urban 
migration has contributed to escalating unemployment rates and has fuelled poverty and 
congestion, and placed a huge strain on the city’s traditional infrastructure and service-
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delivery system. The massive relocation to Khartoum took place in a context of de-
clining employment opportunities in the formal sector and agriculture but where no 
industrial jobs were emerging to fill the gap. In addition, the cost of living for families 
in Khartoum is continuing to rise substantially, tightening conditions for workers whose 
incomes on average are only a fraction of the recognized cost of living. There are also 
problems relating to the poor provision of water, health and education services and an 
unequal access to those services especially for the poor and women.  
There appears to be a disjuncture between urbanization and envisaged socio-
economic policies. It is true that the current size and scope of the city is far beyond what 
was planned in the past and that the demand for municipal services and infrastructure 
development has far outpaced government plans to provide them. However, in compa-
rison with other states, Khartoum has the highest concentration of many essential 
services that are perquisites for developing human capital, such as health and education. 
The people of Khartoum are presumed to have the highest chances of benefiting from 
those facilities but it would seem that the city’s poor have not been able to benefit from 
the available facilities, and in some cases have lower access to them than people in 
Sudan’s poorer states. 
The following chapters discuss emerging themes and trends that are critical to 
understanding and responding to poverty. A study framework will be identified and 
used to guide the analysis of poverty in Khartoum. 
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Understanding poverty: 
A review of conceptual issues 
 
 
 
 
Poverty is a phenomenon that is hard to pin down. The reason for understanding poverty 
has always impacted on the way it is defined. In addition, poverty is often viewed 
differently from different disciplines and perspectives and within different contexts. A 
quote that summarizes some of the dilemma notes the following: 
If we ask academics why poor people are poor ... different disciplines will answer ... in their own 
unique ways; each with certain kinds of data, certain methods, and certain habits of thinking ... in 
most substantive areas [of the social sciences] there is what to outsiders seems like an amazing lack of 
reciprocal knowledge. (Abbott 2001: 142, quoted in Hulme & Toye 2005: 1) 
A variation on the way poverty is understood is in turn closely related to disagreements 
about its causes, and the weight that should be given to the different factors. Essentially, 
this is reflected in the wide variations and methods that are used to tackle poverty. It is 
clearly difficult to define a single understanding of poverty. However, it is possible and 
useful to establish some of the basic features that are believed to be more relevant to this 
study. It is on the basis of this proposition that the following section delineates the main 
concepts that will be discussed and used in this study of poverty in Sudan. The chapter 
reviews basic approaches to understanding poverty, namely vulnerability, social exclu-
sion and empowerment, and points out the theoretical underpinnings of these concepts 
and their relevance to addressing the issue of poverty. It argues that employing these 
perspectives provides a closer picture of the reality of the poor and their expectations in 
life.  
Which poverty indicators 
Poverty is usually linked to a ‘lack’ or ‘deficiency’ of essential resources that are neces-
sary for human survival and improvement (Wratten 1995: 12). Robert Chambers (1995: 
179) argues that poverty in development discourse is commonly used in two distinct 
ways: a widely employed usage is to ‘refer to the whole spectrum of deprivation and ill-
being’, while in the second usage, poverty ‘has a narrow technical definition for pur-
poses of measurement and comparison’. Traditionally poverty is defined as material 
deprivation, as living on a low income or without sufficient means to purchase common 
goods. Some economists prefer to look at consumption because it is less volatile than 
income (Chambers 1995: 179).  
Many comparative and trend data on poverty are cast in terms of private in-
come/consumption, with the $1 per day PPP standard used as a rough poverty line. 
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Poverty lines (i.e. the World Bank’s $1 a day per capita global poverty line) are often 
used to represent the level of income or consumption necessary to meet minimum 
requirements. At present these only include estimates to meet food, clothing, shelter and 
basic education and health needs. Poverty line definitions are widely used despite their 
significant and documented limitations. It has been argued that drawing poverty lines at 
a specific point in time to define poverty offer no indication as to those people who are 
vulnerable to or at risk of becoming poor. For example, Satterthwaite (2004: 37) notes 
that households with incomes near the poverty line experience frequent fluctuations in 
income and, over time, individuals and households can move in and out of poverty, but 
this dynamic is not captured by poverty lines. 
One of the limitations of using monetary measures is associated with its failure to 
capture non-marketed and non-priced goods, like social services and other aspects that 
are important to human well-being such as the natural environment and community 
resources and social relations. This is significant, particularly in the urban context, 
where poverty tends to be associated with the inability of individuals or households to 
pay for non-food items (Satterthwaite 2004: 12). For example, sanitation and garbage 
collection can become major items in household expenditure. Rent for housing or the 
cost of land and public transport are a few of the items that eat up significant parts of the 
urban poor’s income. Furthermore, Farrington et al. (2002: 19) note that poverty lines 
do not reflect the urban population’s dependency on cash income. As almost all their 
resources have to be changed into cash so as to be utilized for consumption, the urban 
poor may be portrayed as less poor in terms of earnings.  
The conceptual distinction between deprivation in income and non-income aspects is 
of considerable relevance to understanding poverty. Sen (1999: 14) considered income 
as a means to achieve other objectives but not an end in itself. A lack of income is not 
the only deprivation that people may experience and even people who have adequate 
command over commodities may suffer far more severe deprivation in several other 
aspects of life, than those set and measured as ‘basic needs’. For Sen, an individual’s 
poverty should be linked to what they are capable of doing and being. He emphasizes 
freedom as a base for individual capability and affirms that income and wealth are ‘not 
desirable for their own sake’, instead, they are basically a means to achieve ‘more 
freedom to lead the kind of lives we have reason to value’ (Ibid.). 
In this sense, a lack of rights and freedoms can both be a cause and a consequence of 
poverty. UN definitions of poverty delineate relationships between economic and politi-
cal deprivation and the violation of human rights. They accentuate the issue of being 
able to make choices and pursue them as a key aspect in understanding people’s well-
being and as a matter of human rights: 
[…] poverty may be defined as a human condition characterized by sustained or chronic deprivation 
of the resources, capabilities, choices, security and power necessary for the enjoyment of an adequate 
standard of living and other civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights (UN-HRC 2006: 31). 
Such a perspective suggests that poverty considerations go beyond sufficient income 
or the constraint on economic resources to constraints on the ability of the poor to fully 
exercise their social, cultural and political rights. The language of rights also empha-
sizes the holistic nature of rights, that all rights are indivisible and inter-dependent.  
It is argued that when people have the freedom of choice and action, they will be able 
to influence the course of their lives and decisions that affect them (de Haan & Zoomers 
2005: 36-37, Kabeer 1999a: 2). The main issue is that individuals differ in their ability 
to access and convert resources into the achievement they aspire for. De Haan & 
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Zoomers (2005: 33-34) argue that the ability of individuals to achieve their goals 
depends on their positions in the web of power relations that they are impeded by. This 
web of relations is defined by gender, class and ethnicity. In other words, individuals’ 
social identity, in the sense of the way they are positioned in the social structures of 
power becomes a critical aspect in their ability to access and convert resources to the 
desired goals. Since societies are made up of diverse social groups, the ability of 
individuals that belong to marginalized groups to access resources can significantly be 
eroded, leaving them more vulnerable to poverty than others. Therefore, the perspective 
of social exclusion becomes of great relevance to understanding poverty because it 
enables the understanding of questions such as who is being denied rights and opportu-
nities, by whom and through what mechanisms. The concept of ‘vulnerability’ is seen as 
an important link to this discussion, highlighting not only the relativity of poverty but 
also shedding light on the numerous ways in which people ‘are made vulnerable by 
other people’ (Stephens 1996: 12). 
Overcoming exclusion is seen basically as being in the hands of the poor themselves 
and a function of their awareness. Again, individuals and groups actions to break the 
cycle of exclusion are either enabled or constrained by the structures of power in their 
contexts. This includes wider political and economic structures, norms, discourses and 
the political and legal framework within which people pursue their own livelihoods. 
Here the discourse of empowerment is relevant. Empowerment involves the transfor-
mation of power relations so that the poor and disempowered can attain or enhance 
control and choice. Empowerment is about enabling the poor to build their inner 
strength and self-worth to act (Kabeer 1999a, Rowlands 1997). Therefore, it requires 
above all the recognition and utilization of the power of the disempowered. This is what 
Rowlands (1997: 14) calls ‘power within’.  
To sum up, the conceptual distinction between deprivation in income and non-
income aspects is of great relevance. Poverty is seen to result from the complex, multi-
dimensional and pervasive processes, attitudes, and institutionalized power structures 
that result in the exclusion of some groups. Breaking this cycle depends on the poor 
themselves, according to their various identities. However, this may not be possible due 
to personal, social and/or environmental constraints. Therefore, empowerment becomes 
an important tool to enable the poor to overcome their exclusion. 
Ways of understanding poverty 
There are a number of ways to understand a person’s well-being, ranging from com-
pletely objective to completely subjective. Poverty is seen objectively when it is defined 
and measured by quantitatively measurable indicators of well-being and is seen subjec-
tively when it is defined by the poor themselves (Hulme et al. 2001: 8). The objective 
measures involve normative judgments such as what causes poverty and how it can be 
tackled. Often understanding the realities of the poor and what should be done to help 
them overcome poverty are built from a distance, and constructed in a way that is more 
convenient to the viewer (Chambers 1995: 179). Hulme et al. (2001: 8), argue that 
perception imposed from above can lead to ‘disempowering poor people and removing 
their right to create and own knowledge’. Participatory Poverty Assessments have 
shown that people’s perceptions of their poverty do not necessarily conform to the one-
size-fits-all set of models. They show that there is often a huge gulf of differences 
between how poverty is understood and interpreted by outsiders and how the poor 
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themselves perceive it (Chambers 1995: 173). Therefore, the use of participatory 
methods has generated an area of poverty knowledge that is based on the realities and 
life experiences of the poor, their priorities, expectations and aspirations.  
Norton et al. (2001: 6-7) argue that participatory methods are of critical importance 
to the poor since they are often illiterate and because their poverty limits their access to 
decision-making and their opinions are hardly ever been sought by government 
officials. The methods of the poor’s participation in decision-making and policy proc-
esses range from a simple form of top-down consultation to being partners in the deter-
mination of policies that affect the people’s lives. The concept of participation goes 
beyond enabling the poor to analyze their own situations to enabling them also to take 
action. Gaventa (2002: 6) argues that the participatory process should lead to challeng-
ing or changing the underlying social and power relations in a society.  
Participation is, therefore, basically about providing the enabling environment that 
allows people to pursue their goals. The use of participatory methods has generated an 
area of poverty knowledge that is built on the realities and life experiences of the poor, 
their priorities, expectations and aspirations including participation in social life and 
inclusion in decision-making processes. 
Poverty may be chronic (long-term) or transitory/temporary (short-term). The main 
characteristic of chronic poverty is its extended duration. While people move into and 
out of poverty over time (the transient poor), the chronic poor experience constant 
deprivation (Hulme et al. 2001). External shocks such as policy changes and natural 
disasters, for example, can leave a household in poverty. Whether such new structures 
of poverty will be temporary or persist in being chronic depends on various factors. 
These can include; individual’s initial assets, community support and social policies. 
Chronic poverty may be severe, multi-dimensional in nature and more serious than 
transient poverty. Its causes are likely to be linked to a more complex set of interrelated 
causal aspects but they can also be linked to inter-generational poverty. On the other 
hand, temporary poverty might result from a one-time decline in living standards - such 
as seasonal variations in food security - that a household can gradually overcome, and 
this might happen regularly over time. Distinguishing between chronic and transient 
poverty matters since the first is a more serious situation and its perpetuating factors are 
likely to be different, and policy responses will also be different. Nevertheless, exam-
ining factors associated with transitional poverty may help understand the mechanisms 
and processes by which certain individuals and groups become and remain chronically 
poor, thus explaining the variation in the degree to which different groups faced with 
common problems will manage to craft a solution. 
 
Vulnerability 
The term ‘vulnerability’ carries a myriad of meanings which have evolved over the 
years. In most usages, the ‘vulnerability’ concept can be used interchangeably with the 
concept of ‘poverty’. Conventionally, vulnerability has been viewed as a dynamic 
concept, while poverty had being looked at as a static phenomenon (Moser 1998: 3). 
However, the increasing recognition of poverty as a dynamic phenomenon too has 
altered the conventional distinction between the two. Despite the close association 
between the two, the terms “vulnerability and ‘poverty’ do not refer to the same thing 
(Prowse 2003: 7, Wratten 1995: 17). Wratten (Ibid.), for example, argues that ‘vulner-
ability is not synonymous with poverty, but means defencelessness, insecurity and 
exposure to risk, shocks and stress’. Prowse (2003: 3, quoting Lok-Dessallien 1998: 5) 
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indicates that a simple differentiation between poverty and vulnerability is encompassed 
in the fact that ‘not all members of a particular vulnerable group are invariably poor’. 
Although the notion of ‘vulnerability to poverty’ has remained quite elusive, poverty 
can be seen as the prospect that an individual or a household are likely to suffer as a 
result of shocks that intensify vulnerability. For Chambers, vulnerability can be one of 
the symptoms of poverty and poverty is marked not only by a lack of physical necessi-
ties, assets and income, but essentially by physical weakness, isolation, vulnerability 
and powerlessness. At the same time, vulnerability and poverty work together to create 
a vicious circle in which the two reinforce each other. An increase in vulnerability 
affects poor people because they have greater exposure to other risks, such as health 
problems, death, loss of employment, etc, without the ability to respond to them. Blaikie 
et al. (2003: 53) highlight the mutually-reinforcing nature of poverty and vulnerability. 
They argue that economically marginalized people such as urban squatters or those who 
live in marginal environments, for example, isolated, flood-prone urban locations, are 
more likely to be of marginal significance to those who hold economic and political 
power. Consequently, their political and economic marginalization leads to three, often 
mutually reinforcing, causes of vulnerability. Firstly, the activities of the poor can 
perpetuate their vulnerability when their working, living and social environments 
severely limit their livelihood options to those unrewarding and insecure livelihood 
activities and resources. Secondly, the marginal position of the poor is often associated 
with low priority for government interventions intended to deal with hazard mitigation. 
Thirdly, vulnerability can lead to the blockage, erosion or devaluation of local knowl-
edge when marginalized people lose trust in their own methods of self-protection. 
Blaikie et al. (2003: 53) argue that a loss of necessary inputs (raw materials or labour 
costs) can also limit the use of local knowledge. Vulnerability can, therefore, be both a 
cause and a symptom of poverty. This in turn suggests that the prospect of a lower level 
of well-being is associated with greater vulnerability. 
Vulnerability has frequently been seen to have two sides: an external side of shocks 
and stress; and an internal one which denotes the ability to adequately respond to and 
recover from external stresses. The external side of vulnerability is diverse in nature and 
can range from macro-economic shock, unemployment to ecological, social and 
political problems, natural disaster, health hazards or personal insecurity. These, in turn, 
may be either long- or short-term in nature. Amis (1995: 151) considered the exposure 
of the urban population to market conditions as a main cause of their vulnerability. In 
the same vein, Wratten (1995: 23) notes that, in the urban context, unemployment is a 
major cause of vulnerability and that ‘even a few days without work can represent a 
serious financial blow’. Poor people are the most prone to suffering the consequences of 
economic shocks that diminish their ability to escape long- or short-term poverty by 
depleting their human and physical assets. Vulnerability in the urban areas can be as 
much the consequence of a lack of rights that exposes people to a wide range of risks. 
Meikle (2002: 15-23) has seen much of the vulnerabilities of the urban poor and relates 
it to their questionable legal status as well as to the poor’s physical and social environ-
ments. In fact, urbanization and its attendant fragmentation and polarization are seen to 
exacerbate the vulnerability of urban residents disproportionately, but particularly that 
of the poor, with slum residents incurring higher risks from natural hazards (Blaikie et 
al. 2003: 70-71). 
Vulnerability in any of its forms is a function not only of external factors but essen-
tially the ability of individuals to protect themselves or recover having been exposed to 
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stresses and shocks by outside forces (Chambers 1995: 189). Therefore, it is important 
to go beyond shocks and risks to dig deep into the socio-economic and political 
structures and processes that restrict people’s ability to respond to such factors. Blaikie 
et al. (2003: 11) have looked at vulnerability as it relates to the dynamics of vulnerable 
people themselves, arguing that vulnerability is ‘the characteristics of a person or group 
and their situation that influence their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and 
recover from the impact of a natural hazard’. They linked vulnerability to a combination 
of factors that determine the extent to which an individual’s life and livelihood are 
exposed to risk by a certain event in nature or in society.  
The root causes of vulnerability and its reproduction over time in a particular society 
reflect the exercise and distribution of power. It has been shown that the inability of 
large segments of a society to gain access to essential resources, which leaves them in 
dare poverty (i.e. to the extent of starving) often points to factors beyond the poor them-
selves (Smith 2003: 5, Blaikie et al. 2003: 149). In particular, the power of the state and 
the form of control applied are very significant (Blaikie et al. 2003: 53). This power 
may work along the line of inherent vulnerabilities such as belonging to a particular 
class, gender or ethnicity, or factors such as disability or region of residence (Blaikie et 
al. 2003: 68-69).  
By looking at some of the causes of the famines that have hit communities in Africa, 
evidence suggests that the vulnerability of the people affected has been more a direct 
result of inequity in resource access and of the plotting of politics than of natural 
hazards. For example, during one of the major famines that hit western Sudan in 1984, 
Oxfam studied the conditions that preceded the famine and provided the following 
account for the underlying condition: ‘The people who died did not do so because the 
rains failed in 1984. Despite hard work and calculation, they died because they could 
not grow enough food and were too poor to buy what they needed’ (Cater 1986: 1; 
Oxfam publicity booklet, quoted in Blaikie et al. 2003: 147). The reasons that were put 
forward as an explanation for the situation of ‘not enough food' and 'too poor to buy', 
include ‘drought, unsuitable technologies for providing water for humans and livestock, 
population pressure and a fragile ecosystem, deforestation and a fuel crisis, chronic 
uncertainties over land tenure, lack of credit, and monopolistic power of merchants in 
rural areas’ (Blaikie et al. 2003: 147). All of these reflect structures of domination 
which may include relations among individuals but point clearly to relations between 
individual citizens and the state. The vulnerability of the people was principally rooted 
in social processes and the core reasons were ultimately quite remote from the disaster 
itself. As Blaikie et al. (2003: 147) argue, the famine situation did not hit suddenly due 
to the occurrence of natural hazards, but rather the situation would have exploded 
anyway and without the occurrence of unfavourable weather conditions. Hence, vulner-
ability and deprivation in any form are intrinsically linked to the imbalance of power 
relations in a specific society that restricts people’s capacity to make full use of the 
resources available to them. 
In the context of Sudan, Chapters 2 and 3 have painted a fairly coherent picture of 
the way power relations operated historically to undermine the livelihood of the people 
and make them vulnerable to the harsh effect of shocks. First of all, there are the 
problematic colonial boundaries the country inherited, and the complex challenge of 
achieving national unity despite the historical divisions between ethnic groups. 
Secondly, it has been argued, the state policies of agriculture, land use and rural 
development were designed to create and exacerbate the vulnerability of both the rural 
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and urban population. The detrimental outcome of such policies is the disintegration of 
traditional agriculture that took place without creating alternatives to absorb labour 
either on the new modernized farms or in urban industry. This has led to rural out-
migration, as well as to an increase in the marginal population in Khartoum and other 
cities. Such policies have led to a contraction of formal employment and a significant 
reduction in urban wages and large increases in irregular employment in urban areas. 
The emerging trend is that a large number of the population have become less able to 
deal with trends and shocks, and thus endure their long -term and harsh consequences. 
Given these circumstances that surround poverty in Sudan, the concept of vulnerability 
is seen to be more relevant to the understanding of the dynamics leading to and perpetu-
ating poverty. 
To sum up, vulnerability is seen not simply as a matter of exposure to shocks and 
hazard but essentially as people’s capacity to deal with them successfully. The discus-
sion highlights the intrinsic relationship between poverty and vulnerability, arguing that 
vulnerability can be both a cause and a result of poverty. This in turn suggests that the 
prospect of a lower well-being is associated with greater vulnerability. In addition, it has 
been argued that vulnerability and deprivation in any form are linked to the imbalance 
of power relations in a specific society and this affects people’s capacity to make full 
use of the resources available to them. The concept of vulnerability is proposed as a 
basic component in the debate about poverty in Sudan. 
 
Social exclusion  
Initially, the ‘social exclusion’ discourse mostly took place in developed countries, 
emerging in response to the increasing social divides that resulted from new labour-
market conditions and the inadequacy of social-welfare provisions to meet the varying 
needs of diverse populations. An important conceptualization of social exclusion has 
come from the French Republican tradition, with its emphasis on solidarity that views 
social exclusion ‘as a rupture of the social fabric, and attributed to a failure of the state’ 
(A. de Haan 2001: 23-24). Increasingly, the concept has gained popularity and been 
extended to refer to the state of people who are excluded from mainstream society not 
only because of income poverty (Hulme et al. 2001: 27). 
Social exclusion is seen as a multi-dimensional and dynamic process and refers to a 
combination of inter-related factors concerning ‘social relations and organizational 
barriers that block the attainment of livelihoods, human development and equal citizen-
ship’ (Beal & Piron 2005: 9). This definition points clearly to the fact that social exclu-
sion is as much about a lack of access to material resources as it is about the denial of 
the rights of equal citizenship. What also needs to be added here is that the process of 
exclusion, or inclusion, is not static. Castells (1997) argues that exclusion is a dynamic 
process shifting over time and space, depending on several factors and affecting differ-
ent groups of people in different ways. Thus “who is excluded and included may vary 
over time, depending on education, demographic characteristics, social prejudices, 
business practices, and public policies’ (Castells 1997: 73). On the other hand, Beal & 
Piron (2005: 8-9) see social exclusion as covering both the static condition and the 
dynamic process of exclusion. As a condition or outcome, social exclusion highlights 
the nature of individuals’ or a group’s social relationships with others; and the forms of 
marginalization based on ethnicity gender age etc. As a multi-dimensional and dynamic 
process, social exclusion refers to a combination of inter-related factors that restrict the 
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achievement of livelihoods, ‘human development and equal citizenship’ (Beal & Piron 
2005: 9). 
De Haan & Zoomers (2005: 33) argue that social exclusion reflects the way in which 
different institutions enable or constrain the access of different people to different types 
of resources. They contend that the concept essentially goes beyond resource-allocation 
mechanisms to power relations, culture, social identity and the distributional 
implications for the poor and least powerful members of society. Focusing on the ways 
in which individuals gain memberships to different groups signifies first and foremost 
the importance of ‘ascribed identities’ principally race, ethnicity and gender or sexual 
orientation in demarcating those deemed to be eligible for inclusion or exclusion 
(Kabeer 2000: 5-6). The socially excluded represents individuals who belong to social 
groups whose ethnicity, culture and identity enjoy the least amount of recognition, 
influence and power in a society. 
It is not only individuals and groups that suffer exclusion but also entire countries or 
regions can be excluded (de Haan 2000: 340). Beall (2002a: 48-49) also noted that some 
urban neighbourhoods or areas are left out by the overall policy structure, with the 
consequence of exclusion for significant section of their population from economic and 
social opportunities. Beall argues that within cities, social exclusion is intimately bound 
up with local governance being inclusive or exclusive (Beall 2002a: 45).  
The concept of ‘social exclusion’ has a conceptual relevance with the known notions 
of poverty, since there is indeed a close link between economic stratification and the 
phenomenon of exclusion within a society. When wider features of poverty are recog-
nized, these usually include social exclusion as a lack of participation in the life of one’s 
community. While acknowledging that there is no universally agreed upon definition 
for poverty, the Copenhagen World Summit on Social Development defined poverty as: 
... lack of income and productive resources to ensure sustainable livelihoods; hunger and malnutrition; 
ill health; limited or lack of access to education and other basic services; increased morbidity and mor-
tality from illness; homelessness and inadequate housing; unsafe environments and social discrimina-
tion and exclusion. It is also characterised by lack of participation in decision-making and in civil, 
social and cultural life. (UN 1995: 57) 
The above definition clearly establishes the fundamental dynamics between poverty 
and exclusion. When poverty is defined as encompassing a wider set of conditions, it 
becomes a central component of social exclusion. The socially excluded are more likely 
to be denied access to income, assets and services that are afforded to others in their 
society. Hence, the processes of exclusion result in multiple deprivations. People can 
become excluded from material, social, political and cultural resources. Kabeer (2000: 
9) argues that various forms of social exclusion and marginalization can result when 
institutions grant some actors authority over others in deciding on principles of resource 
allocation and exchange within a specific context. Kabeer (Ibid.) argues that: 
Disadvantage results in social exclusion when the various institutional mechanisms through which 
resource are allocated and value assigned operate in such a way as to systematically deny particular 
groups of people the resources and recognition which would allow them to participate fully in the life 
of that society. 
Each type of disadvantage gives rise to different kinds of disadvantaged groups. Fraser 
(1997, cited in Kabeer 2000: 4), suggested that a conceptual spectrum extends from 
primarily economic types of disadvantage or injustice at one end to primarily cultural 
types at the other. At the economic end of the spectrum, injustice concerns the exploita-
tion (i.e. of labour), marginalization (exclusion from means of acquiring livelihood or 
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relegated into less-rewarding employment) and deprivation (the denial of an adequate 
standard of living). The ‘cultural’ end is composed of injustice generated from social 
patterns of representation, interpretation and communication. Kabeer argues that the line 
that separates economic and cultural disadvantage is more of heuristic than real, since 
the two are closely inter-related and sometimes inseparable. Between primarily 
economic and primarily cultural forms of exclusion, there are also hybrid forms of 
injustice that are ‘bound up with cultural-valuational disadvantage’. 
Social exclusion can result in poverty when citizenship rights come to be systemati-
cally not realized for some individuals and groups. For Kabeer (2006a), citizenship acts 
as an allocative function within the boundaries of the nation state, by governing access 
to resources, bestowing legitimacy and support for an unjust economic and social 
hierarchy within a society. This suggests the importance of citizenships rights, particu-
larly the economic and social rights for the historically disadvantaged groups. In the 
context of the south, social exclusion has its historical roots in the ambiguity of nation-
building, politics and political engineering in the advent of modernity. Kabeer (2006a: 
91-96) argues that the history of nation in the south reflects the denial of ‘respect, rights, 
dignity and even humanity by some groups to others’.  
Individuals can be excluded but not necessarily poor. Social exclusion can take place 
between groups that are not considerably different from one another economically (de 
Haan & Zoomers 2005: 34). In the same vein, Kabeer (2005: 3) notes that social exclu-
sion involves a social process in which a horizontal model of equality can be created 
and reinforced. Such an inequality not only transcends class boundaries but also accen-
tuate disparities within the same social class. It becomes a matter of individual biogra-
phy as social identity becomes ‘the central axis of groups’ exclusion’. The analysis of 
both poverty and social exclusion is therefore interlinked with institutional analysis that 
is concerned with the twofold processes of granting or denying access to essential 
resources.  
The social-exclusion perspective starts from a general idea of the importance of 
inclusion in society. Kabeer (2005a: 6) emphasizes the importance of having the choice 
of inclusion, and in withdrawing from group memberships according to own will. In the 
same line, A. de Haan (2001: 29) argues that inclusion should reflect the choice of 
actors. In other words, inclusion might not be the choice of some people, while others 
can be included against their will. Exclusion should, therefore, be perceived in terms of 
‘exclusion from rights or entitlements: what counts is people’s access and less whether 
they decide to use that access’ (Ibid.). As such, social inclusion becomes tied up with 
individual choice on the one hand and on the other by the structures that define, inter-
pret and implement rights as well as the political processes that define the channels 
through which people can access resources and claim their rights.  
Being denied the opportunity to participate fully in the life of their community 
prevents the excluded from realizing their potential. It is thus imperative to enable the 
poor to take an active role in decisions that affect their lives as well as challenging deep-
seated attitudes and prejudices that prevent them from realizing their human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. These aspects will be discussed in the following sections. 
To sum up, processes of social exclusion are at the heart of poverty. The concept of 
social exclusion is multi-dimensional and encompasses the processes and social 
relations that underlie deprivation. The concept of social exclusion is seen to enable 
understanding relations of power and control. This underlies the process by which some 
groups in society are marginalized and impoverished. Exclusion often occurs to certain 
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groups in a population, in general those with marginal significance to those who hold 
economic and political power. Excluded individuals usually have certain social traits 
that locate them outside the circuits of dominant social and political power. Social 
exclusion generates and increases people’s vulnerability. Those groups with less-
favoured traits such as class, ethnicity, religion or gender who are denied the opportuni-
ties available to others to enhance their livelihoods may become less able to respond to 
shocks and trends. 
 
Power and relations 
In its broader sense, power refers to the command over the resources by which actors 
become able to achieve their goals (Kabeer 1999a: 2). Conceptualizing power is the 
capacity to mobilize resources requires qualifying resources and their utility. Resources 
include a combination of conventional material assets such as land, livestock or equip-
ment, as well as a wide range of human and social capital that can be accessed and used 
to define goals (de Haan & Zoomers 2005: 33, Kabeer 1999a: 3). De Haan & Zoomers 
(2005: 33) highlight the importance of understanding relationships between resources. 
They argue that resources are interrelated and, to be able to mobilize one type of 
resources, it is necessary to make use of other types too. The utility of resources has 
been eloquently explained by Bebbington (1999: 2022, quoted in de Haan & Zoomers 
2005: 32) as follows: 
A person’s assets, such as land, are not merely means with which he or she makes a living: they also 
give meaning to that person’s world. Assets are not simply resources that people use in building 
livelihoods: they are assets that give them the capability to be and to act. Assets should not be under-
stood only as things that allow survival, adaptation and poverty alleviation: they are also the basis of 
agents’ power to act and to reproduce, challenge or change the rules that govern the control, use and 
transformation of resources. 
The possession of resources is just a means of gaining power and control over one’s 
own destiny rather than an end in itself. The extent to which actors are able to mobilize 
resources depends on their specific social context and includes a wide rage of legal, 
political, economic and cultural institutions. Relations at these levels have the most 
important impact on poverty (de Haan & Zoomers 2005: 33). Resources have therefore 
often been explained as having two forms: authoritative resources that stem from the 
control of the activities of actors, and allocative resources that derive from the control of 
material things. Drawing on Giddens (1979), Kabeer (1999a: 3) argued that allocative 
resource ‘tend to be embedded within the distribution of authoritative resources, or the 
ability to define priorities and enforce claims’. Hence the two forms of resources are not 
independent of one another but tend to be mutually reinforcing. 
In any social system, resources are unequally divided among different actors. Power 
is exercised through differentiated actors. De Haan (2005a: 6) argues that there are 
always variations in personal capacities and motivation among different actors. Actors 
usually belong to varying positions along traits such as class, status, gender and cultural 
or religious marginality. Differences in power between them affect the opportunities and 
outcomes of their livelihoods in numerous interactions. Taking as example the power of 
the state versus citizens; the state has the power to interfere in traditional systems and 
thus contribute to people’s vulnerability. In their quest to monopolize power, states can 
undertake systematic persecution, ethnic cleansing or use civil wars to eliminate the 
political power of the people (Blaikie et al. 2003: 95). Wratten (1995: 24) notes that 
compared to the rural poor, the urban poor as a group are more prone to encountering 
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different forms of suppressive power from the state agents and the police due to their 
informal activities or tenure arrangements. Although power may appear more connected 
to state institutions, it is reproduced and maintained in several familial settings of 
everyday life. Belief systems and cultural practices play an important role in legitimiz-
ing and reinforcing material structures (Foucault 1978: 139). Some actors are also 
endowed with legitimacy and authority in their respective institutional contexts merely 
for being in such social position in society. For example, men in their superior power 
position in the household hierarchy, head of firms or chiefs of tribes etc. 
Power is always renegotiated and can characterize the competition and conflict of 
interest among different actors and between different activities within any particular 
context. For example, de Haan (2005a: 6) argues that power in the household is essen-
tially linked to competition and conflict in the sense of a division of interests, goals, 
values, beliefs and preferences of different members. Conflict does not imply power-
lessness of either party in the conflict. Kabeer (1999a: 42) notes that conflicts and acts 
of violence against women in households can take place not only because women have 
far less access to and control of power and resources but because women have ‘greater 
voice within the household’. Therefore, the notion of power also implies the prospect 
that individuals with less power also exercise power and have some degree of control. 
De Haan & Zoomers (2005: 36-37) have emphasized the importance of power not only 
as top-down but also as ordinary power operating at the less apparent end of those been 
controlled or dominated. 
The notion of power implies that as power and control can operate through coercion 
and conflict, it can also operate through consent and active involvement (Foucault 1978: 
138, Kabeer 1999a: 7). This type of debate has often highlighted the central analogous 
between power and language/knowledge processes (Foucault 1978, Escobar 19951). 
Foucault’s (1978: 138-39)2 notion of disciplinary power is useful here as it draws atten-
tion to the mechanisms of control that operate through complicity. Foucault highlights 
the way different oppressive ideologies may be institutionalized through the regulation 
of the body, actions and thoughts/discourses (i.e. in prison). For Foucault, the domina-
tion is most dangerous and controlling when it is ‘normalized’ through self-regulation 
and self-discipline. There, without being forced to, individuals become actively 
involved in the reproduction of the culture of their oppression by their own thoughts, 
words and deeds. Women are seen to be more vulnerable to the effect of disciplinary 
power. As Kabeer (2005: 14) argues:  
Gender often operates through the unquestioned acceptance of power. Thus women who, for example, 
internalize their lesser claim on household resources, or accept violence at the hands of their hus-
bands, do so because to behave otherwise is considered outside the realm of possibility.  
                                                 
1  Particularly in relation to development activities and the role of development practitioners in shaping 
applications and outcomes of development programmes. 
2  ‘What was then being formed was a policy of coercions that act upon the body, a calculated manipu-
lation of its elements, its gestures, its behaviour. The human body was entering a machinery of power 
that explores it, breaks it down and rearranges it. A “political anatomy”, which was also a “mechanics 
of power”, was being born; it defined how one may have a hold over others’ bodies, not only so that 
they may do what one wishes, but so that they may operate as one wishes, with the techniques, the 
speed and the efficiency that one determines. Thus discipline produces subjected and practiced bodies, 
“docile” bodies.’ 
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The danger of the disciplinary power rests in the fact that it makes social rules appear 
consensual and non-negotiable although they are merely manifestations of asymmetry of 
power.  
In summary, resources are the means for gaining power and control over destinies 
and include material, social and human resources. The terms on which people gain 
access to resources are always linked to issues of power distribution within a society. 
The concept of social exclusion draws attention to the outcome of the power imbalance 
within society and the way it influences the livelihood of people. Power is created and 
maintained through state institutions, ideologies or society’s values, beliefs and attitudes 
as well as individual consciousness. Ideology does a far more effective job of sustaining 
an unequal power structure.  
 
Institutions 
The previous discussion on power has highlighted the integral importance of institutions 
at all levels in the distribution of resources and in determining livelihood outcomes. 
Various institutions are involved in the processes of allocation and distribution of 
resources among different people. These include ‘economic, social, and political 
structures, as well as legal definitions and enforcement of rights, and the ideological 
order’ (Blaikie et al. 2003: 52). These institutions allocate material and symbolic re-
sources. A well-quoted definition of institution is drawn from North (1990: 3) and reads 
as follows:  
Institutions are the rules of the game of a society, or, more formally, are the humanly devised con-
straints that structure human interaction. They are composed of formal rules (statute law, common 
law, regulations), informal constraints (conventions, norms of behaviour and self-imposed modes of 
conduct), and the enforcement characteristics of both. 
According to the definitions above, there are numerous institutions that determine 
people’s access to resources at various levels: at the individual, household, group, 
community, local government and national government level. In addition, several insti-
tutions that operate at the global level now determine people’s access to resources at any 
given local levels (de Haan 2000: 353-57). These institutions range from markets, 
multinational corporations and international financial institutions to world trade organi-
zations. 
Institutions can be divided into two broad categories: formal and informal. Formal 
institutions (or formal power resources) control social behaviour with established 
precedents consisting of statute law, common law and regulations, and thus relating 
directly to the state. Traditionally, state institutions have the sole capacity to define 
policies that determine access to and control of resources and consequently the viability 
of livelihood options. Power inequalities are part of the dynamics of the relationships 
between the bureaucratic authority versus people or citizens. Such inequalities are 
spelled out in the state-society power-sharing over public-sector management and 
resource allocation. The state’s interest and/or capacity to defend the poor’s interests 
and rights through the legislation and execution of policy change and the enforcement 
of positive actions through its judicial system are critical for their survival. It has been 
claimed that the poor are rarely well served by state institutions. Kabeer (2000: 28) 
argues that although the state could effectively become an apparatus for evading the 
negative impact of the market and customary social relations, in reality the state has 
actively served to reinforce problems of poverty, exclusion and social injustice. For 
example, in the urban areas, government regulation and, more particularly, the intensity 
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of entry, is often seen to have a great impact on the vulnerability of the poor (Amis 
1999: 2, Satterthwaite 2004: 35). Land use policy and attitudes towards the informal 
sector are often served to jeopardize people’s ability to survive (Amis 1999: 41). The 
enforcement of these regulations takes place through harassment and penalties for many 
informal enterprises or the eviction and resettlement of poor land users (Satterthwaite 
2004: 35). Several urban government institutions therefore actively serve to create or 
exacerbate poverty. 
Informal institutions usually indicate the habitual ways in which a society runs its 
everyday affairs and consists of standards of behaviour, conventions and self-imposed 
modes of behaviour (Kabeer 2003: 14). However, there is always dynamic interaction 
between formal and informal institutions. Traditional norms develop gradually and 
become deeply entrenched in behaviour patterns and they not only govern the way the 
traditional authorities function but also influence the actions of state institutions such as 
the law. As Kabeer (2000: 6-10) argues, informal rules can serve as a gateway to formal 
rules, especially when viewed from the angle of gender and the way it structures princi-
ples of resource distribution in a society. Women in many societies become socially 
excluded from basic sources of wealth, social status, power and well-being such as land, 
labour market and property through the dominant legal systems. In this regard, property 
and land laws informed by gender serve to compromise a woman’s ability to maintain 
her livelihood and survive difficult situations. 
To summarize, it has been argued that, firstly, social exclusion underlies poverty and 
vulnerability and, secondly exclusion is embedded in power structures. This section has 
sought to identify the power structures, institutions and actors who maintain and 
encourage processes of exclusion. It is clear that institutions regulating patterns of 
inclusion and exclusion range from the household to the local state, the national state 
and international levels. People always pursue their livelihoods within a complex matrix 
of formal and informal laws, regulations, norms and customs that determine the acces-
sibility of resources. These constraints influence their decisions about which routes to 
take. 
 
Agency and empowerment 
The extent to which excluded people are able to combat their exclusion is basically a 
function of their own power. For Foucault (1978: 139), the notion of power involves 
relationships that influence people’s actions. Though it may not necessarily involve 
force or violence, such relationships include making people do what they would not 
have done otherwise: power in this sense involves constraining or altering people’ 
agency. However, while de Haan & Zoomers (2005: 37) agree with Foucault that 
‘individuals are both subjected to power mechanisms and are, at the same time, its 
creators’, they criticize Foucault’s conception of power for being too deterministic in 
‘see[ing] less room for actors to induce change’. Their exposition of power calls for 
movement away from the conventional conceptualization of power as the ability to 
apply power over people, structures and resources to power that is mostly exercised in 
the form of actions and behaviours of both the powerful and the powerless.  
Such forms of power have been detailed in Rowlands’s (1997: 13-14) conception of 
power as involving a relationship between structures and agency of challenge. 
Rowlands draws attention to the importance of understanding power in its multi-dimen-
sional forms, as ‘power over’, ‘power to’, ‘power with’ and ‘power within’. These 
perspectives of power are not separate entities but instead could be seen to lie along a 
 57
continuum from ‘power over’ to ‘power within’. At one end, ‘power over’ represents 
the limiting force that strives for total control and domination. At the other end, ‘power 
within’ or ‘internal power’ is generated by trust in oneself and relates to individual 
consciousness/understanding and self-esteem and hence the ability to deal with and 
combat the power over or unjust situations. Here Rowlands draws out the central 
parallels that exist between power that restricts people’s capacity to achieve certain 
goals and the capability that people have and are able to exercise to change negative 
situation. This implies that, even at the other end of power where people are subjected 
to ‘power over’, they are not completely passive victims and may become involved in 
active individual or collective resistance. This highlights the issue of the capability of 
agency, and people’s power to intervene to effect change.  
Individual (or collective) agency hinges upon the ability to define goals and put them 
into effect (Kabeer 1999: 437). Such ability is bound up by three interrelated and 
inseparable elements: resources, agency and achievements. Agency is exercised when 
social actors interact, negotiate and resist power leading to the reinforcement or trans-
formation of existing situations. For Kabeer (1999: 438), agency can take the form of 
‘decision-making’ and/or ‘bargaining and negotiation, deception and manipulation, 
subversion and resistance’. Achievement refers to the extent to which a person or group 
is able to achieve their desired outcome while resources refer to material as well as 
human and social resources and access (Kabeer 1999: 437). 
Poverty and disempowerment are intrinsically linked because the inability to meet 
essential life needs and the consequence of relying on powerful others eliminate 
people’s capacity to make meaningful choices. Kabeer (1999: 437) defines empower-
ment as ‘the expansion in people’s ability to make strategic life choices in a context 
where this ability was previously denied to them’. This understanding highlights 
empowerment both in terms of fundamental change and also in the sense of the power 
‘to do’, ‘to be able’ and of being in control of one’s own situations. It also indicates that 
powerful people who are endowed with the ability to exercise a great degree of choice 
and autonomy are not empowered since they have not been disempowered in the first 
place. 
Individual agency is exercised within the structural constraints of institutions and 
various practices but these constraints always impose limits on what people can achieve. 
De Haan & Quarles van Ufford (2001: 4) argue that while people in poverty may 
remain full agents, their agency should not mean that they are a ‘free agent who can 
become whatever they choose’. Their agency is restricted by fewer resources and strate-
gic capacities, and is influenced by cultural beliefs and norms. Empowerment therefore 
becomes the central agenda in supporting the poor’s struggle to exercise effective 
choices. In addition, power cannot ensue to the poor without challenging the rules that 
foster their exclusion be it within the household or in the community at large.  
De Haan & Quarles van Ufford (2001: 4) and Kabeer (1999: 438) argue that to trans-
form agency into effective action, the poor need the backing of the institutional context 
or the mechanisms of formal and informal rules including laws, regulations, norms and 
customs that determine people’s access to resources as well as their ability to employ 
the asset effectively to attain what they aspire to. These matters raise questions about 
the way the poor become aware of their rights and how they can engage and make 
effective demands on the state, and the extent institutions can be responsive and 
accountable to them. Rights are seen to be essential to increasing the boundaries of what 
individuals can achieve. It is argued that there is an intrinsic relationship between 
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empowerment and rights. Rights are important in the lives of the poor and the absence 
of some (economic and social rights) undermines the security of livelihood and their 
ability to exercise agency in their own lives and the lives of their community. At the 
same time, a lack or minimum levels of agency (including minimum political and civil 
rights) restrict the poor’s capacity to influence decision-making processes that in turn 
impact negatively on the outcome of their livelihoods (Kabeer 2002: 31). Therefore, 
nominal rights granted by institutions are not enough for empowerment if they are not 
linked to building capacities among the disadvantaged to enable them to exercise those 
rights.  
Empowerment cannot be done by an external party but has to come from within. 
Rowlands (1997: 16), points out that: ‘true power cannot be bestowed: it comes from 
within. Any notion of empowerment being “given” by one group to [an]other hides an 
attempt to keep control’. The role that individuals are able to play in decision-making 
and the resultant expansion of choice and action both in their personal life and in 
broader social interactions are seen as defining aspects of empowerment. However, the 
poor often lack the information and political power necessary for meaningful participa-
tion in political decision-making processes. 
For Rowlands (1997: 14), the main route to empowerment lies in mobilizing the 
participation and knowledge of marginalized people, particularly women. ‘Empower-
ment is more than participation in decision-making; it must also include the processes 
that lead people to perceive themselves as able and entitled to make decisions.’ 
Empowerment requires supporting the ‘power within’ of disempowered groups, facili-
tating the building of their inner strength and self-worth. This indicates that empower-
ment is intrinsically tied to the possession of knowledge and skills that enable the 
autonomy of action. Kabeer (2006a: 99) expands this issue further by arguing that 
individual knowledge of rights and political options as well as the belief in one’s rights 
are essential elements for the poor and challenge the rules that determine access to 
resources. However, an individual’s efforts may remain fragile which will necessitate 
collective action. Rowlands (1997: 15) argues that ‘empowerment is a process; that it 
involves some degree of personal development, but that this is not sufficient; and that it 
involves moving from insight to action’. It highlights that while individual conscious-
ness/understanding (power within) is a prerequisite to effecting change at an individual 
level, it is also important for group or collective action (power with) that can organize, 
challenge or change the rules that determine the control, use and transformation of 
resources for the good of the whole.  
Empowerment and rights can be seen as mutually reinforcing. As discussed earlier, 
empowerment operates in two broad realms: the first concerns the agent’s capacities, 
and the second involves the institutional constraints including effective rights or ‘insti-
tutionally recognized opportunities’. These two concerns may operate in tandem. 
Imbalances of power can cause institutions to grant only nominal rights that could not 
be exercised or made use of. On the other hand, agents may be aware of their rights and 
have the capacity to exercise them, but they may also not have these rights.  
To sum up, different forms of power can take place simultaneously. The fundamental 
shift and transformation of power for the poor start with the poor themselves. The extent 
to which actors are able to effect change is determined by factors within themselves 
(agency) as well as societal factors. Individual consciousness/understanding (power 
within), is a prerequisite to effecting change not only at an individual level but also at a 
group or collective level. The poor cannot successfully change the rules without power 
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enshrined in formal institutions. In this context, it is useful to distinguish empowerment, 
in the sense of actors’ capacities from rights. 
 
Empowerment and rights 
As mentioned earlier, empowerment concerns both the ways in which the poor exercise 
power to change and influence institutions that affect their livelihoods, as well as issues 
of governance and institutional transformation. Rights are central to both. UNDP (2003: 
1) states that the difference between the language of ‘right’ and that of ‘need’ is huge 
and so are the implications for addressing poverty within each. ‘A right is something to 
which one is entitled solely by virtue of being a person. It is that which enables an 
individual to live with dignity’ (Ibid.).  
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and subsequent instruments, recognize 
that everyone, as a member of society, ‘has economic, social and cultural rights, such as 
rights to the highest attainable standard of health and education, as well as civil and 
political rights such as rights to life and liberty’ (DFID 2000: 9). While this perspective 
integrates concerns with the fulfilment of human rights, its central emphasis remains on 
the instrumentality of expanding people's choices, by enhancing their capacities to 
utilize those enhanced capacities. Explicit in this assumption is the idea that poverty 
should not be seen as an issue of available economic resources but rather it should be 
considered an issue of political commitment and legitimacy. DFID (2000a: 7) specifies 
principles that uphold rights to include the observance of the following: inclusive rights, 
the right to participation and the fulfilment of obligation. These principles point to the 
state as a duty bearer. The concept of citizenship offers the theoretical linkage between 
the state and citizen and implies multi-dimensional rights associated with participation 
in the political sphere, social inclusion and the security of livelihoods. Claiming and 
realizing rights is a political process where citizens’ ability to mobilize and influence 
depends on state institutions. The state has an obligation to strengthen the processes of 
citizen participation as well as the institutions and policies that protect and promote the 
realization of citizen’s rights (Gaventa 2002: 2). 
Participation, both social and political, is recognized as a human right in itself and as 
fundamental to the realization of other rights. UNOHCHR (2002: 48) highlights the fact 
that the effective participation of the poor should start from the right to information that 
enables them to participate actively in their community’s affairs as well as overcoming 
other capability failures. Political participation has often been geared towards raising 
citizens’ awareness to enable them to hold elected representatives more accountable. 
The goal of participation goes beyond the need to hold others accountable, to enable 
people to articulate their needs and organize to achieve their goals (Cornwall & Gaventa 
2001: 32-33). This stresses the importance of inclusive participation as the basis for 
‘active citizenship’ and frames citizens as ‘makers and shapers rather than as ‘users and 
choosers’ (Gaventa 2002: 6).  
In a study that explores what inclusive citizenship means to excluded people, the 
notion of citizenship came to be conceptualized as involving multi-dimensional rights. 
These are expressed within four common and broad values that have emerged in diverse 
contexts (Kabeer 2005: 3). These include ‘justice’, ‘recognition’, ‘self-determination’ 
and ‘solidarity’. ‘Justice’ is seen as involving fairness and equality ‘when it is fair for 
people to be treated the same and when it is fair that they should be treated differently’. 
In ‘recognition’, the emphasis is on the recognition of the potential inherent in each 
human being, and the recognition and respect of their differences (Kabeer 2005: 4). 
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‘Self-determination’ refers to individuals’ ‘ability to exercise some degree of control 
over their lives’ (Ibid.: 5). ‘Solidarity’ is the ‘the capacity to identify with others and to 
act in unity with them in their claims for justice and recognition’ (Kabeer 2005: 7). 
These common values could be seen to reflect both a horizontal as well as a vertical 
view of citizenship which accords as much significance to relations between citizens 
and the states as to the informal recognition of rights or the ‘societal understanding’ of 
who belongs and who does not.  
Kabeer (2005a: 22) argues that people’s ‘sense of citizenship lies in the terms on 
which they participate in this collective life and the forms of agency they are able to 
exercise’. Where people are only able to participate on highly unequal terms or are 
denied access altogether, citizenship relates to their attempts to challenge these 
exclusionary processes and bring about change. This concept implies that citizenship is 
realized through the agency of citizens themselves according to their various identities. 
However, while emphasis is placed on the role citizens play in contesting and claiming 
their rights, there are nonetheless challenges for the active role of citizens. Kabeer 
(2006a: 100) argues that the practice of citizenship should not always be expected to 
lead to an automatic challenge in people’s exclusion, particularly where exclusion is 
deeply entrenched. Different forms of exclusion that occur as a result of membership to 
a particular group may preclude individuals from accessing and exercising their rights 
on equal footing and consequently lead to horizontal inequality and poverty. O’Neil & 
Piron (2003: 19) argue that even in the context of legal equality, some forms of 
discrimination are hard to overcome due to the historical inequalities that produce socio-
economic and political disadvantages and constrain access to rights. 
In addition, limited access to resources and the inability to secure an adequate 
livelihood may impact negatively on agency by decreasing people’s ability to act 
individually and collectively. For Kabeer (2006a: 98), this issue underscores the 
indivisibility of basic needs and basic rights: 
Where people lack the means to meet their daily survival needs, they will only achieve security of 
livelihoods by binding themselves into highly asymmetrical relationships, receiving a variety of 
resources essential for their basic needs in return for a variety of resources, which reinforce their 
patron’s dominant status: political or factional support, muscle power in conflict, aid in emergencies, 
guaranteed supply of labour in peak periods and so on. 
The challenge is to enable them to mobilize and develop a sense of citizenship and 
the ability to act; especially when they have internalized a sense of powerlessness that 
constrains them from challenging the way that social group has been positioned in 
society. While citizenship rights are individual rights, defining them can only be carried 
out collectively. It is only when individuals have organized collectively to articulate and 
define their own interests collectively as a group struggling ‘from below’ that they 
become able to challenge their exclusion and redefine ‘the boundaries of citizenship’ 
(Kabeer 2006a: 100). At the same time, the state’s respect for citizenship rights and the 
promotion of the principles of equality is central in these processes.  
To sum up, when the poor have rights, they have legitimate claims against individ-
ual, group, social, cultural or economic institutions, and the state. Both the formal and 
informal recognition of rights are important in the lives of the poor. The state has an 
obligation to protect, support and secure the attainment of the human rights of all their 
citizens. The concept of ‘citizenship’ can be useful since it underpins the multi-dimen-
sional rights that are associated with participation in the political sphere, social 
inclusion and the security of livelihoods. Rights are indivisible and restriction in one 
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right may impact on the attainment of other human rights. An important challenge is to 
enable excluded people to mobilize and develop a sense of citizenship and ability to act.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has presented a detailed discussion of the main issues considered to be 
closely associated with poverty in any context. To start with, poverty is a dynamic and 
multi-dimensional phenomenon that is much broader than income deprivation alone. 
Poverty results not only from a lack of material resources but essentially from 
constraints on people’s capacities and choices, thereby increasing their vulnerability. 
The study conceptualizes poverty in terms of vulnerability or the inability of people to 
respond adequately to shocks and hazards. A variety of economic, social and environ-
mental concerns are the root causes in making an individual or group vulnerable or at 
greater risk to a variety of social ills. The notion of vulnerability goes beyond mere 
exposure to shocks and hazard to underlie people’s capacity to deal successfully with 
these shocks and hazards. There is an intrinsic and reinforcing relationship between 
poverty and vulnerability, and vulnerability can be both a cause and a symptom of 
poverty. This suggests that the prospect of lower well-being is associated with greater 
vulnerability. Vulnerability and subsequent deprivation in any form are linked to the 
imbalance of power relations in a specific society, and involve people’s capacity to 
make full use of the resources available to them. Social exclusion generates and 
increases people’s vulnerability. 
The concept of social exclusion is seen to enable an understanding of relations of 
power and control. It underlies the process by which some groups in society are margin-
alized and impoverished. Exclusion often occurs to certain group of population, gener-
ally those with marginal significance to those who hold economic and political power. 
The excluded individuals usually have certain social traits that locate them outside the 
circuits of dominant social and political power. Those disadvantaged groups with less-
favoured traits concerning class, ethnicity, religion and gender and who are denied the 
opportunities available to others to enhance their livelihoods may become less able to 
respond to shocks and trends. 
The social-exclusion perspective puts centre stage questions about who the excluded 
are. What are they excluded from exactly? And who are the formal and informal ‘custo-
dians’ of membership and inclusion? The terms on which people gain access to 
resources are always linked to issues of power distribution within a society. People are 
excluded by institutions and behaviour that reproduce and enforce prevailing social 
attitudes and values, particularly those of the powerful actors in society. Vulnerability 
and deprivation in any form are thus intrinsically linked to the imbalance of power 
relations in a specific society that restricts people’s capacity to make full use of the 
resources available to them. 
The social exclusion of the poor and their lack of power in relation to the powerful in 
society clearly indicate the need to create new mechanisms to enable them to regain 
power and control over their destinies. It has been argued that the fundamental shift and 
transformation of power for the poor starts with the poor themselves. The extent to 
which they are able to combat social exclusion is determined by factors within them-
selves (agency) as well as societal factors. The poor’s consciousness/understanding 
(power within) is seen as a prerequisite to effecting change not only at an individual 
level but also at a group or collective level. This study is anchored in the premise that 
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questions of empowerment need to be located within the individual actors’ social, 
cultural and historical context. The poor cannot successfully change the rules without 
power enshrined in formal institutions. In this context, it is also useful to distinguish 
empowerment in the sense of actors’ capacities from rights. Rights can empower the 
poor and marginalized groups to combat social exclusion on an empowered footing. 
Rights and empowerment approaches can therefore be mutually supportive. 
It is in this sense that the concepts of vulnerability and social exclusion will be used 
to construct a more comprehensive understanding of the factors underlying relative 
disadvantage, disparities and the well-being of the poor in Sudan. The next chapter 
looks at the specific factors relating to urban poverty to inform the study framework that 
will incorporate the principles that have been highlighted in these two chapters.  
 
 5 
 
Dimensions of urban poverty 
 
 
 
 
Unregulated globalization, climate change and rapid urbanization in Africa have intro-
duced new forms of vulnerability for the urban poor who are experiencing deepening 
and cumulative patterns of social exclusion. Coquery-Vidrovitch (1991: 2) points to the 
need to understand the historical roots of urbanization in Africa including ‘the integra-
tion of the household into new networks of capitalist production; the invention of a new 
web of concepts and practice on land and land laws, on housing and rental’. Many urban 
centres served as major points for regional and international socio-economic activities 
before the colonial era. For Coquery-Vidrovitch (1991: 21), precapitalist African 
urbanization had a ‘restricted development fitted well with the demographic conditions 
and modes of production and long distance economic relations of mostly rural and 
trading societies’. She argues that urbanization in Africa occurred in phases depending 
on the changing terms on which Africa were integrated into the world economy, 
including policy imposition by international bodies.  
This chapter identifies the specific vulnerabilities of the urban poor, which are 
imposed by various factors. It starts by looking at the interrelationships between urban 
and rural livelihoods and the context-specific vulnerabilities of the urban poor to under-
stand the particular constraints the urban poor face in maintaining their livelihoods. It 
also considers policies that can be geared towards alleviating poverty.  
Urban-rural interrelationships: Implications for livelihoods 
Several studies have concentrated on understanding what characterizes ‘urban’ or ‘rural’ 
poverty as well as the interrelationships between the two categories, for example 
Satterthwaite & Tacoli (2002: 67). These studies provide evidence that urban and rural 
areas are interlinked and that the boundaries between them are fluid. They suggest that 
these boundaries should be seen as a continuum rather than a sharp dichotomy (Satter-
thwaite 2000: 19). De Haan (2005a: 7) argues that an increasing number of households 
from both urban and rural areas rely on a combination of livelihood activities and 
resources. For rural populations, the need to access markets, services and employment 
opportunities in urban centres forms a critical corner of their livelihood activities. Amis 
(1995: 153) argues that ‘livelihoods tend to be at their most complex nature in urban 
areas, with households drawing on a wide variety of activities to capture income and 
other resources’. Urban households may combine a range of activities and occupations 
to build a diverse portfolio of activities and derive a part of their livelihood from wage 
labour and a part from farming undertaken by absent household members in the rural 
areas in conjunction with a variety of other activities. Rural assets provide economic 
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and social support and serve as a safety net for poor households in the city. In addition, 
the rural base represents a refuge for urban workers if they lose their jobs (A. de Haan 
2000: 7). While these processes are relevant to people, the intensity of such interactions 
is driven by poverty (Tostensen 2004: 2) and its returns are of crucial importance to the 
poor (Owuor 2006: 193-212). As it has numerous benefits, such an interrelationship 
may impact negatively on the sustainability of livelihoods at both ends of the spectrum. 
Cities use the most fertile and productive land, consume natural resources such as water 
and minerals, and pollute the environment. Similarly, the use of agricultural chemicals 
in the rural areas can pollute the urban environment by, for example, contaminating 
sources of drinking water (Tostensen 2004: 2). There are thus strong connections 
between the two spheres. Wratten (1995: 20) has questioned the use of the term ‘urban 
poverty’ as a separate category from ‘rural poverty’, and suggested that such a division 
could conceal the real underlying causes of poverty. The determinants of urban and 
rural poverty are linked and have to be addressed jointly. It does not matter what 
geographical context people operate from because their efforts always revolve around 
securing their basic livelihood requirements, accessing resources and fulfilling their 
various aspirations in life. It follows that their livelihood activities are equally affected 
by macro- and micro-level changes and social constraints to assets and opportunities 
(i.e. class, gender and ethnicity). The livelihood activities pursued by the people in each 
context matter more. Therefore, Amis (1995: 148) suggested that ‘the question to ask is 
not where do individuals live but how do they survive and where do they get their 
incomes from’.  
Notwithstanding the connectivity of rural-urban spectrums, the livelihood options 
open to rural, peri-urban and urban populations differ depending on the nature of the 
local context and the opportunities it offers for generating a livelihood (Satterthwaite 
2000: 1). Geographical context often imposes a particular combination of resources and 
activities that enable people to pursue their livelihood in that context (Satterthwaite & 
Tacoli 2002: 66). 
In summary, urban and rural areas are linked through various processes and relation-
ships. Such interactions enable households to diversify their livelihood options but can 
also present a source of vulnerability. The livelihood activities pursued by the popula-
tion in each context matter most. The urban context requires specific sets of livelihood 
resources for survival.  
The particular vulnerability of the urban poor 
Satterthwaite (2000: 1) argues that where people ‘live and work influences whether or 
not [they] face deprivation and the nature of that deprivation’. Thus, the urban poor 
often face particular vulnerabilities that are different to those faced by the rural poor. 
Many studies have examined the factors that are specific and crucial for the urban 
context by looking at the type of livelihood resources (or combinations of ‘capitals’) 
that are required to pursue these livelihoods (Amis 1995, Rakodi 2002, Satterthwaite & 
Tacoli 2002, Satterthwaite 2000). This is either by comparing urban and rural contexts 
or by examining urban livelihoods in a more relative way. The results indicate that 
urban populations have fewer survival options than rural population. The vulnerability 
of the poor in the city is seen to be exacerbated by their dependence on cash incomes 
and their direct exposure to the harsh effects of the market (Amis 1995: 153-154). This 
is particularly important in the light of the commercialization of housing and urban 
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services, the lack of tenure security, increased personal insecurity, the inaccessibility of 
urban services and a lack of effective community support mechanisms. The main 
dimension identified is the issue of the labour market, for example the insecurity of 
employment and/or casual labour (Amis 1995: 153, Rakodi 2002: 289-290). These 
factors are interlinked and deprivation in one gives rise to other form of deprivation. 
The importance of each is highlighted separately below. 
 
Urban employment and income-generating activities 
The majority of the urban poor are engaged in wage labour and the public sector 
remains an important source for employment. However, people usually engage in 
multiple activities rather than relying on one source of income. Paid employment is not 
necessarily the main source of income. Self-provisioning activities such as petty-
commodity production for petty sale and household production for consumption and 
service activities are some of the important alternatives if there is no incomes coming 
directly from a salary or if wages are too low. The combination of various activities 
plays a critical role in the survival of the household. The more complex the livelihood 
activities, the more likely they are to reduce vulnerability (Farrington et al. 2002: 26).  
As the world is becoming increasingly urban, there is growing evidence that labour 
markets are becoming one of the main determinants of wealth and poverty. As dis-
cussed in Chapter One, mass migration from rural to urban areas has taken place in 
various African countries, fuelled by adverse conditions in the rural areas. People have 
migrated to escape unfavourable conditions in their place of origin and to look for 
income through the employment and market opportunities that cities offer. This migra-
tion has also been fuelled by urban centres’ requirements for human resources particu-
larly in the semi-skilled and unskilled groups that rural areas have in abundance,. 
Historically, this relationship has marked a transition from the traditional sector to the 
modern sector or a move from being a food producer to becoming reliant on wages for 
subsistence. On the other hand, population dynamics in the form of rural to urban 
migration have led to increasing numbers of urban job seekers. This is manifest in the 
long-term unemployment or precariousness of job as well as the growing competition 
for low-paid work due to a growing number of new entrants in the labour market. The 
majority of new entrants in the urban labour force seem to be creating their own 
employment or working for small-scale, family-owned enterprises.  
Urban poverty is seen to relate directly to the urban labour market with its various 
institutional arrangements of regulations rather than urbanization itself. The ability of 
households to avoid poverty depends critically on factors related to wage labour. Amis 
(1995: 147) argues that urban populations who have no source of income or employ-
ment are ‘the poorest and hardest hit by poverty’. This highlights the importance of 
labour market in determining incidences of urban poverty or of employment as a route 
out of poverty. A. de Haan (2001: 33) has highlighted the connection between employ-
ment and other forms of deprivation. Referring to Paugam’s (1995) research on social 
exclusion in France, the author argues that a loss of employment in poor neighbour-
hoods of France brought with it not only a loss of income but also ‘social and psycho-
logical forms of deprivation, such as marital problems and loss of ‘social capital’. The 
boundaries between employment and social exclusion are becoming ill-defined and the 
relationship between unemployment and poverty is an even more complex matter.  
Opportunities in the labour market are essentially dependent on skills and education, 
nutrition and health, which in turn are dependent on health care and safe environmental 
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conditions (Farrington et al. 2002: 20, Amis 1995: 151). This relationship points to the 
inter-dependence of employment and the provision of and access to services. The 
marked reduction in these services impacts negatively on workers. Globalization and 
global policies have had a negative effect on the employments and options available to 
the urban poor to survive (Farrington et al. 2002: 31). With neo-liberal policies, which 
dominate in the process of economic globalization, the labour market has been 
fundamentally transformed. These policies have forced African governments to orient 
their economies towards greater international integration at the expense of social 
services and long-term development priorities. Structural Adjustment Programmes 
(SAPs) had a disproportionate impact on the urban poor and particularly those who 
relied primarily upon wage employment. Such policies led to a reduction in 
employment creation and in real wages while no alternative jobs were created. No 
proper safety nets absorbed the huge number of persons who were affected. This led to 
the emergence of new categories of poor people, as discussed in Chapter 2. However, 
even before the introduction of SAPs, a deterioration in workers’ conditions was being 
observed in many African countries. Amis (1995: 146) argues that not withstanding the 
impact of SAPs on employment, there are clear indications that urban wages within 
Africa were declining from the 1970s onwards and before SAPs. For Amis (1995: 146), 
this decline had to do with the socio-political changes that took place after 
independence. In several African countries a ‘privileged urban workforce’, whose 
interests contradicted with the rest of the labour force, was created in the formal sector. 
However, this resulted in further decline in the conditions and wages of formal workers.  
The urban poor lack decent productive employment that would allow them to trans-
late their human capital into political agency. The ILO (2005: 23) describes ‘decent and 
productive employment’ as the type of ‘work that not only provides a sufficient level of 
income but also ensures social security, well working conditions and a voice at work’. 
These goals are intrinsically linked to issues of promotion and protection of the funda-
mental rights at work and may touch upon the labour market’s regulatory framework, 
issues of freedom of association, the progressive elimination of child labour, forced 
labour and discrimination at work Overall, it means that the urban poor, whether 
operating in the formal or the informal sector of the economy, do not have access to 
productive employment. The prevalence of low-wage jobs in urban areas suggests that 
having a job does not guarantee an escape from poverty if it does not lead to improving 
livelihoods. Several studies have indicated that the working conditions of the urban poor 
are characterized by pervasive discrimination, low wages, precarious working condi-
tions and job insecurity (A. de Haan 2000: 7). Informal-sector workers are affected by a 
lack of the subsidies that formal-sector workers may have access to. They also experi-
ence inadequate training and skills as well as insufficient capital to invest. The lack of 
urban services (electricity, telecommunications, water and sanitation) also impacts 
negatively on the efficiency and productivity of informal-sector activities which are 
often home-based). People working in the informal economy generally lack labour 
rights. They are vulnerable to unexpected job loss as well as to employment-related 
disease and accidents. Seasonality and the uncertainty of employment hits the poor who 
work as day labourers especially hard when the demand for labour decreases.  
The mere availability of employment opportunities does not guarantee that employ-
ment will be equally distributed between populations with different identities (Amis 
1995: 151, A. de Haan 2000: 7). Characteristics such as gender, ethnicity, castes or age 
frequently determine the segments of the labour market that an individual can access. 
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Women are often the ‘disadvantaged group’ within the urban economy (Amis 1995: 
152). Although more women have been drawn into the labour market in the last few 
decades, their involvement remains in casual and low-paid jobs as a result of the 
traditional cultural barriers to education, health and the labour market, and the compet-
ing demands for their labour in the domestic sphere. In addition, as labour recruitment 
operates through informal networks, the weakness of such a network in urban areas may 
restrict people’s access to employment.  
In summary, wages and employment are important livelihood sources for the urban 
poor but there are several structural constraints to them, and to realizing their potentials. 
 
Housing  
Housing is commonly identified both as a basic need and as the most important productive 
asset for the urban poor. Moser (1998: 32) equated the role of housing in the livelihoods 
of the urban poor to that of land for the rural poor. The importance of housing comes 
from the fact that it helps keep people out of poverty by providing basic needs for 
shelter and/or access to income-generating opportunities through home-based produc-
tion or leasing, or as collateral for credit (Moser 1998: 24). This is particularly impor-
tant as most of the urban poor have no access to formal-sector employment that can 
provide insurance. Housing becomes a critically important asset at times of shock and 
stress when a house can be rented or utilized as a base for a household enterprise or 
other activities (Amis 1999: 37). It is within this understanding that it is assumed that 
the urban poor, with their tangible assets such as housing, are more likely to survive and 
do well compared to those who lack them. 
However, the location of a residence itself is a major determinant as to whether a 
house can be used as a productive asset or become a source of vulnerability instead. 
Blaikie et al. (2003: 28) suggest that the vulnerability of urban household to shocks is 
closely linked to the quality and location of their housing. Several studies have shown 
that a large number of the urban population do not have adequate housing, with many 
living in flimsy housing in crowded areas, or in hazardous low-lying areas that are 
flood-prone zones. These factors add to their vulnerability by undermining their health 
conditions and leaving them less able to deal with the physiological effects of hunger 
and cold (Blaikie et al. 2003: 180). At the same time, many of these houses are easily 
destroyed or rendered uninhabitable by the slightest weather condition. The poor then 
have to deal with the effects of losing their homes and property. 
Blaikie et al. (2003: 70-71) raises the issue of option and accessibility that forces 
some to reside in the least-secure zones and houses. They argue that inhabitants of these 
hazardous areas 
… would not choose to live there if they had any alternative, nor do they deliberately neglect the 
maintenance of their overcrowded and deteriorated tenements. For them it is the best-of-the-worst of a 
number of disaster-prone scenarios such as having nowhere to live, having no way of earning a living 
and having nothing to eat.  
The structure of urban land ownership and rent often play critical role. The poor lack 
the means that would enable them to obtain land through formal channels, or by pur-
chasing or renting accommodation on legally developed land. The informal sector then 
becomes the only possible channel through which they can access land. Informality thus 
occurs due to the failure of the formal state and market systems to formally provide land 
for the majority of the urban poor. The outcome is that informal tenure arrangements 
characterize the living arrangements of the majority, where they become vulnerable to 
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eviction and a set of other problems (Mitlin 2003: 182). Additionally, a lack or unaf-
fordable building materials plays an important role in the resilience and quality of the 
housing in which the poor reside (Blaikie et al. 2003: 71).  
Many of the informal settlements have been established in the peri-urban zones. The 
use and occupation of peri-urban land often takes place with no formal planning and 
this often brings additional vulnerability to the inhabitants. The poor living in the rural 
urban interface may face greater health risk. Certain types of informal activities can 
create severe pollution problems and might find good ground in peri-urban areas where 
regulations to control pollution are less tough. Furthermore, people in the rural urban 
interface are vulnerable to the forces of urban land markets which can disrupt their 
agricultural production and their livelihoods (Satterthwaite & Tacoli 2002: 66). Satter-
thwaite (2000: 12) argues that an important challenge to the rural-urban interface is the 
question of dealing with these changes in a way that promotes sustainability and the 
well-being of inhabitants. Tacoli (1998a: 5) argues that development plans often fail to 
understand the dynamics of change which influence cities. These changes are related to 
change in land use, i.e. from agricultural to residential or industrial land uses. The 
assumption held by development planners is that there is a sharp dichotomy of discrete 
spheres between what is rural and what is urban. She further notes that urban develop-
ment plans are usually concerned with urban nodes and pay little attention to agricul-
tural or rural development, while development plans for rural areas are confined rural 
areas and pay no attention to urban centres. Such misunderstanding usually results in 
the splitting up of policies along spatial and sectoral lines.  
Nevertheless, informal housing comes at a high cost and is neither legally recognized 
nor serviced by the city authorities. People in the informal settlements are forced to pay 
very high prices for services. And they may also be vulnerable to a range of health 
conditions due to the unsanitary environment. The ability of the poor to participate in 
political decision-making is significantly hampered by their tenure arrangement that 
they may be excluded from the right to register and vote (Meikle 2002: 43). Most 
importantly, their legal status often puts them in positions of harassment and confronta-
tion with the police and bureaucracy. Municipality responses to informal tenure vary 
between passing tough regulations to excluding informal settlements from infrastructure 
extension plans. UN-HABITAT (2004: 3) experience shows that: 
The city authorities view most people living in slums as illegal. Because of this, cities do not plan for 
or manage slums, and the people living in them are overlooked and excluded. They receive none of 
the benefits of more affluent citizens, such as access to municipal water, roads, sanitation and sewage. 
This attitude to slum dwellers and approaches that disregard them, perpetuate the levels and scale of 
poverty, which impacts on the cities as a whole. 
Such attitudes impact on other aspects of people’s livelihoods and feeds directly into 
poverty. The way such regulation is implemented has a big impact on the vulnerability 
of the poor (Amis 1999: 36).  
There is a growing need to reform land policy so that the poor and excluded can 
benefit and contribute to growth (Kabeer 2006: 15). For the urban poor, tenure insecu-
rity impacts on households’ social and economic, as well as, on a member’s ability to 
maintain a living, accumulate and have self-insurance in the face of shocks and trends 
(Moser 1998: 11). There is a wide range of tenure arrangements that provide varying 
degrees of security and entry costs. However, the poor are only able to obtain those 
characterized by low degrees of insecurity. Land issues need to be understood in the 
unequal, historically inherited pattern of land ownership in Africa. Mafeje (2003: 10) 
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notes that the notions that delineate African land tenure systems are basically driven 
from the European legal system that bestows authority as well as exclusive control on 
holders. However in much of Africa, land can be owned communally so there is a need 
to distinguish between ‘repository and use-rights’. Collective rights to land are narrowly 
defined to indicate ‘free for all’ on communal ground. However, this understanding has 
set the stage for different interpretations and practices. Landholding groups exercise 
strong control over collective land rights and litigation over such rights is common and 
leads to conflict and violence. Mafeje (Ibid.) notes that there is a basic misconception of 
customary land rights in Africa. For Africans themselves, land rights were driven from 
complex community relations including memberships of given groups, use rights and 
labour relations. Ownership of land usually indicated as ‘the soil and its possible manifes-
tations such as crops and vegetation’, rather than the soil itself. Security of tenure today takes 
place when the right to access and use are underwritten by a known set of rules. Ac-
cording to this understanding, much of the land poor people work and occupy in urban 
and peri-urban of Africa is not legally recognized. A further complication is that many 
African countries have inherited a system of highly unequal land distribution and 
several countries have land tenure systems that discriminate against women (Mafeje 
2003: 21). 
The removal of tenure insecurity and other constraints to people’s ability to utilize 
their housing effectively is considered ‘the single most important critical poverty reduc-
tion intervention’ (Moser 1998: 11). Some African countries have assigned legal status 
to customary tenure as well as to the institutions administering them. However, land 
reform3 has been moving at a much slower pace and the largest obstacle to regularizing 
land ownership relates to the inability of local governments to properly rectify land title. 
Deininger (2004: iv) maintains that when land institutions are effective, the rights of the 
poor are protected and their access are improved: 
Well functioning property rights and land institutions underpin economic development and help 
reduce corruption and social conflict. Efficient land administration that is accessible to ordinary 
people and recognises the complexity of land rights on the ground is crucial. The legal recognition of 
informal land rights is a powerful tool for social inclusion. Land markets must help the poor gain 
access to land. Land use planning needs to be democratic in order to mediate effectively between 
competing interests amongst land users.  
These points are also highlighted by Kabeer who argues that ‘even where there may 
not be enough land to benefit all sections of the poor, land reform can have the effect of 
damping down the monopoly bargaining power of large landlords’. However, since the 
process of land reform is often uneasy and has a long-term nature, some measures can 
already be undertaken to strengthen the land rights of the urban poor. This can take the 
form of recognizing poor people's rights to land they legitimately occupy and providing 
secure leases or transferring ownership to the occupants where the land is owned by the 
government or providing longer-term tenancy arrangements. Kabeer, (2006: 16) argues 
that implementing a ‘community-based approach’ can enable the representation of 
excluded groups in government and redistribution schemes. 
To conclude this section, housing is a key asset for the urban poor but it can also 
become a key source of vulnerability. Ownership of or secure access to housing is 
                                                 
3  ‘Land reform’ refers to various approaches that in general stress ‘actions’ such as land registration, 
land settlement or resettlement programmes on public holdings, the consolidation of fragmented 
holdings, tenancy enhancement and land taxation. It might also include the redistribution of private-
property rights to land. 
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central to ensuring access to other resources such as education and health, as well as 
political rights such as registering to vote. Overlapping land rights and the plurality of 
property systems and institutions create conditions for increased vulnerability. In its true 
sense, empowerment should lead to self-determined change and here tenure security is 
relevant. Removing barriers to the access of the urban poor to safe and secure housing 
to make effective use of the land they occupy is a key area in empowerment. 
 
Urban services 
Access to basic services is vital to improving the quality of life of the poor as well as 
ensuring the sustainability of their livelihoods. Urban services influence areas such as 
access to work, living conditions and access to income-generating opportunities. 
Education provides people with the skills and knowledge they need, while health care 
and economic infrastructure (water, transport and electricity) allow them to ‘use their 
skills and knowledge productively’ (Moser 1996: 7). The accessibility of affordable 
water frees time and resources for other needs such as food, while the accessibility and 
affordability of transport can enhance access to livelihood opportunities and income-
generating activities.  
The access, quality and affordability of services to the urban poor are dependent on 
several actors and operate through a complex web of urban governance. Those actors 
include formal (the state) and informal service providers (NGOs and the private sector). 
Informal practices may be interlinked to other formal activities and institutions in the 
public, private or community sectors. Meikle (2002: 42) argues that the urban poor are 
linked to the structures of governance basically ‘through their dependence on, or exclu-
sion from, delivery of infrastructure and services by urban institutions’. Accordingly, 
these institutions can affect either positive or negative change in the livelihoods their 
urban poor. 
In the past, local governments were the main source of service provision, particularly 
regarding social services. However currently there are deep concerns about the role of 
local government in directly providing services to poor residents. With the application 
of the neo-liberal policies adopted by most African countries, these countries have 
embarked on the privatization of service provision. Previously these sectors had enjoyed 
major government subsidies, both in operation and maintenance. Kabeer (2005a: 18) 
argues that neo-liberal policies have spurred a number of shifts in service provision that 
have transferred the responsibility for service provision from the state to different 
private-sector providers ‘including various non-profit civil society organizations’. The 
result has been that the accessibility of these services to the poor has been greatly 
diminished while informal service provision has becomes the basic source of service for 
the majority of the urban poor. Reduced access to services has compromised the liveli-
hoods of the poor in several ways. Amis (2001: 1) notes that a lack of basic services 
leaves the urban poor with little or no option but to struggle with more expensive 
solutions or to live without them. 
The provision of services and the implementation of frames for stakeholder partici-
pation require resources. Devas (1999: 5) has questioned the ability and means of local 
governments to effectively reach poor communities. Local government’s ability to 
extend services to poor communities is constrained by different and interrelated factors 
including a lack of resources, a lack of capacity to implement policies, corruption and 
variance between government representatives. Funds are dependent on ‘central-local 
financial and political processes’ and the issue of provision may simply be just beyond 
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the capacity of local authority. Devas (1999: 5) and Amis (1999: 12) stress the impor-
tance of strong municipal finances in reaching the poor and argues that this is dependent 
on the ability to access steady local tax revenue and have efficient financial manage-
ment. 
In many urban areas, public services might be available but informal settlements are 
usually excluded from service provision. Experience has shown that for many countries, 
there is what is termed as ‘divided cities’ and differential access to basic service 
provision (Meikle 2002: 43). Accordingly, the poor receive only marginal or no services 
from the municipal authorities. The municipality might contribute to the elimination of 
informal arrangements that are used to provide services to residents of such areas. 
Inadequate regulation has been one of the most significant issues in the way service is 
delivered to or denied for poor communities. In this regard, local governments might be 
constrained by political conflicts with higher tiers of government or face legal barriers 
in addressing the needs of the poor (Devas 2004: 16). Therefore, devolution of political 
power and economic resources to local governments and the communities is very 
critical to their efficient delivery. However, the exclusion of the poor can also be 
enforced through grassroots organizations. For example, some community-based 
projects rely on local leaders and contractors to manage services in their communities. 
Although this might be a practical way of managing delivery locally, it can impose and 
reinforce the exclusion of the urban poor. Local leaders and well-connected members of 
the community end up harvesting assets or leadership opportunities and expanding their 
land holdings and enhancing their political relations (Devas 2004: 8). This implies the 
poor’s need for empowerment to ensure greater participation in decision-making 
processes and an enhanced capacity to claim their rights at the local level. It also entails 
the transformation of service delivery to respond to the needs, interests and rights of all 
citizens. Enhancing access to services depends on improved governance. Rakodi (2007: 
349) states that accountability at the local level can ensure ‘the adequacy of environ-
mental infrastructure and services and their availability to the poor’. In most of Africa, 
the involvement of NGOs in service delivery has been a direct outcome of the lack of 
resources to support universal coverage (Edward & Hulme 1998: 6). Their expansion 
has come as a response to the neo-liberal policies which saw in the NGOs the ideal 
channel for service provision to replace that of the state (see also Chapter 1). Such 
policies have changed the service-delivery landscape dramatically over the past few 
years and modified the state-citizen relationship. With NGOs’ increasing role in service 
delivery compared to a subsiding one for the sate, there are concerns that NGOs are 
altering the ‘social contract’ between the state and its citizens (Edward & Hulme 1998: 
15).  
To conclude, the vulnerability of the urban poor is often amplified by a lack of 
access to urban services. State provision is important for the urban poor but it is subject 
to local and national political processes. The state machinery is often not neutral and is 
likely to replicate wider social powers so that socially excluded groups are also the least 
likely to gain access to social services offered by the state. Urban services in poor areas 
are mostly undertaken by NGOs, albeit largely funded by external sources. NGOs are 
increasingly been criticized for being ineffective in reaching the poor. To turn the tide 
against all the injustices that were inflicted upon the urban poor in relation to service 
delivery, there should be more responsive institutions either formal or informal. 
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Personal insecurity 
A lack of security has implications for livelihood activities, trust and the sense of well-
being in communities and individuals. Acioly (2002: 1) argues that cities are becoming 
‘more spatially and socially divided’. Such trends are being driven by increased 
inequality and producing urban environments characterized by severe forms of poverty, 
violence and insecurity. Urban inequality is more visible in the spatial and social 
separation of rich and poor. It is a common phenomenon that in almost all African 
cities, huge poor communities live in shanty-towns on one side of the city while the 
more spacious and well-provided-for communities on the other. The mixture of ‘segre-
gation, inequality and proximity’ leads to social friction where violence and insecurity 
worries the well-off, and forces them behind high-walled and gated communities. 
However, poor communities suffer an even higher cost. The lack of personal security 
due to high levels of crime and violence also pervades poor people’s lives and impacts 
on the way they pursue their livelihoods. It is essential that the government’s role 
should be maintaining the rule of law and providing security for all. 
Civil society or grassroots organizations 
There are several forms of social networks of mutual benefit and solidarity for persons 
with common interests in urban areas. Blaikie et al. (2003: 15) consider kinship net-
works and larger collectivities as a vital constituent in well-being and one which can 
afford the ‘basis for action when vulnerability is made a reality’. These networks are 
thought to influence poverty in general although the ways such they are perceived vary 
considerably. Recently, poverty debates have come up with the idea of ‘Civil Society 
Organizations’ as an essential component in understanding the relationship of trust and 
social capital available to the urban poor. Although the concept of ‘Civil Society 
Organizations’ (CSOs) is loaded with vagueness, it is not the intention here to probe into 
the debate of what constitutes CSOs. The main issue to be considered here is the capacity of 
grassroots organizations to freely organize and empower the poor and to address their 
situation fundamentally. Therefore, the section will look into the factors that have 
shaped the dynamic nature of the grassroots in poor communities by exploring the inter-
action between them and the state. 
Among the poor, community networks can be based on kinship, ethnicity, culture, 
religion or workplace affinities. In several poor urban communities, social networks 
have been formed in response to de-industrialization, increased unemployment and 
struggles for modest living spaces in segregated cities. These goals have often been 
associated with pressing for citizenship rights, health and education, and sometimes 
accompanied increased rates of political and ethnic violence. The networks can provide 
access to information about jobs, facilitate access to employment and press for an 
improvement in services in poor communities. Their roles can go beyond effecting 
change in the country as a whole. For example, Mitlin (2001: 154-155) notes that some 
religious organizations have played a significant role in the struggle for political 
independence. In addition, some traditional organizations have been able to provide 
communal infrastructure and services in African cities but there is relatively little 
evidence to show that these conclusions can be generalized. Mitlin (2001: 163) argues 
that although some grassroots organizations are able to press for improvements in 
service provision and effect some changes in their neighbourhoods, they have not yet 
been able to fundamentally address the situation of the urban poor because all their 
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actions have remained controlled by the state. The interface between the state and CSOs 
is central in addressing group interests.  
For grassroots organizations to exercise their civil rights, there needs to be a political 
environment that respects the fundamental freedoms of its people as citizens. This is 
also the goal of many grassroots organizations in urban areas. The relationship between 
the state and CSOs has a certain history in Africa which is relevant to their role today. 
Mamdani (1996: 15) highlights the need for understanding such a relationship and the 
power applied by the state to achieve control. Historically, this relationship has been 
shaped by different modes of state control, although the state attempts to subdue grass-
roots organizations by bringing them under its control. This does not necessarily imply 
complete control for either. The bifurcation of power during colonial rule in Africa has 
had a far-reaching impact on causing disjunction between the state and society in post-
colonial Africa. Mamdani (1996: 18) argues that colonial power established two 
systems of power under one authority: direct rule was applied in urban areas, with 
indirect rule in rural areas. In urban areas, direct rule was devised to exclude Africans 
from ‘civil freedoms guaranteed to citizens in civil society’. The nature of this rule set 
the stage for different forms of CSOs in urban areas. Although there was little or no 
space for civil society activism then, throughout African cities there was an extraordi-
nary level of popular mobilizations and the formation of various popular organizations 
around the struggles for basic rights. The nationalist leadership was able to unite these 
groups and ignite their ambitions in the promise that, through independence, all their 
aspirations would be achieved. At the dawn of independence, the post-colonial or 
‘developmental’ state of the 1960s and 1970s allowed some role to popular discourse 
and practice and sought popular consent (Neocosmos 2002: 43). But having political 
power in its hands, the nationalist leadership was unwilling to hand over the same rights 
to others. The popular groups that enabled the nationalist leadership to come to power 
lost their ground and purpose to the extent that they were seen as blocking the new state. 
Many popular organizations were banned, constrained or incorporated into state struc-
tures (Mamdani 1996: 15). 
In the contemporary period, relations between the state and many sectors of civil 
society are characterized more by hostility than by cooperation or partnership (Neocos-
mos 2002: 48). Such hostile relationships are fuelled by the hegemony of dictatorship in 
many African countries and the decline in urban resources. The drive of the state and 
the international financial institutions towards deepening privatization and the commer-
cialization of urban services during the 1980s led to serious changes in the patterns of 
state-grassroots organizations. It laid the basis for the emergence of a new form of urban 
consciousness that questions the principle of state control. Many groups started to 
organize at community or neighbourhood level, struggling against privatization, service 
cutbacks and evictions in the main urban areas.  
As the flow of support from the west became the major condition for state reproduc-
tion, there was little concern for popular consent. The state’s relationship with its 
citizens has been confined to mainly ‘administrative and coercive relations’ (Neocos-
mos 2002: 44). Clear forms of coercion are therefore employed by the state against 
these organizations’ activities. Grassroots organizations in urban areas are less able to 
effect positive chance in the lives of the poor and are increasingly less able to demand 
rights and social entitlements (Mitlin 2001: 158). They lack the capacity to ‘reduce the 
symptoms of urban poverty (such as exclusion from access to basic services) as well as 
to address some of the more structural causes that result in a lack of empowerment and 
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powerlessness’ (Mitlin 2001: 152-157). Their activities remain very much restricted due 
to government control over access to land and urban services. Local leaders may experi-
ence pressure from external sources as well as encountering problems in running the 
organizations. In many situations, the strategy adopted by CSOs is to toe the line with 
state officials and politicians in order to secure better offers from the sate to the urban 
poor. Politicians and state officials usually expect an array of personal and political 
profits in exchange for the services they offer (Mitlin 2001: 161). Under such circum-
stances, grassroots organizations tend to become part of the state or become apolitical in 
character. 
Overall, grassroots organizations can conceal ambiguities and conflicts inherent in 
society. The problem of leadership of grassroots organizations is a key area. To an 
important degree, CSOs role is seen as being circumscribed by their leadership who 
have power over access to community resources or else control the organizations and 
thus create new patterns of exclusion and exploitation (Mitlin 2001: 156). In many poor 
neighbourhoods, the poor cannot actively participate in organizations that are assumed 
to represent them (Mitlin 2001: 157). Grassroots organization are, therefore, mostly not 
in a position to represent the interests of the urban poor, and their existence do not 
necessarily promote social integration or help in reducing the vulnerability of excluded 
populations living in large cities. 
In summary, it is apparent that dissatisfaction with the social and economic effects of 
modernization and globalization has encouraged the emergence and informed the goals 
of many grassroots organizations. In Africa, due to the unfavourable political environ-
ment, these organizations are less able to represent the interests of the urban poor and 
dense networks of civic involvement are not a sign or a source of definite support. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to identify the specific vulnerabilities of the urban poor by 
looking at the interrelationships between urban and rural livelihoods and the context-
specific issues of particular importance to the urban poor. Urban and rural areas appear 
to be interlinked through various processes and relationships. Such interactions enable 
households to diversify their livelihood options but at the same time can present a 
source of vulnerability in both contexts. The urban context requires specific sets of 
livelihood resources for survival. Overall, the vulnerability of the urban poor is closely 
linked to their dependence on a cash income and their livelihoods, the type of livelihood 
activities they undertake and their exposure to the harsh effects of the market. This is 
particularly important in light of the commercialization of housing and urban services, 
constraints on land use and the lack of effective networks of support. 
Wages and employment are important livelihood sources for the urban poor. How-
ever, there are several constraints on them that prevent the poor from realizing their 
potentials. Housing and tenure security are also sources of vulnerability. Ownership of 
or secure access to housing is central to ensuring access to other resources such as 
income-generating activities, education and health, as well as political rights such as 
registering to vote. Overlapping land rights and the plurality of property systems and 
institutions create conditions for reduced access to these resources. Furthermore, access 
to urban services is subject to local and national political processes. The withdrawal of 
the state from service provision and the handing-over of them to various non-state 
providers have affected people’s access to these services. Informal provision is inade-
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quate or expensive or both. A lack of security has various implications for livelihood 
activities, trust and well-being among communities and individuals. 
The extent to which grassroots organizations, as a particular kind of social network, 
are able to penetrate and mobilize urban communities is dependant on various political 
actors with different vested interests, goals and ideals. Problems of plurality, polariza-
tion and conflicts of interest are all part of the existence of various social networks. 
These organizations are therefore less able to represent the interests of the urban poor.  
These conclusions imply that understanding the vulnerability of the urban poor 
requires a flexible and dynamic approach that focuses on resources that matter to people 
most and the constraints they face in accessing them. Chapter 6 will look at the liveli-
hood approach as a suitable framework for enabling such understanding.  
 6 
 
The sustainable livelihoods approach  
as an analytical framework  
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The previous chapters have provided a basic understanding of poverty that will guide 
the current study. Some cross-cutting themes run through the discussion and should 
inform the analytical framework. To start with, poverty is conceptualized as a dynamic 
and multi-dimensional phenomenon that goes beyond sufficient income or constraints 
on economic resources to constraints on the ability of the poor to make effective choices 
and act upon them. The concept of ‘vulnerability’ is seen as an important link to this 
discussion. The notion of vulnerability includes not only exposure to shocks and hazard 
but essentially people’s capacity to deal successfully with these shocks and hazard. 
Vulnerability therefore denotes both the relativity of poverty as well as the numerous 
ways in which people ‘are made vulnerable by other people’ (Stephens 1996: 12) (see 
Chapter 4).  
In the urban context, the vulnerability of the urban poor is seen as being accentuated 
by their dependence on cash incomes and the commercialization of physical infrastruc-
ture. The main sources of vulnerability include the labour market, the overlapping rights 
and plurality of systems and institutions in relation to housing, an overall lack of access 
to urban services, and ineffective local social networks (see Chapter 5). 
Power constrains or imposes limits on what people can achieve. Since societies are 
made up of diverse social groups, the ability of individuals that belong to marginalized 
groups to access resources can be significantly eroded, leaving them more vulnerable to 
poverty than others. Hence, an individual’s ability to achieve their goals depends on 
their position in the web of power relations. The perspective of social exclusion is 
relevant to understanding poverty because it brings to centre stage questions such as 
who the excluded qre, what exactly they are excluded from and who the formal and 
informal ‘custodians’ of membership and inclusion are (see Chapter 5).  
Chapter 5 argued that the social exclusion of the poor and their lack of power in 
relation to the more powerful actors in society clearly indicate the need to create new 
mechanisms to enable them to regain power and control over their destiny. It is believed 
that, in its true sense, empowerment should lead to self-determined change. Therefore, 
the fundamental shift and transformation of power for the poor starts with the poor 
themselves. But that change should made possible by transforming the environment 
within which poor people operate and enable them to build and mobilize their own 
resources. The study is anchored on the premise that questions of empowerment require 
being located within the individual actor’s social and cultural world. The poor cannot 
successfully change the rule that limits their efforts without power being enshrined in 
formal institutions. In this context, it is useful to distinguish empowerment, in the sense 
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of actors’ capacities from rights. Right can empower the poor and marginalized groups 
to combat social exclusion on an empowered footing.  
Conceptualizing poverty in the manner stated in the opening of this chapter provides 
the guiding principles informing this study as well as the causes and manifestations of 
poverty in the context of urban Sudan, in particular in Khartoum, the capital city. The 
tool with which such understanding will be translated into practical steps should 
encompass the main elements of poverty discussed earlier in a holistic manner along 
with its causal contexts. For this, the sustainable livelihoods (SL) framework is seen as 
a suitable tool since it adopts a distinctive way to analyze poverty as well as ways of 
intervening to improve the conditions of the poor. Users of the SL approach have 
indicated that it has enabled them to better understand some of the pressing issues in the 
lives of the poor, as well as the constraints, and trends in livelihoods. The approach has 
also helped understand differences between the various categories of the poor, and the 
significance of issues that were previously viewed as only technical (such as access to 
transport and information).  
While the sustainable livelihoods approach is one tool for examining the main and 
common aspects surrounding poverty, it is not the only approach, and other issues 
which are not explicitly covered by the SL framework but impact on poverty will be 
incorporated in the adapted framework. These include power relationships (related to 
gender, class and ethnicity), history culture (values, beliefs, tradition, identity, notions 
of status) and rights. The suggested SL will also reflect the specific characteristics of 
urban situations taking on board the key contextual factors that are specific to urban 
areas, and treat them as mutually interrelated in the provision of the final outcome of 
poverty. The following discussion aims to provide an overview of the sustainable liveli-
hoods approach and highlight the points that make it relevant for this study. 
Sustainable livelihoods framework 
The SL framework represents a configuration of opportunities and assets available to 
poor people, as well as the sources of their vulnerability. It also includes the important 
dimension of the formal and informal institutions, processes and policies that constrain 
the efforts of the poor. The issues are illustrated in the form of five core principles that 
guide the analyses (Figure 6.1). These include the capital assets of households, the 
vulnerability context of households, the livelihood strategies, the policy institutions and 
processes and the livelihood outcomes. There are, however, slight variations between 
frameworks that are applied in rural or urban contexts. Overall, SL frameworks encom-
pass the means, activities, entitlements and assets through which people maintain a 
living: 
A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (including both material and social resources) and 
activities required for a means of living. (DFID 1999: 1.1) 
Assets may be natural/biological (e.g. land, water, common-property resources) 
human (e.g. knowledge, creation by skills), social and political (such as community, 
family, social networks, participation, empowerment) or physical (e.g. infrastructure, 
markets, clinics, schools).  
The SL framework starts with an understanding of these assets in order to reveal 
opportunities as well as constraints. The focus on assets does not imply that the SL 
framework place more attention on the well-off in society. Instead it reflects a recogni- 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Sustainable livelihoods: The analytical framework 
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tion of everyone’s intrinsic potential, and other material or non-material assets such as 
health, labour, knowledge and skills, an affiliation to social networks, access to physical 
resources, or the capacity to influence key institutions. 
The sustainability of livelihoods depends on the possible ways poor people mobilize 
their asset portfolios (or opportunity) on a long-term basis. Sustainability of livelihood 
implies the ability to recover from stresses and shocks and to maintain and/or enhance a 
living now or in the future. The concept of sustainability of livelihood is explained by 
DFID as: 
A livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks, maintain or 
enhance its capabilities and assets, while not undermining the natural resource base. (DFID 1999: 1.1) 
The framework also recognizes that the livelihood activities of the poor are dynamic 
and context-specific. Accordingly, it seeks to identify the vulnerability of the poor that 
results from unexpected shocks, long-term trends and seasonal stress (i.e. cyclical 
fluctuations in prices, production, health and employment). These factors make up the 
vulnerability context and directly influence people’s asset status and the options 
available to them in pursuit of successful livelihood outcomes. 
The next section will elaborate on the basic components of the SL framework with 
some reference to urban areas. 
 
Livelihood capitals (assets) 
At the centre of the SL framework are the assets that people draw on to pursue their 
livelihood. Livelihood assets or capital include a broad range of tangible and intangible 
resources, both material and social that individuals, households and communities can 
mobilize to maintain their livelihood or deal with shocks and trends. It was Chambers 
(1995, quoted in Farrington et al. 2002: 18) who suggested distinguishing between 
tangible and intangible assets. Tangible assets refer to physical assets such as stores, 
jewellery and food, which are usually owned by people who hold them. Intangible 
assets such as social claims or legal frameworks offer the opportunity to access re-
sources over which people have no direct control. There are significant variations 
between urban and rural environments in terms of capital assets. For example while 
natural resources in urban areas have less importance, financial and physical assets are 
more important (Farrington et al. 2002: 4). Overall, capitals determine the capacity of 
people to pursue their different livelihood strategies. However, the distribution of liveli-
hood assets in a given society is always unequal as factors such as class, gender and age 
may significantly affect people’s access to livelihood assets. Hence, de Haan & 
Zoomers (2005: 32) view asset - whether tangible or intangible - as bases of power and 
a means of changing the rules that govern control over and the use of resources. 
In the SL framework asset is classified in five major groups: human capital (or 
livelihood capabilities), social capital (claims and access), financial capital, natural 
capital, and physical capital. There is significant overlap between the different capitals. 
For example, social capital can determine people’s access to a wide range of other 
assets. This conceptual overlap between access and control over assets is a common 
source of confusion. In general, for individuals and communities to pursue their differ-
ent livelihood goals, they need a combination of different forms of capital.  
Human capital (capabilities) comprises individual skills and education as well as 
good health i.e. physical abilities that enable people to work or maintain their liveli-
hood. These are also determined by living conditions, sanitation, nutrition, primary 
health care etc. At a household level, human capital refers to the total and the quality of 
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the labour available. Human capital is crucial for making use of the other four types of 
livelihood assets. 
Financial assets include savings, credit, remittances and pensions. Financial capital 
endows people with different livelihood options. In the context of today’s highly 
monetized urban economy, survival depends chiefly on financial resources. Wages or 
income from the sale of labour are usually the most essential assets for the urban poor 
and to which they attach high priority. 
Physical capital comprises the urban services available to people including health, 
water, sanitation and energy. In urban areas, housing is one of the most important assets 
for the urban poor since it provides not only shelter but can also serve as collateral and 
as an income-generating asset (Moser 1998: 24, Amis 1999: 37). Infrastructure and 
services have an interrelated influence on areas such as access to work, living conditions 
and access to income-generating opportunities. Access, quality and the affordability of 
these services to the urban poor are dependent on several actors and operate through a 
complex web of vertical and horizontal urban governance. These actors include formal 
(the state) and informal service providers (NGOs and the private sector).  
Natural capital is defined as land, common-property resources and open access to 
natural resources that are utilized by people to generate a means of survival (Carney 
1998: 7). Natural capitals are naturally occurring assets and are important to those who 
derive all or part of their livelihoods from resource-based activities (farming, fishing, 
gathering in forests, mineral extraction, etc.). They are mostly to be found in rural areas 
but their importance to urban livelihoods cannot be denied. Within the urban context a 
wide range of resources are included, for example, intangible public goods such as trees, 
land and water for household use and sanitation. The benefits of these stocks can be 
direct and/or indirect, and are intimately connected with property and user rights.  
With respect to social capital, it is important to note that individuals and households 
can access resources by participating in social networks that are based on mutual recip-
rocity, trust and obligations within the community and beyond. Social networks and 
trusts are not ends in themselves, but are geared to provide new opportunities and 
enable members to achieve their individual and community objectives. The literature on 
social capital is controversial and contains agreements and disagreements on the extent 
to which social capital can provide support to the poor. Overall, most authors agree that 
social capital is an aspect of social structure that represents an asset for particular groups 
and individuals and which can be utilized to gain advantages and benefits (Putnam 
2000: 319, de Haan & Zoomers 2003: 6, Baumann & Sinha 2001: 1). Social capital 
plays an important role in providing access to and control of many of the other capitals 
for various individuals (de Haan & Zoomers 2003: 6). A shared cultural identity and 
strong intra-group communication help people to access local resources. In addition, 
networks of solidarity can lead to civic engagement and political action. Moving up the 
scale, effective networks with state or civil-society actors may facilitate access to urban 
services. 
In the urban context, Amis (2002: 10) observed a close relationship between chronic 
poverty and weak social capital. He argues that the capacity of some areas or some 
groups to respond to change in their external environment may diminish due to 
‘shortage of networks, [and] weak networks/patronage into the labour market’. Hence 
social capital is an important asset, one that can reduce vulnerability and enhance 
opportunities.  
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The urban poor seem less able to draw on social capital. Some authors argue that 
networks of support in urban areas are less effective due to social and economic hetero-
geneity. Such heterogeneity is assumed to contribute to reducing community and inter-
household mechanisms of trust and collaboration (Wratten 1995: 24, Meikle 2002: 41). 
Furthermore, Amis (2002: 10) notes that the development of social capital in poor urban 
communities involves a closure of networks, which serves to develop norms of trust-
worthiness but also keeps some people out. He notes that the structure of small group 
social interactions in poor urban communities often encompasses insider/resident versus 
outsider/newcomers. Residential exclusion within cities contributes greatly to weaken-
ing social capital. In many cities there are exclusion territories, areas of concentration of 
poverty and unprepared peripheries that host the poor. For Rabinow (2003: 356), social 
fragmentation can result from the exclusion of these areas with the consequence of 
disintegrating communities. He argues that the organization of space creates a barrier to 
inter-personal and inter-group communication which enables the development, sharing 
and exploitation of resources. Therefore, the spatially isolated urban poor may lose the 
potential to utilize the social networks of a larger society. However, this does not 
assume the existence of close relationships generating access to resources. As 
DeFilippis (2001: 797) argues, the problem is not that poor communities are bereft of 
trust, norms and relationships but it is more that these relationships are not able to 
generate capital.  
Nevertheless, the extent to which the poor can count on their stock of trust, norms, 
and reciprocity networks in times of increased vulnerability is also open to question. 
Blaikie et al. (2003: 120) argue that as communities face crisis situations or become 
poorer; their stock of social capital tends to erode, making them even more vulnerable 
to crisis situations. Citing Deng (1999), Blaikie et al. (2003: 120), noted that although 
informal networks of support systems among the Dinka ethnic groups (of southern 
Sudan) were well developed, they could not stand the pressure of consecutive crises 
(war, drought, enslavement, displacement) that culminated in famine. These networks of 
support failed to the extent that local people refer to the famine crisis as ‘famine of 
breaking relationships’ (cok dakrua). The same is being seen with the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic. When a crisis hits, individuals in the community battle for control over the 
diminishing stock of resources, grabbing what they can to survive while excluding other 
groups. There should, therefore, be less emphasis on the supporting role of social 
networks during an extensive livelihood system collapse in complex emergencies.  
Social capital exists as a horizontal linkage within and between households, extended 
family and/or among members of an ethnic group of similar status as well as communi-
ties. They also encompass a vertical linkage between political elites and ordinary 
citizens or what some commentators have called ‘political capital’ (see Pasteur & 
Shankland 2002, Baumann & Sinha 2001: 1, Rakodi 2002: 11). The ‘vertical’ dimen-
sion of social capital, as opposed to the ‘horizontal’, concerns power, representation and 
access to key decision-makers (Rakodi 1999: 318). People’s political capital determines 
how they access other assets. Citing Booth & Richard (1998: 79), Rakodi (2002: 11) 
argues that political capital acts as ‘a gatekeeper asset, permitting or preventing the 
accumulation of other assets’. Political capital is tied to individuals in their interactions 
with more powerful others at different levels in the public and private spheres. As 
discussed in Chapter 4, these relationships may allow or constrain the pursuit of 
different livelihood strategies. Power relations are seen as inherent in social norms and 
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networks that influence relations between civil society and the state or relations that can 
endow poor people with political capital (Rowlands 1997: 13). 
Prominent social capital theorist Putnam has conceptualized social capital as win-win 
relationships based on trust, norms and values and built on mutual interest. He argues 
that ‘Where trust and social networks flourish, individuals, firms, neighbourhoods and 
even nations prosper’ (Putnam 2000: 319). However, critiques of such notions argue 
that this is not necessarily always the case. For example, strong social ties may also lead 
to immoral or unproductive actions that can be harmful to society (Durlauf & 
Fafchamps 2004: 5). Most importantly, de Haan & Zoomers (2003: 5) argues that same 
relationships that bring about benefits to individuals or group can be used to exclude 
and delineate separate spheres and hence become a source of vulnerability for others. 
For de Haan & Zoomers (2003: 6), social capital is a relational resource in the sense that 
it exists not as a possession but in individuals’ relations with other individuals and 
entities. As a relational practice, it can create a dynamic of conflict and inequalities as 
well as harmony and support. Individuals, as mentioned earlier, endeavour to maintain 
livelihoods within a realm of power and there are differences of power between differ-
ent individuals and groups, or within society. Actors with their conflicting interests can 
use social capital to achieve their objectives and, as such, social capital can lead to 
different outcomes due to an individual’s actions. The more powerful can employ social 
capital to influence different institutions that mediate access to resources in order to 
pursue their personal interests at the expense of others. Human characteristics such as 
age, gender and class may determine access and type of social capital at birth. As such, 
social capital can be understood as both a resource embedded in social relations as well 
as an access. Use of such a resource resides within actors (Ibid.). Any analysis of social 
capital is, therefore, linked with an analysis of the structure of social relations that shape 
interactions between different individuals, groups and entities with different powers. 
This particularly points to the role of institutions and policies in this process. 
To conclude this section, social capital denotes both vertical and horizontal relation-
ships, as well as the political and social environment that influences social structure and 
norms. Social capital is not located within the actors themselves but is to be found in the 
relationships and personal interactions between and among social actors. An under-
standing of social capital should, therefore, take into account conflicting interests 
between social and collective identities and their impact on the way livelihoods are 
organized. 
 
Policies, Institutions and Processes (PIPs)  
The social and institutional context in which individuals and households maintain their 
livelihoods is referred to as Policies, Institutions and Processes (PIPs) and occupies a 
central position in the SL framework. PIPs operate at all levels, from the household to 
the global, and in all spheres, from the private to the most public. They are the main 
determinants of access to a wide range of capitals that people draw on in pursuit of their 
livelihood. The institutions, structures and organizations of concern to the SL frame-
work refer to public institutions such as political, legislative, governmental as well as 
private institutions such as NGOs, commercial institutions and CSOs. Institutions also 
include norms, routines, conventions, beliefs, age and gender. Processes cover policies, 
laws, social norms, rules of the game, and incentives. Processes – whether formal or 
informal – determine the relationship between organizations and individuals. Essen-
tially, PIPs govern access to public and private resources and determine the extent to 
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which people can use, substitute or trade between different types of livelihood assets. 
PIPs directly feed back to the vulnerability context by governing ecological or econo-
mical trends, alleviating or exacerbating effects of shocks or reducing the damaging 
effects of seasonality etc. They thus determine the outcome of livelihood strategies by 
determining the choices and the viability of people’s livelihoods (Farrington et al. 2002: 
2).  
In the urban context, institutions of public-sector agencies, such as social services, 
play a significant role in exacerbating or alleviating the vulnerability of the urban poor. 
In addition, certain regulations determine the poor’s options and feed into their multiple 
vulnerabilities, with the main ones relating to a lack of clear legal status of tenure and 
undertaking unregistered activities in the informal sector, which the majority of the 
urban poor are involved in. These issues influence the poor’s livelihoods in general and 
also impact on their rights to register and vote, and restrict their access to urban and 
financial services (Farrington et al. 2002: 12-13) (see Chapter 5). 
PIPs represent the sources of power and control in on-going processes of negotiation 
over livelihood access. Within the SL framework, people experiencing deprivation in any 
form are not seen as homogenous and passive victims who are subjected to the wider 
social processes but as active agents responding to change. While the poor spare no 
effort in challenging the odd situation, their ability to maintain a sustainable livelihood 
on their own initiative is severely restricted or diminished by factors beyond their 
control. Therefore, empowerment is seen as an essential concern for PIPs, a concern that 
enables the poor to have better access to assets and the strategic possibilities for 
employing these assets to influence the structures and processes (Carney et al. 1999: 9). 
In this respect, people’s lack of effective rights in relation to the more powerful others 
constrain their ability to make meaningful choices. 
To sum up, PIPs are central in determining access to various types of capital and they 
are relevant in both the public and private sphere. Policies, institutions and processes 
influence the outcome of livelihood strategies – the ways people combine and use assets 
to meet their objectives. Therefore, they are the source of power and control in on- going 
processes of negotiation over livelihood access. Incorporating the issue of rights allows 
better understanding of the way PIPs work for or constrain people’s livelihoods. 
 
Vulnerability context 
The SL framework indicates that people’s livelihoods and the overall availability of 
assets are primarily affected by trends, shocks and seasonality. Vulnerability refers to 
the situation and the factors causing poverty as well as the ability of individuals and 
households to cope and respond adequately in the light of these vulnerabilities. The 
vulnerability context represents a key dimension of livelihoods. Vulnerability in the 
framework refers to the exogenous forces in the forms of trends, shocks and seasonality. 
Trends can take place at different levels i.e. household, local, national or international, 
and can take the form of population trends, resource trends, economic or governance 
trends, technology trends, etc. Shocks can include human shocks, natural shocks, 
economic shocks, conflict, or crop/livestock health shocks. Seasonality relates to prices, 
production, health, and employment opportunities. Trends and seasonality are not 
necessarily always harmful but may manifest a positive change such as new technolo-
gies trends, a more stable climate or good economic trends (Pasteur & Shankland 2002: 
7). These forces lie beyond the immediate control of the poor and influence the asset 
base, livelihood strategies and the outcome of these strategies. Forces are dynamic and 
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include social, economic, political, legal, environmental and political factors (Soussan 
et al. 2003: 2).  
In the urban context, the vulnerability of the poor is closely related to their reliance 
on a monetized economy to meet their basic needs and their increased dependency on 
the informal sector, as well as insecurity of tenure and a lack of or limited access to 
urban services (Beall & Fox 2007: 6-7, Farrington et al. 2002: 4). A lack of residential 
options, except in hazardous zones, exposes the urban poor to environmental risks. In 
addition, as the poor tend to congregate in unofficial squatter slums without property or 
other rights, they are subject to periodic bulldozing. Cities are also characterized by 
heterogeneity and social fragmentation, with all the consequences of distress and 
desperation that can lead to violence and crime (Beall & Fox 2007: 7). And urban 
residents around the world, irrespective of their status or wealth, are becoming more 
vulnerable to the effects of violence and acts of terrorism. 
Many factors within the vulnerability context are linked to PIPs, particularly those 
deep-rooted ‘structures of constraint’ that preclude individuals from exploiting opportu-
nities. Pasteur & Shankland (2002: 7) have expanded their SL framework to include 
impediments to realizing unexploited opportunities. Opportunities embrace the prospect 
of a positive outcome from resources that have not yet been exploited, or rights that 
have not yet been realized such as social entitlements granted by law (like education) 
but people do not access them. Understanding this matter entails examining issues such 
as the costs of education, intra-household power relations and the need for child labour, 
prevalent cultural values, etc. It is imperative to recognize the importance of issues such 
as class, gender or race in forming significant parts of the vulnerability context. 
The vulnerability context is dynamic and always changing. Understanding vulner-
ability in terms of multiple, overlapping factors affecting poor individuals and house-
holds is an important step. Soussan et al. (2003: 2) argue that for the poor it is not only 
one factor but often multiple vulnerabilities that compound each other and impair 
individuals’ or households’ responses to a specific event. Hence when dealing with 
factors within the vulnerability context, it is important to be aware of how various types 
of vulnerabilities influence each other. 
To sum up, the vulnerability context represents the external environment in which 
people live and influence their assets and strategies. However, individual biography and 
life events are also leading causes of individuals’ vulnerability. The vulnerability of the 
poor gains its meaning and value through existing policies, institutions and processes. It 
is necessary to understand livelihood strategies in order to understand the sources of 
vulnerability as the starting point in a livelihoods analysis. 
 
Livelihood strategies 
Livelihood strategies denote the activities that individuals, households and groups carry 
out to make their livelihoods. In this discussion, reference will be made to household 
livelihood strategies. Beall & Kanji (1999: 2) have pointed to the usefulness of under-
standing household-level strategies in order to reveal the dynamics of labour and 
income allocation as they relate to larger economic, social and political processes. 
Household livelihood portfolios draw on multiple and complex types of resources and 
activities, and the specific combination of assets and activities followed is commonly 
known as the household’s ‘livelihood strategy’. They can be long-term or short-term 
strategies.  
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Livelihood strategies can be seen as a broad rubric concept that denotes intentional 
and unintentional actions, with different reasons causing households and individuals to 
undertake certain activities at any specific time. Households may opt to diversify their 
strategies to cope with sudden shocks or to reduce risk ex ante by engaging in certain 
activities. De Haan (2000: 347-348) distinguishes between ‘coping strategies’ that occur 
as a response to shock and ‘adaptive strategies’ that are longer-term decisions and take 
the form of a ‘normal livelihood strategy’. The focus on coping strategies and adapta-
tion helps explain how people compile their efforts and resources in normal times and 
during time of stress. Coping strategies embrace a series of adaptive strategies not 
merely carved out to protect basic needs but also to achieve various ends higher up the 
hierarchy. Referring to Maslow’s (1970) ‘basic needs’ model, Blaikie et al. (2003: 113) 
argue that the hierarchy of ‘human needs’ starts with the most important and basic 
needs for survival and moves up to the ‘higher order’ needs of love and belonging and 
self-esteem. Occupying the top of the pyramid is ‘self-actualization’, where individuals 
are able to fulfill their potential and are capable of being what they want. These needs 
have a positive relationship with each other.  
The motives behind the carrying-out of certain livelihood strategies are dynamic, and 
compel or prompt households to diversify activities and resources to meet their different 
needs at different times. Blaikie et al. (2003: 114) note that there is a close link between 
the type of stressful event and the specific reactions of people, which are commonly 
guided by their previous experiences in dealing with similar events. Ellis (2000: 41) 
suggests a differentiation between two types of livelihood strategies in rural areas. 
These are natural resource-based activities such as collection and gathering, cultivation, 
livestock-keeping, weaving etc., and non-natural resource-based activities such as trade, 
services, remittances, etc. Blaikie et al. (2003: 117) note that both production and 
income diversification are employed as coping strategies in urban areas. Strategies may 
also involve drawing on a wide range of social-support networks including rights and 
obligations within the household, the extended family and the community to assist in 
the current situation. Amis (1995: 147) notes that livelihood strategies in the urban areas 
are crucially linked to income and employment activities and argues that, for the urban 
poor. coping strategies often involve participation in multiple economic activities, 
usually in both the formal and informal sectors, which may eventually become perma-
nent. Beall & Kanji (1999: 7) view the arrangement of reproductive tasks like domestic 
chores and child-rearing as forming a very important part of household livelihood 
strategies because they allow participation in paid work as well as activities that lead to 
the development of social capital.  
Livelihood strategies are dynamic and may be intentional or unintentional (de Haan 
& Zoomers 2005: 38-39, Ellis 2000: 10). Ellis (2000: 10) phrased it as follows:  
The construction of a livelihood … has to be seen as an ongoing process, in which it cannot be 
assumed that the elements will remain the same from one season, or from one year to the next. Assets 
can be built up, eroded, or instantaneously destroyed … Available activities fluctuate seasonally, and 
across years, especially in relation to larger economic trends in the national economy and beyond.  
Households combine their assets and activities to suit their own situation (e.g. 
geographical local context, age, life-cycle stage, educational level, tasks) and in 
response to changing circumstances. Livelihoods strategies are informed by the 
compounded and different goals of the individual members within the household. De 
Haan & Zoomers (2005: 38-39) have questioned, however, the viability of using the 
term ‘strategy’ to imply intentional behaviour as they argue that the term ‘strategy’ 
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entails ‘deliberate or conscious’ actions. And this deliberate or conscious action is not 
always there even though ‘people constantly weigh different objectives, opportunities 
and limitations in response to external and internal circumstances that change over time’ 
(de Haan & Zoomers 2005: 38-39).  
The sustainable livelihoods approach suggests that a successful strategy will lead to 
an improvement and consolidation of poor people’s access to resources, which should 
result in an improvement in their livelihoods, decrease their vulnerability to shocks and 
stresses and lead to a more sustainable use of natural resources (Farrington, et al. 2002: 
1, Rakodi 2002: 16). Several coping strategies may minimize the effect of the crisis for 
the poor temporarily but boost their vulnerability in the long term (Blaikie et al. 2003: 
117). Coping strategies can involve attempting to earn extra income when hardship hits 
through illegal or quasi-legal activities such as undertaking informal-sector activities, 
waste recycling or burglary. Other strategies can compromise the long-term sustainabil-
ity of the livelihood system, contributing to the decline of soil fertility and the de-
vegetation of the landscape. In the same vein Farrington et al. (2002: 16) note that, in 
the urban context, some of the temporary mainstay strategies employed by the urban 
poor to minimize costs such as ‘withdrawing children from school and marrying off 
daughters early’, just contribute to marginalizing the whole household as well as placing 
an increased burden on the women. In addition, A. de Haan (2000: 4-6) points out that 
although migration has increasingly become an important coping strategy, as well as 
means of improving livelihood, it has not radically helped to improve living conditions. 
Since multi-local livelihoods are distinctly age and gender-differentiated, the absence of 
particular household members may disadvantage others. Migrants often live in exploit-
ative conditions that are associated with the deteriorating living environment of tempo-
rary accommodation, a loss of voting rights and restrictions that prevent them from 
influencing existing policies. Migration also has direct environmental consequences that 
can be serious, with declining vegetation and natural resources near clusters of migrants 
(A. de Haan 2000: 15).  
The reasons why many of the strategies that the poor follow do not necessarily 
correlate with improved well-being or the sustainability of the environment have to do 
with issues of choice, structure and agency. 
Coping strategies can be seen as ‘the manner in which people act within the limits of 
existing resources’ (Blaikie et al. 2003: 113). The literature proposes two broad reasons 
to the dynamics related to pursuing specific strategy types. These are the available 
assets as well as the opportunity to utilize them effectively. In this respect, de Haan 
(2000: 352) gives the issue of ‘access’ a wide berth, particularly with respect to its role 
in transforming assets into viable livelihood options. For de Haan, livelihood strategies 
are determined by access to one or a combination of the ‘stock of assets’ and opportuni-
ties that allow households to transform these into goals. Access thus concerns capital as 
well as opportunity, which brings the discussion back to the earlier one about the way 
policies institutions and processes work (or do not work) for the poor. This adds the 
dimension of power relationships to issue of livelihood strategies.  
To sum up, livelihood strategies are the responses by individuals and households to 
changing internal and external circumstances. They are also influenced by the various 
choices, preferences and goals of different household’s members. Households pursue 
their livelihood strategies within the limits of their context and employ their institutional 
relations. 
 
87 
Livelihood outcomes 
A livelihood outcome is the product of a livelihood strategy and feeds back into the 
vulnerability context and asset base. Livelihood assets are transformed by policies, 
institutions and processes that determine the extent to which an enabling environment 
for livelihoods is in place including the freedom that people have to transform their 
assets into their desired livelihood outcome. Factors within the vulnerability context, 
(trends, shocks and seasonality) impact directly on people’s asset status and the options 
open to them to pursue their preferred livelihood outcome. Livelihood outcomes can 
lead to security and insecurity cycles of livelihood. A livelihood outcome is successful 
if it reduces vulnerability, improves income levels, enhances well-being, improves food 
security and allows a sustainable utilization of natural resources (Rakodi 2002: 16, 
Chambers & Conway 1991: 2) but it is not successful if asset bases are depleted because 
vulnerability then increases. Outcomes are judged against people’s motives and priori-
ties but the types of livelihood outcome that people seek often differ from the actual 
outcome they achieve. 
Relevance of the sustainable livelihoods approach to this study  
The sustainable livelihoods approach focuses on assets, opportunity, household strate-
gies and the sustainability of livelihood systems, a focus that provides a practical tool 
for understanding the way people go about their livelihoods and a means for supporting 
their efforts. One of the potential strengths of SL is its holistic nature. A holistic 
approach to the poor’s livelihoods takes on board people’s perceptions, priorities and 
aspirations. It concerns do not stop with the livelihood outcome but goes beyond to 
understand the assets that the poor draw on in pursuing their livelihoods (de Haan & 
Zoomers 2005: 32). The approach also has the ability to link micro-macro levels from 
the local to the global in an analytical and systematic manner (Hulme et al. 2001: 25). It 
can thus depict the dynamic interactions of power relations within the micro-level of the 
household, network and community and the global influence.  
Being people-centred, the livelihood approach offers a more successful approach to 
development, including participation and empowerment. It starts by focusing on people, 
their assets and activities and on what matters most to them. It takes people’s strengths 
as a starting point and recognizes their active role in dealing with changes and exploring 
opportunities (de Haan & Zoomers 2005: 33). At the heart of the approach are the assets 
on which households or individuals draw to build their livelihoods. While people in 
poverty may not have cash or other savings, they do have other assets, including their 
health, labour, talent, knowledge and skills, social networks and the natural resources 
they have access to. Through an understanding of these assets, the SL approach seeks to 
reveal opportunities that people are able to pursue, and the constraints that they can 
identify themselves. It focuses on people’s aspirations and their capacity to take advan-
tage of these opportunities. The SL approach’s goal, therefore, is to enable people to 
achieve what they aspire to by supporting their strengths and assets. Its response is built 
upon the poor’s own perceptions and priorities rather than experts’ points of views. It 
has the potential to respond to people’s needs in a realistic way.  
An important advantage of the SL approach is its dynamic nature that allows an 
understanding of important factors such as the way in which household livelihoods 
change over time and why some households are persistently poor while others manage 
to escape poverty (de Haan & Zoomers 2005: 32-33). A core element is vulnerability 
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and the approach provides a tool to identify vulnerable households and understand the 
reasons behind variations in vulnerability between households that have the same level 
of assets over time. This is done through the disaggregation of poor households on the 
basis of their diverse characteristics as well as their most pressing needs. Relevant to 
this is the recognition of the variations in the contributions of men and women in the 
household.  
The sustainable livelihoods approach is considered suitable for understanding factors 
that enable or constrain people’s livelihoods and tackles them, in their interrelation-
ships, in a dynamic and holistic manner.  
Considering the livelihood approach for better policy interventions 
The previous sections have described the main features of the sustainable livelihoods 
approach and its suitability for understanding factors that enable or constrain people’s 
livelihoods in a dynamic and holistic manner. Nevertheless, the literature also reveals 
broad shortcomings in the approach that require substitutions or additions by other 
approaches.  
Firstly, it has been argued that while the SL framework offers an understanding of 
the factors that influence sustainable livelihoods at a given context, it does not explicitly 
address issues of politics and power relations that underpin policies and processes. De 
Haan & Zoomers (2005) and Baumann (2000) argue that the conceptualization of power 
relations within the SL is incomplete, and there is a need to include a tool by which 
power relations are brought to the foreground. In particular, the livelihoods approach 
‘should include an analysis of the dynamic of power relations (or the wielding and 
yielding process) as part of its institutional analysis’ (de Haan & Zoomers 2005: 37). 
Rights are one of many aspects of the exercise of power within the policies, institutions 
and processes that influence people's livelihood strategies and their outcomes. However, 
the way PIPs influence rights is also not clear (Marzetti 2003: 3). Also, the SL approach 
pays little attention to gendered intra-household issues of power and hierarchy. The 
household – whether in an urban or rural context – is a place where members cooperate 
and compete for resources. Different household activities are influenced by power 
relationships but research has established that inequalities of power and conflicts of 
interest within a household have a significant influence on the livelihood outcome (e.g. 
Kabeer 2000). A lack of clarity about power issues impinges our understanding of how 
access is negotiated, attained or denied.  
One recommended way out is the incorporation of political capital into the asset 
pentagon. Political capital would cover the opportunity and ability to use power to en-
hance livelihood options. This allows an analysis of the operation of power and politics 
in the livelihoods of people. By its very nature, social capital embraces critical elements 
of power and political relationship. Hence it was argued that much of the operation of 
this capital relates directly to ‘policies, institutions and processes’ (Marzetti 2003: 3). 
Baumann (2000: 6) argues that incorporating political capital into the SL framework is 
important as it involves ‘rights’ that give rise to claims and assets that enable people to 
pursue their different livelihood options.  
The emphasis on rights provides an additional analytical tool for understanding the 
weakness or strength of people’s positions. As discussed in Chapter 4, the poor often 
have constraints on realizing and claiming their rights and people’s access to effective 
rights can be analyzed through the way they are enabled (or constrained) from influ-
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encing political processes that determine decision-making and access, or the way they 
are able to draw on political capital (Farrington et al. 2002: 25). The PIPs analysis can 
help in understanding the complex power relations surrounding the issue of rights that 
matter most to the poor. Pasteur & Shankland (2002: 5-9) have suggested approaching 
the interface between rights and livelihoods as they relate to people’s aspirations and 
vulnerabilities, and influence their assets. People’s aspirations are related to the weight 
and importance they attach to rights and citizenship. Vulnerability can be examined 
from the angle of lack of rights (such as labour rights or land rights) on the livelihood of 
the poor. Rights can be seen as assets and rights to resources. This entails examining the 
way rights influence assets, by identifying the main assets that are influenced by rights 
i.e. physical assets such as housing, economic assets like employment opportunities. 
These concerns can be linked to the way societal structures and processes set up, 
support or deny the legitimacy of certain of the poor’s claims. 
The second criticism has been the rigidity of the asset boxes in the SL framework. It 
has been argued that grouping people’s livelihoods into financial capital; human capital, 
physical capital, natural capital and social capital is rather artificial and that the 
conceptualization of the assets themselves and what they should include is lacking. In 
urban areas this grouping does not reflect the specific nature of the interrelationships 
between assets, an example of this being the way ‘natural capital’ is conceptualized to 
reflect only those natural resources. Conceptualization of natural capitals in urban areas 
should also incorporate ‘services derived such as air quality, waste assimilation, protec-
tion from floods and fire’ (Mukherjee et al. 2002: 99).  
The categorization of capitals does not explain relationships between them – i.e. if 
gaining more of one particular asset can substitute for another – and their dynamics over 
a lifetime. Empirical studies have shown that some of the resources that people draw on 
to secure their livelihoods will not fall exactly into these categories (see for example, de 
Haan & Zoomers 2005, Baumann & Sinha 2001). As de Haan & Zoomers (2005: 33) 
demonstrate, social capital may define access to natural resources and physical assets. 
Such a trend can also apply to different combinations and the substitution of other 
assets. Emphasis should therefore be placed on the flexible combinations of, and trade-
offs between, various assets. It is also imperative to understand the dynamic and histori-
cal context within which various livelihood assets are combined in pursuit of different 
livelihood strategies. De Haan & Zoomers (2005: 41) propose using livelihood trajecto-
ries as a tool and methodology to understanding the way power is constituted and 
reproduced in daily life and the way it impacts on the livelihoods of people in the course 
of their lives. For them, this understanding can be made by examining the livelihood 
strategy portfolios that different households or groups pursue and the historical path-
ways they have taken. A livelihood pathway demonstrates a series of strategic and 
unintentional patterns of behaviour that have emerged over time. Life histories can 
demonstrate and explain factors behind long- and short-term changes. 
To summarize, the sustainable livelihoods framework provides the most suitable tool 
to understand the livelihoods of the poor but there are two broad concerns. First there is 
the need to emphasize the flexible combinations of, and trade-offs between, various 
assets. It is also imperative to articulate a dynamic and historical context – the way 
various livelihood assets are combined in pursuit of different livelihood strategies. 
Second it is necessary to make power relations more implicit by incorporating political 
capital as a vertical dimension of social capital. In this regard rights can become a useful 
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entry points to address how power imbalances limit or exclude some people from the 
assets necessary to pursue a sustainable livelihood. 
Encompassing definitions of the urban household within the context of the 
sustainable livelihoods approach 
This discussion aims at operationalizing the concept of the ‘household’ within the 
sustainable livelihoods framework. The concept of ‘household’ is commonly used as an 
analytical category that covers a wide range of residential forms, groupings of people 
and functions. The context within which a household operates (i.e. rural or urban) is 
also seen as an important criterion for understanding livelihood strategies (Beall & 
Kanji 1999: 2). Research has often employed the term urban ‘household’ loosely to 
refer to a collection of kin that share a common residence following the western nuclear 
model. Critics have pointed to the importance of the developmental cycle of the house-
hold over time that results in various forms of domestic unit (Beall & Kanji (1999: 2, 
Rakodi 2002: 7). The perception of extended family households as an arrangement that 
caters for and accommodates the sick and the unemployed is seen unrealistic because 
the process of household consolidation is a lengthy and dynamic process that constantly 
changes as people act and react to their surroundings. For instance, membership of a 
household may not determine mutual obligations and rights to the extent that a house-
hold can become ‘fluid in size, composition and location’ with members operating from 
multiple spaces (Beall & Kanji 1999: 3). The rural-urban linkages are significant 
dimensions to look at to understand household mechanisms. Non-resident family 
members who work elsewhere and send remittances and in-kind contributions provide 
important support to the household’s livelihood. Urban households can receive support 
from rural family members in the form of foodstuffs, and others, as well as through 
looking after children, the old, and sick family members to free up other members for 
paid work. Despite the importance of such contributions, it is different from that of 
members in the household available to make ‘day-to-day resource allocation decisions, 
accessing services, negotiating social relationships or participating in community level 
activities’ (Beall & Kanji 1999: 3). De Haan (2005a: 5) also argues that in rural and 
urban contexts, individual household members are increasingly pursuing their own 
individualistic ways and goals. This has implications for the traditional assumption of a 
nuclear or extended family, as well as traditional patterns of labour division. 
The process of decision-making within the household is regarded as a key area for 
understanding the dynamics of poverty (de Haan 2005a: 3). Several cultural, chrono-
logical and spatial dimensions of social difference influence intra-household decision-
making and resource allocation. The intra-household allocation of resources and house-
hold decision-making processes are often seen and analyzed from different perspectives. 
The unitary models which were dominant assumed that a household behaves as if it is a 
single unity, with a single utility function. Such models have been widely criticized on 
the grounds that the household is an arena of different voices, gendered interests, 
unequal resource allocation, and probably conflict. Work carried out by Folbre (1984: 
304) on poverty in the Philippines found considerable differentiation in the poverty 
status of different members within a single household dependent on factors such as 
gender, age and health status. She concluded that individual bargaining power played a 
significant role in their share of the household’s total income. She also recognized that 
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relative bargaining power may change and lead to a changing distribution of goods and 
leisure within the household.  
The drawbacks of the underlying assumptions of unitary models have led to the 
emergence of a number of alternative approaches that focus on the individuality of 
household members and the variations in their preferences and goals (Chant 2007: 32). 
Citing Alderman et al. (1995), Kabeer (2003: 4) argues that theoretical developments 
have provided the bargaining models of household decision-making as an alternative 
basis for theorizing about the household. The bargaining models of household decision-
making recognize the conflicting views concerning the desired outcome within the 
household as well as the possibility of cooperation.  
The ‘cooperative-conflict’ model is one version of this approach and recognizes that 
individuals within a household have different interests, preferences and access to goods 
and services. The realization of their various and probably conflicting goals is deter-
mined by their relative bargaining power (Chant 2007: 32). According to the perspec-
tive, a cooperative outcome would be more beneficial to all parties than non-coopera-
tion. However, different members have conflicting interests in the choice of cooperative 
arrangements. Outcomes usually signify variations in the degree of ‘bargaining power’ 
applied by each household member. Multiple circumstances govern the strength of 
bargaining powers in that they are determined by ‘fallback positions’ or a member’s 
ability to survive outside the household. Old models have conceptualized bargaining 
power as a function of economic resources (i.e. wage, inheritance etc.) that individual 
members could fall back on in cases when cooperation fails (Kabeer 2003: 4-5). 
However, recent models have incorporated issues of norms and attitudes of perceived 
interest response and contribution. They also incorporate the non-individual specific or 
extra-environmental parameters ‘such as the cultural acceptability of outside work for 
women and laws relating to child support’ (Kabeer 2003: 4). The ‘breakdown position’ 
for women is seen as worse than that for men due to their reproductive roles and their 
reduced access to education and employment opportunities (Sen 1990a: 237). However, 
‘neo-classical household economics are seen to lack the ability to fully examine intra-
household relationships, particularly those related to power positions, asymmetric 
gender relations, inequalities and ‘social-embeddedness’ of the household within wider 
social relationships’ (Kabeer 2003: 5). Understanding household units requires firstly 
looking beyond the household at the distinctive patterns of behaviour that characterize 
the way of life and relations of a society 
To sum up, households are made up of different actors with different and possibly 
conflicting needs and goals, and different abilities to pursue and achieve these goals. It 
is necessary, therefore, to understand a household’s units from the angle of the 
geographical context, as well as the rules, norms and practices that govern social 
institutions and reinforce certain patterns of decision-making. 
The sustainable livelihoods approach as an analytical framework for this 
study 
The discussion in this chapter has suggested adopting the sustainable livelihoods 
approach in this study of the causes and manifestation of poverty in urban Sudan, in 
particular in Khartoum. It has been argued that the sustainable livelihoods approach is a 
flexible and dynamic approach that focuses on aspects that matter to people most in a 
holistic manner and provides a tool for understanding the constraints on achieving them. 
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The approach also takes into account the interrelationships between different forms of 
vulnerability among the poor and the systems of support available to them to deal with 
them successfully. 
While the sustainable livelihoods approach is one tool for examining the main and 
common aspects surrounding poverty, it is not the only approach and it has to be 
adapted to suit local circumstances and overcome some perceived shortcomings. There-
fore, while the SL approach’s main elements will guide the study, other issues that are 
not covered explicitly by the SL framework but impact on poverty will be incorporated 
in the adapted framework. It has been argued that the presence of assets is not enough 
for households to build sustainable livelihoods but what is critical is accessibility to 
these assets, which is largely determined by power and politics. These factors are made 
explicit within the suggested study framework and it also reflects on the specific 
characteristics of urban situations taking on board the key contextual factors that are 
specific to urban areas, treating them as interrelated in the provision of the final out-
come of poverty. 
Defining the term ‘household’ is seen as an important entry point for the study. 
Households are complex units of analysis which are formed of members with different 
interests and goals. Intra-household resource allocation and decision-making are influenced 
by multiple factors including norms, values, beliefs and relations beyond the household. 
Hence there is a need to consider how these factors in turn influence the access of 
different members to different sources and types of capital. 
 
Research problem 
The previous chapters have provided a broad sketch of the constraints within which the 
urban poor in Sudan pursue their livelihoods. Shifting policy directions have impacted 
negatively on people’s private and public endowments (their human and physical capital 
including their access to urban public services). There are indications that some groups 
have been marginalized (because they are more affected by the above-mentioned 
changes) while other groups have benefited from intricate networks of kinship and 
political affiliations. The aim of this study is to understand why some households have 
been able to escape poverty whilst others remain trapped in poverty or have experienced 
further decline. This focus entails looking at the way people conduct their livelihood 
strategies within the constraining effects of the social and natural environment. 
 
Research questions 
The main reason for applying the SL approach in Sudan was to investigate the follow-
ing questions: 
 
1. Who are the poor and who are the better-off? What capital do they have and how do 
they construct their livelihoods?  
2. What are the key institutions and processes, including rights, that are concerned 
with providing, and/or denying access? 
3. What have been the major changes for people in different periods, and what effect 
has this had on their livelihood strategies and what factors have shaped these pro-
cesses?  
 
Type of data needed to answer these questions 
Based on these questions, information was collected on the following:  
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• Assets available to households and individuals within the household: access to and 
control over main livelihood resources, ways of using these assets and men’s and 
women’s priorities. 
• The way rights influence access to assets, the main assets that are influenced by 
rights, i.e. physical assets such as housing, economic assets like employment oppor-
tunities.  
• The operation of power and politics in the livelihood of the poor: the link between 
institutions and power/exclusion; the mechanisms that restrict or grant people’s 
access to various resources, the social traits of the excluded individuals, people’s 
ability to have a role in decision-making, the weight and importance that people 
attach to rights and citizenship, people’s aspirations, and the way they have been 
able to engage and make effective demands on the state, kinds of collective actions.  
• The rules, regulations and prevailing social attitudes and values, particularly those 
of powerful actors in society that sabotage an individual’s livelihood strategies. 
Reconstruction of the experiences of events and changes that have taken and the 
ways of responding to them, sources of support that households depend on in times 
of need. 
 
Data collection methods 
Field research was undertaken between May and 13 July 2005 in four neighbourhoods 
in Khartoum. Earlier field research in 2004 provided the basis for a broader under-
standing of issues to be further investigated. Some of the case studies from the previous 
three years and up to July 2007 were also followed up. The selection criteria for 
communities aimed at monitoring the diversity and dynamic of livelihood activities and 
possibly comparing patterns. The first step in the field research involved the selection of 
communities where there were variations in livelihood means and culture. There were 
eight poor neighbourhoods in and around Greater Khartoum and the study selected four 
of them. 
A visual assessment was made of the eight poor neighbourhoods before selecting the 
four. A visit was paid to each neighbourhood to note the quality of housing, market-
based activities, the availability of health and education facilities, the appearance of the 
children on the street and the quality of their clothes, population density, service cover-
age, exposure to calamities, dominant housing pattern, etc. Although this might seem a 
cursory appraisal, given the lack of other means to identify which neighbourhood is 
poorer than others, this form of substantiation seemed necessary. On the basis of this 
information, four eligible neighbourhoods were selected which represented the 
‘poorest’, ‘better-off’ and those ‘in between’ among the eight poor neighbourhoods. The 
four neighbourhoods selected were Al-Baraka (previously Kartoon Kassala), Mayo, Dar 
es Salam and Siriha because they represented an interesting diversity in terms of 
comparative well-being and ethnic make-up. Siriha neighbourhood was selected as it 
showed considerable socio-economic progress compared to the other three areas despite 
being the most recently established. Finding it would shed light on how households and 
communities have managed to improve their well-being. Mayo was selected because it 
was the city’s poorest neighbourhood despite being one of the oldest. The other two 
neighbourhoods seemed to fall in the middle between the Siriha and Mayo in terms of 
well-being. Al Baraka neighbourhood is the oldest neighbourhood among the four, yet 
the general conditions appeared to be lower than in Dar es Salam. It was hoped that 
these variations would depict the diverse constraints each community was facing.  
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The four neighbourhoods are distributed over the three cities of Greater Khartoum on 
the outskirts of: Khartoum, Khartoum Bahri and Umdurman (see Map 3.1).  
 
The selection of the sample households 
Seventy households were selected in each neighbourhood using a stratified sampling 
technique. Instead of selecting from the neighbourhood as a whole, the selection opted 
to use geographical divisions (blocks) for each neighbourhood. Abusin (2003: Appendix 
B) found that using stratified sampling based on geographical location was the most 
suitable technique for Participatory Poverty Assessments in such areas because of the 
danger of excluding some households when using a list of inhabitants as a basis for 
selection. Most importantly, those neighbourhoods are increasingly expanding and 
newcomers are usually not known to the formal authorities.  
Selecting blocks therefore allowed the inclusion of newcomers as well as the poorest 
who live in ‘illegal’ temporary shacks. The geographical division of each neighbour-
hood was as follows: Mayo was divided into 16 blocks, Al Braka 11, Dar es Salam 12 
blocks and Siriha 12 blocks. Around a quarter of the blocks from each neighbourhood 
were selected at random (see Table 6.1). The study then opted to explore the full 
continuum of well-being levels in the block. Community meetings were held with 
members of the selected blocks and neighbourhood residents with good community 
knowledge. These meetings involved diverse groups of the population (men, women, 
youth, different ethnic groups, power groups). Participants defined what they believed 
to be the categories of poverty in the community and proposed the terminologies, 
definitions and meanings of words that express poverty and well-being in their commu-
nity. These meetings classified households into four broad levels of well-being: those 
who are ‘always poor’ (tabaneen) and usually need assistance to cope, the ‘sometimes 
poor’ or (nus nus), the ‘medium’ (wasat); and the last were the ‘non-poor’ (murtaheen). 
This classification relied mainly on the type and stability of employment and the dura-
tion of poverty. Other factors that people saw as placing households apart from the rest 
included ownership of a dwelling, affiliation to a powerful network, and having access 
to electricity (grid or power generator) for lighting. 
 
 
Table 6.1 Selection of households according to well-being category 
Neigh-
bourhood 
Popula-
tion 
2004 
(x1000) 
Estim. 
popula-
tion per 
block 
(x1000) 
No. of 
blocks 
No. of 
selected 
blocks 
No. of 
selected 
h’holds 
from each 
block 
No. of 
selected 
non-poor 
house-
holds in 
each block 
No. of 
selected 
sometimes 
poor 
h’holds in 
each block 
No. of 
selected 
‘medium’ 
house-
holds in 
each block 
No. of 
selected 
always 
poor house-
holds in each 
block 
Mayo 517 32 16 4 16,16, 19,19 2,2,3,3 5,5,5,5, 2,2,3,3 7,7,8,8 
Dar es 
Salam 480 40 12 3 
22,23, 
25 3,3,4 6,7,7 3,3,4 
10,10, 
10 
Al 
Baraka 343 3 11 3 
22,23, 
25 3,3,4 6,7,7 3,3,4 
10,10, 
10 
Siriha 8 0.7 12 3 22,23, 25 3,3,4 6,7,7 3,3,4 
10,10, 
10 
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Seventy households, distributed along the line of wealth ranking identified by the 
community, were randomly selected from each neighbourhood (see Table 6.1). Given 
that the goal of the study was to understand qualitatively the nature and dynamics of 
poverty, it was necessary to insert a measure to ensure that respondents represented 
predominantly the poor, and included some of the poorest of the poor. The division was 
as follows: 30 households from the ‘always poor’; 20 from the ‘sometimes poor’; 10 
households from the ‘medium’; and 10 households from the ‘non poor’. 
The methods used for data collection and analysis were participatory, in line with the 
framework that seeks to understand the opinions of members of the community, and 
especially poorer men and women, in matters concerning their daily reality and their 
ideas about ways of addressing these issues. The Participatory Poverty Assessments 
(PPAs) drew from the lessons learnt from the first PPA and aimed to complement the 
poverty trends observed in the preliminary study. Various participatory techniques were 
used including household survey, community survey, focus group discussions and 
interviews. The interviews and meetings were semi-structured with open-ended 
questions and topics for discussion prepared in advance. Question were added or 
omitted as appropriate. Interviews and meetings with local men and women, children 
and leaders were held in the neighbourhoods selected. The knowledge of individuals 
whose socio-economic status provided them with a better ability to give a vivid account 
of poverty was sought through livelihood analysis or life histories, even if these people 
were no longer residing in the neighbourhood. In-depth life history interviews that 
provided a retrospective view of trajectories of change were conducted with 40 house-
holds representing all the social classes in the four localities. The life history interviews 
were geared at generating information regarding determinants of certain routes in 
individuals’ lives and the availability or absence of options. Interviews also included 
those who were considered to be ‘non-poor’ in order to highlight the main features that 
differentiate them from the poor and, most importantly, to understand why they were 
not falling into severe and/or long-term poverty. Officials and leaders of large organiza-
tions at district and provincial levels were also interviewed. Secondary data were 
collected at different levels, notably local statistics and provincial strategy documents. 
Both qualitative and quantitative data were generated. The collective perceptions and 
estimates obtained from participants’ life experiences formed the basis for analysis. On-
site analysis was made by participants through visual diagrams, maps matrices, calen-
dars etc. The analysis did not attempt to aggregate findings from the study areas to the 
larger population.  
The next part of the study presents the empirical analysis and is divided into four 
chapters. Chapter 7 provides a brief comparative perspective of the study areas and then 
identifies some of the major policies, institutions and processes operating in the areas, 
and analyzes the way they shape the poor’s opportunities to make meaningful choice. 
Chapter 8 highlights livelihood diversity and the different kinds of activities that house-
holds undertake. It examines how this mix of activities varies according to a house-
hold’s resources and in response to external shocks and stresses. Chapter 9 examines 
access to resources by households in the different well-being categories and in Chapter 
10 life paths provide a retrospective view of trajectories of change and generate infor-
mation regarding determinants of certain routes in individuals’ lives and the availability 
or absence of options. The last chapter summarizes the study’s findings and provides 
some concluding remarks and policy notes. 
 
 7 
 
Poverty profiles of  
the four neighbourhoods 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The number of people living in informal settlements around Khartoum has grown 
rapidly since the early 1970s. This can be seen in the increasing number of informal 
settlements, as well as their size. There are various reasons why people came to these 
new neighbourhoods but war and environmental crises were two of the most important 
driving factors. The deterioration of security in rural areas has led to increased armed 
robberies of cattle and property and this has been a significant push factor that forced 
people to take refuge away from their original homes. In addition, mechanized farming 
has forced former producers to move to the city in search of paid jobs. The peak of the 
mass exodus of rural populations took place mostly during the mid-1980s. Even for 
people from the city, costly and restrictive bureaucracies have contributed to the exclu-
sion of the poor from formal (legal) housing or land ownership, forcing them into the 
city peripheries. Others were forced to relocate to certain neighbourhoods for municipal 
planning reasons. The very existence of these neighbourhoods reflects the difficulties 
many face in securing affordable housing to such an extent that they have been spatially 
excluded from living among those who are able to pay more.  
The selected study neighbourhoods – Mayo, Siriha, Dar es Salam and Al Baraka – 
share common characteristics but are also intrinsically unequal and different. The four 
neighbourhoods are located over a wide and complex geographical area. Being on the 
outskirts of Greater Khartoum, they were not officially included in the city’s structure 
and there has been no provision of basic urban services including water, electricity, 
sewers or paved roads. Some of these neighbourhoods have become partially formalized 
but there are also variations in terms of the size of formalized space in each neighbour-
hood. There is a clear line of stratification between these neighbourhoods and the main 
city, with these neighbourhoods being inhabited by low-income people mainly working 
in the informal sector. Some of them lack titles or deeds to their plots since land is 
seized through ‘invasion’. Houses of the neighbourhoods are made mainly of mud and 
thatch. The majority have used flimsy scrounged materials such as plastic sheets, 
cardboard or scrap metal and the cheapest construction materials for roofing. Such 
structures are easily swept away by floods or destroyed by storms. The majority of 
houses consist of one to two rooms that are occupied by as many as 19 household 
members. Ironically even lower quality housing has started to emerge in the marginal 
peripheries of these neighbourhoods on the relatively less-valuable land. 
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The following sections provide a brief comparative perspective of the study areas and 
identify some of the major policies, institutions and processes that operate in these 
areas. They analyze the way these, in turn, shape the opportunities the poor have to 
make meaningful choices, including localities (Mahalyat), popular committees, regula-
tions on small-scale and micro-enterprises, Zakat: (Social Development Fund) land 
tenure system, NGOs and Community-Based Organizations (CBOs), traditional 
headmen, ethnicity and gender. 
Characteristics of the neighbourhoods 
Mayo 
Mayo is the largest and most diverse neighbourhood of the four in the study. It is 
located near Khartoum’s southern border (see Map 3.1) about 22 km from the centre of 
the city. Administratively, Mayo belongs to Jebel Awlia locality and is divided into 16 
blocks. Each block has a popular committee made up of six appointed members to liaise 
between their block and the locality. Until 1970 the area used to be a savannah-like 
forest with small trees, vegetation and shrubs that functioned as a protective shield for 
the city from strong sand storms. Trees were removed by the government to make space 
to relocate informal settlers who used to live in the central areas of the city. The 
neighbourhood has neither agricultural resources nor water resources. To the west of 
Mayo, about 5 km away, is Yarmouk, the industrial area for military equipment. To the 
south-east, there are new plans for a future industrial area for the State of Khartoum. 
About 0.5 km from the northern edge of the neighbourhood is Khartoum’s main sewage 
site where waste from septic tanks is disposed of and flows untreated. Mayo’s location 
poses enormous health hazards for its population who come into direct contact with 
fecal waste. Houses in Mayo are built using mud bricks or mud with wooden poles, 
bamboo and grass for roofing, and they are sealed with treated animal dung for protec-
tion to prevent erosion by the rain. Housing conditions get worse during rainy season 
because the houses are made of bricks, cement and grass. 
According to the Locality Reports (LJAM 2004), Mayo’s population was estimated at 
517,000 persons in 2004. There are around 22,000 houses and shacks, giving an average 
of 23.5 persons per house/shack. However, the average number of household members 
within the sample point to far less than the average. This difference is attributed to the 
methods undertaken by the locality, which considered the number of people to a single 
doweling of an average of 250 sq m. Such space can house up to six different house-
holds, as the study revealed. Mayo is the most crowded neighbourhood of the four 
selected. It is also the fastest-growing neighbourhood, with a population that is believed 
to have doubled since the mid-1990s (LJAM 2004). The inhabitants of Mayo are mainly 
Africanized ethnic groups and include the Nuba ethnic group (23%), the Fur (22%); 
then West-African ethnic groups (21%), groups from southern Sudan (20%) and other 
small Arabized and non-Arabized groups (circa 14%) (LJAM 2004: 7). 
People started to live in Mayo in 1972 and although Mayo is the second oldest 
neighbourhood compared to Dar es Salam and Siriha, its urban services and tenure 
insecurity are by far the worst among all the areas. The majority of ‘early comers’ were 
relocating from other sites where they had seen their houses demolished by the munici-
pality. They were promised legal rights of land but such promises did not materialize for 
many until 1992. A long process preceded granting people legal access to land and 
included collecting fees from inhabitants for registering land. Demolition and eviction 
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are commonplace and some people have been through demolition as many as eight 
times. Those who opposed demolition and went on demonstrations were jailed. They 
were whipped and humiliated in front of everyone and campaigning for land rights even 
cost some people their lives. Therefore, a lack of tenure security and the fear of demoli-
tion represent the most stressful and traumatic events for many inhabitants of Mayo. 
According to locality records (LJAM 2004: 9), 61% of Mayo’s population has legal 
rights to the land they occupy, while the rest are squatting, renting or staying with 
relatives. The locality estimated that 20% of the populations are squatters and 19% are 
renting. Plots sizes range between 200 to 300 sq m. Security of tenure is lowest in Mayo 
compared to the other three neighbourhoods. The government approved the allocation 
of land for those who were residing in the area for a particular length of time and many 
of Mayo’s residents have put their scarce resource into land that they are not sure they 
will be allowed to stay on tomorrow or not.  
Different types of livelihood activities are practised but there are clear variations 
between the involvement of men and women. Very few of the men or women work in 
government or white-collar jobs. The main activity for men is casual work: agricultural 
work, housing construction and concrete work, blacksmithing, welding, metal work, 
carpentry, mechanics and electrical work. Large numbers of women from the Mayo 
sample are active in different income-generating activities, including local vend-
ing/petty trade, home industry, agricultural work and as domestic workers in the main 
city. Child labour is more apparent in Mayo than in the other neighbourhoods. Small 
children from the age of six onwards are undertaking laborious work and work long 
hours selling merchandise on the streets or working as loaders, domestic workers or 
shoe polishers. Although most of the ethnic groups do not approve of prostitution, it is 
practised by young girls from the age of nine onwards in Mayo itself and beyond.  
For Mayo’s men and women, transport costs represent an important barrier to 
working out side the neighbourhood, reducing any profits on income from casual or 
permanent jobs. The city’s tarmac roads do not reach beyond the neighbourhood’s 
northern border. Some of the internal roads are made of gravel or earth and the quality 
of all of them is very poor. Transport for passengers and freight by both non-motorized 
and motorized means becomes extremely difficult during rainy season. 
The neighbourhood’s main source of water is from boreholes provided by the locality 
but there are some hand pumps and open wells. According to the locality, water from 
boreholes is connected to around 50% of houses while the other 50% have to buy water 
for everyday purposes. Even for those who are lucky enough to have a private tap on 
their premises, the water supplied is not suitable for drinking. Of the sampled house-
holds, none has access to safe drinking water and to add to the problem, the water 
pressure is low and people have to wait for hours to get what they need. Some of the 
network connections do not function properly. The main source of drinking water in 
Mayo is water vendors, if people can afford it. The cost of water ranges between SP 300 
and SP 2,500 (Sudanese Pounds) per day if there is no dust or rain but this can double if 
the weather conditions are bad. 
Mayo is the worst-off among all neighbourhoods in terms of public health. A leper 
settlement was set up in the middle of Mayo with 31 households and 200 members. 
They mix with the healthy in their daily lives without using protection. The presence of 
the municipality’s main sewage system just half a km from the neighbourhood is a 
serious health hazard. Stagnant water from poor drainage and streams blocked with 
uncollected refuse are breeding grounds for mosquitoes and other pests that are carriers 
 
 99
of disease. The community meetings (CM-M-1) revealed that the residents of Mayo 
neighbourhood regularly suffer from malaria, diarrhoea and various infections. Limited 
health-care options and the high costs involved mean that people are less likely to seek 
preventive care that could help them better manage their illnesses. The costs of consul-
tation and treatment are often beyond the ability of the majority to pay. There are three 
clinics provided by NGOs and these represent a somewhat more affordable option 
compared to private and government clinics, charging between SP 2,000 to SP 3,000 
($0.80-$1.20) per person per visit. The neighbourhood has two hospitals but the facili-
ties are poor and not even glucose is available for dehydrated children in emergencies. 
The neighbourhood has no access to grid electricity although some better-off house-
holds have power generators to light houses and to earn extra income. Crop residues, 
firewood and dung are used as the main fuel for cooking. Coal is also sometimes used 
for cooking but its use is limited due to its cost. 
 
Al Baraka (Cartoon Kassala) 
The neighbourhood of Al Baraka is in the southeastern part of Khartoum North (Bahri) 
(see Map 3.1). The neighbourhood is divided into 11 residential blocks and, according 
to the locality records (WB-16S, 2004), there are around 34,270 persons living in 5,200 
houses, which averages 6.5 people per house. The sample data show that households 
have an average of 7.7 persons. Its administration falls under the Eastern Nile Locality. 
Al Baraka is bounded to the west by Silate (a government agricultural scheme) and to 
the northeast by the Khartoum North industrial area. Due to its location, Al Baraka is 
prone to fumes and the effects of toxic waste from the industrial area. The whole area 
used to be squatter settlements and houses then were made of cardboard boxes; which is 
where it got its name Cartoon Kassala from. Recently the name was changed into Al 
Baraka (or the blessing). Now the area is classified as a third-class neighbourhood 
according to the Ministry of Housing. Part of the neighbourhood is still a squatter 
settlement, and residents are not sure whether they will be able to secure legal rights to 
the land they occupy or not.  
People started to inhabit Al Baraka in 1971 which makes it the oldest of the four 
neighbourhoods. At this time the government removed the informal settlers by force 
from the industrial area of Bahri and relocated them to Al Baraka. The pioneer residents 
of Al Baraka were mainly factory workers in the industrial area who had moved 
together at least twice before they landed in Al Baraka in 1971. Other residents whose 
informal houses were demolished by municipal planners have also come to reside in Al 
Baraka. The neighbourhood has grown larger as people have continued to come from 
the main city as well as different parts of the country. Inhabitants who chose to settle in 
the neighbourhood of their own will preferred it to the city since land in the neighbour-
hood is attractive to the better-off and so there is no competition for it.  
According to the Eastern Nile locality (WB-16S 2004: 12), 74% of AL Baraka’s 
population has a secure tenure status. The locality estimated that only 12% are squatters 
and 14% are renting. Plot sizes range between 200 and 300 sq m but some households 
have much smaller or larger plots. Land ownership represents a constant source of 
insecurity for many and while some inhabitants have been provided with formal tenure 
status, for others the situation remains unclear. As in Mayo, those who have no legal 
status have been threatened with demolition several times, with bulldozers set to 
completely demolish their homes. Some families have seen their homes destroyed as 
many as five times.  
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The neighbourhood is inhabited by various ethnic groups. While Africanized groups 
predominate, there are relatively more Arabized groups here as compared to Mayo. 
According to the locality records (WB-16S 2004: 4), the largest groups are the southern 
ethnic groups (a mixture of Dinka, Shuluk, Baria, Tabsusa, Lokoyo, Jure, Balanda, and 
Madi) which account for 35% of the population. Ethnic groups from Dar Fur (the Fur, 
Zagawa, Bgarra, and Hawsa) represent 15% of the population, ethnic groups from the 
Nuba Mountains represent 14% of the population and other Arabized and non-Arabized 
groups make up 36% of the population. 
The majority of the population are unskilled workers in the informal sector. The 
Silate agricultural project is an important centre for casual work for both men and 
women with around 25% of the adult population working on the scheme on a seasonal 
basis. A predominant proportion of the work associated with ploughing and sowing is 
conducted by men, while the women work in vegetable harvesting. Men also work in 
the industrial area as unskilled labourers as well as on the poultry farms in the 
neighbourhood. They also work in building sales or in government offices. Some men 
and women work in the formal sector as messengers, cleaners, drivers and guards 
Women work as food vendors selling tea, coffee and food on the street or in nearby 
factories and markets. Some also work as domestic workers in Bahri city. 
According to the Community Meetings (CM-B2), education was confined to NGO-
run schools until 1993 but the government currently has ten primary schools and two 
high schools. The area also has 14 private primary schools. In addition, there are three 
adult education centres and two Koranic preschools (Khalawa). The teachers mainly 
come from the neighbourhood.  
Until 2004 none of Al Baraka’s population was connected to a private tap water. 
Currently, water is supplied on behalf of the municipal government by the Company for 
National Industry, a private body. At the time of the study, 62% of households were 
connected through this network but the rest were unable to afford the connection fee of 
SP 390,000 ($156) per household (WB-16S, 2004: 51). There is a fixed monthly fee of 
SP 10,000 ($4) for consumption. The Popular Committee in each block undertakes the 
administration of water matters in the neighbourhood but the company is in charge of 
carrying out all maintenance work. However, the neighbourhood can go for days 
without water due to the frequent problems in the main system. According to the 
community meetings (CM-B2), the most reliable system for water supply is water 
vendors’ carts that come to the houses. Water vendors represent the most important 
source of water even for those who are connected.  
There are three clinics in the neighbourhood. One belongs to the Sudan Council of 
Churches, one to the Committee for Muslims of Africa and the third to the government. 
They charge less for their services than private clinics. There is a government hospital 
about 7 km form the centre of Al Baraka. The area has no paved or asphalt roads con-
necting it with the city and no public bus operates within or between Al Baraka and the 
main city. All the present services are run by private companies at extortionate rates 
with fare ranging between SP 500 and SP 1000 ($0.20 and $0.40) for a one-way ticket 
for transport within the neighbourhood itself. Travel to the main city increases three- to 
tenfold, which is the equivalent of two working days for a woman on the Silate project. 
The community meetings (CM-B2) indicated that people mostly rely on donkey carts or 
walk within the area. Transport, including donkey carts, is available on the main road.  
The neighbourhood has no access to grid electricity but some of the better-off house-
holds have power generators to light their houses- and earn extra income. Crop residues, 
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firewood and dung are used as the main fuels for cooking. Coal is also used for cooking 
sometimes but its use is limited since it is expensive. There is a significant connection 
between poverty and the use of energy in the neighbourhood. A famous proverb to 
indicate the poverty of others is ‘those whose houses don’t light fire’, which signifies a 
lack of what to cook and that they are unable to rent a bulb, buy kerosene or candles due 
to the costs of obtaining and using them. 
 
Dar es Salam 
Dar es Salam was established fairly recently compared to the previous two neighbour-
hoods. It is located on the western edge of the city of Umdurman (see Map 3.1) and lies 
on the southern border of the fourth study area, Siriha. On its southern and eastern 
borders it is surrounded by desert. The Libya Market and Mowelih livestock markets 
are located about 7 and 6 km respectively from Dar es Salam and provide employment 
opportunities for large numbers of the population on both a permanent and long-term 
basis. There are no agricultural projects or factories in the vicinity of the neighbourhood 
and among the three neighbourhoods it is the least popular due to its remoteness 
(around 17 km from the centre of Umdurman) from job sources and the main city. The 
area also has fewer restrictions on land acquisition and the price of land is much lower 
than in other neighbourhoods. Nevertheless in terms of general conditions (streets, 
buildings facilities), the neighbourhood looks much better than Mayo or Al Baraka. 
People started to reside in the neighbourhood informally during the early 1980s; 
however the neighbourhood was not planned until 1991. The first settlers were groups 
from northern Kurdofan who had came from the drought-affected zones in the western 
part of the country. Other residents came from various southern and western states and 
as was the case of Mayo and Al Baraka, many residents were displaced from other 
unplanned neighbourhoods or came from Khartoum’s planned neighbourhoods. 
According to the locality report, the population is estimated at 480,000 people in 2004 
(MDR-D 2004: 1). The number of houses is 60,000 houses, which gives an average of 8 
persons per house. The proportion of those who own the land they occupy is much 
higher than in Al Baraka and Mayo. And 69% of the sample had legal rights to the 
premises they occupied. Houses are made of similar materials to in Mayo and Al Baraka 
and the majority of the houses have one or two rooms.  
Unlike Al Baraka, there is an obvious variation between groups who came early 
(during the early 1980s) to the neighbourhood and those who came afterwards. The 
groups that came earlier were able to establish their houses in strategic locations and 
closer to the main roads where there is transport. They were also able to secure plots for 
their relatives, in addition to their own. These were later on either used by those 
relatives or rented or sold for newcomers. The majority of the sample households have 
no or only low levels of education and they lack adequate skills. Many inhabitants either 
have a small business or work as casual labourers in Suqe Libya (a big market on the 
southern edge of the city). People from Dar es Salam also work in various locations in 
the main city and in particular Umdurman and Khartoum North. Due to its proximity to 
Siriha area, some inhabitants of Dar es Salam work between the two areas. Some also 
work in the neighbourhood in petty trade, vending home industry, cart transport, 
construction, blacksmithing, welding, metal works, carpentry, etc. Women work mainly 
as domestic workers and petty traders. Unlike those in Al Baraka, the people in this 
neighbourhood have fewer options in terms of earning their livelihood.  
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There are 17 government primary schools for boys and girls but in these schools 
classes can have up to 130 students and the Catholic Church has 14 primary and secon-
dary schools in the neighbourhood. There are six clinics only for first-aid services 
during the day but medicine costs are much higher in these clinics than in the main city. 
But since going to other centres involves transport costs, people have no other option 
but to use the medical facilities available locally. According to the community meeting 
(CM-D3), medical treatment is only seriously considered in emergency situations. 
There is no hospital in the neighbourhood or emergency medical services at night.  
The main source of water supply in Dar El-Salam is the hand pumps. There are 175 
hand pumps in total that were installed by UNICEF, ADRA and MSF Holland but 
currently a large number of them are out of order. Besides pumps there are four bore-
holes linked to elevated tanks. All the neighbourhood households have to purchase 
water from donkey carts because the poor quality of the piped water is considered an 
important source of health problems. Like the previous neighbourhoods described, Dar 
es Salam has no access to grid electricity. Some better-off households have power 
generators that they use to light their houses- and earn extra income. Crop residues, 
firewood and dung are used as the main fuels for cooking although coal is also some-
times used. 
 
Umbadda Siriha 
Siriha is around 7 km from Dar es Salam and just within the western border of the city 
of Umdurman. Compared to the other three neighbourhoods, it is the closest to the main 
city. Administratively, it belongs to Umbadda locality and is joined to it directly to its 
western and northern sides. As in the case of the other neighbourhoods, each block has 
an appointed Popular Committee but the Popular Committees in Siriha are formed from 
appointed traditional headmen of the ethnic groups within the neighbourhood. The 
Libya Market, one of the biggest retail markets in the country is around 1 km from 
Siriha. In addition, the Mowelih Market, one of the largest livestock markets is only a 
few km away. The two markets provide employment opportunities for large numbers of 
the population of Siriha.  
Siriha is the most recently established neighbourhood out of the four selected for this 
study. People started to reside in the neighbourhood after 1984 and came here for 
similar reasons that other people went to the other neighbourhoods. According to the 
locality’s records (MSUR-S 2004: 4), the total population is estimated at about 8,200 
persons. The number of houses is 1,374 which gives an average of 6.9 persons per 
house. The main ethnic group in the neighbourhood is the Nuba (40%), followed by the 
Baggara (Kurdofan) at 25%, and a mixture of various northern ethnic groups (35%), 
The Shanabela ethnic group represents the neighbourhood’s most affluent and powerful 
ethnic group.  
The neighbourhood is in a fast-developing area in terms of urban services and the 
general conditions of the houses and inhabitants compared to the other three neighbour-
hoods. All the roads connecting the neighbourhood to the main city are paved and even 
some of the internal roads are also paved. Land in the area is much sought after due to 
the area’s location and proximity to the city. Land prices are therefore rising fast and 
there are clear pressures to replace residential premises with more commercially lucra-
tive buildings. More high-rise buildings are appearing in the zone adjacent to the main 
city, displacing the poorer people into areas where land is less valuable. The main 
occupation of the men is casual labour in which 38% are engaged (MSUR-S 2004: 7). 
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The women are more concentrated in vending and petty trade than in any other type of 
job. Working in the formal sector is not popular for men or women in the neighbour-
hood although they work in the nearby markets or the cities of Umdurman and Bahri. 
Transport to the city is not regular but is much better than in the other three neighbour-
hoods and not as expensive. Child labour seems to be low or non-existent in this area.  
Khartoum Water Corporation provides water for the neighbourhood in the form of 
private direct-in-the-house taps and is responsible for the general maintenance of the 
network. A monthly water fee of SP 13,000 ($5) applies. Despite this rate, the majority 
of households in the neighbourhood have access to piped supplies but the majority still 
have to buy drinking water from vendors because the water pressure is very low. Siriha 
is in a relatively good position compared to the other neighbourhoods in terms of the 
availability of water as well as in terms of the prices charged by water vendors.  
About 10% of the neighbourhood has access to grid electricity (MSUR-S 2004: 11), 
mainly the houses adjacent to the established neighbourhood of Umdurman. Although 
the electricity network is technically within reach of the majority, the poorer households 
were not able to have connections to tapped electric lines, poles or connections. This is 
mainly due to the cost involved in the process and which totals about SP 3,300,000 
($1,320). Unauthorized power connections run as high as 20% of those connected. 
According to the community meetings (CM-S4), kinships can make it possible to extned 
power lines to relatives, friends or those who can pay a specific amount of money for 
the convenience. Connecting to the main grid provide a source of power and authority 
for those connected. Those who are already connected to the grid suffer poor quality 
service and frequent blackouts. A few households have power generators that they use 
to rent out lines for neighbours. There are six schools in the neighbourhood: three for 
boys and three for girls. Children have to go to secondary school in other areas in the 
main city. There are four adult education centres, and the mosques are very active in 
adult education and in Koranic teachings in this neighbourhood than in the others. The 
neighbourhood has no hospitals but does have four health centres that charge a fee of SP 
5,000 ($2) per visit. In addition, patients pay for medicines and examinations. Siriha 
represents the most developed neighbourhood among the four in terms of overall 
conditions, living standards, roads, hygiene and telecommunication facilities (tele-
phones, post office).  
Policies, Institutions and Processes (PIPs) 
This section outlines the social and institutional context that people in the four 
neighbourhoods construct and adopt in their livelihoods. It covers a wide range of issues 
related to participation, power, authority, governance, laws, policies, social relations 
(gender and ethnicity), institutions (laws, land tenure arrangements) and organizations 
(NGOs, government agencies). As Chapter 6 indicated, PIPs govern access to public 
and private resources and determine the extent to which people can use, substitute or 
trade different types of livelihood assets. Essentially PIPs represent the source of power 
and control in on-going processes of negotiation over livelihood access. PIPs directly 
feed back to the vulnerability context by governing ecological or economic trends, 
alleviating or exacerbating the effects of shocks or reducing the damaging effects of 
seasonality. They thus determine the outcome of livelihood strategies by determining 
the choices and viability of people’s livelihoods. The discussion below examines the 
extent to which people’s livelihoods are shaped by them.  
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Localities (Mahalyat) 
The localities are the first level of local government in the neighbourhood and the main 
formal body in charge of local governance. Each locality encompasses organizational 
structures that represent all the state ministries at the locality level. The State of 
Khartoum, within which the four neighbourhoods fall, has seven localities. The study 
areas are in three of the seven localities: Al Baraka – the Eastern Nile Locality; Mayo –
Jebel Awlia Locality; Dar es Salam and Siriha – Umbadda locality. The states (Wilaya) 
and localities' main responsibilities include the provision of basic education, health 
services and water supplies. The localities are responsible for primary and preschool 
education, while the states are in charge of providing secondary-school education, and 
the provision and distribution of textbooks to all pupils. Localities are responsible for 
the management and provision of primary health care and environmental sanitation, 
including garbage collection and sewerage management. Health care at hospitals, dental 
care, and the building of small water schemes and their maintenance are the responsi-
bility of the states. Major functions performed by localities include street paving and 
maintenance, street lighting, street cleaning, garbage collection, regulatory functions 
(such as health and sanitation inspections in restaurants and monitoring zoning 
violations), revenue-generating projects, land development and town planning. In all the 
services provided, power remains concentrated in the hands of different state agencies 
that provide guidelines for the type, quality, extent and scope of the different services to 
be delivered (Maggate 2003: 24). Furthermore, some of the pressing issues in the 
locality might be ignored because they do not fall under their scope.  
According to the 2003 Local Governance Act, the locality includes the local author-
ity’s agencies that have autonomy or discretion over local decision-making, local 
service delivery and the local allocation of resources (A.M. Salih, 2004: 6). The admini-
stration of the locality consists of a hierarchy of officials and workers headed by the 
Municipal Commissioner and twenty to thirty locality council members. The 2003 
Local Governance Act indicates that a locality elects a legislative council, which in turn 
elects the executive body. The Legislative Council was denoted the legislation of local 
policy and supervising executive branch via an Executive Officer. The Act states that 
the members of the legislative council should be elected to represent different actors in 
society. Civil servants and technocrats, who may not be residents of the locality them-
selves, could be seconded from various government agencies to the locality. However, 
legislative councils were dissolved with no further elections (Abusin 2004: 5). An 
important point to note here is that while the states have devolved some power to local 
non elected localities, these localities have in fact been kept under central government 
control by various means. Maggate, (2003) notes that localities do not work towards 
common goals that cut across locality boundaries but that their work tends to be frag-
mented and restricted by budgets and regulations at higher levels. Each locality is 
subject to the jurisdiction of a higher tier of government, namely the State of Khartoum. 
The State of Khartoum is the main power broker at the sub-national level. In that, a 
locality is strictly controlled by the central government and maintains strong liaison 
with agencies at state level. These in turn delegate minimal authority and resources to 
local governments to coordinate services in their communities. The State Governor or 
(Wali) has the mandate to appoint local government staff as well as the chief executive 
and the senior civil servants who carry out the work in the locality. The State of 
Khartoum defines basic services, sets the guideline policies, provides some of the 
resources, facilitates local planning, provides technical assistance and training for 
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frontline personnel, and supervises and evaluates programme delivery in the short and 
long term. In addition, Article 19/3 provides that the State’s government has the right to 
suspend enforcement of any local order issued by the localities, or introduce amend-
ments to it (SLGP 2003: 17). The current law allows for minimum participation of local 
communities and places most of the power in the hands of the commissioner and the 
locality’s senior staff below the authority of the state governor. The recent study of 
SLGP, Baseline Survey Report (2004) pointed out that the Local Administration Act 
2003 ‘allows more central decision-making including the day-to-day management 
issues’. In the same vein, Hamid (2002: 4) argues that the country’s administrative 
system is ‘characterized by delegation of authority (tafweedh) and not devolution of 
power (takhweel)’. Those two systems of local governance are largely restrictive for the 
locality’s autonomy and for citizens’ participation.  
Localities were not able to build effective participation with the community they 
serve, and this is the important reason for ordinary people’s feelings of apathy, 
alienation and cynicism about government. Many of the federal and state services have 
been mandated without any consideration of local needs, priorities or interests. The 
focus group discussions in all neighbourhoods (FGD-M8, FGD-M5 CM-M-1, CM-B2, 
FGD-B6, CM-D3, and CM-S4) indicated that they were never consulted in any matter 
concerning their neighbourhoods. They indicated their mistrust in the locality and their 
fear of actions that the locality may carry out and that might lead to the destruction of 
their livelihoods or homes. The impact of these acts was serious and expressed in a 
range of ways in community meetings in Mayo and Al Baraka (CM-M-1, CM-B2). In 
Mayo a focus-group meeting with women (WFGD-M9) pointed out that despite their 
continuous complaints to the locality regarding the hazards the whole community face 
due to the presence of the main sewage site next to their neighbourhood, no action had 
been taken. Citizens and in particular marginalized groups are excluded or remained 
poorly integrated in the functioning of interest groups. To a large extent, local govern-
ance falls under the shadow of traditional politics, tainted by local patronage and 
dominated by local elites. The only means for citizens’ participation in decision-making 
of the locality is through the Popular Committees and the headmen. In all the 
neighbourhoods, members of the Popular Committees and traditional headmen are 
selected from among the most influential people in the community. However, even 
those bodies have been marginalized from the locality’s decision-making process and 
this has eroded trust in their capacity to accomplish anything for their communities. 
The representation of women and different ethno-linguistic communities in the 
locality’s administrative positions remains low and is confined to lower-level functions. 
The 2003 Local Governance Act states that at least 10% of the executive seats should be 
allocated to women but female participation in these positions remains very low across 
Khartoum’s localities and particularly in the three localities studied (Abusin 2004: 75). 
This has also been affected by the long tradition of gender inequality and patriarchal 
values which place huge barriers on women’s participation.  
The grip of the central government’s control has remained tight on local government 
resources and the localities have very meagre resource bases on which to draw. The 
2003 Local Government Act (Article 26) outlines thirteen major funding sources of the 
localities.1 These include real estate tax, sales tax and business profit tax, land and river 
transport fees, 60% of the animal and agricultural product tax, crafts and industry 
                                                 
1  SLGP: UNDP & Ministry of Finance, Economy and Manpower (Sudan) 2003. 
 
 106
production tax, a percentage of state projects within the locality, health and business 
licenses, the rental of commercials shops in markets, house proceeds, cultivable land 
tax, herds tax, donations and credits, and fees on services provided by the locality. 
These venues are supposed to adequately finance the different locality’s programmes. 
However, SLGP (2003: 10) demonstrates that many of these sources of funding, 
particularly those with high revenues, no longer exist. The reasons cited for this include 
the encroachment on these resources by state and federal agencies, which has led to an 
imbalance between the expected expenditure and the budget available to local govern-
ments. To generate additional funds, localities have assumed the collection of revenue 
from numerous taxes, fees and charges, which has resulted in a squeeze on people’s 
already-overstrained budgets. Informal workers have experienced real difficulties in 
carrying out their livelihood activities under such harsh circumstances. On the other 
hand, a lack of or limited funds impacts on the availability and quality of essential 
services for citizens. This is also evident in the stagnation and deterioration of basic 
amenities at the grassroots level. All areas are suffering from an almost total lack of 
government support for local-level services. However, there are important differences 
between the neighbourhoods in terms of services provided by the three localities and the 
way they perceive and are attempting to solve local problems. Mayo is worse off than 
its counterparts followed by Al Baraka, while Siriha enjoys all the services. 
To sum up, the term locality includes the local authority’s agencies which have some 
autonomy over: local decision-making, local service delivery and the local allocation of 
resources. Locality is highly controlled by central government and maintains strong 
liaison with agencies at state level. At the local level, localities have not been able to 
build effective participation with the communities they serve. The only means of citizen 
participation in decision-making in the locality is the Popular Committees (PCs) of their 
block. The majority of citizens, therefore, and poorer people in particular have remained 
excluded from the functioning of their locality. And due to a shortage of resources, the 
localities have been unable to undertake their responsibilities and impose taxes, fees and 
charges and this has resulted in a squeeze on people’s already-overstretched budgets.  
 
Popular Committees (PCs): ‘Lijan Shaabia’ 
On the bottom rung of formal local government are the Popular Committees (PCs). 
They were established by the Popular Defense Act of October 1989 but their role was 
revised in the 1994 Popular Committee Act, the 1998 Local Governance Act and lately 
in the 2003 Local Governance Act. Basically, these acts have appointed PCs as the 
formal bodies that represent their local administration and have reshaped their authori-
ties according to state needs. While the PCs give the impression that the people in the 
neighbourhood are democratic and independent, this is not the case. According to the 
law and rhetoric, PCs members must be elected by their neighbourhood constituents, 
and undertake responsibilities designated by the locality’s executive councils (Maggate 
2003: 30-31). In fact PC members are still essentially hand-picked by the local authori-
ties on the basis of their supportiveness. PCs are made up of adult males and none of the 
PCs in the four areas has a female member. 
The role of PCs includes conveying government information to neighbourhood 
residents, passing demands upwards and mediating disputes between ethnic groups and 
within families. However, the Popular Committees play a far more powerful role in the 
livelihoods of the poor than this. Historically, the network of Popular Committees was 
created by the current government to provide a means of controlling residential areas 
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where demonstrations played a political role in toppling past governments. They were 
also created to propagate new political ideologies and to solicit popular support 
(Maggate 2003: 30). Therefore for a long time the PCs were used as a powerful means 
of infiltrating the communities armed with a wide range of authority that enabled them 
to undertake anti-constitutional activities ranging from searching and arresting people 
through to approving or forbidding private parties (HRW 1996: 129-135).  
Although they were not paid a salary, they received sugar and other food staples at 
subsidized prices from government allocations that they could sell to people in their 
blocks at prices below the market price, and still earn some revenue. To receive their 
rations, households had to sign up for the PC and this way the PCs were given another 
control tool (HRW 1996: 265.). During the 1990s when the Sudanese government was 
experiencing intense economic hardship, one of the measures taken was the phasing-out 
and subsequent abolition of food subsidies. This measure led to a decreased authority of 
the Popular Committees for a while. However, they managed to regain power from the 
different roles and leadership they assumed in community life. According to community 
meetings (CM-M-1, CM-B2, CM-D3 and CM-S4), PCs have full political, economic 
and cultural control over the neighbourhood, deciding on the eligibility of residents in 
their block to land, Zakat or social funding for the poor. They can support or reject job 
applications or requests for assistance with education and medical fees, and bank loans 
for small business. They can influence residential security, essential services and 
personal security, with members of Popular Committees enjoying automatic member-
ships in other committees in their neighbourhoods. For example, some NGOs when 
setting up a local committee to manage a certain issue in the area (such as micro credit 
or water) will select various members of the Popular Committee. An example is the 
micro-credit project for the elderly in Al Baraka that was provided by the Sudanese Red 
Crescent (SRC) and Water Management Committees in Dar es Salam, Mayo and Al 
Baraka. 
Overall, people felt that the PCs were relevant to their lives but that they were not to 
be trusted. In different community (i.e. CM-M-1, CM-B2) meetings, people tended to 
remain silent when in the presence of PC members. People avoid talking about govern-
ance issues or publicly criticizing the way PC members had handled their matters. 
However in face-to-face interviews, people expressed their mistrust, fear and suspicion 
of the PCs and poorer people, in particular, indicated that they were not supported by 
their PCs when they needed their advice or recommendation. Poor people who occupy 
land informally are more vulnerable to pressure and exploitation by PC members 
because the role of popular committees gains additional importance because they repre-
sent the residents in negotiations with the government. For example, the PC participates 
in negotiations and the acceptance or rejections of actions intended by the government 
concerning the rejuvenation of the area through demolition and resident relocations. 
Focus-group discussions (FGD-B10, WFGD-M9, and FGD-D6) indicated that PCs’ 
opinions often did not represent a community’s views since they usually approve what-
ever action the government intends to take against the residents. At the same time, they 
are in fact just tools used by the state to portray a democratic image for repressive 
purposes. While enjoying different measures of control over the neighbourhood, these 
committees have the lesser ability to press demands upon the local authorities (Maggate 
2003: 18) They are more of a nominal organization with no power to protect the inter-
ests of their own members against government actions such as contesting government 
demolitions plans and actions even when some of the PC members themselves are 
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among the victims. The actual role and effect of these committees differ from one 
neighbourhood to another and from one block to another. It seems that most of them are 
ambiguous in their relationship to the community’s interests and could intrude, 
conspire, spy or otherwise become a vital support to people in their block. The positive 
side of PC actions is never evident for poorer people. 
The PCs are organizations that inhabitants regularly encounter whether they like it or 
not. Most inhabitants know at least a few or all of their PC members and interact 
occasionally with them in ways that involve some sociability. But at the same time, 
people are usually cautious in dealing with them and try not to express themselves 
freely in front of them, particularly at public meetings. 
In summary, while PCs are assumed to represent people and facilitate their day-to-
day affairs, the opposite may be true and PCs can become a major negative power that 
constrains the access of the poor to various livelihood resources. 
 
Regulations on small-scale and micro enterprises 
Activities of small-scale and micro enterprises in the neighbourhoods represent the main 
source of livelihoods for the majority. There are two main sides: planned markets and 
licensed work places or unplanned markets and unlicensed work places. The planned 
markets and licensed work places are approved by the local authority while the others 
lack the necessary permission to operate or operate illegally. Activities range from 
vending, blacksmithing, pottery, carpentry, the mechanical engineering of cars and 
bicycles, tailoring, to mending shoes, beds and household utensils. The environment 
within which these livelihood activities take place is characterized by abundant over-
regulation, which continues to inflict losses on entrepreneurial activities. 
There are several legal and administrative frames that the locality administers on 
behalf of the state and impact on these activities and the benefits that people can draw 
from them. The most important are the 1996 Society Security Act or (Public Order Act), 
the Public Health Act, and the 2001 Act of Violations (SLGP 2004: 2-10). The Public 
Order Act regulates small business, vending and vending sites through licensing, 
penalizing alcohol production and its consumption and controls public appearances and 
imposes a proper Islamic dress code, particularly for women. In addition, it also 
controls a vender’s behaviour inside cafes and restaurants and prohibits the sale of tea, 
food and drink outside designated areas. Public Order Forces were set up as a law-
enforcement body mandated with enforcing the above-mentioned issues. Public Order 
Courts were also set up to provide immediate justice for violations of the Public Order 
Law. However, while public-order courts were suspended in 2000 and public-order 
cases were heard in criminal courts, the Public Order Forces have remained in place. 
The Public Order Act constitutes a major source of vulnerability for women. The Act 
has its historical roots in Sharia law when the current regime introduced a rigid gender 
policy that entailed ‘cleansing’ the public space of women and imposing strict controls 
on women’s freedom of movement. While these policies are no longer enforced as 
rigidly as they used to be, the issue of women working outside the home is still a 
contested terrain. The women’s focus-group discussions (FGD-B15, FGD-D11, FGD-
S7, WFGD-M9) indicated that such a law had profoundly affected their choice of liveli-
hood activities by imposing a whole set of constraints on their activities. In addition, the 
inability to comply with it had often put them in direct and constant confrontation with 
the law. Several women indicated that their businesses had been closed at certain points 
for allegedly operating in ‘indecent clothes’ or ‘not behaving well’ and for making, 
 
 109
selling or consuming alcohol. The interpretation of what is ‘decent dress’ and ‘proper 
behaviour’ are left to the judgment of public-order officers. The door is, therefore, wide 
open for corruption and harassments.  
The second law is the Public Health Act, a federal instrument that enforces health and 
safety regulations applied to food and beverage vendors, whether mobile or operating 
from a fixed location (SLGP 2004 2-10). The Act states that any person vending food 
must have a vending license in compliance with this Act. The Act allows the locality to 
levy fines on vendors of food or beverages. Licences cost food vendors SP 51,000 
($20). Vendors are also expected to provide proof of residency and are also required to 
provide a certificate that proves they are free of contagious diseases. This cost also 
around SP 55,000 ($22) on top of which a monthly garbage collection fee of SP 3,000 
to SP 5,000 is applied. The Ministry of Health takes 60% of the revenue while the 
locality receives 40%. Fines range between SP 5,000 and SP 10,000 and so the 
registration procedure becomes expensive, cumbersome and time-consuming. Taxes and 
rates imposed by the local authority for an already-established business are a critical 
hurdle. Rates are not governed by people's total turnover each year but are not built 
upon realistic estimates of the actual profits that people make. According to community 
meetings (CM-M-1, CM-B2, CM-D3, and CM-S4), these fines and taxes seem to 
envisage large enterprises since most of the small business in that neighbourhood can 
hardly break even. Community meetings indicated that they were unable to comply with 
the high cost of regulating their business and that they find themselves often devoid of 
registrations, licences and certificates. To avoid bankruptcy due to the regulations and 
fees imposed, better off entrepreneurs have no choice but to bribe the tax or health 
inspector in order to forgo their business registration. These meetings indicated that an 
important feature that differentiates between poorer households and better-off ones is 
the ability of the later to pay bribe officials.  
The third law is the 2001 Act of Violations which gives the Violation Department of 
the Ministry of Finance the right to exercise its licensing powers under Articles 9 and 
10, including imposing fines. It gives the heads of respective departments the authority 
to decide and impose appropriate fines on offenders. Non-payment or failure to pay the 
full amount leads to processing the case through the court system. Depending on the 
violation(s) cited, the court may impose an additional fine, confiscate merchandise or 
impose a jail sentence, or all the three. What complicates matters more is that paying for 
such a licence requires proof of residency. According to respondents who were squat-
ting, the provision of such a certificate can become complex and depends on the rela-
tionship between the person applying for the licence and his/her block’s Popular 
Committee. Many vendors and entrepreneurs thus operate without a license.  
In summary, the informal sector in which many of the poor find employment is 
governed by excessively burdensome rules of taxation, licensing, certification, registra-
tion and numerous other administrative procedures. These government-made barriers 
prevent the poor from accessing assets and opportunities and from achieving sustainable 
livelihoods.  
 
Zakat (Social development fund)  
Zakat is the only government-run safety net for the poor in the city and in the country as 
a whole and operates at a state level in Khartoum (Abusin 2003: 8). It is a religious tax 
that is supposed to be collected from the well-off (generally 2.5% of a Muslim’s yearly 
income) and distributed to the poor and needy. Zakat funds are collected by the 
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government, but administered outside its normal budget. The Zakat Act, which was 
enacted in 1984, brought the fund under the taxation department. In 1986 the Zakat 
Chamber (Diwan El Zakat) came into being and has been accorded independence from 
all tax-collection agencies and is not accountable to any executive body. The supervi-
sion of the chamber is allocated to a board of trustees appointed by the President and 
headed by the Minister of Welfare and Development. The Zakat Chamber becomes the 
main institution authorized by law to receive Zakat and donations. The chamber was 
also given the responsibility of disbursing these proceeds to the poor (World Bank 
2003a: 73) and it is supposed to distribute all the money collected within a year of its 
collection.  
Zakat is believed to relieve poverty and play the role of social-security plans for those 
who need it most. According to the law, Zakat funds are distributed to the following 
categories: the Indigent (Fuqara) and Paupers (Masakin), Road Farers,2 the Insolvent, 
for the Sake of God,3 Persons of Inclined Hearts4 and On Bonds,5 Zakat Collectors and 
last Construction, Operations, Maintenance and Collection costs of Zakat. Eligibility for 
Zakat is therefore broad and open to various interpretations of who is eligible and who 
is not. For example, even state ministers are eligible for monthly Zakat. Overall, the 
amount allocated to the poor amounts to less than 50% of the total budget of the Zakat 
Chamber. El Naayal (2002: 10) indicates that in 1997 only 43% of the Chamber’s 
budget was distributed to the poor. According to respondents, Zakat operates on the 
basis of social and political capital with poorer individuals and households consequently 
having least access to it (see Chapter 9). The provision of Zakat is administered by the 
Popular Committees or through local committees made up of community leaders. The 
Zakat Chamber presumes trust, integrity and fairness in including or excluding persons 
on the grounds of eligibility. Hence, El-Batthani, (2000: 1) contends that there is a lot of 
rooms for ‘manipulation and appropriation by powerful, rent-seeking, prebendal groups 
whose interests run counter to those of the poor’. This point was further confirmed by 
respondents who indicated that despite their extreme need of cash, medicine, food etc,, 
their application for Zakat was turned down even though some who were better-off than 
them had been awarded money. Some better-off households have received more Zakat 
than poorer households so the role of Zakat in reducing or mitigating the effect of 
shocks and stress for poorer households is minimal. Furthermore, the bureaucratic 
procedures accompanying it are long and waiting periods can be lengthy. For the 
majority of the poorer households in crisis, such as those with a critical illness, Zakat 
never materializes, for others it came too late. And in the rare cases that the poor 
received Zakat, it was ineffective because the amount allocated was too little and did 
not allow them to overcome the crisis they were facing.  
Zakat has, in principle, to be paid voluntarily by the faithful every year but an Act 
was passed in 1990 which made the payment of Zakat compulsory for people and 
corporate bodies. The state exerts political pressure on people to pay Zakat. Community 
meetings (CM-M-1, CM-B2, CM-D3 and CM-S4) indicated that most transactions 
ranging from obtaining or renewing a small-business licence to arranging a small bank 
loan cannot take place without proof of Zakat payment in advance.. The poor them-
selves have to pay Zakat regardless of whether they can afford, even though they were 
                                                 
2  Travellers who have no relatives in the city. 
3  To satisfy God. 
4  Propagation of the faith and to those who are expected to convert to Islam. 
5  Slaves. 
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supposed to receive it in the first place. In an ideal situation, Zakat was to be the only 
tax on Muslims, yet the Zakat system of taxation has been imposed, in addition to the 
already-operating secular tax system. Considering the poverty conditions in the study 
areas, it can be presumed that incidences of Zakat were not being imposed according to 
the dictates of Islamic equity, since the majority of the inhabitants there are extremely 
poor. However they are still bearing the burden of Zakat taxes and people who are 
themselves eligible to receive Zakat are actually paying it for the better-off in society.  
In summary, while the introduction of Zakat as a safety net is supposed to relieve 
poverty, the opposite is happening and poor sections of the population are bearing the 
burden of paying Zakat to the wealthier. 
 
Land tenure system 
Plots of land in Khartoum are classified in five categories; first, second, third, fourth 
and fifth classes. First-class plots are the largest and have services. They are allocated to 
the Sudanese elite and are not accessible for the lower classes. Second-class plots are 
allocated to middle-income groups, the land is smaller than first-class plots but modern 
and permanent building materials are also used. Third- and fourth-class areas usually 
use poor, traditional building materials and are provided with minimum services. Fifth-
class areas are located on the peripheries of the city and do not have service provision. 
There was less competition for the fourth- and fifth-class plots, however, rapid popula-
tion growth in the city has led to growing demand for land and has increased housing 
costs which, in turn, has impacted on the outward movement of people from the main 
city to the fifth-class areas, such as the four neighbourhoods in this study. This has also 
been compounded by the influx of poor rural people who have arrived in the city 
escaping crises in their areas. The division of land into classes was inherited from 
colonial time when planning and housing were used as tools to separate the European 
community from the nationals, and it now serves the purpose of separating the well-off 
from the poor.  
People who settled in these neighbourhoods a long time ago indicated that the areas 
had started as squatter settlements and been developed outside state regulatory frame-
works. A large percentage of inhabitants continue to occupy and hold land outside the 
official systems and are likely to continue to do so for the foreseeable future. Quite 
often occupants do not have proper rights such as property titles or a lease. One of the 
most-raised issues at the community meetings was the land issue and people indicated 
that a lack of secure land tenure and legal protection is one of the most important causes 
of vulnerability (see Chapter 9).  
Structures of powers surrounding land rights are complex but the state has the 
responsibility of drawing up land policies and enacting land regulations. Almost all 
government branches pass legislation and offer a general framework in relation to land 
use but central government has always been involved in the implementation of actions 
concerning land use and its management. The localities have the right to plan and 
determine which areas should be developed, to expropriate land or initiate expropria-
tion, or they can act as land developer or landlord. However, the powers of the localities 
remain very limited. 
The 1970 Land Administration Law and its 1975 amendment delineate land rights 
and the registration of use rights for the state. The law states that use and ownership of 
land require that land be demarcated and owned by the state. Land is owned by govern-
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ment land distribution, land purchase or donation.6 The law did not allow for private 
ownership but instead it is rented (Hikir) from the state for thirty to fifty years (Taha 
2001: 17). With planning, inhabitants of the fifth-class areas (the neighbourhoods) are 
allowed to obtain legal title to the residential plots in the area they occupy or some-
where else provided that they have been living continuously in the area for at least five 
to seven years, have the necessary documents and can pay the total land price in one 
instalment. Focus-group discussions (FGD-M8, FGD-M5 and FGD-B10) pointed out 
that despite many inhabitants have lived in those neighbourhoods for a long time but are 
still unable to obtain the legal rights to the plots they occupy. The situation is particu-
larly acute in Mayo and Al Baraka due to a lack of savings, high taxes and bureaucratic 
procedures. Despite the fact that the price set for land in those neighbourhoods is below 
the market price, it is still beyond the reach of many poorer households that cannot pay 
the full amount in a single cash instalment (see Chapter 9).  
No allowance has been made for easy payment plans or loans for those who are 
unable to raise the full amount up front. As the community meetings (CM-M-1, CM-B2, 
CM-D3 and CM-S4) and interviews show, those who were able to pay the full amount 
initially might not be able to continue paying the annual tax of SP 25,000 ($10) and the 
garbage-collection fees of SP 36,000 ($14.40). These taxes might even deter people 
from opting for a legal title to land. Furthermore, the bureaucratic process of legalizing 
land ownership is too slow to keep up with growing demand. Documents required for 
the process, such as a citizenship certificate, a marriage certificate and a birth certificate, 
have never been issued to people who were born in remote rural areas, or those who 
were born into poor families in the city. Community meetings in all neighbourhoods 
(CM-M-1, CM-B2, CM-D3 and CM-S4) indicated that obtaining these documents is 
difficult, costly and time-consuming. The procedure also requires providing two wit-
nesses, usually PC members, to verify the information provided. In such situations, 
there is plenty of opportunity for those in positions of power to exercise pressure and 
exploit those in critical need of their support. Therefore, while access to securing land 
rights in these neighbourhoods is possible for those with political and financial capital, 
poorer people’s access is extremely restricted.  
The state has the right to buy ownership rights to land should development plans call 
for this. Therefore even those who have legal rights to their land are not immune to the 
possibility of demolition. While demolition and forced evictions are a violation of a 
deeply entrenched human right7 – the right to adequate housing – forced removals take 
place in accordance with the law and are carried out in the name of ‘urban renewal’. In 
addition, inhabitants who have no legal rights to land are not entitled to compensation 
for the replacement cost of houses and property lost in the process of demolition. This is 
also outlined by the 1990 Amendment to the Civil Transactions Act that prohibits 
appeal against land actions undertaken by the state (Rahhal & Abdel Salam 2002: 11).  
The community meetings (CM-M-1, CM-B2, CM-D3, and CM-S4) stated that 
demolitions and relocations of people from informal settlements have been executed 
with excessive force, resulting in misery, deaths and a loss of property. The new 
locations offered to the people affected usually lacked the basic facilities from water 
and health to education and transport. At those new sites, people lose their rights to 
many ‘other essentials’ including the right to work and civil rights (Rahhal & Abdel 
                                                 
6  For further details on land tenure in Sudan, see Chapter 2. 
7  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is now considered as part of customary international law 
and is applicable to all states. 
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Salam 2002: 11). Tenure security has been a source of continuous confrontation 
between the state and residents who have demanded rights or opposed demolition in the 
four neighbourhoods. Confrontational actions related to land has taken place throughout 
the history of these neighbourhoods, with memorable ones in Al Baraka in 2001 and in 
1998 in Mayo and in Al Dar es Salam in 1995. Riots in those neighbourhoods have 
always constituted a significant internal political challenge for the government and 
tough measures are often taken against those involved in such actions. However, these 
actions force the state to make compromises, particularly if news of them is broadcast 
internationally.  
According to the localities’ records, the market value of land in Mayo, Dar es Salam 
and Al Baraka is almost similar at around SP 1200/m² ($0.48) for those eligible to plots 
according to government criteria and who are registered on the waiting list. However in 
Siriha neighbourhood, proximity to the main city as well as the recent provision of some 
services, roads and transport have resulted in an increased market value of land. This 
has added an increased burden to poorer households and left them more vulnerable to 
market pressure than those in the other three neighbourhoods studied. Part of the land 
adjacent to the city has been sold by the public authorities to private investors. Accord-
ing to the community meetings (CM-M-1, CM-B2, CM-D3 and CM-S4), even those 
who resided in the neighbourhood long ago but could not provide sufficient evidence to 
their rights to the land become vulnerable to forced eviction or demolition. In addition, 
those who have settled on land whose value has increased over time are also exposed to 
market pressures. Poorer households are retreating from prime locations in favour of 
investors and those who are able to pay more. While this is the case, the economic crisis 
has impacted significantly on the ability of the state to solve land tenure issues and the 
authorization of urban services. A lack of service was clearly manifested during the 
1988 floods when thousands of the poor became homeless. 
Seasonal rains and flooding destroy houses and deprive people of the resources and 
assets that a house might provide. The majority of houses are made from poor materials 
that cannot withstand rain or protect inhabitants from environmental hazards. According 
to one respondent, the rainy season burdens them with several problems including 
leaking roofs, cracked walls and flooded pit latrine (see Chapters 9 and 10). Even 
moderate rain can cause severe destruction to property and life, particularly for those 
who live in shacks which are usually built from cheap materials that have been loosely 
nailed together. After moderate rainfall, many of these shacks are simply swept down-
stream. In all four study neighbourhoods, and particularly in Mayo and Siriha, the 
natural flow of the rainwater is obstructed due to the way the houses have been built 
very close to each other. 
In summary, Sudan’s land tenure systems and local government policies do not 
facilitate efficient land use but reinforce prevailing inequalities of wealth and unequal 
opportunities. The poorer population can thus only access the informal land market, 
which comes with a great degree of vulnerability.  
 
Development NGOs and Community-Based Organizations (CBOs) 
Development NGOs and Community-Based Organizations (CBOs) cover a wide range 
of institutions, some of which are independent of the national government. Some of the 
national NGOs have a direct affiliation to the government and are used as a means of 
promoting state policies. Others have practices that can be closely identified with a 
certain political party. However, under the 1999 Act they are all classified as NGOs. 
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The laws and regulations that affect the NGO sector are numerous, sometimes even 
unclear and contradictory. NGO activities are regulated by the 1999 Act of Humanitar-
ian Aid Commission (HAC), which incorporated the former Relief and Rehabilitation 
Commission and the Commission of Voluntary Agencies. The new Act required that all 
NGOs reapply for a registration licence, disclose their name and address and explain 
their goals and raison d'être. Each project by NGOs must be approved in advance by the 
HAC, as must all foreign funding. The HAC also supervises NGO and CBO activities in 
Sudan. 
The Act specifies that NGO activities should pertain to agricultural, relief, medical, 
missionary, educational, cultural, vocational, social welfare and other developmental 
activities. Although these categories seem to cover all the kinds of voluntary activities, 
the state however retains the right to include or exclude any activity it sees fit. For 
example, missionary activities, although permitted by the Act, were restricted at a later 
stage (Al Nagar 2006: 69). An important feature of the Act is that it prohibits the regis-
tration of any NGO if its sole or principal objects involve or include political concerns. 
The government retains the discretionary powers to accept or reject the registration of 
any organization if their activities are believed to be tainted with political concerns. 
While some NGOs were allowed to continue their work or start new activities after the 
Act was passed, many were denied access to work in the country or in a specific region 
or city on these grounds. Immediately after the Act came into law, the government 
started to create its own Islamic NGOs which have penetrated not only the urban areas 
but even small remote rural villages (Al Nagar 2006: 70). These organizations were 
thought to work more efficiently outside government than within it. In addition, as 
NGOs, they could perhaps appeal for voluntary support from the public more effec-
tively than could a government programme, particularly as citizens may have a cynical 
perspective of government motives. These Islamic NGOs have received strong backing 
from the state, particularly when the Al-Tamkin and Al-Takaful policies were issued 
during the early 1990s (Salih 2002: 6). Al-Tamkin is geared towards enhancing the 
capacity of Muslims in non-Muslim regions such as southern Sudan and the Nuba 
Mountains, while Al-Takaful or the Islamic Solidarity Fund is used to finance the 
activities of Islamic NGOs. The application of these two policies has granted Islamic 
NGOs unlimited support and massive opportunities for expansion in activities and 
scope. On the other hand, the role of secular organizations, particularly local ones, has 
started to subside. 
Since then, several national and international Islamic NGOs have started operating in 
Sudan implementing various projects themselves or providing funds for other national 
NGOs to implement them. In Khartoum’s poor neighbourhoods, these NGOs have taken 
part in relief operations and charitable activities like providing drinking water, setting 
up clinics and hospitals, improving sanitation, and providing and supervising mother 
and child healthcare. These activities almost always go hand in hand with the estab-
lishment of religious educational institutions.  
The signing of the peace agreement in November 2004 between the government and 
the SPLA/SPLM8 has led to an increase in the number of NGOs working in different 
development fields. In addition, the signing of the peace agreement initiated a prompt 
international response to meet the emergency needs for food and other humanitarian aid 
in the South as well as supporting good governance and the rule of the law. The number 
                                                 
8  Sudan People’s Liberation Army and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement. 
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of NGOs working in Sudan has continued to rise due to the explosive situation in Dar 
Fur. Many international NGOs started with strong support from foreign donors and 
INGO activities have been concentrated mostly in the relief and rehabilitation in 
western and southern regions. In Khartoum State, relief aid covers all IDPs camps and, 
to a lesser extent, reaches out to poor neighbourhoods in and around the city. However, 
since most residents in the four neighbourhoods have experienced several forms of 
crisis during their stay (i.e. flood, demolition, outbreak of disease, etc.), relief aid has 
been of critical support and, without it, many might have not been able to make it. 
The four neighbourhoods have known NGOs since they were first established. 
Different types of NGOs exist and include International NGOs (INGOs), community-
based and grassroots organizations, neighbourhood clubs, and religious and ethnical 
associations. The discussion below highlights the role of the main NGOs in the area.  
 
International NGOs 
Since local governments often find themselves strapped for resources, international 
NGOs have stepped into the breach to provide services for residents. Their number has 
increased over the past two decades and their earlier position as humanitarian providers 
in the 1980s has changed to one of service provider. Currently they are involved in 
implementing development programmes at neighbourhood level and piloting innovative 
development interventions for poverty reduction. Women’s focus-group discussions 
(WFGD-M9, FGD-B15 and FGD-D11) value and remember those NGOs that enabled 
them to read and write and access credits. NGO programmes are run either directly or 
through local agencies with activities covering service provision, education, community 
development, culture, environmental protection, community safety, human rights and 
the creation of a gender-equal society and, to a lesser extent, humanitarian -relief activi-
ties. Most INGOs in the four neighbourhoods have a service orientation and their 
activities include, firstly, the provision of water and, secondly, health and education. 
The main INGOs in the field of water supply and managements are the Red Crescent, 
the Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA), Al-dawa Al-Islamiya (DAWA, 
Islamic Dawa organization), the Organization of Muslims of Africa, UNICEF, the 
French Cooperation and MSF Holland. These INGOs have supported the establishment 
of hand-pumps in Mayo, Dar es Salam and Al Baraka. MSF Holland has also provided 
the training of community-based water management committees (CWMC) at block 
levels in Mayo and Dar es Salam. The Red Crescent has supported the training of 
community people in water management as well as training trainers in Dar es Salam. 
INGOs have been at the forefront of the provision of health care too in the four 
neighbourhoods. Some have long been involved in the preventive and curative services, 
in particular the prevention and control of malaria, TB, HIV Acute Respiratory Infec-
tions (ARI), and support for health facilities. The National Health Strategy encourages 
international organizations to provide their health services through the Ministry’s insti-
tutions in order to regulate their work. These NGOs mostly work in partnership with the 
Ministry of Health and sometimes parallel to it. The most important INGOs working in 
the area of health in the four neighbourhoods include MSF Holland, Al-dawa Al-
Islamiya (DAWA, Islamic Dawa organization) and the Organization of Muslims of 
Africa. Some have provided health centres, with feeding and vaccination services such 
as those provided by DAWA. Others have provided support for existing health facilities 
in Mayo, Al Baraka and Dar es Salam, such as Islamic Relief. In addition, NGOs such 
as Fellowship for African Relief (FAR), the Cooperative for Assistance and Relief 
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Everywhere (CARE) and MSF have provided support for the construction of pit latrines 
in Mayo, Al Baraka and Dar es Salam.  
Community meetings (CM-M-1, CM-B2, CM-D3 and CM-S4) indicated that during 
the difficult time of forced evictions and demolition, FAR, backed by an initiative from 
Enfants du Monde, Droits de l’Homme and the UN provided important support to the 
neighbourhood community by raising the matter of forced eviction with the government 
and appealing to the Ministry of Planning. In the field of governance, CARE Sudan and 
CARE UK are undertaking a project aimed at strengthening local PCs in Al Baraka. 
Many INGOs have capacity-building projects that help residents and equip them with 
practical skills. These projects usually see the transfer of skills as a tool that ultimately 
leads the neighbourhood community to becoming able to address their own problems at 
some later stage. They usually involve income generation, vocational training and 
education, the management of small projects, water resource management in the area 
etc. The main INGOs in this field include the UN – with the Local Development 
Committee (LDC), and FAR in Dar es Salam who supported income generation and 
adult education projects. World University Services (WUS) and the Sudan Open 
Learning Organization (SOLO) are active in the field of literacy in Dar es Salam, Mayo 
and Al Baraka. Oxfam and Accord have joint activities in community development in 
Dar es Salam. In Mayo, OXFAM supported women’s income-generating activities. 
Goal is also active in Mayo with their eight adult education centres. In Siriha, Friends of 
the Children Society (AMAL) provide educational programmes to rehabilitate drop-outs 
and street children. Urban Upgrading and Poverty Alleviation Project (UPAP) was a 
significant project funded by UNDP and implemented by UN-HABITAT in Mayo, Dar 
es Salam and Al Baraka. According to respondents, the project provided micro-credit or 
revolving funds for people who were not able to access the conventional, formal finan-
cial system. The -credit was used in various business activities such as small income-
generating activities, basic services provision (community water supply, educational 
facilities, electricity supply, health centres, etc.). The project came to an end in 2002 but 
the impact of this project is still being felt in many of the area’s socio-economic 
development features. 
 
National NGOs 
Within the four neighbourhoods, a trend to be noticed is that over the past two decades a 
vibrant national NGO community has emerged that is having a profound impact on 
local development. They have been promoting change through different means from 
managing water resources to disseminating information on health and other matters. 
Some are supported by larger national or international NGOs, while others are sup-
ported by members themselves. According to the community meetings (CM-M-1, CM-
B2, CM-D3 and CM-S4), the most active ones in the neighbourhoods are the Sudan 
Council of Churches (SCC) that has provided health centres and feeding and vaccina-
tion services in all the four neighbourhoods. The SCC also provides adult education 
facilities in the four areas. In Al Baraka, CARE Sudan supported by CARE UK is 
undertaking a project to strengthen the local PCs. Sawa-Sawa (Always Together) is a 
grassroots organization in Dar es Salam supported by the Red Crescent and is under-
taking water management and training for local people in water management. The 
organization for community development provides trade-related capacity-building of 
small businesses for people in Dar es Salam. However, within the sample households, 
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the poorer individuals and households did not benefit much from these resources (see 
Chapter 9). 
In Al Baraka, the Sudanese Red Crescent (SRC) has implemented a micro lending 
project funded by Help Age International. The project provides micro credit to the 
elderly to enable them to set up their own micro enterprises for income generation. The 
Murabaha9 (hire-purchase) method of finance was applied for loans with a maximum 
period of 18 months, repayable in two-weekly instalments with a grace period of 1-2 
months. According to respondents, those who received the credits were able to use them 
for developing their businesses or starting new businesses.  
Women’s associations exist in all the neighbourhoods. The Sudanese Development 
Association (SDA) works in all four areas helping women to organize CBOs for savings 
and credit (registered as cooperatives or NGOs, depending on their choice). Women’s 
focus groups (FGD-D11, FGD-S7, FGD-B15) indicated that members were assisted in 
maximizing their potential not only by organizing themselves but also by upgrading 
their existing skills to better manage their business and community initiatives and 
establish effective links with local government and other actors (see Chapter 10). They 
were also provided with micro credits and the training necessary to manage their 
finances. The Association of Women Vendors of Food and Tea in Abu Zeid Market is a 
trade union representing self-employed women in Abu Zeid Market who, through 
collective action, are trying to regulate their working conditions so as to eliminate 
different forms of exploitation. The association has the advisory support of the 
Sudanese Development Association (SDA) and members come mainly from Dar es 
Salam and Siriha, but women from Al Baraka and other parts of the city are also 
involved. According to the participants, women who have joined the organization have 
found their lives changed in a very positive way (Chapter 9).  
Branches of the General Union of Sudanese Women (GUSW) who are affiliated to 
the National Congress Party (the government party) exist in all neighbourhoods. It 
offers adult education training and in some blocks has income-generating activities too. 
Its main concern is to mobilize women to support state activities. The Shaheed organi-
zation (Martyr of the War) has outreach in all neighbourhoods, and particularly in 
Siriha. It provides material support for the families of those who died in the civil war in 
the south while fighting on the government side. In Dar es Salam and Mayo, Women 
Training and Promotion Association (WOTAP) provides income-generating activities 
and adult education using the government curriculum. Most importantly, the organiza-
tion’s small micro-lending programme has provided critical support to those who 
needed the cash most. Community meetings in Dar es Salam (CM-D3) and the women‘s 
focus group in Mayo (WFGD-M9) both considered WOTAP as an NGO that is close to 
people and their problems. 
Regional, ethnic and neighbourhood groups and associations are forming spontane-
ously to carry out local activities and generate and allocate resources that the state (or 
municipality) is unable to provide. They include women’s groups, sports clubs, youth 
associations, and religious or educational associations. They are established on people’s 
own initiatives and characterized by self-help projects where local people are involved 
in the implementation of a project by contributing cash, tools, materials and labour. 
They are intended to provide the various needs of specific target groups and these can 
include skills training, challenging bad attitudes, building up confidence and solidarity 
                                                 
9  Loan in kind where the lender procures and sells goods to the borrower on a cost plus mark-up basis. 
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at both group and community levels, the strengthening of networking between groups 
from the similar region or ethnic group, and the building of shelters. Some of them 
represent the neighbourhood and beyond, while others represent specific target groups 
within the neighbourhood. These groups have usually large outreach among their 
communities. In particular those that were established according to ethnic background 
such as the Association of Nuba Mountain Women Living in Khartoum, the Association 
of Masaleet in Al Baraka and the Association of Fur in Siriha. According to respon-
dents, these would be very important groups if they had the financial and political 
capital but since they usually lack this, their effect is minimal. Furthermore, poorer 
individuals are less likely to be involved or benefit from them (see Chapter 9). 
Muslim and Christian religious groups are a common type of association in the four 
neighbourhoods. The Christian and Muslims groups occupy an important space in the 
lives of their respective communities as a source of solace. Members of a group usually 
come together in their neighbourhood once or twice a week, read sacred scriptures and 
pray together.  
In all four neighbourhoods, credit and saving schemes are a common form of 
women’s organization that addresses the immediate and direct needs of members as 
well as several indirect, longer-term needs. Respondents have indicated that their 
involvement in these schemes were dependent on their financial capital and ability to 
save. For this reason, the majority of the poor were not able to be part of them (see 
Chapter 9). 
 
The role and shortcomings of NGOs 
NGOs play a major role in community development in the areas. Their main advantage 
is their ability to create trust and a good relationship with people, although their out-
reach to poorer people is less apparent. An important constraint in the work of all NGOs 
is the government control over their activities and citizens’ involvement. In particular 
for neighbourhood groups, the state defines what they could engage in without trans-
gressing into politics and challenging the absolute authority of the state. Except for 
those NGOs that are supported by the state, such as Islamic NGOs, the General Union 
for Sudanese Women (GUSW) or state-approved organizations such as the Sudanese 
Society for the Eradication of Harmful Traditional Practices that have the freedom to do 
what they please. 
INGOs are the main providers of essential services such as water, health and educa-
tion facilities. The majority of people of the neighbourhoods have come to know these 
organizations and their activities. However, INGOs’ work does not always run smoothly 
in those areas and there are problems related to constraints with legal and political 
frameworks, mistrust and low levels of collaboration between the government and 
INGOs, particularly those that mix an advocacy role with service delivery. This, in a 
way, impacts on the ability of INGOs to assume a more coherent role in the community 
by incorporating vital issues such as empowerment or the violation of human and 
women’s rights. The mistrust exists on both sides. Municipal officials openly criticize 
INGOs and see their services as mere political propaganda and their activities as ad hoc 
support characterized by mistrust, suspicion and paternalism. INGOs workers, on the 
other hand, blame the state for its lack of presence, its neglect of the poor and for 
discriminating against some groups.  
Secular national NGO operations are hampered by inadequate legal and political 
frameworks and the lack of constructive cooperation between them and the government. 
 
 119
Many suffer limited capacities and resources and work against all the odds to meet the 
needs of those to whom the government shows little commitment in providing assis-
tance. This in turn frustrates their efforts and reduces the scope of their activities to a 
very small section of the population. For example, WOTAP has been successful in 
providing micro finance but the scope of its activities has been localized due to limited 
resources. 
Credit provision is often limited and only given to a small group. For example, the 
Sudan Red Crescent’s (SRC) micro-lending project could only give a maximum loan of 
SP 125,000, which is barely enough to start a small business. Establishing and running 
local NGOs were also cited among the important hurdles faced. Many of the projects by 
national NGOs have a very short life span, fading away as quickly as they surface. 
Funding is one central problem that most national NGOs face. Some embark on 
mobilizing local resources, with mixed results; others attempt to develop sources of 
earned income, while others have downsized or closed down altogether. For example, 
some of the medical centres provided by the SCC in Mayo are closing down because of 
a lack of funding. Feeding and maternity care in Al Baraka, as well as adult education in 
classes in Dar es Salam are all closing down. Information on national NGOs and their 
activities is scant and unreliable. Many people in the same neighbourhood are not aware 
of the work these organizations are conducting in their own neighbourhood.  
The level of community involvement in national or international projects varies 
considerably. Some NGOs have encouraged participation and facilitated the building of 
local capacity of communities to take decisions after the NGO leaves. Examples of 
those are FAR, MSF and ADRA that all involved neighbourhoods in decisions regard-
ing the placement of facilities as well as the management of water supply and sanitation 
projects. Local people were also given access to training and technology and have joint 
responsibility for the operation and maintenance of the facilities. WOTAP, on the other 
hand, has been successful in setting up a solid foundation not only for micro finance, 
but also in the social mobilization of communities.  
Nonetheless, community participation has become more rhetoric than reality for some 
other NGOs. Examples are the SCC, the Islamic Dawa and the GUSW where people 
were not part of the implementation, design, monitoring or evaluation of any project. 
On the contrary, in their activities there appears to be discrimination against secular 
forces and religious minorities. Islamic Dawa tends to establish Khalwas (Islamic 
schools) which teach only Arabic and the Koran for Muslims and non-Muslims. Food 
donations are sometimes used as a tool of religious pressure or conversion. Women’s 
involvement in development projects in the neighbourhoods tends to be low except in 
their own organizations. While this is sometimes attributed to the already-overburdened 
status of women due to their traditional activities, most NGOs do not put place a 
framework that caters for women’s specific time constraints. For example, women 
might not be able to take part in meetings or activities that are held in the evenings. And 
they might not be welling to travel a long distance or incur costs to attend a meeting. 
Being virtually absent from most meetings, women stand little chance of influencing 
decisions and even less of being elected or selected as members of different committees. 
For the majority of regional, ethnic and neighbourhood groups and associations, partici-
pation is at a minimal level for the community as a whole since neighbourhoods are 
divided along ethnic lines. Most importantly, these groups usually lack financial and 
political capital and so their impact tends to be minimal.  
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In summary, NGOs provide significant and wide-ranging services and activities 
covering many of the neighbourhoods. Among their most impressive activities are the 
creation of livelihood opportunities and increasing poor people’s access to information 
and credit. However, in their different forms, NGOs are not able to address fundamental 
issues related to power and entitlements to resources due to their mandated role or to 
overall governance and resource constraints. In addition, NGOs are not always inclusive 
in their targeting and service delivery, and vulnerable groups are less likely to be 
involved and reap any benefits from participating.  
 
Traditional headmen  
Each ethnic group usually has a headman called a sultan, chief or Umda, depending on 
the ethnic group. Those from southern Sudan have sultans as headmen, while chiefs and 
Umad are usually the headmen of groups from the northern and western parts of the 
country. Headmen are either elected by their groups for these leadership positions or 
inherit it from their fathers. According to the community meetings (CM-M-1, CM-B2, 
CM-D3 and CM-S4), older and wiser men sometimes qualify for headmen positions 
when the other two categories are not there. Some are also appointed by the govern-
ment, particularly in the case of the Umad. Sultans seem to command more prestige in 
their communities than the others and within most southern ethnic groups, loyalty to the 
group is highly valued. Responsibility is generally considered to fall on the group in its 
entirety rather than on any particular individual. The role and position of headmen in the 
lives of their communities seem to have undergone huge changes. According to the 
respondents, they used to enjoy a special position in their communities as ‘wise men’ 
who provided spiritual direction and managed relations with other ethnic groups and 
governments and took important decision concerning the community life in general. 
However, they have started to lose some of this privilege with the independence that 
city life gives its young working members. In addition, the headmen are increasingly 
becoming preoccupied with their own survival, often to the detriment of the group they 
are meant to protect, lead and guide. At the same time, a part of their job has been taken 
over by the different government agencies in the city and their apparent role is now 
mostly confined to providing religious guidance and mediating in local domestic dis-
putes within and between their group and other ethnic groups and mobilizing their 
communities to rally behind the state.  
The government saw the headmen as agents who could play an important role in 
keeping law and so traditional headmen have gained official backing for their role in the 
community’s affairs. They have been assigned the role of government advisors on 
matters concerning their respective communities and delegated administrative and 
judicial functions within their own ethnic group. Within Mayo, Al Baraka and Dar es 
Salam, the headmen and popular committees are separate entities although they often 
play a parallel role. However, the case is different in Siriha. Traditional neighbourhood 
headmen were assigned membership of the PCs in their respective blocks. Ostensibly 
headmen in all neighbourhoods become a mechanism for political mobilization, help in 
organizing their community and monitor their activities. According to respondents, 
Headmen are active in mobilizing their community for government parades and other 
activities but most importantly, they provide sufficient means of control to help the state 
penetrate deep into a community’s life. In return, they receive irregular support in cash 
or in kind from the central authorities. On rare occasions, some of their communities 
also receive support – through the headmen – in the form of sugar, sorghum, oil and/or 
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blankets. Communities can also benefit from their network or relations with higher 
authorities but this depends on the level of government satisfaction with their perform-
ance and with their record in keeping law and order within their ethnic group. This 
particular matter has restored the lost power and authority of the headmen; but has also 
had an insidious effect on the community’s solidarity and created a rift between tradi-
tional headmen and their communities. Respondents have indicated that disputes with 
headmen often arise regarding recommendations about receiving free medicine or 
waiving school fees, regarding their share of free groceries, which are supposedly 
allocated to the whole group by the government on occasion. An important but unspo-
ken point of disagreement relates to the headmen’s cooperation with the government 
regarding the political activities of members of the community. In the name of law and 
order within their groups, headmen are expected to supply the authorities with informa-
tion on any ‘illegal’ political gatherings or activities that members of their group have 
or are attempting to organize. Such a dubious relationship with the state puts the 
headmen in a difficult position with their constituencies. Though most seem to be better 
off than the rest of their communities, they lack personal security as they fear being 
murdered by their own community members. According to the community meetings 
(CM-M-1, CM-B2, CM-D3 and CM-S4), a number of the brutal conflicts, which have 
left many injured or dead, destroyed properties and taxed the security of the neighbour-
hoods, have been fuelled by such suspicion. These conflicts are particularly bad in 
Mayo and headmen are reacting to their fears by quickly reporting any suspicious 
behaviour by their members to the authorities. And the vicious circle continues. 
According to the headmen, if they do not perform their role as specified by the state, 
they, together with their people, will be excluded from access to resources be it land, 
education, donations of sorghum and sugar or help with medicines or even keeping the 
prestigious positions as headmen. There is always a lack of trust between the headmen, 
their people and the authorities. The people know their headmen and go to them when 
they need access to the city's social and political structure. But there is little trust in the 
relationship. It is also important to note that not all the headmen have the same degree 
of power and authority and for some the ‘headmanship’ is a mere title that does not 
carry any power or authority. According to some respondents, powerful headmen are 
able to connect isolated individuals to neighbourhood or extra-neighbourhood 
resources. And by the same token they are also able to exclude or isolate.  
In summary, different ethnic communities have lost their earlier traditional support 
mechanisms to modern market relations, providing a fertile recruiting ground for the 
state in their attempts to wrestle power from different ethnic groups using the traditional 
headmen. Some individuals have become vulnerable to changes in their own livelihood 
opportunities as essential resources are mediated through patronage networks that link 
them to their headmen. 
 
Ethnicity 
Residents of the four neighbourhoods represent a large number of the ethnic groups in 
Sudan.10 Within the sample alone, 57 ethnic groups were represented. Many of the 
larger ethnic groups have their various sub-ethnic groups and affiliation and there are 
also a small number of people from neighbouring countries such as Chad, Nigeria and 
the Central African Republic. However, for the purpose of this study ethnic communi-
                                                 
10  According to UNOCHA (2006), Sudan has 600 ethnic groups that speak over 400 languages and 
dialects.  
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ties will be grouped into three broad ethnic groups based on cultural and racial differ-
ences. The percentages are as follows in the sample: Arabized communities (36%); 
Africanized communities (64%) and non-Sudanese ethnic groups (9%). Some further 
categorizations are sometimes used on a regional basis. Accordingly the sample house-
holds, 54% of the households were from western Sudan, 22% were from southern 
Sudan, 15% were from northern Sudan and 9% from foreign countries. 
According to the locality records, Africanized ethnic groups from western and 
southern Sudan are represented disproportionately among the four neighbourhoods, 
which also corresponds with the sample households in this study. These groups were 
scattered in separate or marked areas within neighbourhoods. People from the same 
ethnic group tend to stick together and there are clear lines of demarcation in residential 
areas within the neighbourhoods along ethnic lines as well as another demarcation on a 
regional base. For example, groups from Bahr al Gazal in southern Sudan live in the 
northern part of Mayo, and within that area; the Dinka ethnic group has its own marked 
space and so forth. Each ethnic community is internally structured by its own values and 
culture, has its own language, and perceives itself as being different even when there are 
clear similarities between them.  
Complex political changes have taken place in the country since the time of coloni-
zation. These have influenced the social status of the ethnic groups by structuring the 
hierarchy and inequality in power and social status among the diverse groups, and by 
providing access to and control over economic and political resources, especially over 
land and internal rule to some groups while marginalizing others (see Chapter 2). 
Although there have been changes over time, the structured hierarchy in the groups 
remains and has played an important role in determining access to and control over 
economic, political, and cultural resources, and the status and interaction between 
different groups. During the community meetings (CM-M-1, CM-B2, CM-D3 and CM-
S4), people associated accessibility of resources with informal groups with a certain-
ethnic membership. There are also varying levels of disparity among the different ethnic 
groups as some are considered superior to others within the same groups. This depends 
mainly on their descent, for example the descendants of rulers and kings will always 
have a better position and more power in the community than the ordinary people. The 
influential people in the four communities are mostly members of the high-ranked 
groups who supply the headmen of their communities. Most development projects work 
through these local elites. 
The size of a certain ethnic group can determines its position in the community and 
whether it will be able to share resources with others, control resources, exclude or be 
excluded from using resources. However, small ethnic minorities have their own strate-
gies that enable them to survive among the giants. For example, small ethnic minority 
communities, particularly the non Sudanese groups such as the Fallata, Hawsa and 
Ambararu, have, for generations, struck alliances with bigger groups from western 
Sudan and relied on them for protection and access to resources. Conflicts between 
ethnic groups are more apparent than other forms of relations and can be triggers by 
numerous factors. Within the four neighbourhoods, these include perceived and actual 
discrimination, competition for water, land, spots in markets or street for vending and 
they can all take an ethnic line. Conflicts occur more in Mayo and least in Siriha. 
Sometimes, small groups mobilize around their grievance along ethnic lines and attack 
groups they believe are oppressing them. Long-standing rivalries occasionally erupt into 
bloody conflicts, which can change the power balance for some groups. The local 
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authorities have often handled ethnic tension and conflicts by strengthening one group 
against another, which contributes to marginalizing some groups and exacerbating the 
conflict.  
The community meetings (CM-M-1, CM-B2, CM-D3 and CM-S4) stated that lan-
guage problems are one of the central issues affecting them. The majority of African-
ized groups are not well versed in Arabic, which is spoken by those with power and 
influence. The majority speak their own languages and a large number of them do not 
understand Arabic or cannot communicate in it, placing them at a considerable dis-
advantage. Respondents have indicated that they could not understand what is being 
talked about on the radio or what was written in publications or posters in Arabic. They 
could not negotiate their pay or terms of employment with their employers or complain 
about mistreatment. As the community meetings (CM-M-1, CM-B2, CM-D3 and CM-
S4) pointed out, language is crucial for those who stand in front of a judge in a law 
court (which is very common) and cannot speak enough Arabic to defend themselves.  
Membership of a certain ethnic group does not impose a rigid code of conduct but an 
ethnic group provides its members with an identity, a sense of security and a broad 
framework for the resolution of conflicts. When it comes to everyday behaviour, most 
ethnic groups are becoming more pragmatic and adaptive. Occasionally people may 
even adopt different ethnic identities in different situations or contexts but ethnicity, as 
well as regional identity provides the basis of everyday interaction between people as 
well as a means to access political and economic resources.  
To sum up, the different neighbourhoods have a varied heterogeneous mass of 
religions and cultural beliefs but the opportunities the different groups can enjoy is not 
uniform and the heterogeneity of access to resources on the basis of ethnicity is well 
recognized. The implications of this are that marginalized groups may not be able to 
utilize local links and resources or may become the victims of conflict.  
 
Gender 
Gender differences and gender relations are expressed in a range of ways and greatly 
influence women’s livelihood opportunities. They are basically defined by practices and 
ideologies, in interaction with other structures of social relations such as class and 
ethnic origin. Various cultural norms as well as the state provide the basis for such a 
role by defining and imposing women’s and men’s social obligations and their expected 
behaviour. Sudanese society is highly patriarchal with its legal structure governing 
marriage and divorce as well as many cultural inhibitions that confine women to certain 
jobs and obligations. 
According to the women’s focus-groups discussions (FGD-D11, FGD-B15 and 
WFGD-M9), although there are few differences in the perceived roles of men and 
women among different ethnic groups, women’s roles were seen as being in the house-
hold, solving family problems and providing for basic needs such as food and water. 
Women from different ethnic groups indicated that there had been a massive change in 
their perceived and expected roles. Women from the Arabized group indicated that 
traditional attitudes to gender differences are still prevalent, in presuming that women’s 
work should be mainly domestic. However, when livelihood strategies call for the 
deployment of more household members into the labour market, they have no problem 
in breaking the gender barriers. And in some instances, women have to undertake 
responsibilities including taking up activities that have traditionally been considered 
male domains.  
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Conclusions 
This chapter has introduced the four neighbourhoods and their main characteristics. 
Living conditions are extremely poor and the inhabitants have to deal with low-quality 
housing and dire environmental conditions. A dramatic increase in the size of the four 
neighbourhoods has taken place without proper land use planning and increased urban 
services, causing a surge in illegal settlements. Registering land involves high costs, 
which are required to be paid in one instalment. In addition, it also involves complex 
and bureaucratic procedures. The only option available to the poor is informal land and 
housing but for many such housing can be prone to demolition without compensation. 
Residents in these neighbourhoods lack the means to participate in any decisions that 
affect their lives and the informal or illegal status of the poor limits their rights to 
influence formal political processes. 
Access to productive assets, i.e. land, labour, water and capital, is mediated by a 
complex matrix of formal and informal institutions that work to create opportunities 
and/or constraints for access to resources in numerous ways such as through public 
policies, regulations and political structures.  
Gender and ethnicity are important determinants of the way populations are included 
or excluded from societal resources, power and opportunities. Gender differences and 
gender relations are expressed in a whole range of ways by practices and ideologies, and 
in interaction with other structures of social relations such as class and ethnicity. 
Overall, these socially constructed norms denote an unequal division of labour, power, 
responsibilities and rights between men and women. And the legal status of women in 
Sudan in particular remains exceptionally discriminatory. Different ethnic groups with 
their rich cultures mix and mingle in seemingly countless combinations across the 
neighbourhoods and ethnicity results in an extremely heterogeneous and complex 
mixture of population, with extreme disparities in social status. These provide the basis 
of everyday interactions between people as well as a means for accessing political and 
economic resources. 
By virtue of their marginalization and exclusion, the poor are not represented in 
decision-making bodies and if they are included, it is just to legitimize the decision and 
policy process rather than to genuinely state their opinion or enable them to have some 
control over their lives. The cosmetic participation of the community is done by the 
appointed PCs and the supporting traditional powers of the headmen in the communi-
ties. 
The locality is the main formal institutions that people come into contact with 
through their PCs but the localities have not been able to fill the role of the community 
institution responsible for programme design and service delivery. There are two 
important features that characterize a locality’s governance in the areas: centralization 
and penetration. Centralization has allowed control over the economy and the political 
system while penetration has enabled control down as far as the neighbourhood level 
through the PCs. The locality’s staff and leadership from the lowest level right to the 
top are controlled by the central authorities. Operating within a very restricted budget 
and with limited human resources, and being accountable only to their hierarchical 
superiors, the localities are not in a position to respond to the local needs or to tap into 
local traditions of cooperation and participation.  
Compared to the rest of the city, the classic form of governance that prevailed in the 
city has undergone significant transformations within the neighbourhoods. There is a 
move from the increased role of the state in the city towards systems of ethnicity with 
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traditional leaders running the everyday affairs of the neighbourhoods. These traditional 
authorities also have a formal nature in that they are assigned by formal state institu-
tions and are given a special mandate in some critical domains. However, they are 
deprived of any autonomy through policies of state corporatism. Traditional headmen in 
the community uphold and maintain the status quo because they are aware that they will 
lose their power and authority unless they adapt their institution to accommodate the 
broader political context. PCs too are created by the state as a mechanism of cooption 
and controlled inclusion so there is no space for popular participation. By playing the 
role of community-initiated institutions that manage communal resources and represent 
local people in locality decision-making, people in the neighbourhoods have been 
harmed further. The power and authority of these two key societal actors have helped 
institutionalize rigid hierarchical patterns of political participation, excluding large 
segments of the population from economic and political power. 
Several NGOs are working in the areas but the potentially constructive influence of 
these networks has been hard to realize under the strict control of the state and the 
weakness of these organizations. Some CBOs have been successful in penetrating and 
mobilizing the community but they were not successful in making demands on the state 
or influencing state actions.  
Livelihood activities are governed by regulatory constraints, such as fines and taxes 
on small businesses as well as cumbersome procedures to legalize activities. Those are 
provided by the Public Order Act and the 2001 Act of Violations and have concentrated 
mostly on the treatment of the negative manifestations of informal activities rather than 
their root causes. The application of these acts effectively deprives the poor of their 
hard-earned income and savings, and every possible source of livelihood. In such times, 
the existence of an efficient and reliable public social safety net to protect households 
from a loss of assets, unemployment and poverty can be crucial to their survival. How-
ever, the only government-run safety net, Zakat, is not able to play such a role.  
The next chapter looks at the characteristics of the people living in the four 
neighbourhoods, how they pursue their livelihood strategies and how these contextual 
constraints impact on the strategies they are able to undertake. 
 
 8 
 
Household capital and  
livelihood activities 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
According to the sustainable livelihoods framework, outlined in Chapter 6, people’s 
livelihoods draw on the resources that they can access and the activities they undertake. 
A key characteristic of the livelihoods framework is that certain types of capital are 
required to enable people to pursue the strategy of their choice. The types of capital 
discussed here include human, physical, social and political, financial and natural 
capital. The discussion has so far focused on the availability of these capitals and their 
role in the different kinds of activities that people undertake. There has been a concep-
tual difficulty in separating financial capital from the activities that it generates; there-
fore, this capital is linked to livelihood activities. This chapter examines the factors that 
differentiate people in terms of their ability (or inability) to pursue certain livelihood 
strategies rather than others. To understand these factors, it is important to start from the 
perceptions of poor people themselves on their different situations of well-beings and 
their varying abilities to pursue livelihood strategies. Perceptions of well-being were 
generated through participatory exercises that explored the full continuum of levels of 
well-being within each neighbourhood, as discussed in Chapter 7. Four categories of 
well-being in the community were identified: the ‘Always Poor’ (AP), the ‘Sometimes 
Poor’ (SP), the ‘Medium Poor’ (MP), and the ‘Non-Poor’ (NP). The discussion will 
follow this line of classification to highlight the way the mix of activities varies 
according to the social, economic, institutional, governance and environmental contexts 
in which people operate as their activities become a mere response to these factors. In 
addition, the discussion has disaggregated people’s activities according to intra-
household composition in terms of age and gender, placing more focus on age and 
gender and its members. It argues that dependence on child and female labour is 
essentially a sign of increased vulnerability, as these two groups usually have less 
ability to access relatively profitable jobs than adult men. 
Perceptions of poverty 
To capture the diversity between people within each of the four neighbourhoods, 
considerable parts of the community meetings were focused on establishing community-
based criteria that highlight the socio-economic differences between people within each 
neighbourhood. People’s perceptions of the causes of poverty were influenced by their 
different livelihood backgrounds. They also differed by gender and ethnicity and 
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according to their current situations. Poverty was perceived as caused by factors that are 
beyond people’s own control such as job retrenchment, ill health, floods, war, drought, 
criminality, price increases, informal-sector regulations, limited access to education and 
greedy people in the society (see Figure 8.1). In this conceptual framework, these 
factors refer to the vulnerability context. Low wages are seen by some men as the most 
important reason for being poor. As a young man put it ‘no matter how hard you work, 
and how many hours you put into work, the wage you receive will never allow you to be 
any thing but very poor’. People who came from the rural areas thought that a lack of 
alternatives such as livestock, land or natural resources in the urban context increased 
their poverty to a level higher than what it used to be in the rural areas. People from war 
zones saw the lack of security as the main cause of poverty while people from the city 
viewed their poverty as being a result of retrenchment, rising prices and fewer employ-
ment opportunities.  
 
 
Figure 8.1 
 
   Source: Fieldwork research 
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Women saw divorce and family disintegration as a major cause of poverty. They also 
perceived the way some husbands used money to support their drinking habits or having 
a second or third wife as another cause (see Figures 8.1 & 8.2). 
 
 
Figure 8.2 
 
 
 
           Source: Fieldwork research 
 
 
Both men and women believed that their poverty was perpetuated because they had 
large numbers of dependants or because of the break-up of families, which reduced the 
number of earners. They also believed that migration and the subsequent changes in 
family structures placed additional burdens on women, especially those who provided 
for several dependants. Perceptions of poverty were not confined to material poverty. 
Health, family or neighbourhood relations and the ability to maintain a basic level of 
social engagement always came high on people’s lists of priorities. Women attached 
high importance to these relations in the provision of support with day-to-day chores 
and during times of crisis. 
When people compare their situations now and in the past, they almost always 
believe that their situation is much worse now than it used to be 25 years ago or so. 
They also saw that social relations were becoming much weaker because these relations 
have currently become very costly to maintain. 
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Twenty five years ago I did not need such an amount of money to go out, to socialize with friends and 
get out a lot more than I do now … just little things like not going out every Friday … and catching up 
with friends, like that is non-existent now. (Hussein, a 61-year-old male from Al Baraka. Quote 2-B) 
There was general agreement among both men and women that the situation of 
women is worse now than in the past. Despite the intensive productive roles that women 
are assuming now, their contributions are not materializing into increased well-being for 
themselves or their households.  
People’s hopes for the future did not fit with the way they are prioritizing them now. 
For instance, although they attached high importance to educating their children now 
and in the future, in reality, children’s education is often placed among the least impor-
tant items in household priorities. People also compared the accessibility of children's 
education now and 25 years ago and felt that in the past: 
… children did not cost the family so much in education or health, but now paying the cost of primary 
education for one child can leave a family at the verge of starvation, not to mention if a child gets sick. 
(Daniel, a 56-year-old male from Mayo. Quote 6-M) 
Many parents would rather not have their children working but with the ever-
increasing cost of living they have no other alternative.  
Feelings of insecurity haunt virtually everyone and a major fear is becoming further 
impoverished. This fear holds with it several strings of issues related to their current 
state of vulnerability and the expected intensification of inability to respond to adver-
sity. People fear the loss of livelihood, falling sick, dispossession of land or shelter, 
violence and theft and having to confront administrative and legal systems due to 
informal-sector activities. The poorest fear rain because it destroys shelters, brings 
mosquitoes and disease, and lessens the demand for work. People from better-off 
households fear theft, break-ins or being followed and mugged. Elderly men are more 
concerned about walking alone outside their homes after dark being mugged and 
personal injury as a result of crime because they are physically weaker and they see the 
potential for harm as greater.  
Categories of poverty 
There was a common view that opportunities were not distributed equally and that those 
who have a solid capital base such as a house or a strong network of support are able to 
utilize them to cope with changing circumstances. When it comes to evaluating their 
own conditions, most people tend to think of their condition as ‘Medium Poor’ in 
comparison with other people in the community. Although some individuals are appar-
ently living in a worse situation than the rest of the community, judging from their 
tenure arrangements and general household conditions, they saw themselves as ‘not 
doing so badly’. They also gave examples of those worse off than themselves. The 
principle issues that were seen to differentiate them and the poor are that they have their 
labour and they do not beg. Other issues included having something to eat that day; 
being able to repay their debts, not steeling money and not being afraid of the police 
because they are not involved in informal-sector activities. People also compared them-
selves to those who are better-off. A typical statement would be ‘... they did less physi-
cal work, yet they are more comfortable than us, and most of them are corrupt and 
cheats’. Those who saw themselves as been extremely poor were either mostly depend-
ent upon others because of their poor health, their age or their physical disabilities. Old 
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people and people with contagious diseases saw themselves as the poorest in the 
community. 
The only poor person is the old person who, when people see him walking down the road they would 
say: ‘oh you’re still alive’ instead of ‘good morning’ or ‘how are you’. You are too old and need help 
in doing everything, people avoid even greeting you in fear that you would ask for assistance. (Peter, a 
72-year-old male from Mayo. Quote 1-M) 
For both men and women who came from the main city, their relocation to the 
neighbourhood was seen as an indication of their poverty and they often labelled them-
selves as tabaneen (Always Poor) regardless of how they were perceived by the 
community. Contrary to how members from poorer households view themselves, better-
off households tend to water down their relative wealth and their presumed comfort. 
They often talked about how hard (physically) they work, their negative contacts with 
the outside world and their inability to be part of local or national networks of informa-
tion and power.  
These discussions have highlighted the way people in the community perceived 
differences and inequalities among them and the various levels of well-being that exist. 
Participants defined what they believe as shared socio-economic characteristics between 
different inhabitants or poverty categories. They have used these well-understood 
criteria to classify which households are poorer than others and which households are 
better off, taking into account the length of their poverty experience. These shared 
characteristics were based in the first place on the way people make their livelihoods 
and the security or vulnerability of their efforts.  
The most important determinant in classifying a household into a certain category 
was the stability of their job such as regular workers, contract workers or casual 
workers. In this way, it could be said that the basic focus of such criteria is on their 
livelihood strategy. Other variables used to enhance such classification include housing 
and tenure security, household headship, external support (from family, government or 
NGO), physical conditions and old age, and having access to electricity (grid or power 
generator) for lighting. The participants identified four categories each with distinctive 
characteristics. They proposed the terminologies, definition and meaning of words that 
express poverty and well-being in the community. Two broad categories of well-being 
were initially identified: ‘The Poor’ and the ‘Non-Poor’. By enumerating the shared 
characteristics of ‘The Poor’ category, further categories emerged: the ‘Always Poor’ 
and the ‘Sometimes Poor’. Similarly, after detailing the shared characteristics of the 
‘Non-Poor’, it emerged that the ‘Non-Poor’ is composed of the ‘Non-Poor’ (murtaheen) 
and the ‘Medium Poor’.  
 
The ‘Always Poor’ (tabaneen)  
The term tabaneen literally means those who became physically worn out due to their 
long-term and unsuccessful efforts to maintain or improve their well-being. Although 
tabaneen refers to being physically active it also applies to those who cannot work. The 
tabaneen (Always Poor) us composed mainly of workers whose remuneration is 
extremely low, seasonal workers and workers with unstable jobs, those who work in the 
informal sector, those who are unable to work (i.e. with health problems, the elderly and 
disabled), women household heads with young children, households with few adult 
males, and those who just came from crisis zones such as Dar Fur and could not find 
jobs. The tabaneen always lacks more than one important measure of security beside 
that of their work. They lack tenure security and/or live in run-down houses and they do 
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not have dahar (strong networks of support). The tabaneen usually do not have 
adequate clothes, their houses are always dark at night and they cannot afford to buy 
clean drinking water.  
 
The ‘Sometimes Poor’ (nus-nus) 
The ‘Sometimes Poor’ are the most diverse and versatile households, with features of 
both the ‘Medium Poor’ as well as the ‘Always Poor’ households. Though they are able 
to maintain an adequate livelihood at certain times, they are less able to sustain this over 
a longer period. This is mostly due to factors related to the nature of their livelihood 
activities or tenure arrangement. The ‘Sometimes Poor’ category is composed of house-
holds whose main income earners are casual workers or are self-employed in the 
informal sector. These households become poorer due to seasonality or when their main 
income earners are imprisoned or merchandises are confiscated.  
The ‘Sometimes Poor’ may have measures of security that are lacking among the 
‘Always Poor’, such as tenure security or having, more income earners per households. 
For example, a casual labourer who was the main income earner but has no tenure 
security was classified as ‘Always Poor’. However a casual labourer, who was also the 
main income earner, with a legal title to the land she occupies was classified as 
‘Sometimes Poor’. Another example is a widow working in the informal sector and with 
grown-up sons was classified as ‘Sometimes Poor’, while a widow in the informal 
sector with young dependents is classified as ‘Always Poor’. 
 
The ‘Medium Poor’ (wasat) 
People in the ‘Medium Poor’ category share several characteristics with the ‘Non-Poor’ 
or murtaheen, but they have certain elements of vulnerability that are not observed 
among the Non-Poor households.  
These households depend for their livelihoods on formal employees (but in less 
profitable jobs compared to the Non-Poor), the self-employed in the formal or informal 
sector and pensioners who are found in both the formal and the informal sector. Busi-
nesses of the ‘Medium Poor’ households in the informal sector are less vulnerable and 
more established compared to the ‘Always Poor’ and the ‘Sometimes Poor’. The 
‘Medium Poor’ households in the informal sector always have some form of fall-back 
situation if their business is raided by the local authority. They are also able to avoid all 
or most of the local authorities’ measures such as confiscations of merchandise, forced 
removal, the demolition of structures, and arrest, fines and imprisonment through their 
strong network of support. These households are usually headed by males, they enjoy 
security of tenure and their houses are strong and can withstand bad weather conditions. 
Like the ‘Non-Poor’, their houses always have lighting at night and they always buy 
clean drinking water. 
 
The ‘Non-Poor’ (murtaheen) 
The term murtaheen literally means those who do not work physically too hard and get 
rest whenever they need it. The murtaheen category is composed of households where 
the main income earner is in either stable employment with a long-term contract or self-
employed in a regulated business. They have well-constructed brick houses and can hire 
people in to work in their business. These households are always headed by males; have 
a strong dahar (network of support), have access to electricity (grid or power generator) 
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for lighting, have electronics, the women do not have to work and they always buy 
clean drinking water. 
In summary, people’s classifications of households into different categories of well-
being basically reflect social differentiation and inequalities between people within their 
respective communities.  
Livelihood capitals 
Demographic characteristics: The ‘Always Poor’ 
Average household size in this category varies between 7.0 in Siriha and 8.8 persons in 
Mayo. Overall, Mayo neighbourhood has the largest households across all the well-
being categories, while Siriha neighbourhood has the smallest household size, followed 
by Dar es Salam. Large household size is often due to the large number of children. 
Another important contributor to this is the old-age security hypothesis that prevails 
among most ethnic groups and is based on the assumption that children provide some 
form of insurance against risk when their parents are old. In the absence of any extra-
familial support or private or state institutions, dependence on one’s children for finan-
cial assistance and/or personal care become critical for the sick and the elderly. Large 
household size is also attributed to the tradition of polygamy which is practised by both 
Muslims and Christians and among most ethnic groups. The ‘Always Poor’ households 
form the majority of households with polygamous arrangements, with Fur husbands 
having two to three wives and Dinka men between two and seven wives. The depend-
ency ratio is the highest among the ‘Always Poor’ and households in this category are 
mainly made up of members under the age of sixteen (see Chart 8:1). This age group 
represents the largest group in Al Baraka where 62% of the people in the ‘Always Poor’ 
category are under sixteen years of age. It follows then that the ‘Always Poor’ in Al 
Baraka has the smallest number of adult members in the 16 to 64 age group and also the 
largest number of children below the age of six. In general, across the ‘Always Poor’ 
households in the four neighbourhoods, the proportion of children in the under-sixteen 
group is much higher than other age groups.  
‘Always Poor’ households are less likely to co-reside with elderly members 
compared to the other categories in the same neighbourhood. The ‘Always Poor’ from 
the bigger ethnic groups usually account for large household size. For example, the 
average household size for the Fur ethnic group in Al Baraka is 9.6 and for the Shuluk 
in Mayo it is 9.2. Ethnic groups of Arab origin, like the Jumwamaa, appear to have 
relatively smaller households with an average size of 6.2 among the Jumwamaa and 5.7 
among the Danagla. The ratio of male to female is the lowest for the ‘Always Poor’ in 
all neighbourhoods and particularly in Al Baraka where the male/female ratio is 45% 
and the highest in Siriha is 49%. Among the ‘Always Poor’ households there are appar-
ent shifts away from the male-headed structure of the household, either due to increased 
economic pressure or for reasons related to war. Around 50% of the ‘Always Poor’ 
households in Mayo and Al Baraka are headed by females. In Siriha and Dar es Salam 
this stands at 37% and 27% respectively. In these households, women have become the 
involuntary head due to death, divorce or the departure of the spouse, or because the 
wife herself fled an abusive relationship. Family abandonment and widowhood are most 
common in Al Baraka due to the concentration of many Darfurian groups who have fled 
the turmoil in their region. Males were either conscripted in the different factions of the 
conflicts, killed or have sought separate livelihoods elsewhere. Divorce rates are highest 
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in Siriha, followed by Dar es Salam. Divorce is high among Arabized communities, 
while family abandonment is high in the Africanized communities. The majority of the 
chronically ill and disabled are to be found among the ‘Always Poor’. 
 
 
Chart 8:1
Distribution of ' Always Poor' household members according 
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                            Source: Fieldwork research 
 
 
The majority of the ‘Always Poor’ are from the Africanized communities, -except in 
Dar es Salam, compared to households from the other categories in the same neighbour-
hood. Although the ‘Always Poor’ households are predominantly Muslims, except in 
Mayo, they have the highest concentration of non-Muslims compared to other catego-
ries.  
 
Demographic characteristics: The ‘Sometimes Poor’ 
Average household size in this category is smaller than the ‘Always Poor’ for the same 
neighbourhood, except in Dar es Salam where the ‘Sometimes Poor’ households are 
relatively bigger. As for the ‘Always Poor’, more than 40% of household members of 
the ‘Sometimes Poor’ are under 16 years of age (see Chart 8:2). The proportion of adult 
members in the 16 to 64 age group is higher than their peers in the ‘Always Poor’ 
households. The male/female ratio remains the same as the ‘Always Poor’ except in Al 
Baraka where it increases to 47%. Incidences of divorce, family abandonment and 
widowhood are lower compared to the ‘Always Poor’ and there are fewer households 
headed by women. In Siriha and Dar es Salam, the majority of the ‘Sometimes Poor’ 
households are Muslims, while in Al Baraka and Mayo the majority of the ‘Sometimes 
Poor’ are non-Muslims. Ethnically, the ‘Sometimes Poor’ households are mainly 
composed of Africanized groups, except in Dar es Salam.  
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Chart 8:2 
Distribution of 'Sometimes Poor' household members 
according to age group
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                          Source: Fieldwork research 
 
 
Demographic characteristics: The ‘Medium Poor’  
The average household size in this group is relatively smaller than the previous two. 
Unlike the ‘Sometimes Poor’ and ‘Always Poor’ the proportion of adult members (16 to 
64) is higher than the proportion of young members (see Chart 8:3) except in Al Baraka. 
The proportion of female-headed households is much smaller than among the ‘Some-
times Poor’ and ‘Always Poor’ groups. Like the ‘Non-Poor’, household heads in the 
‘Medium Poor’ category are more likely to be relatively older compared to those in the 
other two categories. The few female-headed household heads in this category are 
elderly widowed women with no dependents; they are the main income earner and often 
own their house. The ratio of male to female is almost balanced within this category for 
all neighbourhoods. The majority of households in the ‘Medium Poor’ category are 
Muslim and belong to the Arabized ethnic group, except in Mayo where the majority 
are Christians and descendants of Africanized groups. 
 
Demographic characteristics: The ‘Non-Poor’ 
Non-Poor households have the smallest number of household members in all the 
neighbourhoods, ranging from 5.8 persons in Dar es Salam to 7.2 for Mayo. The 
dependency ratio is the lowest across all the neighbourhoods and categories. This is 
reflected in the relatively smaller percentage of people under the age of 16 (see Chart 
8:4). The adult population in the 16 to 64 age category is the highest. For example, 65% 
of household members in Siriha and 49% of those in Mayo belong to this group. The 
female/male ratio is similar to the ‘Medium Poor’ category. None of the ‘Non-Poor’ 
household is headed by a woman except in Al Baraka where 10% of households have a 
female head. The majority of the ‘Non-Poor’ households belong to Arabized ethnic 
groups. In Siriha and Dar es Salam, all the ‘Non-Poor’ households belong to the 
Arabized and Muslim group. Only 30% of the ‘Non-Poor’ in Mayo and 10% of their 
peers in Al Baraka belong to Africanized groups. 
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Chart 8:3 
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Chart 8:4 
Distribution of 'Non Poor' household members according to 
age group
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In summary, people’s classifications overall reflected strong linkages between 
poverty and the composition of households in terms of gender, ethnicity and age. The 
‘Always Poor’ are mainly made up of households from the minority ethnic groups, 
headed by women and having a lot of young members. The ‘Non-Poor’ are mainly 
made up of households that belong to the dominant ethnic groups, headed by males, and 
with fewer dependent members.  
 
Health 
Ill health characterizes the majority of the sample households, particularly those in the 
‘Always Poor’ category. There are variations, however; between people’s health 
problems and the way they seek medical help or otherwise. These differences are based 
on gender, age, ethnicity and well-being category. The ‘Always Poor’ households 
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demonstrated clear evidence of greater levels of ill health; while those in the Non-Poor 
are relatively healthier (see Charts 8:5 & 8:6).  
 
 
Chart 8:5
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Chart 8:6 
Percentage of households with one or more members with 
chronic illness or disability
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Malaria is the major illness among the majority of people in the different well-being 
categories and in different age groups within the four neighbourhoods. The high levels 
of malaria are due to the neighbourhoods’ disturbed and poorly managed environments. 
Swarms of malaria-carrying mosquitoes breed freely all year round in the numerous 
untreated small pools of rainwater and in the open-pit latrines, causing high levels of 
malaria, especially among children and pregnant women. Mayo and Al Baraka have the 
highest percentages of households with at least one member with recurring malaria due 
to their specific locations. Mayo is next to the municipal sewage dump, while Al Baraka 
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is adjacent to agricultural fields. The prevalence of malaria is thus due to a lack of 
governmental concern about people’s health, and the lack of a public health programme 
focusing on citizens’ needs. Furthermore, the exorbitant price of malaria drugs puts 
them beyond the reach of the ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households that are 
then less able to cope with malaria and, due to illness, struggle to earn an income. A 
typical bout of malaria usually lasts between one and three weeks during which time the 
patient suffers recurring high fever with chills, headache, back pain, sweating, weak-
ness, nausea and anaemia. Malaria patients become extremely frail and completely 
dependent on other household members for days afterwards. Malaria attacks are worse 
during the rainy season when the ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households are 
at their lowest point financially due to reduced job opportunities in this season. Malaria 
thus exposes ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households’ vulnerability, particu-
larly if the patient is the sole or main breadwinner 
‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households have the highest percentage of 
members with physical disabilities and people with a stigmatizing disease like leprosy. 
Member with such health limitations are more prone to being discriminated against, 
even within their households, and are more likely to be neglected and malnourished. 
They are often not considered part of a community’s social life; cannot go to school and 
cannot work or earn a living. These issues combine to cut them off from the rest of 
society and make them fell unwanted. At the same time, the inaccessibility of health 
care leaves them with no support, which exposes them to more difficulties and further 
health problems. Variations in health conditions are more apparent in older age among 
the ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households. Although people may be cared 
for by their families in older age, they become more vulnerable when they get sick, 
particularly with an incapacitating illness that make them dependent on others for their 
survival. Depression is very common among the elderly who are suffering from long-
term illness. Men and women from the different well-being categories expressed their 
fears about living too long, suffering pain and causing their caregivers trouble.  
Women among the ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households face greater 
health risks due to the types of livelihood activities they undertake. For example in 23% 
of ‘Always Poor’ households there was at least one woman who had severe sight 
damage or a lung disorder due to long-term smoke inhalation while cooking over a 
biomass fire or kerosene. Among them are those whose livelihood activities have forced 
them to be in constant contact with smoke while cooking. 
Fad-lu (AP) is 49 and a widow from Siriha. For the past 13 years she made and sold 
kisra (traditional bread,) for restaurants. She started to experience a burning sensation in 
her eyes some years ago and used traditional medication. However when her problem 
became exacerbated she saw a doctor who advised her to avoid smoke and heat. She 
couldn’t afford to do so and continued her work with increased pain and difficulty. Over 
the past three years her problem became more complex and she started to lose her 
eyesight. Fad-lu can no longer work or even see her way around the house but at the 
same time she cannot seek help because she cannot afford it (LH36-S). 
Women from ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households suffer health compli-
cation as a result of their hard physical labour. Women who carry heavy head loads to 
markets or to the main city as part of their livelihood activities indicated that they suffer 
problems such as back pain and chronic headache. Childbirth for women in ‘Always 
Poor’ households mostly take place at home and with no professional help whatsoever, 
except maybe for a local midwife if the household budget allows it. Childbirth for 
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females from ‘Non-Poor’ households usually takes place at hospital. From the entire 
sample, almost all the young girls from Arabized ethnic groups and some Africanized 
ethnic groups had either undergone genital mutilation or were waiting for it to happen 
some time in the near future.  
In summary, ill health is closely connected to the poorly managed environment, with 
significant variation between neighbourhoods. It is also related to the type of livelihood 
activities undertaken and the gender and age of household members. Disease, particu-
larly malaria, impacts heavily on the ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households’ 
livelihood options due to their inability to access health care. Ill health also impairs 
poorer people’s physical capacity to undertake sustainable livelihood activities.  
 
Education 
The inability to read and write is widespread among members of ‘Always Poor’ and 
‘Sometimes Poor’ households. Among the ‘Always Poor’ group, illiteracy rates among 
those over the age of 29 is very high, ranging between 76 percent in Dar es Salam to 
90% in Mayo (see Chart 8:7). This is because most people never attended school and 
have never had access to an adult literacy programme. Illiteracy is much higher among 
women than men: 90% of females from the ‘Always Poor’ group had never been to 
school in comparison with 78% of the men. On the other hand, except for Siriha, all 
‘Medium Poor’ and ‘Non-Poor’ household heads had a primary-school education or 
higher. In contrast, only 10% to 24% of household heads from ‘Always Poor’ house-
holds had completed primary school.  
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Among all the poverty categories, children between six and fifteen had the highest 
enrolment rate in primary-school education compared to older children (15+). However 
there are also variations among different categories and between different neighbour-
hoods. Children from ‘Medium Poor’ and ‘Non-Poor’ households have the highest rates 
of primary-school attendance. For example, all children aged between six and fifteen 
from ‘Non-Poor’ and ‘Medium Poor’ households in all the neighbourhoods were 
enrolled in school but among the ‘Always Poor’ households in Mayo 40 % of the 
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children of that age and around 20% of their peers in Siriha were not enrolled in educa-
tion. This is attributed to the high cost of education, which forces the ‘Always Poor’ and 
‘Sometimes Poor’ households to withdraw their children from school. This will be 
discussed in detail in the next chapter. In addition, ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ 
households with s small number of adult labourers tend to send their children to work 
rather than to school, compared to households with more adult labourers. This is also 
apparent among female-headed households, such as those in the ‘Always Poor’ and 
‘Sometimes Poor’ categories.  
The proportion of female children and male children attending school in the 6-15 age 
group also varies between the different well-being categories and neighbourhoods. 
Following the classic pattern, girls’ enrolment is overall much lower than that of boys 
across all the well-being categories and neighbourhoods. Among the ‘Always Poor’ and 
‘Sometimes Poor’ households large numbers of children, particularly girls, are still 
never enrolled in school. For example, among the ‘Always Poor’ households of Mayo, 
the percentage of boys enrolled in primary school is almost twice as high as the number 
of girls. It is only in Al Baraka that girls’ enrolment in primary education is almost 
similar to that of boys. School access has been a principal constraint on girls’ education 
among ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households. Parents cite school fees as the 
most important reason for non-enrolment among both boys and girls. Variations in 
school enrolment were also related to household characteristics (including demographic 
shocks), school characteristics (including the availability of public and NGO-run 
schools, costs and distance) as well as cultural constraints. Since the ‘Always Poor’ and 
‘Sometimes Poor’ households are the ones more prone to these shocks and lack the 
ability to respond to them, (see Chapter 10), only in exceptional cases have their 
children made it to secondary school and/or university, but then they were either sup-
ported by an NGO or the church.  
Enrolment in education varies between those who attend a full school year without 
interruption, those who drop out from time to time and those who drop out and never 
resume education. Dropping out is often due to the high cost of education and a lack of 
credit support to cover a child’s education from primary school to a higher level (see 
Chapter 9).  
The drop-out rate is higher among girls than boys. A number of complex and interre-
lated factors contribute to this high level among girls from ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Some-
times Poor’ households. The life histories (e.g. LH4-M and LH11-M) show that while 
household economic shocks affected both girls’ and boys’ schooling negatively, they 
have more effect on girls. When ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households were 
confronted with economic shocks they always withdrew girls from education first. 
Likewise, when households were confronted with demographic shocks such as the death 
of the mother, it was the girls who were withdrawn from school to look after the family. 
Many girls were married at a very young age, preventing them from receiving further 
education. Girls from ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households are, therefore, at 
a double disadvantage compared to their male counterparts in the same households.  
To sum up, poorer households have the least education due to issues of access. 
Throughout the discussions, it was made clear that education was essential for a decent 
standard of living and that many felt a poor education was the underlying cause of their 
poverty and one of the key reasons that many were unable to access decent employ-
ment, housing and health care. Many participants felt that poor education was a key 
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indicator of exclusion, and one of the most significant barriers limiting their choices and 
opportunities. 
Physical capital  
Household assets 
A household’s assets include saleable personal belongings that households currently 
possess such as jewellery, clothing, bicycles, kitchen utensils, electronics and furniture. 
Most Non-Poor households, particularly those in Siriha, have a higher stock of valuable 
belongings such as TV sets and refrigerators and a few of them even have gas cookers. 
People indicated that they relied on these goods generating cash in times of need. Men 
from ‘Medium Poor’ and ‘Non-Poor’ households, particularly the ‘Non-Poor’ house-
holds, command more productive assets from which they can receive cash or in-kind 
income, for example sewing machines, merchandise, handcarts and livestock. Men from 
Siriha’s ‘Non-Poor’ households have more productive assets than their peers in other 
neighbourhoods. Similarly, women from Non-Poor households in Siriha have the 
highest number of productive assets among their peers from other neighbourhoods. 
Women’s productive assets basically include poultry or goats and a little jewellery.  
The data show that the possession of valuable items is highly stratified. The majority 
of the ‘Always Poor’ households have no valuable assets from which they can gain 
income. Some households that have no physical capital indicate that their capital was 
either sold or destroyed during demolition, kashat or floods and fire. Many have sold 
their physical capital, including houses, during times of emergency. More than 30% of 
households from each neighbourhood owned no household capital of any significant 
financial value that could be sold in a time of need. For example the estimated resale 
price of goods for the ‘Always Poor’ households in Mayo have an average value of only 
SP 30,000 ($12), while their peers in Siriha owned capital worth SP 50,000 ($20) (see 
Chart 8:8).  
Chart 8:8 indicates that there is a gradual change moving from the ‘Non-Poor’ 
through the ‘Always Poor’ households. Each category is distinct although the difference 
might not be as huge between the last two categories. The ownership of capital among 
the ‘Sometimes Poor’ households does not differ so much from that of the ‘Always 
Poor’. A larger difference exists between the ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ 
households on the one hand and the ‘Medium Poor’ and ‘Non-Poor’ households on the 
other. Differences also exist among the matching well-being categories within the 
different neighbourhoods. For example, average household capital available for the 
‘Medium Poor’ households in Siriha is SP 250,000 ($100), while it is SP 140,000 ($56) 
for the ‘Medium Poor’ in Mayo. ‘Non-Poor’ households in Siriha have average assets to 
a value of SP 650,000 ($260) which is the highest among all the groups. While ‘Non-
Poor’ households in Mayo have an average asset value of SP 200,000 ($80), which is 
not only the lowest among their category in other neighbourhoods but also lower than 
the average asset values of all ‘Medium Poor’ households in other neighbourhoods. 
Overall, households from Mayo have the lowest physical capital under command 
compared with their respective categories from other neighbourhoods, while households 
from Siriha have the highest. The difference in ownership of physical capital between 
the ‘Non-Poor’ and the ‘Always Poor’ in Siriha is the highest when compared to similar 
categories in other neighbourhoods.  
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‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households have extremely low valuable physi-
cal capital that can be utilized in times of needs. These households have the least choice 
in terms of their livelihood strategies and thus are the most vulnerable when confronted 
with adversity.  
 
Housing 
Ownership of dwelling has a powerful cultural and economic importance for all well-
being categories. It is also an effective indicator to differentiate between he ‘Always 
Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ and the rest of the groups. All the ‘Non-Poor’ households 
and ‘Medium Poor’ households from all the neighbourhoods have secure tenure status. 
Compared to the ‘Sometimes Poor’ households, the ‘Always Poor’ households have the 
most uncertain tenure situation (see Charts 8:9 & 8:10), having the largest number of 
squatters and renters. The ‘Always Poor’ in Mayo enjoy the least stability in terms of 
their dwelling arrangements compared to their category in other neighbourhoods  
The quality of dwelling varies considerably between the different well-being catego-
ries. A typical ‘Non-Poor’ household’s house has a 300 m2 plot or more, is built of red 
bricks, cement or mud and coated with cement from inside, and consists of more than 
one room, a kitchen, a bathroom and a toilet. A typical house in the ‘Always Poor’ 
category ranges in size from 10 m2 to 200 m2, is built from any available materials such 
as mud, straw, traditional thatch or bamboo, recycled pieces of tin or plastic, and has no 
toilet. Dwellings of the ‘Medium Poor’ are mostly built of solid materials. As most 
dwellings of the ‘Always Poor’ households are not made good-quality materials and 
cannot stand harsh weather conditions, these houses are prone to being swept away by 
rain or blown away by strong winds. Seasonal rains and flooding account for huge 
annual losses of houses. The floods of 1988 in particular left many families homeless. In 
Al Baraka and Mayo squatter families from the ‘Always Poor’ group maintain a 
precarious existence on flood and drainage canals and banks of streams.  
These locations enable them to access job opportunities without incurring any trans-
port costs but at the same time put them at the mercy of the weather. Rented houses, 
particularly in Al Baraka and Mayo, are extremely small and rundown with many 
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having problems related to leaking ceilings, inappropriate drainage for rain water, a lack 
of toilet facilities or unsafe pit latrine that flood or collapse during the rainy season. 
Traditional landowners who live in the main city are usually unwilling to allow any 
building of permanent housing on their land or to fix problems with their houses. They 
also oppose the provision of running water fearing that they may lose control over their 
land. 
To sum up, poorer households’ living arrangements are characterized by high insta-
bility. Houses are generally small and sub-standard and expose them to a myriad of 
hazards. Out of all these problems, the main determining factor is the issue of tenure 
security that differentiates between the poor and the non-poor.  
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Chart 8:10
 Tenure security of 'Sometimes Poor' households
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Social and political capital 
Social networks among poorer households tend to consist of people at similar levels. 
The family provides the first and main line of support and in most cases the only line of 
support for ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households. However, family disinte-
gration is higher among these particular households than others. Crisis in the rural areas 
has contributed significantly in this respect. Frequently, the family disintegrates as the 
male head goes off in search of income or joins a militia, and the wives and children are 
left behind in the city. Divorce is high in Arabized communities, while family aban-
donment is high among the Africanized communities. Family breakdown due to aban-
donment is the highest among the ‘Always Poor’ households of Mayo (30%) and Al 
Baraka (20%). Similarly, divorce is very high among the ‘Always Poor’ households, 
particularly in Siriha. Domestic violence and aggression against women and children are 
common and often lead to the breakdown of household relations.  
Networks of vertical linkages that operate with local- and national-level authorities 
are extremely limited. Community meetings (CM-M-1, CM-B2, CM-D3 and CM-S4) 
highlighted this issue as a lack of Dahar or Wasta, which refers to a lack of useful 
kinship relations, connections and contacts. Dahar and Wasta often simplify more 
vertical relations that link people across diverse and unequal situations, and allow the 
accessing of better livelihood opportunities. A well-known proverb used to signify how 
these vertical relationships work: ‘A person who lacks Dahar will be hit in the 
stomach’, meaning that a person without Dahar will starve. Links with local govern-
ment authorities are seen to be of crucial importance in order to access, land, education, 
health facilities, job opportunities etc. Some individuals may have formal or informal 
connections with officials and politicians which they mobilize to influence their access 
to resources. For example, traditional leaders have used these connections to access 
urban services and other resources (e.g. LH2-M). However, poor households have no 
means of interacting with the state, nor are they able to interact with each other or 
exercise autonomy in their organizations. The relationship between residents and the 
locality is mediated by PCs. These relations are strongly state-oriented, hierarchical in 
nature and allow no room for residents’ participation. The focus-group discussions 
(FGD-M8, FGD-M18 and FGD-B6) also indicate that the PCs and the traditional 
leaders are not true representatives of their communities. While PC members and tradi-
tional headmen ae able, through their position, to access personal benefits, the commu-
nity and particularly ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households were the least 
able to benefit. The four communities lack any effective forms of grassroots associa-
tions to enable them to voice their demands or to pursue common interests collectively. 
According to the law, people are prohibited from forming any organizations apart from 
church groups, tajweed and other Islamic groups, and regional and/or ethnically based 
associations. Other group meetings and gatherings are also not allowed and those who 
are found to be breaking the rules are persecuted and jailed. 
Men have relatively better access to vertical networks than women. For example, 
women are not represented on the PCs or local committees for water management or 
other public affairs, and very few people have links with CBOs or NGOs in their areas. 
Some local organizations, such as the Sudanese Development Association (SDA), has 
helped women to organize a CBO for savings and credit (registered as a co-operatives 
or an NGO depending on their choice) (see Chapter 9). Although such mobilization was 
established to empower women traders in the informal sector who were experience 
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excessive harassment by the authority, it soon spread beyond this level. However, the 
network’s outreach is extremely limited in its scope.  
Affiliation with political parties is a recent phenomenon that has emerged with the 
new orientation towards democracy. However, kinship ties have been the main channel 
through which a few men and women from the neighbourhood have gained access to 
political positions as party representatives in their neighbourhoods. Non-elected repre-
sentatives of political parties in the area often come from ‘Non-Poor’ households or 
from traditional headmen. Either way, ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households 
are not included. The involvement of people from the neighbourhood in the political 
environment remains cosmetic and they have no opportunity to influence policies. The 
involvement of women in particular has been inherently low compared to that of men. 
And non-elected representatives are not able to make any connections between residents 
and their political parties let alone with the state. Yet in terms of personal gains, those 
who have denoted political roles have been able to access credit and regular wage 
opportunities, food and health care assistance (WFGD-M9, FGD-M18 and FGD-S14). 
Regular salaried employment can open the door to more beneficial vertical networks. 
Individuals in regular salaried employment are involved in networks such as trade 
unions, workers’ cooperatives and national health insurance schemes. Employees can 
benefit from workers’ cooperatives that are active primarily in the provision of daily 
household items at wholesale prices. All regular wage workers are automatically 
members of their organization’s trade union. Although, due to their nature, trade unions 
are not able to play their expected role, i.e. pressing for demands vis-à-vis the employ-
ers in favour of workers, workers on the committee have been able to ensure better 
working situations for themselves and have also facilitated employment entry for their 
relatives. Workers in casual work and self-employment lack any form of organization. 
The only available union in this respect is the Association of Women Vendors of Food 
and Tea in Abu Zeid Market. The association has empowered its members to defend 
themselves against different forms of exploitation and to demand their rights through 
collective action (see Chapter 9). 
Savings and credit cooperatives (Sanduqes) are probably the most important form of 
neighbourhood networking used by the different well-being categories. The way 
Sanduqes work provides additional benefits to those involved. During the collection and 
distribution of credit, members also get to collect various forms of information on 
prices, places where they can find cheap products, get to know influential members of 
the community, etc. Information is also disseminated on various matters that concern 
the community. However, ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households are less 
involved in Sanduqes due to their limited resources. 
Perceptions of the neighbourhood impact on people’s opportunities to succeed in 
forming effective relationships and beneficial networks beyond their communities. In 
particular Mayo and Al Baraka are considered as being strongly influenced by political 
as well as criminal elements that act as a conduit or barrier for any benefits accruing to 
the people. This stigmatization was cited in meetings as a reason why some were 
discriminated against in front of the police, when applying for jobs or for waiving 
school fees, when legalizing land, or participating in a variety of personal networks 
(FGD-B19, FGD-M18 and FGD-S12).  
In sum, it appears that the community lacks the essential mechanisms of support that 
provide an environment for individuals and groups to access resources. However, even 
with this advantage, the ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households seem to be 
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most disadvantaged compared to others. In the light of a lack of economic opportunities, 
diminishing health and education services, ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ people 
can easily fall into desperate poverty. 
 
Natural capital 
Natural capital in the form of land, water and trees is of less significance to people’s 
livelihood strategies, although scarcity of water did not allow people to incorporate 
urban agriculture in their livelihood’s strategies, as is the case in other African coun-
tries. In all well-being categories, land is only used for shelters due to a lack of water. 
People have very limited access to land for shelter due to issues of property and user 
rights. The life histories (i.e. LH2-M) indicated that people were not able to cope with 
consecutive shocks without seriously depleting the natural resources around them. This 
is particularly true during their initial period of residence in a neighbourhood when 
many households incorporated strategies of common resources, such as tree cutting and 
wood collection, to generate income. Tree cutting had also intensified as people built 
and rebuilt their housing due to demolition. Eventually the areas were bare and the poor 
people lost an important source of building material, fuel and biodiversity that the trees 
offered, as well as herbal medicines and an important source of income.  
Livelihood activities: How do households make a living? 
Livelihood strategies for both men and women are principally labour-based and reliant 
on forms of social networks. Livelihood activities for the sample households can be 
divided into three broad activity groups: self-employment, regular wage/salaried 
employment, and casual labour. Ascribing one of these activities as a main source of 
living for a certain household is rather arbitrary because the main source of income 
tends to change in response to factors within and outside households, such as demo-
graphic shocks, seasonality of work, regulatory constraints, the availability of transport, 
etc. The intensity of such change is much more apparent among ‘Always Poor’ and 
‘Sometimes Poor’ households than among ‘Medium Poor’ and ‘Non-Poor’ households. 
This research project looked at the activities that households derived their major income 
from over the previous six months.  
Very few household heads were unemployed since the poor cannot afford to stay 
unemployed. Those who were unemployed were the physically disabled or the very old. 
They represented only 3% of the ‘Always Poor’ of Al Baraka, while all the ‘Always 
Poor’ households in other neighbourhoods had at least one income earner. Households 
with no income earner depended on food donations from neighbours and on begging. 
While these households were categorized among the ‘Always Poor’, they suffered far 
more deprivation than the category they belong to. They were more vulnerable when 
confronted with health shocks or the demolition of their shelters. Similarly, households 
with physically disabled members, even if they were not the household head, were 
among the poorest households and exhibited more vulnerability to adversity. This was 
due to the high cost of medicines and because every household member needs to be 
involved in income generation.  
All the members of the ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households can be 
engaged in increased work efforts and undertake multiple activities. The poorer the 
household, the more income earners it requires. On the other hand ‘Medium Poor’ and 
‘Non-Poor’ households have relatively smaller numbers of income earners and in some 
 
 146
cases the household head is the sole income earner. Secondary income earners among 
‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households were mainly young, while among 
‘Medium Poor’ and ‘Non-Poor’ households they were adults. It is also evident that 
secondary earners usually have less well-paid jobs than the main income earner. 
Workforce participation in manual labour among elderly males over the age of 65 was 
relatively high in the ‘Always Poor’ group; unlike in the ‘Medium Poor’ and ‘Non-
Poor’ households where some of the elderly are pensioners or have other forms of work. 
Elderly females had the lowest participation in activities outside the home, although 
they were usually involved in home industries or in looking after smaller children in the 
household.  
Life histories (e.g. LH14-D) show that the earnings of ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes 
Poor’ households tend to fluctuate more than ‘Medium Poor’ and ‘Non-Poor’ house-
holds. Wages fluctuate during slack seasons and when there is an abundance of labour, 
during kashat (municipal raids on non-formal activities), in the rainy season when some 
manual labour stops, and when a member of a household is sick. Accordingly, being a 
main income earner shifts from one member to another. This dynamic is more apparent 
among the ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households than among ‘Medium 
Poor’ and ‘Non-Poor’ households. The shifting of the position of main income earner 
can be as frequent as every month or every week, particularly for those working in jobs 
that are characterized by high insecurity. An example of this is Zakia’s household: 
Zakia (SP) is 48 years old. She lives in Dar es Salam and earns her living by selling tea, coffee and 
donuts but without the necessary permits. Most days she brings home around SP 4,000 ($1.60). Her 
husband works as a casual labour in construction making around SP 10,000 ($4) per day, but he 
usually works on short contracts and most days he does not find work and sometimes he earns less. 
Zakia’s work is mostly dependent on factors beyond her control, such as; kashat and weather condi-
tions. When her husband finds work, he provides the household’s main income, since he earns far 
more than Zakia does. However, when the husband doesn’t find employment, the family depends on 
her income alone. During the past six months, for example, (Jan-June 2004), the husband was only 
able to work for 60 days. But the work was good enough that he was able to pay the rent, to secure 
some household necessities and raise the cost of transport to go back home (to Gezira) where he 
worked in cotton picking (Oct-Dec). When Zakia and her husband could not earn sufficient income, 
their two teenage sons worked as loaders in the Libya market and brought home around SP 2,000 
($0.80) each a day. Although consumption had to be cut and no rent or school fees could be paid, no 
one went hungry (LH14-D).  
There are considerable differences in the main employment activities of men and 
women that influence the level of income earned in male- and female-headed house-
holds. Women have lower earnings opportunities compared to men because by virtue of 
cultural norms and legal and labour market barriers, they have greater constraints on 
their socio-economic mobility. In addition, they are burdened with the responsibility of 
caring for their young, older and chronically ill household members. Households that 
endure severe poverty are, therefore, those female-headed households with no husband 
present, especially among the minority ethnic groups.  
Minority ethnic groups and particularly those who have recently moved to the city 
from war-torn or drought-ridden areas or in search of employment are confronted with a 
wide range of constraints that people in the same category do not commonly face. These 
groups often take the hazardous and low-paying jobs that are least popular among the 
local community. A lack of education and training, coupled with language barriers, 
expose them to exploitation by their employers and even by the well-established people 
in their own group. Their children are marginalized by their language, culture and 
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extreme poverty and are especially at risk. The following section looks at various details 
of these activities and constraints. 
 
Self-employment 
Self-employment makes a significant contribution to a household’s income across all 
the well-being categories (see Charts 8:11 & 8:12). These activities include small-scale 
manufacturing (furniture production, metal welding, wood or stone carving, household 
utensils including traditional beds and mattresses, baskets, mats, pots), vending and 
petty trade, transport (donkey carts), shoe repair, small-scale car and bicycle repair, 
scavenging, and a wide range of legal and illegal products. They also cover activities 
performed by traditional healers and fakis, Zar Shikhas, fortune tellers and theft. These 
activities provide the major share of a household’s income for the Non-Poor category in 
comparison with all other categories including ‘Medium Poor’ households from all 
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Chart 8:12
Self-employment activities by gender and poverty category 
(household heads)
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
AP SP M NP
Poverty categories and gender
%
 h
ou
se
ho
ld
 h
ea
ds
 in
vo
lv
ed
Siriha
Dar S
Mayo
Baraka
Siriha
Dar S
Mayo 
Baraka
 
                        Source: Fieldwork research 
 
 
 148
neighbourhoods. The involvement of household heads from ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Some-
times Poor’ is higher than that of the ‘Medium Poor’ in all the neighbourhoods. 
Involvement in self-employment activities is differentiated by the area that people 
operate from. People from Siriha have relatively higher involvement in self-employ-
ment, while ‘Always Poor’ heads from Mayo depend the least on self-employment 
compared to their peers from other neighbourhoods. 
Self-employment among the ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households were 
noticeably more oriented toward street vending and petty trade, while in ‘Medium Poor’ 
and ‘Non-Poor’ households they were more oriented towards small production and 
trade. Vending is one of the most important activities undertaken by large numbers of 
different members of households in different well-being categories. For example 
‘Medium Poor’ households have often combined vending with regular or other types of 
employment (i.e. LH16-B). Even casual labourers turn to vending during a bad season, 
or visa versa, and vendors turn to casual employment during times of harassment by the 
authorities. Vending takes place from a multiplicity of locations and different age 
groups also undertake activities in this field. The majority of heads in ‘Non-Poor’ 
households have undertaken self-employment as their major and permanent source of 
living. The majority of young secondary income earners among ‘Always Poor’ and 
‘Sometimes Poor’ are self-employed. Young graduates who cannot find jobs in the 
formal sector also undertake self-employment activities such as vending and petty trade 
while looking for jobs. Some school-age children who are currently enrolled in schools 
have also participated during school holidays or combined work with schooling.  
Engagement in self-employment activities vary by gender and ethnicity. Women’s 
enterprises are much smaller, with lower investments, mostly based at home and with 
little access to the market. Women from ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ house-
holds are mostly active in the less-rewarding, low-skilled and more risky areas while the 
men are mostly self-employed in the relatively lucrative, higher-capital areas. For 
example, women are specialized in processing alcohol which puts them in a confronta-
tional position regarding the police, and in selling perishable goods which makes them 
more vulnerable to losing their capital. Furthermore, women’s trading and vending are 
more of an extension of their domestic work as they concentrate mainly on traditionally 
female jobs such as sewing and food and drink preparation while men predominate in 
skilled and unskilled labour, small manufacturing and transport. Men and women from 
certain minority ethnic groups are barely eking out a subsistence living through very 
low productive activities such as collecting and selling firewood, waste material 
collection, scavenging and selling scavenged materials, begging and steeling. According 
to the community meetings (CM-M-1, CM-B2, CM-D3 and CM-S4), some young men 
from ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households are involved in the trade of 
weapons, drug dealing, theft and violence. These activities affect the community badly 
and place the people involved in constant conflict with the authorities. 
Returns from self-employment vary from ‘adequate’ when the household’s livelihood 
depends mainly on them as the case with the ‘Non-Poor’ and ‘Medium Poor’ house-
holds, to ‘meagre’ and cannot sustain the household without combining it with other 
activities as is the case for ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households. ‘Medium 
Poor’ and ‘Non-Poor’ households in this field are better equipped to deal with whatever 
changes and influences their activities and their activities thus have more stability. On 
the other hand, the ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households are less able to 
control their working environment, which directly impacts on the stability and the 
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benefits they derive from these activities. Although more members from ‘Always Poor’ 
and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households are available to engage in self-employment activities, 
their remuneration approaches zero. As Charts 8:11 and 8:12 indicate, ‘Always Poor’ 
and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households do not rely on these activities in the long term as 
their major source of income compared to ‘Medium Poor’ and ‘Non-Poor’ households. 
Activities in this field were influenced by external and internal factors including 
household characteristics, government policies towards formal and informal activities, 
the seasonality of work, and financial and social capital. The vulnerability of ‘Always 
Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households is closely connected to fluctuations in and the 
seasonal nature of demands for the goods and services they produce and sell. For 
example, street vending decreases during the autumn from May to August and then 
picks up slowly by September. Activities, such as water vending and local cart transport 
flourish best during this period. Demands for cooked meals decrease greatly during 
March and June due to the school holidays, and so on. Seasonality leads to low and 
insecure incomes during lean seasons and many ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ 
household members would shift to casual employments or other form of self-employ-
ment.  
A distinction can be made in self-employment between activities in the formal sector 
and those in the informal sector. The overwhelming majority of ‘Medium Poor’ and 
‘Non-Poor’ households operate in the formal sector. On the other hand, all the self-
employed members of the ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households operate in 
the informal sector. Those informal entrepreneurs are often connected to larger firms 
and wealthier individuals through subcontracting agreements and the supply of materi-
als and/or the supply of goods or services to formal firms. Remaining in the informal 
sector threatens the security of their livelihoods, not only by restricting people’s access 
to the support and services available within the formal economy but by destroying 
people’s livelihoods altogether. However, involvement in informal-sector activities has 
been a logical response to formal-sector regulation and bureaucracy. As the ‘Always 
Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households grapple with a decreasing profitability of 
labour, it becomes extremely difficult for them to comply with the law without jeop-
ardizing their immediate survival. This has decreased the benefits they derive, as will as 
exposing them to forms of vulnerability. ‘Medium Poor’ and ‘Non-Poor’ households in 
the informal economy were able to tap into the grey area between legality and illegality 
by bribing government officials such as health inspectors, market administrators and tax 
collectors. However, the poor cannot afford these payments. ‘Medium Poor’ and ‘Non-
Poor’ households avoid confrontation with the law by employing members from 
‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households to undertake the risky part of their 
activities such as selling merchandise in the street or selling illegal products on their 
behalf.  
Self-employed people from the ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households 
operate mainly from their respective neighbourhoods, while ‘Medium Poor’ and ‘Non-
Poor’ households usually operate between different neighbourhoods and the main city. 
As a result, ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ enterprises have difficulties due to 
reduced or no access to raw materials, markets, finances or transport. Self-employment 
within neighbourhoods is an arena of competition, exploitation and struggle between 
people with varying powers. While ‘Medium Poor’ and ‘Non-Poor’ households were 
able to employ their network of relations for credit and the supply of materials, ‘Always 
Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households lacked essential resources to support their 
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initiatives. A lack of resources including a lack of financial capital for running or the 
start-up of a business is a key barrier for ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ house-
holds and even some ‘Medium Poor’ and ‘Non-Poor’ households entering into more 
profitable areas or develop their firms. Although operators in this field are technically 
self-employed, they remain heavily dependent on relationships with traders or larger 
firms. Formal financial institutions are usually inaccessible even to the majority of the 
‘Non-Poor’ (see Chapter 9). 
In summary, there are variations in terms of the type of possible self-employment 
activities that individuals can pursue. The benefits that poorer households can derive 
from these informal sources are seldom adequate and often uncertain due to their lack of 
access to social networks and a wide range of institutions that are concerned with the 
provision of support and resources. For them, the most widely used options are not 
always the most effective.  
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                                      Source: Fieldwork research 
 
 
Casual wage labour 
Casual wage employment is disproportionately represented among the ‘Always Poor’ in 
all neighbourhoods but represents an important source of income for large number of 
the ‘Sometimes Poor’ households (Chart 8:13). None of the ‘Medium Poor’ and ‘Non-
Poor’ household heads work as casual labourers though young members from their 
households may work during their school holidays.  
Casual employment is undertaken not only by heads of ‘Always Poor’ and 
‘Sometimes Poor’ households but also by household members in significant numbers. 
Young people are likely to be employed as part-time labourers, especially in the 
manufacturing industry, domestic work or in nearby markets. Their pay is much lower 
than that received by adult males. Elderly people are less likely to undertake casual 
employment. However, for the ‘Always Poor’, the economic compulsion to work 
combined with a lack of alternative jobs to suit the elderly, forces them to undertake 
casual wage activities in jobs which might not suit them physically. They are then more 
vulnerable to falling sick and have no social security. More females are involved in 
casual employment among the ‘Always Poor’ compared to the ‘Sometimes Poor’ 
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households due to the concentration of households headed by females in this group 
(Chart 8:14).  
People work as causal labourers in agriculture, poultry and animal farms, construc-
tion, in-house services and as unskilled workers. There are differences in the terms of 
labour that heads from the ‘Always Poor’ and those from the ‘Sometimes Poor’ under-
take. Casual employment provides the lowest income among the others, where the 
majority of households earned an average income of SP 75,000 ($30) (see Charts 8:11 
& 8:12). Daily wage rates are very variable depending on gender, age and the 
seasonality of the job among other things. In general, wages lie in the range of SP 2,500 
to SP 10,000 ($1 to $4) per day for adults. For skilled labour in construction and the 
manufacturing industry, the rate can go up to SP 20,000 ($8) per day but very few 
works as skilled labour. All workers in the sample have short-term or seasonal jobs. The 
majority have no skills and have received no training in the work they do so they remain 
in low-paid labour. Although the bulk of casual labours are illiterate or come from those 
who have attained only basic primary education, there are also workers who have 
completed higher education and have been forced due to a lack of other alternatives to 
take casual employment. In addition, university students and students at different levels 
can undertake casual labour as a part-time job or during school holidays.  
Casual employment varies greatly according to the season, decreasing markedly from 
April until September, and then picking up slowly by October. The slack season accom-
panies a decreased demand for casual labour in agriculture, the manufacturing industry 
and construction, with a rising proportion of workers seeking employment within the 
neighbourhoods and the main city. Workers usually seek alternative jobs in their own 
neighbourhood first. However, the demand for casual paid labour is much lower in these 
neighbourhoods. The majority of inhabitants tend to undertake jobs related to building 
and mending and many get help from neighbours, relatives and friends through a system 
of mutual cooperation. Work in the main city represents the best option. Workers are 
either hired through contractors in their neighbourhoods to work in the city, hired 
independently in the city or get the job through relatives and friends. Those who are 
hired through neighbourhood contractors are better off since they can get transport and 
longer-term employment but they are paid less compared to those seeking independent 
contracts in the city. Those who work through relatives are likely to get better paid but 
the cost of transport often takes a large part of their wage. Alternatively, workers live on 
site until their contract ends.  
‘Always Poor’ heads predominate in precarious jobs which the ‘Sometimes Poor’ are 
reluctant to take on, such as washing cars, collecting garbage, shoe polishing, selling 
illegal drugs and even sex. Some of the least popular or stigmatized jobs are undertaken 
by males from minority ethnic groups. These include human-waste disposal and waste 
collection working directly for individuals or contracted by a government agency or 
private contractor. While this type of labour is crucial for a household survival, they 
have lower wages and the local, as well as, the wider community have a deeply held 
prejudice against these labourers. People who undertake such work usually end up 
deprived of income, status and social respect. Furthermore, these groups become 
exposed to a wide range of risks like disease or being injured by sharp objects, fine 
shards of glass or hypodermic needles in the solid waste. Sometimes the jobs for which 
demand rises may be culturally defined as women’s jobs, such as domestic work. 
Female heads from Arabized ethnic groups are less likely to be involved in casual work. 
Chart 8:26 show that women from Siriha are less involved in casual employment than 
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their peers from other neighbourhoods. This is particularly true for the Arabized ethnic 
groups among the ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households compared to other 
neighbourhoods. Female heads from Africanized ethnic groups are more likely to be 
involved in domestic work. The ‘Always Poor’ of Mayo and Al Baraka have the highest 
involvement of women in domestic work, which coincides with the fact that these two 
neighbourhoods have the highest concentration of Africanized ethnic groups (Chart 8:26 
below). Domestic drudgery is never the preferred occupation for the majority of women 
since it is socially stigmatized; making it even harder for poor people to gain access to 
the resources they need for survival. When opportunities for better work (i.e. in agri-
culture) become available, they usually take them.  
‘Medium Poor’ and ‘Non-Poor’ households that cannot regulate their businesses 
employ members from ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households as vendors to 
sell their merchandise in an attempt to avoid direct confrontation with the law. They 
receive the minimum amount that provides them with just enough money for a small 
meal and at the same time they bear the consequences when merchandise is lost or 
stolen. Workers in this case are subject to a triple exclusion: the precariousness of the 
type of employment, exclusion from labour legislation and exploitation by employers 
(e.g. LH12-S).  
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The highest involvement in casual labour is found among the ‘Always Poor’ of Mayo 
and Al Baraka due to the agricultural projects there as well as poultry and animal farms 
nearby. Households that rely on agricultural labour as a major source of income suffer 
not only from low average incomes but also a large variation in income. Although agri-
culture provides a vital source of income for a good part of the year, the seasonality of 
the work is a major source of vulnerability. In Al Baraka, males can expect to get up to 
122 days of employment a year, and female members up to 150 days. However, this is 
rarely the case. Due to the competition for work in these projects, and their low capacity 
to absorb labour from the neighbourhood on a regular basis, a worker would usually get 
70 and 90 working days a year respectively. Both males and females are involved in 
agricultural work: men are usually specialized in ploughing and sowing, while women 
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work in harvesting and tending vegetables. Females have a higher involvement in this 
work than males (see Chart 8:26 below). Women are preferred to men in agricultural 
work because they are likely to work longer hours and accept a low wage. For example, 
a male resident of Al Baraka usually receives SP 10,000 ($4) per day for his work on 
the Silate project, while a female resident receives SP 5,000 ($2) per day on the same 
project, and newcomers (males and females) receive between SP 2,500 and Sp 3,000 
($1 to $1.20) per day for doing the same job.  
Lack of access to other employment activities within easy reach ensures that there is 
a steady supply of people desperate enough to take on any task for any period of time 
and for a mere pittance. Therefore, employers can set their own conditions and wage 
levels, and will still have people who would work for even lower wages.  
Fatima is a 28-year-old Darfurian who is squatting in Al Baraka. She came to the neighbourhood three 
years ago with her brother, mother and her two children. She works on the Silate project earning 
around SP 5,000 ($2) or less per day in vegetable harvesting. She would even negotiate a lower wage 
herself to guarantee work but due to completion and the seasonality of the work, her monthly earnings 
usually do not exceed SP 30,000 ($12). At least at the end of the day she ‘brings some money home’ 
(LH17-B).  
In summary, a much larger percentage of ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ 
households are casual labourers. They earn pitiful wages that condemn them to survive 
in a state of disproportionate poverty and undignified daily existence. The likelihood of 
a households being poor depends not only on the wages earned but also on factors such 
as the security and seasonality of the work and the nature of employment. The exclu-
sionary economic setting ensures that women and some minority ethnic groups’ activi-
ties remain very limited, or confined to menial, difficult and hazardous work making it 
even harder for them to gain access to the resources they need for survival. Casual 
labourers are, therefore, the most vulnerable groups among workers, barely surviving on 
the fringes of the larger society. 
 
Regular wage employments 
This category includes households living on s regular wage or salaried employment as 
their major sources of income. The best jobs available include officers and personnel 
with NGOs, primary-school teachers, clerical jobs in local-authority offices and other 
government offices, and low-ranking military personnel. Most employment comes from 
the government, private firms or small owner-operated micro-enterprises. There are also 
variations among different well-being categories in terms of the type of wage employ-
ment accessed.  
When comparing casual workers to those working in regular wage/salaried employ-
ment, the majority of the latter seem to do much better. The majority of regular wage 
employees belong to ‘Medium Poor’ households followed by ‘Non-Poor’ households 
(Chart 8:15). Among ‘Medium Poor’ and ‘Non-Poor’ households, there is higher male 
involvement than female. Household heads that used to be wage employees but have 
retired and receive a pension have a better well-being status than those who have lost 
their wage employment due to retrenchment. There are also former employees who are 
retired and have a regular pension. The majority of them belong to the ‘Medium Poor’ 
households. There are also former employees who have lost their jobs in formerly 
protected sectors due to the changing nature of the economy. This group of former 
regular wage employees is spread across well-being categories. For example, 20% of 
the ‘Sometimes Poor’ in Siriha and 13% of their peers in Dar es Salam have a re-
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trenched household member. Although none of the ‘Always Poor’ heads or members of 
their households currently hold regular salary jobs, some of them or members of their 
household used to do so and were retrenched or sacked. For example, in 6% of the 
‘Always Poor’ households in Mayo and in 13% of their peers in Siriha there was at least 
one regular salaried employee who had lost his/her job at some point in the history of 
the household. 
 
 
Chart 8:15
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                         Source: Fieldwork research 
 
 
Households become more vulnerable when they switch their economic activities in 
response to job loss. The extent to which such an effect translates into current well-
being status is determined by a worker’s ability to respond to alternative economic 
opportunities based on their access to capitals. ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ 
households suffer due to their lack of resources, including knowledge and intra-house-
hold dynamics. Job losses in this case push formerly employed workers into deep long-
term poverty that is then transmitted inter-generationally (i.e. LH12-S).  
However, having regular wage employment does not automatically lead to house-
holds being lifted out of poverty. The vulnerability of regular wage employees and their 
dependents is directly related to salient labour-market trends over the past two decades, 
specifically, the increase in precarious non-standard employment and stagnant minimum 
wages. Many workers do not work in standard jobs with secure contracts, mandated 
benefits and social protection. The majority of workers with such work are to be found 
among the ‘Sometimes Poor’ who tend to move in and out of regular jobs. The precari-
ous nature of their work leads to seasonal stress. These workers are typically younger, 
less educated, less skilled, are paid lower rates than full-time workers, and have fewer 
rights. Workers from this category are concentrated in low-skilled low-paid jobs with 
little opportunity of advancing up the career ladder. Women in particular tend to be 
confined to even worse jobs with lower payment. Gender roles and stereotypes have an 
impact on the terms of employment offered to women workers. For example, all the 
female formal workers among the ‘Sometimes Poor’ in Al Baraka work in service, as 
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cleaners and cooks or in similar occupations. Their higher involvement in this work is 
explained by the need for this type of service by firms in the vicinity of Al Baraka.  
 
 
Chart 8:16
Regular salaried employment by gender
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Low-wage employment is one of the most important reasons for workers’ vulnerabil-
ity in this field. None of the households heads currently employed earned the minimum 
wage. The monthly incomes of those employed in regular salaried employment were too 
low to sustain a household. An individual working full-time for the current minimum 
wage earns about SP 160,000 ($64) per month. On average, a formal-sector operator 
makes a monthly income similar to or a bit higher than the monthly earnings in self-
employment and casual wage activities for the ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’. 
However, the majority of ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households attach high 
value to these types of jobs and aspire to them because a formal, salaried job offers 
more livelihood security as well as providing the opportunity to access additional 
activities and resources that compensate for the low salary.  
Joseph is 48-year-old man from Al Baraka who has been working as a messenger for a government 
ministry for the past 20 years. His wage is SP 160,000 ($64). While this is too little to sustain his big 
family, his job allows him the opportunity to make and sell refreshments to employees. The combined 
income enabled him to pay the school fees for two of his children and to build a three-room house. 
Having a National Health Insurance card also enabled him to overcome the difficult times when a 
member of his family was sick. When his house was swept away by flood in 1988, his employer gave 
him a long-term loan for rebuilding. And when his daughter completed her education, he was able to 
use his network in the ministry to secure her a job as a receptionist. (LH16-B) 
The emergence of the low-wage economy, with its temporary and seasonal jobs 
pushes workers to substitute their income by combining several different livelihood 
activities at one time. As the life histories show, it is quite usual for regular wage 
employment to be combined with vending or casual employment after or between 
working hours (i.e. LH12-S and LH16-B). ‘Medium Poor’ and ‘Non-Poor’ households 
were successful in accessing better-paid profitable or long-term secondary jobs. How-
ever the ‘Sometimes Poor’ cannot do this because they have neither the skills nor the 
resources to access them. A critical feature of the work environment is potential loss of 
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employment, either permanently or temporary. Workers in these sectors tend to be 
concentrated in less-skilled jobs (i.e. loading, packaging, collection, labelling, typeset-
ting, etc.). These types of jobs are increasingly disappearing due to automation. Older 
workers in traditional crafts and newcomers with low skills are always prone to losing 
their jobs. Those who have lost regular employment have more difficulty replacing lost 
income with the earnings of secondary earners and due to lack of savings (i.e. LH33-B). 
In such employment, workers are not protected by health and unemployment benefits 
or workers’ safety regulations. Although the Ministry of Labour has set a minimum 
compensation package according to the job and industry, people indicated that tough 
regulations imposed by both private and public firms have kept them in a continuous 
state of fear about losing their jobs. A lack of channels for workers’ complaints, such as 
trade unions, or the independent political powers of labours makes it difficult for them 
to claim any right. No workers in the private and parastatal sectors have any constitu-
tional right to trade unions of their own. The law allows for the unionization of a 
company provided that the union includes both workers and enterprise management. 
Unions are therefore made up of parties of conflicting interests and in private firms they 
are mostly non existent and workers are not expected to engage in any beneficial 
bargaining with their employer.  
The ‘Always Poor’ and some of the ‘Sometimes Poor’ could not access regular wage 
employment. Access to job opportunities is often also determined by a person’s network 
and access to information about jobs. The life histories show that those who have 
regular employment are likely to be able to help relatives in getting jobs in the same 
firms (i.e. LH2-M). It was indicated during various community meetings (i.e. WFGD-
M9, FGD-B6) that a lack of information tools and resources that help job seekers 
identify job opportunities makes current regular wage employees from the neighbour-
hood, or from a particular ethnic group, the main channel through which information on 
jobs are circulated. Furthermore, local employees may be able to recommend a job 
seeker for lower-ranked jobs but job seekers’ livelihood and chances depend on whether 
they have the right link or not. Since this channel is not neutral, job seekers from 
‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households usually do not benefit. Wage em-
ployment contracts within the neighbourhood were often disadvantageous, involving 
multiple employers and excluding the possibility of collective bargaining.  
Limited access to the formal labour market, in particular for women and ethnic 
groups, pushes more of these households into the informal sector with all the risks 
identified earlier. Therefore, the new or additional activities that workers had under-
taken did not provide adequate levels of income to meet their increasing needs for cash. 
To sum up, regular salaried jobs are structured along the lines of well-being status; 
with poorer households effectively excluded from the relatively better jobs due to a lack 
of essential capitals. Jobs (even for some ‘Medium Poor’ and ‘Non-Poor’ households) 
are characterized by being low-paying, temporary, seasonal with little job security, and 
having limited opportunity for training and skill development. A low income has made 
it necessary for workers to carry out multiple activities, while poorer households are 
barely surviving by combining activities. ‘Medium Poor’ and ‘Non-Poor’ households 
have managed successfully to combine wage employment with alternative sources of 
income. 
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Financial outcome of livelihoods activities 
Most households in the four categories generate income from four broad categories of 
activity: regular employment, casual labour, self-employment or a, pension. There are 
also households who have income from sources that cannot be classified as employment 
or pension, for example income derived from rent (renting out a house or a room, 
renting electrical lines), remittances, irregular donations of food and cash and Zakat.  
 
Remittances  
Remittances are usually received from the rural areas from relative there or from house-
hold members who have migrated there for a long or short term. They are basically sent 
to ‘Medium Poor’ and ‘Non-Poor’ households, as very few ‘Always Poor’ or ‘Some-
times Poor’ households receive them. For example, only 3% of the ‘Always Poor’ 
households in Al Baraka reported receiving irregular remittance as opposed to 40% of 
the ‘Non-Poor’ in Al Baraka (see Chart 8:17). 
 
  
Chart 8:17
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                              Source: Fieldwork research 
 
 
The main characteristic of remittances is their irregularity as they are usually sent 
once or twice a year and immediately after the cereal harvest and come in the form of 
cereals and food stuffs (dates, dried okra, dried beans and fruit). Quantities vary and 
tend to increase for ‘Medium Poor’ and ‘Non-Poor’ households and decrease for 
‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households. For example, the ‘Always Poor’ 
households that received cereals had supplies for up to three months and those that 
received cereals from ‘Medium Poor’ and ‘Non-Poor’ households had supplies that 
lasted them up to eight months.  
Remittances of this kind require the harvest in the rural base to be good enough to 
produce a surplus and for there to be transport available to get the produce from the 
rural area to the city. Cash remittances are extremely rare but households from the 
northern part of the country that received dates, fruit and dried beans as well as house-
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holds in southern Sudan were able to sell part or all of their remittances and use the 
money to buy other basic needs.  
Remittances from northern Sudan usually arrive between October and January, a time 
when ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households have fewer resources and less 
work. It is therefore vital for ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households to 
receive remittances as they boost the average income earned by the household and are 
often sold to meet debts and/or cover health expenditure or other household necessities.  
Remittances from urban to rural areas are also common but their form and regularity 
varies between households in different well-being categories. Remittances from the city 
take the form of cash, dry rations and medicines. Some ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes 
Poor’ households allocate their labour resources between rural and urban areas, with a 
husband working in the urban areas while his wife and family migrate to the rural area. 
Among these households, remittances are more common than for the rest of their 
category (e.g. LH12-S). Although ‘Medium Poor’ and ‘Non-Poor’ households have not 
adopted the above-mentioned strategies, some of them have sent irregular remittances to 
their rural base.  
Although remittances do not form a significant part of ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Some-
times Poor’ households’ livelihood strategies, they are vital for the few who are able to 
receive them, and allow these households to cope with immediate shocks.  
 
Zakat 
Zakat – the social development fund – does not provide a regular income but is instead 
mostly a one-off payment and varies in amount, with eligibility being determined on the 
basis of an assessment of need. The ‘Always Poor’ households are not necessarily the 
most eligible (see Chart 8:18).  
 
 
Chart 8:18
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This is because more ‘Sometimes Poor’ and ‘Medium Poor’ households received 
Zakat than ‘Always Poor’ households. Some ‘Non-Poor’ households also received 
Zakat at a certain point in their lives. For example only 3% and 7% of the ‘Always 
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Poor’ households in Al Baraka and Mayo respectively received Zakat, and it was a one-
off payment. Those who received Zakat used it to rebuild a shelter that was demolished 
by flood, to pay for medicines or to pay for funeral costs. ‘Always Poor’ households 
that received this money claimed that the actual level of payment was not adequate to 
address their current problem. Furthermore, the bureaucracy and cost of transport 
between different offices rendered the amount received insignificant. 
 
Pensions  
Very few households have access to a pension. The majority are concentrated among 
the ‘Medium Poor’ households. While none of the ‘Always Poor’ households has a 
claim to a pension, 20% of the households in the ‘Medium Poor’ category in Mayo and 
Siriha, and 10% from Al Baraka and Dar es Salam claim a pension (see Chart 8:19).  
 
 
Chart 8:19
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0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
AP SP MP NP
Poverty categories
%
 o
f h
ou
se
ho
ld
s
Siriha
Dar S
Mayo
Baraka
 
                        Source: Fieldwork research 
 
 
Pension rates are theoretically related to past earnings but the current level of 
monthly pensions has sharply decreased compared to 25 years ago. Pensioners suffer 
bureaucratic procedures and have to pay the cost of transport from their neighbourhoods 
to the pension office in central Khartoum two or three times a month before they can 
cash their money. The final amount received becomes insignificant. None of the house-
holds that receive a pension depends on it as their only or major source of income.  
 
Income from rent  
Owning a house with more than one room can provide an additional source income, 
particularly in Siriha and Mayo. However, it is mainly ‘Medium Poor’ and ‘Non-Poor’ 
households that have access to this type of income. Very few households from the 
‘Sometimes Poor’ group have access to income from rent while none of the ‘Always 
Poor’ households have generated income from such venues. Rent varies according to 
the neighbourhood and the type of house.  
Siriha neighbourhood provides the best opportunity for rent since it is closer to the 
main city and has relatively regular transport. The majority of ‘Medium Poor’ and 
‘Non-Poor’ households in Siriha have income from rent (see Chart 8:20). These house-
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holds live in part of the house and rent out a room or two. People who live near the main 
road in Mayo have good opportunities to rent out rooms, while Al Baraka and Dar es 
Salam have the least chance to rent rooms due to their proximity. Rent in Siriha is by far 
the most expensive of all the other neighbourhoods. For example, while the majority of 
‘Medium Poor’ and ‘Non-Poor’ households in Siriha have rented out their houses for an 
average SP 96,000 ($38.40), the majority of ‘Medium Poor’ and ‘Non-Poor’ households 
in Mayo rent their houses for an average of SP 36,000 ($14.40) per month. ‘Sometimes 
Poor’ households usually rent out small spaces in their premise for an average monthly 
income of SP 11,000 ($4.40). Renting out a room in a house is one of the most impor-
tant strategies that ‘Medium Poor’ and ‘Non-Poor’ households can undertake and that 
enables them to cope with various adversities. Even households that are not currently 
renting would consider doing so if the need arose.  
Households with access to grid electricity or power generators are able to rent lines to 
neighbours in the vicinity. Lines are rented per night or per month to households that 
have no electricity or a generator. The cost of lighting one bulb per night ranges from 
SP 500 to SP 600 ($0.20-$0.24). None of the ‘Always Poor’ or ‘Sometimes Poor’ 
households have access to this type of income. Power generators are mainly owned by 
the ‘Medium Poor’ and ‘Non-Poor’ households in the neighbourhoods. Some house-
holds in Siriha that are connected to grid electricity are also able to illegally rent out a-
line by the night. At least 30% or more of the Non-Poor households in all the 
neighbourhoods earn a monthly income ranging between SP 15,000 and SP 30,000 ($6-
$12) per month from renting out a line (see Chart 8:21). 
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                          Source: Field work research 
 
 
None of the ‘Always Poor’ households from any of the neighbourhoods have an 
income from renting out electricity lines, while a few ‘Sometimes Poor’ households in 
Siriha have an income of SP 15000 or less. Demands for electricity increase during 
social events such as weddings or deaths, in the festive seasons (December-January, 
during Ramadan and Eid al Fiter), as well as in February and March at the time of 
school examinations. Although a few of the ‘Sometimes Poor’ households can rent a 
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line from time to time, the majority of the ‘Always Poor’ households do not incur any 
costs from line renting.  
 
 
Chart 8:21 
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                       Source: Fieldwork research 
 
 
Donations of food, cash and medical treatment 
Local programmes providing economic assistance to persons in need are mainly 
confined to humanitarian assistance and are provided by NGOs. Food items are donated 
from emergency relief stocks either directly to those most believed to be in need or are 
submitted to the PCs or the headmen to disperse. This can include food items such as 
sugar, sorghum and oil but can also include medical assistance at times of crisis. Within 
the sample, a very few households from the ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ had 
received this support on one or two occasions. The state might also distribute assistance 
during religious festivals through their organizations represented in the Shaheed 
(Martyr), and General Union of Sudanese Women. Only 7% of households from the 
‘Always Poor’ in Siriha and 3% in Al Baraka had received such assistance from the 
sate. These were mainly households that had lost members in the war while fighting for 
the Popular Defense Forces (PDF). This assistance was a one-off and was not repeated. 
Religious institutions such as the church and mosques sometimes distribute food 
donations but these tend to be rare and of negligible amounts. During the Muslim 
religious festivals (Ramadan and Eid-Ul-Fitr) private contributions of Zakat and 
Sadakat (assistants provided on an ad hoc basis) are made to share the joy of the season 
with the poor and disadvantaged groups in the community. Donations include cash and 
food parcels containing cereals, meat, edible oil and pulses. Only 10% or less of 
‘Always Poor’ households in Al Baraka and Siriha have benefited from these donations 
in the last ten years. The figure is slightly higher in Mayo where 17% of ‘Always Poor’ 
and 10% of ‘Sometimes Poor’ households have received non-cash private contributions 
of Zakat and Sadakat. Private donations of food and medicines have a very limited 
reach and are of negligible value to the poor. Even for those who receive them, they 
only provide temporarily relief in helping households cope with shocks.  
 
Borrowing 
Access to other financial resources is critical to the livelihood strategies of households 
in the different well-being categories. Loan funds may reduce households’ vulnerability 
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to income fluctuations or assist households to better manage their existing capital base. 
Access to credit helps households or individuals to meet their demands for cash without 
having to sell or pawn essential capitals used in generating income (FGD-S13, FGD-
B6). Most households access cash resources by borrowing. Borrowing and indebtedness 
are common among all categories to varying degrees. Although the intensity of debt 
changes seasonally, the majority of ‘Always Poor’ households almost always carry 
debts with them through the year. ‘Always Poor’ households take out credit for food, 
water, health problems, their domestic rent, school fees, rebuilding shelters, coping with 
income loss, transport, social relations, and investment (Chart 8:22).  
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People can b free of loans for three reasons. Either they are extremely poor so nobody 
would lend them money as they have no means to pay it back, or they have stigmatized 
disease and people do not have any exchange with them, or they are not in need of a 
loan. Households who are not able to borrow because of their inability to repay the 
money are the most vulnerable. To give this statement a face,  
Khadiga (AP) is a 26-year-old divorcee with three young children. She works hard almost every day 
making tuaki, selling empty bottles and cans. Her daily income is very low and some days she does 
not sell anything at all. Any money she makes is used to buy food. She always has to borrow money 
because her income is not sufficient to cover the cost of food but most of the time she is unable to 
repay her debts. Therefore, she is finding it increasingly difficulty to borrow from the same sources. 
When her children get sick, she has no means to pay for medical attention. Her ability to borrow 
money makes the difference between life and death for her sick child. (LH6-S) 
NGO micro-credit programmes have provided vital support to some ‘Non-Poor’ 
households and enabled them to establish or develop their business. Although the loan 
is often too small by itself to start a small business, those who have received it and had 
other sources of borrowing were able to use it for investment, ppurposes rather than 
consumption. A micro credit given to women often plays a far more important role than 
other form of loan. Although ‘Always Poor’ women who had access to this programme 
in the past were not able to use it for investment purposes, being able to access credit 
has strengthened their position within the household as well as, providing them with the 
confidence to assume public roles. 
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Um Gimaa (MP) is 52-year-old female from the Danagla Arabized ethnic group. She used to raise 
chicken and sell their eggs in the neighbourhood or to a middleman. Her profit was so low that her 
basic source of living came from her husband’s work and she only complemented that with her 
income. Um Gimaa had never travelled by herself outside the neighbourhood before due to traditional 
mobility constraints and social convention. When her husband decided to take a second wife and 
desert her after 35 years of marriage she felt vulnerable, particularly since she has no children or 
relative to rely on for financial support. Her neighbour who was already a member of a micro-credit 
CBO programme introduced her to the management. Her loan was approved eight months later and 
with it she was able to build a poultry house in her yard. She was also helped with advice on raising 
and marketing her poultry. Um Gimaa was encouraged and required to have more time and mobility 
to devote to her business so as to make it a success. At first she did not have the confidence to travel 
alone but because of the increased economic pressures and the imminent dissolution of her family she 
has had no choice but to overcome these constraints on her mobility. Um Gimaa travels on an almost 
daily basis to different parts of the city selling her products or buying what she needs for her business. 
Her project has taken off very well and she has been able to make long-term clients, and at the same 
time repay all the loan instalments. She became the major contributor to the household and at the same 
time has established contacts around the city. Her new role and status within and outside the house-
hold has increased her security, autonomy and self-confidence. Although her husband is no longer 
thinking about having a second wife, Um Gimaa is now thinking that she might be better off without 
him. Encouraged by her own success and having gained greater respect in her household and commu-
nity, Um Gimaa has become a local leader, actively participating in community concerns. (LH31-B) 
People in the neighbourhoods lack access to convenient basic forms of financial 
services such as credit, savings, mortgage lending, insurance and remittance mecha-
nisms. Commercial banks demand a high collateral minimum balance and other re-
quirements that most people cannot meet. Almost all small business entrepreneurs con-
duct their business transactions without ever using any mainstream financial services. 
Apart from 20% of the Non-Poor members from Siriha, none of the households in the 
sample had access to financial services. The most common type of substitute collateral 
has been community-based Savings and Credit Cooperatives or Sanduqes. 
 
Savings and credit cooperatives (Sanduqes) 
Savings and credit cooperatives (Sanduqes) are probably the most common and impor-
tant means of informal neighbourhood networking used by the different well-being 
categories. They are a good source of credit for those who have a regular income and 
are able to save or set aside a certain amount on a daily, weekly or monthly basis. 
Sanduqes are initiated and run predominantly by women, although men can become 
members. Potential members must have a group of five to 20 women and agree on an 
acceptable amount (between SP 1000 to SP 5000 ($0.40-$2) that will be deposited by 
each member on daily, weekly or monthly basis. The group also agrees on the sequence 
of payments. Quite often the sequence of receiving credit changes if a member unex-
pectedly has an emergency, is ill or there is a death in the family. A scheme may carry 
on for many years, shifting the turns of the recipients so that each gets an equal oppor-
tunity. Women involved in Sanduqes pay their instalments mainly from their income-
generating activities or from cutting household daily food expenditure. However, since 
the ‘Always Poor’ households are not in a position to save on a regular basis due to the 
seasonality of their income, they are not part of these schemes. For the majority of 
households who live on hand-to-mouth types of activities, weekly or monthly savings 
are not feasible. At the time of the survey all ‘Non-Poor’ and many of ‘Medium Poor’ 
and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households have at least one member in Sanduqes. On the other 
hand, none of the ‘Always Poor’ households has any members participating. However, 
many ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households who currently are not involved 
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in Sanduqes indicated that they used to be members at irregular intervals and when there 
was sufficient income to save. The ‘Always Poor’ used to be involved in Sanduqes that 
were based on a daily payment more than on weekly or monthly ones. The experience 
of these groups shows that although the saving of group members may be small in 
nature, it gives individuals the courage to plan for the future instead of living from one 
day to the next. It also gives a measure of personal security and confidence to take risks 
and launch new initiatives. This is particularly true for members from ‘Medium Poor’ 
and ‘Non-Poor’ households where the need for daily food is met by more staple sources. 
The majority of women from the Non-Poor have invested their Sanduqes money in 
activities in which they are already skilled, such as food processing and selling, raising 
chickens, operating a small shop, making, buying and selling clothing or shoes. For 
members from the ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households, the loan is usually 
utilized for the fulfilment of basic needs (food, clothing, shelter and health) as well as, 
many of indirect longer-term needs such as school fees.  
In summary, access to loans is critical for livelihood strategies for households in 
different well-being categories. Although ‘Medium Poor’ and ‘Non-Poor’ households 
are able to access loans through different means, ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ 
households experience increasing difficulties in doing so and thus have no choice but to 
sell their productive assets or to enter into forms of borrowing that makes them sink 
deep into poverty.  
 
Total household income 
There is a clear variation between the earnings of the households within the different 
well-being categories (see Charts 8:11 & 8:12). ‘Always Poor’ households in all the 
neighbourhoods have the smallest and most unpredictable financial resources driven 
from casual work and unregulated, businesses and occasional food, donations. The 
majority of ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households earned an average total 
monthly income of 75,000 ($30) (see Charts 8:11 & 12). While none of the ‘Medium 
Poor’ and ‘Non-Poor’ has a total earning that is less than SP 155,000 ($62). All the 
‘Non-Poor’ and more than 50% of ‘Medium Poor’ households have a total monthly 
income averaging SP 505,000 ($202) or more. 
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Chart 8:24
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Chart 8:25
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Chart 8:26
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There are apparent variations between similar well-being categories within the differ-
ent neighbourhoods. For example the ‘Always Poor’ households in Mayo have far less 
income compared to their counterparts in other neighbourhoods, while their peers from 
Siriha and Al Baraka have the highest income levels. 
The total incomes of ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households tend to fluctu-
ate due to seasonality and the health of the income earners, or due to the regulations of 
the informal sector. In addition, there is significant intra-household income difference 
with women and children having far lower earnings than adult males. As the life histo-
ries indicate, seasonal fluctuations in employment, income and consumption decreases 
the ability of ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households’ to deal with shocks and 
stresses (LH12-S, LH14-M).  
Households need to use this income for essential items such as food and non-food 
items such as water, medicines, rent, transport, school fees and uniforms, books and 
other necessities. For each income category, the life histories (e.g. LH3-B, LH4-M, 
LH14-M) show that the cost of living generally exceeds direct income (see for example 
Chart 8.27).  
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The difference between income and expenditure is often bridged by borrowing and 
selling assets. Expenditure on food accounts for almost two-thirds of the total household 
expenditure of the ‘Always Poor’ (Chart 8:28). Expenditure may be variable over short 
periods of time due to the seasonality of work, illness or when school fees have to be 
paid.  
Expenditure increases between June and September when households have to pay 
school fees and other school requirements, and due to the need to repair houses after the 
rainy season. The rainy season also brings malaria with it and the associated complica-
tions that may call for medication. Unfortunately, these demands coincide with the time 
of decreasing income opportunities for casual labourers and street vendors. Spending on 
illnesses, school fees and transport amount to a large share of household income. For 
many renters, their rent takes a large slice out of their income. A recurring theme in the 
focus-group discussions (FGD-S13, FGD-S7) was the impact that scarce financial 
resources or a shortage of money can have on obtaining a decent standard of living. 
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Many felt that a lack of financial resources influenced their choices and opportunities in 
life. A lack of financial resources forces people to make choices between items that are 
all important for long-term survival because their money cannot cover the basic neces-
sities. For some, this means missing out on food and for others it involves missing out 
on decent housing or being unable to pay bills.  
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Women’s livelihood activities 
Women are the main income earners in ‘Always Poor’ households in all neighbour-
hoods except Dar es Salam. Female income earners have high representation among 
‘Sometimes Poor’ households (Chart 8:29). Females also contribute significantly to 
their household’s livelihoods as secondary income earners. Such involvement decreases 
if we move through to the ‘Medium Poor’ and ‘Non-Poor’ households to the ‘Non-
Poor’ where the contribution by women is the lowest. A similar trend is also observed 
within neighbourhoods: the poorer the neighbourhood, the higher the involvement of 
women in income-earning activities. The highest female involvement of all the age 
groups is in Mayo and the lowest is in Siriha. Apparently, the mere involvement of 
women in income-generating activities is not sufficient to enhance the well-being of the 
household or strengthen their control over decision-making. The type of employment 
that women are able to undertake seems to correlate with poverty and its duration. 
Although women are represented across the employment spectrum, they tend to be 
concentrated more in the ‘informal’ and risky activities than men. 
Women undertake certain home-based livelihood activities as full-time jobs or 
combine them with other income-generating activities. Home industries involve 
clothing, handicrafts such as hand-woven baskets, Tuaki, bags, mats, kitchen accesso-
ries, food such as kisra, snacks, sweets, fried bean balls and local drinks. Home indus-
tries are seen as a convenient way of ensuring that there is some cash in hand. Many of 
the currently not economically active ‘Non-Poor’, ‘Medium Poor’ and ‘Sometimes 
Poor’ women consider home industry as a fallback situation in times of need. Home 
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industry also has the advantage of flexibility in terms of working hours and independ-
ence, making it more compatible with domestic duties and their reproductive role.  
 
 
Chart 8:29
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Women from ‘Medium Poor’ and ‘Non-Poor’ households tend to undertake home 
industry irregularly and only from home. Poorer women would take home industry as a 
part-time job but combine it with other income-generating activities outside the home. 
Some either specialize in production or marketing or only in production. Simple home 
industry faces substantial competition from the international market. Many of the 
products women produce face stiff competition vis-à-vis products imported from 
abroad, as well as locally manufactured products. Varieties of Asian-made goods that 
were not available in shops before are now being imported into the country by private 
businessmen. These products have replaced traditional handmade products with 
synthetic ones and other substitutes that are sold cheaper than locally made products. 
Women producing these items are finding it increasingly difficult to compete with 
imports and are having to withdraw from the market and find other activities.  
Amal (SP) is a 38-year-old divorcee from Siriha who earns her living by making and selling Tuaki. 
She said that ‘Even the traditional Sudanese Tuaki (men;s head covering) that have been made by 
women for over a thousand of years are now imported from Khaleej (abroad). They are made from 
shiny colours and sell for less than the local ones. But they do not last long, they wears out quickly. 
Butit seems that no body really cares about that.” (LH40-S) 
Vending is a relatively more accessible activity for women from different well-being 
categories. Income usually is low, the investment too is low but it does not require 
special skills or training, and a spot by the roadside, in front of schools or from home is 
all it takes to start the business. Vending within the neighbourhood is less profitable 
than if women opt for the main city. But this is balanced by irregularity and transport 
costs. Most importantly, the regulation of vendors is much tougher in the city compared 
to the neighbourhoods. Since all poorer women operate in the informal sector, the 
measures taken by the locality have led to disruption, dislocation and worst of all, the 
destruction of women vendor and producers’ means of livelihood (i.e. LH12-S). 
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Furthermore, the competition in this type of activity is tough and drives profits down in 
some locations such as Siriha. Ethnicity plays an important role in determining the 
winners and losers in the competition over attractive spots such as in front of schools or 
in a corner of an informal market where people from the same ethnic group would 
usually opt to buy from their counterparts. The most extreme situation is when women 
of certain origins are denied access to operate in the perceived vicinity of their oppo-
nent’s group.  
Their household’s pressing needs for survival are the main drivers of women's 
participation in the workforce but the choice of employment is always restricted. A 
much smaller percentage of women are employed on a regular salary compared to men 
and usually belong to the ‘Medium Poor’ and ‘Non-Poor’ households. As a group, 
women are disadvantage in respect of education and training. They are concentrated in 
low-paid and low-skilled jobs and are mostly involved in part-time or casual employ-
ment, which makes them poorer than their male counterparts. These characteristics are 
shared by both women from ‘Medium Poor’ and ‘Non-Poor’ households as well as 
those from the ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households. Furthermore, women 
have received unfair wages in the past that disproportionately do not allow for a 
minimum standard of living or even a modicum of dignity and so households deprived 
of male labour are more vulnerable than other households. The majority of women also 
have to combine multiple livelihood activities with domestic labouring.  
The majority of women income earners from ‘Medium Poor’ and ‘Non-Poor’ house-
holds are able to undertake the types of jobs that are culturally defined as suitable for 
them, but poorer women are increasingly moving away from this labelling. Women 
from ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ categories do not have much choice or the 
luxury of following what is considered as the socially accepted norms. They have been 
employed in jobs considered socially unacceptable and at the end of the list of available 
options and, hence, have stepped outside society’s norms. These women have various 
problems with their social relationships, including stigma and social isolation. Many 
‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households are only able to survive because they 
have females who took demeaning risky or stigmatizing jobs such as domestic work, 
alcohol brewing and sex work as full-time or irregular jobs (i.e. LH12-S, LH39-B). 
Brewing and selling traditional homemade alcohol provides a relatively higher income 
than any other home industry but it is a highly risky job. Homemade beer such as Araki 
and Marisa are considered important components of the indigenous diet for the majority 
of southern and western ethnic groups. However, the making, selling or consumption of 
alcohol is prohibited by law and women – Muslims and non-Muslims – who are found 
to be involved are prosecuted. Women in any business and particularly those in manu-
facturing and the selling of alcohol are subject to strict codes of public morality as 
defined by the 2001 Public Order Law. The women’s focus-group discussions (FGD-
D11, FGD-B15, WFGD-M9) ) indicated that since the Act’s introduction, many women 
have been flogged and humiliated in public, sent to prison and police stations for long 
periods of incarceration without charge and their merchandise was confiscated. How-
ever, a lack of other alternative makes women come back to the same job (i.e. LH39-B).  
Women from ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households are faced with the 
choice of either starving or pursuing the type of livelihood activity that makes them 
incur more shame and loss of status (i.e. LH12-S). Young women from the ‘Always 
Poor’ households are likely to work as domestic workers in the city but since the 
demand for women in domestic services in the city is usually high this activity tends to 
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be more stable compared to agriculture and petty trade. Domestic work also represents a 
fallback option for poor petty traders when they are faced with harassment by the 
authorities for taxes, licences and prohibited activities. Wages for domestic work tend to 
be much lower than other activities. Furthermore, the cost of transport reduces the 
benefit that women make and forces them to stay at their employers’ residences. Some 
find themselves at the beck and call of their employers on a 24-hour basis. These 
women are highly vulnerable to abuse and exploitation. 
In summary, poverty among women seems to be produced by interlocking social 
relations and processes that constrain the range of opportunities these women can draw 
on. The economic contributions that women therefore make do not materialize into the 
better well-being of the household.  
 
Child labour 
Child workers come from very poor backgrounds both in terms of household human 
capital and physical capital assets. Children from these households become extremely 
vulnerable to income variability because their households often respond sharply to a 
decline in earnings of the main income earner by involving other family members, 
usually children who are withdrawn from school. A significant proportion of children 
from ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households are involved in both paid and 
unpaid work on a regular basis rather than going to school (Chart 8:30).Community 
meetings indicated that their households had no other choice than to draw on their 
children’s support on a regular basis (CM-B2, CM-D3 and CM-S4). For them, child 
labour is of crucial importance to their livelihood strategies during their usually short 
spells of severe poverty, unemployment or sickness of the main income earner. Child 
labour is more prominent among households headed by women due to the absence of 
male labour. Child wages are far lower than those received by adults and range between 
SP 500 and SP 3000 ($0.20-$1.20) a day. Yet, many households would not be able to 
survive without the labour of their children. In some of these household a child’s 
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income accounted for between 20% and 100% of the total household income (i.e. 
LH34-M). 
There is, nevertheless, a trade-off between work and school attendance among 
children that is expected to influence their school performance. As discussed earlier, the 
school enrolment of children from ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households has 
been affected negatively by the introduction of school fees in primary education. 
Nonetheless, ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households lack the ability to invest 
in the education of their children and large numbers of primary-school-aged children do 
not even enter the school system, while others drop out. For the majority of children 
from the ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households who have to work on daily 
basis, attending school is nearly impossible even if a child could raise the school fees 
from his/her own work (i.e. LH18-M). The majority of ‘Sometimes Poor’ working 
children work sporadically. Some children from ‘Medium Poor’ and ‘Non-Poor’ 
households go to school every day and work only during school holidays. Working 
children from ‘Medium Poor’ and ‘Non-Poor’ households usually assist their household 
in the running of their businesses.  
Children’s participation in the labour force is also heightened by family disintegra-
tion. Children are particularly affected by the breakdown of social cohesion as they have 
had to leave home at an early age to fend for themselves somewhere else (i.e. LH13-B). 
Child labour is also associated with the poverty of the neighbourhood: the poorer the 
neighbourhood the more child labour there is. For example, among the ‘Always Poor’ 
households the highest involvement of children in paid labour is to be found in Mayo 
where in 22% of the ‘Always Poor’ households there is at least one child under the age 
of 15 who works on a regular base. On the other hand, the lowest involvement is in 
Siriha where the figure drops to 15%. Other neighbourhoods fall between the two. 
The share of female/male children in paid labour varies but boys have higher share 
than girls except in Mayo where children are equally involved in paid work. Children 
who have had no formal education had hardly any opportunities outside the informal 
sector. Therefore, they tend to work in jobs that put them in direct confrontation with 
the authorities. Children from poor households may work in one activity or combine 
several income-earning activities at any one time. Among the ‘Always Poor’ households 
in Mayo, 40% of the working children do casual work most of the time as shop helpers, 
domestic workers, loaders and porters. Street vending is also undertaken by children 
either for their parents or for others for a wage. Girls are often involved in home indus-
try as well as domestic labour. Boys work as porters, carry goods in markets, load, 
unload and fetch luggage in bus parks, and transport goods (i.e. LH18-M). Sex work is 
used as a last resort for girls and represents one of the few areas in which relatively high 
incomes can be obtained (i.e. LH19-S). Begging is used as a last resort for boys, and 
sometimes becomes the only option between jobs or alongside casual employment. 
Some children are being used by criminal syndicates, especially in the sale and distribu-
tion of illegal drugs.  
A working day can start at 6 a.m. and end 6 p.m. or later. A long working day for 
such a low wage compels children to work extra days to meet their family’s needs. A 
critical issue is that most children can become trapped in this web of activities and find 
themselves unable to escape poverty in the future. 
Rita (SP) is a 14-year-old sex worker in Siriha. She went to school up to fifth grade. Her mother 
became a sex worker herself after separating from her abusive and alcoholic husband. Rita was en-
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couraged to enter the trade she used to shun. She wanted to quit her job and go to school, and may be 
‘become a respectable teacher’. However, she has not found a way out because her mother could no 
longer work and she is the main income earner in the household. (LH19-S) 
To sum up, household-levels of poverty often compel children to work and undertake 
work that is not appropriate for their age and maturity and which traps them in a 
destructive cycle of exhausting tasks and does not allow them access to formal educa-
tion let alone recreation. This evidence points to the intergenerational dimension of 
social exclusion and the extensive barriers to essential livelihood capitals today that 
predict the continued social exclusion and poverty of these households in the future. 
Conclusion  
The discussion above has detailed households’ capital and the different activities 
pursued by individuals in the various well-being categories. To capture the diversity 
between people within each of the four neighbourhoods, the study developed exercises 
to explore the full continuum of well-being within the communities. Four categories of 
well-being were identified; the ‘Always Poor’, the ‘Sometimes Poor’, the ‘Medium 
Poor’ and the ‘Non-Poor’. These categories were set with reference to the way people 
make their livelihoods and the security or vulnerability of their efforts. The other 
dimension that also supported such categorization was security of tenure. ‘Medium 
Poor’ and ‘Non-Poor’ households have a larger portfolio of capitals than poorer ones. 
People’s classifications of households into different well-being categories reflected 
social differentiation and inequalities between people within neighbourhoods and strong 
linkages between poverty and the composition of households in terms of gender, 
ethnicity and age. The ‘Always Poor’ are mainly made up of households that belong to 
minority ethnic groups, headed by female, and that have young members. The ‘Non-
Poor’ are mainly made up of households that belong to dominant ethnic groups, are 
headed by males, and have fewer dependent members. While the ‘Sometimes Poor’ may 
share some of the characteristics of the ‘Always Poor’ households, they may have other 
measures that lessen their vulnerability.  
The vulnerability of households is closely related to their livelihood activities, in 
particular to being informally employed, being a woman, being a child and being poor. 
For each, there are specific sets of vulnerabilities that are imposed by the nature of the 
work and access to various capitals. Capitals provide people with varying degrees of 
livelihood sustainability. ‘Medium Poor’ and ‘Non-Poor’ households have a larger 
portfolio of capitals and men’s portfolios are bigger than women’s. Female poverty is 
produced by interlocking, social relations and processes that constrain the range of 
opportunities women can draw on. The economic contribution women make does not 
materializes into a better well-being of the household. Therefore, households headed by 
females are much poorer than households headed by males within the same groups due 
to their lack of access to male portfolios. Poorer households have lower human capital 
due to multiple barriers to health care and education and these households have ex-
tremely low valuable physical capitals and lack tenure security. Average household 
income differs across categories and these differences, combined with lower unpredict-
able and fluctuating incomes from informal-sector activities help to explain who the 
poor are and who the better-off are. Poorer households and particularly the ‘Always 
Poor’ derive most of their income from casual work and self-employment in the infor-
mal sector, sources that are not steady or predictable. Furthermore, the exclusionary 
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economic setting ensures that women and some minority ethnic group activities remain 
very limited or confined to menial, difficult, and hazardous work that makes it even 
harder for them to gain access to the resources they need for survival. Better-off house-
holds derive a higher percentage of their household income from regular employment, 
regulated self-employment, pensions, capitals and remittances. Incomes obtained by 
poorer households are often inadequate and are too little to maintain a livelihood, cope 
with emergencies or make even small investments. In addition, poorer households lack 
capitals that could be liquidated to cope with crisis. Their low incomes make it neces-
sary for these households to carry out multiple activities and involve more members in 
their livelihood activities. Household-levels of poverty frequently compel children to 
work and undertake work that is not appropriate for their age and maturity and which 
traps them in a destructive cycle of exhausting tasks. This does not allow them access to 
formal education let alone recreation. This evidence points to the intergenerational 
dimension of social exclusion where the extensive barriers to essential livelihood 
capitals predict the continued social exclusion and poverty of these households in the 
future.  
Borrowing by the ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households is almost always 
linked to meeting emergency consumption needs, healthcare expenses, school expenses 
and, most importantly, meeting the expenses of building and rebuilding shelters. They 
are, therefore, confront an with an unprecedented level of debt that makes them not only 
less equipped to deal with the current situation but also vulnerable to even harder shocks 
in the future. These people have the least choice in terms of their livelihood strategies 
and are the most vulnerable when confronted with adversity. 
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Household access and opportunity 
 
 
 
 
Introduction  
The previous chapter examined the assets that households and individuals have and the 
way they are employed in livelihood strategies. The analysis showed how some social 
groups lack the necessary capital and opportunity to pursue a sustainable livelihood. 
The discussion in this chapter will identify the reasons preventing them from accessing 
assets and determine the type of livelihood strategies they could pursue. Following our 
theoretical model, the policies, institutions and processes that determine people’s access 
to resources are central to such understanding. Therefore, the system of entitlements or 
the legal, social and other factors that facilitate or block access to human, physical, 
natural, social and financial assets are assessed in an attempt to understand who is able 
to draw upon a specific asset and who is not.  
Proximity to the main city  
The ability of households to secure a job is governed in part by their neighbourhood’s 
geographic proximity to the main city. The stratified structure of the city has impacted 
negatively on neighbourhood residents by disconnecting places of work from places of 
residence. All neighbourhoods are located on the periphery of the capital city. Poor-
quality or non-existent paved roads and expensive transport services add to the physical 
isolation of the neighbourhoods by discouraging mobility and restricting people’s 
ability to benefit from opportunities outside their neighbourhood. Livelihood activities 
in neighbourhoods are less profitable and wages in the neighbourhoods are much lower 
than those offered for the same job in the main city. A causal labourer in construction in 
the city would earn up to SP 10,000 ($4) per day, while a casual labour in a neighbour-
hood (particularly in Dar es Salam or Al Baraka) would earn a maximum of SP 6,000 
($2.40) a day. Workers in the city also get longer contracts than those in the neighbour-
hoods. In addition, the demand for homemade products such as cooked meals; snacks 
and handicrafts is extremely low in the neighbourhoods (LH14-M, LH12-S). Yet the 
‘Always Poor’’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ categories had no choice but to struggle with less 
profitable activities in their neighbourhoods (LH14-M, LH12-S). For example, most 
household heads in the ‘Always Poor’ category were involved in activities within their 
neighbourhoods. And women from these households had very few or even no 
opportunities to develop their businesses in their neighbourhood. This is due to the 
seasonality of work, lower profitability and intense competition (LH14-M, LH12-S). On 
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the other hand all heads from ‘Non-Poor’ households are involved in income generating 
activities outside their neighbourhoods. All were able to commute frequently to the 
main city and some were able to buy essential goods from the main city at wholesale 
prices and sell them in their neighbourhood at a profit. They also bought homemade 
products from producers in their neighbourhoods and sold them in the main city 
markets. Their network of relationships with larger businesses in the main city grew 
stronger and helped them to access credit and finance (i.e. LH2-M).  
There are variations between the four neighbourhoods in terms of their proximity to 
the main city and ease of mobility. Compared to other neighbourhoods, Dar es Salam 
and then Al Baraka are the neighbourhoods furthest away. Siriha has the most conven-
ient location due to its relative proximity to the main city and also the availability of 
transport there. Its location has enabled even members of ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Some-
times Poor’ households to operate between the neighbourhood and the main city’s 
major markets. Members of ‘Always Poor’ households in Siriha were also in a 
relatively better position to look for or access jobs and casual work in the main city 
compared to their peers in other neighbourhoods. Although they walked six to eight 
miles and back a day to get to the main city, they had the option to do so if necessary. 
In summary, there are evident connections between proximity to the main city and 
the livelihood activities people are able to pursue. Physical distance compounded by a 
lack of affordable and accessible transport to where livelihood activities are located in 
the city considerably constrained poorer people’s options and locked them in less-
rewarding activities in their own neighbourhoods. 
Regulation of the informal sector 
The localities impose numerous laws, restrictions and taxes on self-employment. These 
laws apply to everything sold, directly prohibit hawking as a profession and impose 
restrictions on the use of space for undertaking various activities. Informal-sector regu-
lations applied to people operating at home, in the street and in designated market 
places. Home-based workers are often the most disadvantaged group in terms of returns 
or choices but members of ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households operating 
outside their home are also disadvantaged due to informal-sector regulations. Working 
from home makes it harder for workers, particularly women, to reach and be organized 
than for those working in market places and even on the streets. Focus-group discussion 
indicated that market places provide a better location for operating compared to home-
based or street hawking (FGD-M8, FGD-M8, and CM-S4). There are about five to six 
market spaces in each neighbourhood. However, market areas are not permanent, even 
the planned ones can shift to surrounding streets with vendors, artisans and service 
providers setting up informal kiosks, particularly during times of inspection and tax 
collection, and in the rainy season when sites became inaccessible. They accommodate 
from a couple of hundred vendors, artisans and service providers in Mayo to around 
sixteen in Dar es Salam. Goods are sold from fixed stalls, semi-fixed stalls or com-
modities can simply be piled up on the ground on mats or gunny bags. All the markets 
lacked access to public-service utilities such as sanitary facilities, potable water, elec-
tricity and storage facilities.  
Few of the market spaces are designated by the locality as ‘legal’ markets and the 
majority operate outside the locality’s regulatory framework. At the legal ones, some of 
the entrepreneurs had permission to operate while others took their chances and 
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operated without the required licence. Focus-group discussions (FGD-M18, FGD-B19 
and FGD-S13) indicated that even those with the necessary permission are not usually 
consulted in any of the decisions taken or any enforcement of the law, development 
plans or activities that concern their working space. They also have limited access to 
policymakers and planners and do not have the capacity to make use of any formal 
resources to improve their business. But still they are in a better position than their 
informal counterparts. A feature of the small enterprises of the ‘Always Poor’ and 
‘Sometimes Poor’ household members is their inability to compete with well-off enter-
prises for space in the planned or regulated market place. They usually undertake their 
activities from a multiplicity of locations to avoid being caught without a licence. The 
majority operated along road sides and streets, from homes, unauthorized market places, 
on shop verandas, from an open space, in front of hospitals, at bus stations and bus stops 
or other places where there is a concentration of people and therefore potential custom-
ers. However, at all the locations they had to deal with the locality’s tough regulations. 
All the ‘Always Poor’ and the majority of the ‘Sometimes Poor’ households operated 
without the proper permits and legal status due to the ill-designed rules and regulations 
relating to taxation and business registration. Community meetings (CM-M-1, CM-B2, 
CM-D3 and CM-S4) indicated that, on top of the burdensome financial payments 
required, there is also excessive bureaucracy that overwhelms ‘Always Poor’ and 
‘Sometimes Poor’ people in a web of regulations. To formalize a business, an entrepre-
neur is required to comply with nine different procedures before the firm can begin 
trading. Entrepreneurs from the neighbourhoods have to shuttle back and forth between 
different offices in the main city to pay different taxes and supply different forms and 
papers that some of them had never heard of before. Due to their lack of resources and 
the cumbersome rules, entrepreneurs have no choice but to operate illegally and without 
the proper permits. Working without a license and from an unregulated space is far 
more expensive than if vendors and artisans used regulated spaces and obtained li-
censes. It is also subject to a high daily fee or what is called a Temporary Daily License 
and is burdensome for all but particularly for the ‘Always Poor’. A daily sum of SP 
7000 to SP 20000 ($2.80 to $8) is demanded, which significantly raises the cost of 
doing business in the formal sector and makes any benefits extremely meagre, The 
majority cannot afford the daily license but government policies toward those who are 
not able to pay the daily fee are harsh and include the confiscation of merchandise, the 
forced removal and demolition of structures, mass arrests, fines and imprisonment. 
Workers in this field usually operate for a few days and then the locality kashat invades, 
arrests workers and confiscates their goods. This has contributed immensely to creating 
a vicious circle of vulnerability in which the ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ were 
not able to operate formally, were severely punished by the authorities and had to start 
again from a weaker position than before. Consequently these households became less 
able to deal even with the smallest shocks. One of the most devastating actions that 
members from ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households feared is imprisonment 
since this removes their ability to pursue any livelihood at all. 
Peter is 36 years old and from Al Baraka (SP) and claims that the problem with imprisonment is that it 
increases the burden of debts. Coming out of prison, one had to start looking for a new job to help pay 
off previous debts and replace merchandice that were confiscated. No pawnbrokers or suppliers want 
to provide supplies or offer a new loan for fresh start-up capital before am earlier loan has been paid 
in full (Quotes 13-B). 
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When ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ household heads lose their resources due 
to regulations or they are imprisoned, they cope by changing their household’s labour 
participation. More members become involved, particularly women and children (i.e. 
LH12-S). Therefore, female labour participation and child labour have intensified 
among ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ self-employed households as they con-
front such situations. For these households, the distinction between self-employment 
and other forms of employment is rather arbitrary. Workers move between self-
employment and casual day labour or combine different type of activities at any one 
time in response to seasonality and shocks due to regulation (i.e. LH14-D).  
The majority of workers adopted strategies to avoid any confrontation with the law 
and minimize losses if caught. For ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households 
these include frequent changes of location and working from an open space. These 
strategies have made it too difficult for their businesses to operate, let alone upgrade or 
develop, and have put them at a disadvantage in relation to larger businesses in this 
domain.  
Zakia (referred to in the previous chapter) is 48 years old and lives in Dar es Salam, She earns her 
living by selling tea, coffee and donuts but has no permanent spot. So she has to carry the two large 
baskets containing her stove, cooking equipment and ingredients to different vending sites and street 
corners to make and sell her products. She has to keep changing places because if she stays in one 
place for too long she will be a constant target for police harassment. This does not allow her to make 
regular customers and her daily income fluctuates depending on the location (LH14-D). 
Some members from ‘Medium Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households have ram-
shackle structures that are rebuilt in the same location when destroyed. These house-
holds also adopted a strategy that each time there is an extra income; it is set aside to 
cover reconstruction. On the other hand, a large proportion of the ‘Non-Poor’ and 
‘Medium Poor’ households’ activities are characterized by some form of stability, i.e. 
they have a fixed or semi-fixed spot and have some or all of the necessary legal docu-
ments required to operate. Some of them also struggle to comply with the excessive 
rules and regulations but these households may resort to bribery to avoid punishment or 
to obtain certain services and protection. Some of the self-employed ‘Non-Poor’ believe 
that government officials think that people in self-employment are a source of personal 
revenue. Authorized persons request bribes to avoid confiscation or a tax notice or to 
ease the complexity of bureaucratic procedures. Focus-group discussions (WFGD-M9, 
FGD-M18, FGD-B6, FGD-B19 and FGD-B19) stated that even if bribes are paid, there 
is no guarantee that a different official will not come tomorrow and demand something 
else. A lack of representation and voice and limited knowledge about their rights and 
duties make self-employed persons prone to exploitation.  
People operate in the informal sector because they have been challenged by the costs 
and complexity of formalization. The consequence is not only a lack of access to formal 
resource but also the destruction of livelihoods. This has contributed to creating a 
vicious circle of vulnerability in which ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ house-
holds have not been able to operate formally but still bear the consequence and eventu-
ally become less able to deal with adversity. 
Dynamics of political and social capital 
People in all the well-being categories lack effective political representation and this has 
important implications for their livelihoods. The previous chapter maintained that 
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regular salaried employment can open the door for more beneficial vertical networks. 
However, workers in casual and self-employments lack any form of organization. The 
only available union in this respect is the Association of Women Vendors of Food and 
Tea in Abu Zeid Market. This union is supported by the Sudanese Development Asso-
ciation (SDA), a local NGO, and empowers its members to defend themselves against 
different forms of exploitation and demands their rights through collective action. Life 
histories show that members enjoy a more secure working environment and in addition 
have managed to improve their working conditions, a goal that would otherwise not 
have been attainable. 
Kisma, a 36-year-old food vendor, worked in Abu Zeid Market with 56 other women vendors who 
sell a range of basic domestic amenities as well as traditional items, including clothing and handi-
crafts. But Kisma, with her small capital, was only able to make and sell kisra. Since she was barely 
able to break even, she was not able pay for the required permission, like most of the women in the 
market-. Therefore, she was often the target of wide-spread and systematic harassment, destruction 
and even physical assault. At other times, she has fallen victim to natural disasters such as floods and 
fire. Her plight was exacerbated due to her inability to have access to space and basic facilities for her 
business. At many points in her life, Kisma has begged and gone without food to ensure that her 
children ate. Then a CBO took an initiative to organize those workers in the informal economy to 
form their own union, and equipped them with skills development programmes on marketing, book-
keeping, managing, occupational health, safety and environmental standards, etc. When Kisma joined, 
she was suspicious of the intentions of the organization and thought it was just another form of di’ 
aaia (trick) of the government to make them leave the market. But Kisma learned many skills despite 
her very limited education, and devoted time and effort to union work and came to love her new work 
very much. The union became a recognized body that negotiates with the authorities on behalf of the 
women vendors in terms of payment of tax and the location of their business. Kisma has always been 
part of the negotiating team and has been very active in lobbying the government to protect the plight 
of vulnerable vendors and at the same time ensure that labour standards are applied and respected. 
Kisma also represents the union outside Sudan where she learned from the experience of others in this 
field. Together, Kisma and the other vendors are currently enjoying stable working conditions and 
access to various resources in the city. (LH37-D) 
Many people from ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households resort to indi-
vidual, non-political problem-solving strategies are based on kinship, ethnic and 
neighbourhoods relations. The majority of households have come to live in a specific 
spot in a neighbourhood because they have either relatives or people they know from 
the same region or the same ethnic group. According to different community meetings 
and focus-group discussions (i.e. (FGD-S14, FGD-S13, CM-S4 and FGD-D17), these 
relationships provide an important source of protection and support that many would 
not have been able to live without. They have been able to tap into well-established 
social networks and use them to facilitate aspects of their relocation. Support provided 
by relatives, the ethnic group or people from the same region can take the form of 
accommodating newcomers until they are able to build shelters of their own. Quite 
often the labour needed for building the shelter is supplied from these networks. Such 
relationships also provide general information, financial support to facilitate the move, 
employment as well as emotional and psychological support. In other cases, they 
replace the justice system within the groups, physically defending their members 
against attack or aggression from non-members. They also provide the services that 
members could not afford such as water supply and a legal or illegal electricity supply 
from generators and from the grid.  
However, this type of support is not automatic or enjoyed equally by people in 
different well-being categories. For example, when migrating to the city, many ‘Always 
Poor’ households have stayed in camps outside the city, rather than staying with rela-
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tives in the city. Though they were in disparate need of remittances from rural areas, 
most ‘Always Poor’ households were not able to enjoy this kind of support while more 
members from ‘Medium Poor’ and ‘Non-Poor’ households have (see Chart 8:11). 
Kinship ties are differentiated by class, gender, age and the health of individual mem-
bers. It was established during the fieldwork that people with stigmatized illnesses, such 
as leprosy, had difficulties accessing support from their close relatives and wider ethnic 
groups. Similarly, people with a long-term illness were abandoned by their families who 
were no longer able to support them. Women of a certain age have a more limited social 
asset than men. Poor people from certain ethnic groups were not able to benefit from 
their ties with the wealthy members of their group.  
A clear example of the class dimension in social capital is to be seen in Siriha among 
the Shanabela (Arabized) ethnic groups. Shanabela are the most affluent small traders in 
Siriha and most well-off group in the sample. Many members of the Shanabela are able 
to enjoy support from wealthy relatives. Well-off members were able to secure jobs for 
their relatives and to provide them with credit and finance in times of need or for the 
start-up or development and growth of their small business. Some poorer members in 
the group were employed by prosperous members as mobile vendors, workers or as 
transport operators of donkey carts (i.e. LH7-S). Although these relations play an 
important role in the livelihood strategies of many group members, disparities among 
individuals within the Shanabela ethnic group seem to be bigger than disparities among 
individuals within other ethnic groups. The differences in living conditions of ‘Non-
Poor’ households and ‘Always Poor’ households from the Shanabela ethnic group are 
huge. Poorer members are likely to be exploited by their own group members under the 
guise of group solidarity. 
Ahmed is 27, from Siriha, and belongs to Shanabela, Ahmed is barely literate and works as a transport 
operator. He is very grateful to his relative who provides him with a loan every time he needs it. He is 
also grateful to him because he provided him with the donkey cart he works on to transport people 
around the area. However, Ahmed is required to supply a fixed amount of SP 3000 ($1.20) to his 
patron on a daily basis and whatever left is for Ahmed. However, most days the work barely makes 
SP 3000. To make some profit Ahmed starts at 5 a.m. and keeps going till 8 p.m. His desire to tap 
opportunities for economic advancement in other places is restricted by his inability to pay off his 
loan to his patron. The latter, in turn, encourages him to work longer hours and to go to the remote 
corners of the neighbourhood, but can’t take any less than his fixed rate. (LH7-S) 
These types of relationships though they may cushion households against an imme-
diate shock do not form the type of relationships that lift people out of poverty – the 
contrary could in fact be true and people trapped in such relationships may find them-
selves sinking even deeper into poverty.  
Where ethnic and regional ties are non-existent or tenuous, friendship and 
neighbourhood links may form a critical part of a person’s informal support network. 
Focus-group discussions and community meetings (FGD-S12, FGD-D11, CM-B2, CM-
D3 and FGD-M5) indicated that neighbourhood ties are instrumental in building and 
rebuilding houses after demolition, lending money or other items, and in looking after 
children when their parents could not be home because of work or imprisonment. These 
relations were often equated with kinship relations. For example, children and young 
people usually used fictive kinship terms to address older neighbours, such as, Ammi or 
Khaltie (my father’s brother or my mother’s sister). A common proverb used to describe 
the level of neighbourhood relations is that ‘The neighbour who is closer to you is better 
than the brothers who are far away’. Forming such relationships is fortified by extensive 
contacts and trust. People who have lived in the neighbourhood longer were better 
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connected and able to call upon their relationships within the neighbourhood and the 
community at large regardless of their ethnic background. However, recurring demoli-
tions have had an adverse impact on the social support which the ‘Always Poor’ and 
‘Sometimes Poor’ people have built. These demolitions force the poor to relocate on 
their own, and destroy social capital in the process. In some rare cases, the poor would 
choose not to benefit from community ties. Although these ties can provide enormous 
support and benefit to people in need, the fear of stigma and social isolation that result 
from being labelled as poorer than the community prevent some poor people from 
showing signs of distress to the world outside their household. Individuals and house-
holds adhere to this ideal are generally referred to, as the mastureen, or those who show 
no sign of need despite being in extreme need. The mastureen try to keep this image 
with some sacrifices. 
‘Even when I don’t have any money to buy my daily food, then I go to the market pretending that I 
am buying food, so my neighbours would see me and think that I buy food every day, and that I don’t 
need any handouts.’ (Saffia [SP] is a 46-year-old Jaalia (Arabized) woman from Siriha (LH8-S)  
This trend limits the scope of support and cooperation that community networking 
can bring but increases the risk of these households being permanently poor. The main 
coping mechanisms adopted by mastureen are built around immediate family relations 
and in rare cases kin who reside far away. People indicated that social bonds with 
neighbours and friends are ideally reinforced at certain events through visits, presents 
and money. If this is not done, people who could provide critical backing in various 
stages of life will be alienated (FGD-B19, FGD-S7, FGD-D11). For this type of support 
to work, the existence of other resources is essential. Some households indicated that 
they used to have strong ties with their rural origins, which provided them with irregular 
remittances at times of need, however, because they were not able to reciprocate, i.e. 
send cash or other resources, these types of support are no longer there. Some also had 
ties in the city or within the neighbourhood with which they were able to reciprocate 
obligations. Such ties enabled them to access jobs and housing but being extremely poor 
did not allow them to reciprocate favours and these relationships faded away. Women 
highlighted the importance of being able to reciprocate for a relationship to continue. 
‘It is so difficult just to think about visiting my friends as I used to. Because if I go to visit them, it 
will look bad not to buy some presents, at least half a kilo of sugar or some coffee beans — and with 
my current circumstances I cant even afford to pay for the bus fare to visit them.’ (Fatheea, a 52-year- 
old woman from Al Baraka) (LH38-B) 
With few personal assets, members of ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ house-
holds are less able to reciprocate relations and thus lose an important type of support. 
Social and political capital is differentiated by age and gender. Households headed 
by men enjoy relatively more beneficial exchange with the community than those 
headed by females. This is because some of the important areas in which people get to 
extend and receive support from friends and neighbours involve activities that are 
socially designated as ‘male’. These include building, rebuilding and fixing houses, 
digging trenches during the rainy season, physical defence against aggression of 
individuals and groups, carrying coffins to the cemetery and grave-digging. Males 
usually get involved and participate with their neighbours in activities of this type. 
However, since female-headed households cannot participate, they are more likely to 
need to pay for the continuous process of building, rebuilding and fixing of their houses. 
Chart 9:1 indicates that ‘Always Poor’ households (that have the highest concentration 
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of female heads) had the least support among all the groups in building or fixing their 
houses.  
 
 
Chart 9:1 
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Women substitute this by strengthening their relationships with male neighbours, 
relatives, in-laws and employers to help in activities that they cannot undertake by 
themselves. Young women from the Muslim community are less likely to employ this 
strategy due to the prevalent culture of gender segregation. They have far more restric-
tions on their exchange with the community or even restrictions in terms of their general 
appearance, particularly if they are divorced and/or young. As they get older, they are 
less likely to cultivate ties with outsiders that can be utilized in their livelihood strate-
gies. However, the contrary is true for women from many non-Muslim communities. 
For instance, across southern Sudan ethnic groups, older women who are, well ad-
vanced in their personal and household life cycles, reap the rewards of their high 
investment in social relations. Kinship and neighbourhood ties continue to form a 
significant part of the informal networks of men well into old age. The traditional 
prestige and respect owed to senior males, from ‘Medium Poor’ and ‘Non-Poor’ house-
holds are quite common in many ethnic groups. Substantial support in a variety of forms 
is extended to elderly males in several ethnic groups by their families as well as their 
relatives. Most of the daily responsibilities for caring for an older member fall on 
women, usually the wife, daughter or daughter-in-law. However, this support tends to 
vary according to the well-being of the household. As the data indicates (Chart 8:1), 
household within ‘Always Poor’ group are less likely to co-reside with elderly members 
compared to ‘Medium Poor’ and ‘Non-Poor’ households.  
At several times and for a variety of circumstances, people in the neighbourhoods 
came together using traditional strategies of communication within the community to 
apply pressure through demonstrations, civil disobedience and law-breaking. The 
principles of unification and mobilization often coalesce in land rights. However people 
participate in these actions, their ‘illegal’ informal socialization, and participation bears 
little in their sense of trust and connectedness with different social groups within the 
neighbourhoods. More often than not, powerful ethnic groups used force to demarcate 
their territory and prevent other groups from occupying their area. These conflicts often 
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turn brutal and divide communities along ethnic lines as the community meetings and 
the locality reports indicate. Levels of conflict between different ethnic groups remain 
high and create feelings of powerlessness, threat and alienation among minorities (CM-
M-1, CM-B2, CM-D3 and CM-S4).  
In summary, the ability of individuals and households to pursue certain livelihood 
strategies is defined to a large extent by their position in their ethnic group. Such identi-
ties have principally determined the amount of social and political capital necessary to 
access resources and deal with adversities.  
Access to secure housing  
People perceive tenure security as a key characteristic that distinguishes ‘Always Poor’ 
and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households from ‘Medium Poor’ and ‘Non-Poor’ households 
(see Chapter 8). Those who are unable to secure a piece of land either rent or stay with 
others. Unlike ‘Medium Poor’ and ‘Non-Poor’ households, the dwelling arrangements 
of the ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households, whether renting, squatting or 
staying with others, are almost always short term and or prone to sudden termination. 
‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households are either currently squatting or had 
done so in the past. Furthermore, compared to ‘Sometimes Poor’ households, the 
‘Always Poor’ households have the most uncertain tenure situation (see Charts 8:9 & 
8:10). They have the largest squatter and tenant households. Squatting exposes house-
holds to eviction and recurring demolition. Most households in the ‘Always Poor’ and 
‘Sometimes Poor’ have gone through demolition at least once. Some ‘Medium Poor’ 
and ‘Non-Poor’ households too had experienced demolition before legalizing their land 
(e.g. LH12-S, LH2-M). In terms of demolition patterns, the ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Some-
times Poor’ exhibit similar incidences of demolition for the entire neighbourhood. For 
example, the ‘Always Poor’ households in Mayo have experienced more demolition by 
the municipal authorities than their peers in other neighbourhoods. When a house is 
demolished, householders end up sleeping in the open for varying lengths of time 
depending on their asset base and support network. Since their resources are limited, 
and as they usually have no property elsewhere, their period in the open is always 
longer than a month. As a strategy to avoid incurring more costs on a house that will be 
demolished anyway, many people – particularly from Mayo and Al Baraka – had to 
double up with another family. It is very common that more than two families would be 
crammed into tight living quarters that were supposed to house only one family.  
Augustine (AP) is a 66-year-old Nuer (Africanized ethnic group) from Mayo. He and his nine family 
members live in a small room in a single-family home shared by three other families. A total of 22 
people are living in the house. Augustine’s room was demolished in 1992, 1994 and 2000. ‘Before 
1992 we were told that there were some procedures that should be followed prior to granting us legal 
rights to our homes. We had to borrow and sell our belongings to raise the fee required by the area 
planning authorities. However, instead of that, we just saw bulldozers destroying our homes. We lived 
in the open for days. My children got cholera and when I took them to the hospital they asked me to 
pay a hospital fee in advance’, (LH35-M) 
After demolitions, the city authority will usually relocate residents to new sites that 
are even further away from the city and where people will not be able to get to the city 
due to a lack of transportation. However, this has always proved to be an unviable 
solution for both the government and the poor. For the ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes 
Poor’ households in all neighbourhoods, livelihood security is dependent on wages and 
employment, and their jobs determine where they live. They keep coming back every 
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time they are moved and have rebuilt their homes over and over again. Some house-
holds have gone through the process of demolition as many as eight times. Recurring 
demolition has often led to a loss of resources since the land on which informal people 
built their houses is obtained through illegal squatting on private property and no 
compensation is paid. The costs for households of gaining access to another dwelling 
are very much higher than any poor household could afford. For example, the minimum 
cost of a dwelling consisting of one bedroom, a shed, windows, doors and a pit latrine 
and built according to minimum community standards is SP 500,000 SP ($200).  
However, this can be considerably reduced if the household belongs to an influential 
ethnic group or has a good relationship with the headman of a strong group. In this case, 
the labour would be supplied at no cost. Help would also be provided regarding fetching 
local materials. Brutal state actions such as destroying houses without warning have 
encouraged the poor to organize themselves informally by participating in demonstra-
tions against demolition and forced evacuations. These actions have taken place despite 
the absence of structures that permit collective actions. These actions by the inhabitants 
have been geared to forcing the state to act to resolve the land tenure problem. Squatting 
is not the preferred choice of poorer people as they are aware of the repercussions of 
squatting. However, when weighing up their options, squatting was the best possible 
option for them because they are not able to formally buy or even legally rent shelter. 
The high price set for land in those neighbourhoods is beyond the reach of many 
‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households (see Chapters 7 and 8). Furthermore, 
a lack of formal financial institutions that could provide loans for the poor has made it 
difficult for them to pay the full amount upfront. These households therefore keep 
moving between different arrangements such as renting for two months when income is 
good, squatting until a dwelling is demolished, staying with others according to certain 
conditions (such as labour conditions), being evicted and so on. The majority of renters 
belong to the ‘Sometimes Poor’ and ‘Always Poor’ category. For example 37% of the 
‘Always Poor’ households in Siriha and 30% of their peers in Dar es Salam were 
renting for varying lengths of time. There are also variations between areas in this 
regard. For example Siriha has the largest proportion of tenants due to its proximity to 
the main city. ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ people usually rent in certain areas 
because they want to cut transport costs and they rent because they cannot squat in 
specific areas.  
A constant source of insecurity for these households is the fear of forced eviction in 
times when eviction would mean loss of employment too. Tenants typically pay 
between SP 10,000 and SP 90,000 ($4-$35) per month, a sum most of them cannot 
afford for more than a few months. Men and women from ‘Always Poor’ households 
indicated that tenure security is their number one priority. These households often had 
to trade off between allocating their small amount of earnings to food and meeting the 
other important need, namely shelter. They naturally choose to fulfil the basic survival 
needs and forgo the issue of rent. ‘Always Poor’ households thus usually rent for a short 
period of time (i.e. 1 to 2 months) and get evicted due to the non-payment of rent or 
move by themselves to squat on open space. They may also rent again when there is 
sufficient income. Rented houses are dilapidated and can be categorized as slums, either 
built on government land or land that belongs to others. This means that the shadow of 
eviction follows tenants even if they could afford to rent.  
 184
People fear demolition and eviction the most because such actions put an end to their 
former shelters. They lose resources in the process as well as affordable shelter at a 
convenient location to work and probably an interdependent community lifestyle too. 
To sum up, poorer people live on informal land because they cannot find affordable 
land or a more secure shelter arrangement. Informal tenure status and informal activities 
expose them to a variety of actions that undermine their livelihood strategies by gradu-
ally eroding their forms of capital and their ability to generate income.  
Access to financial institutions 
The previous chapter argued that all ‘Always Poor’ households lack liquid assets and 
that few ‘Sometimes Poor’ have the financial resources to invest in ways that would 
improve their well-being in the long-term. Access to alternative sources of formal 
financial support has been a determining factor in the vulnerability of most households. 
The ‘Always Poor’ has less choice in terms of which venue to borrow from. Within the 
neighbourhoods, local shops constitute the main, and sometimes the only, available 
source of consumption credit for the ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households. 
However, local shops do not provide cash loans. Some households also rely on cash 
loans from neighbours, friends or relatives who are mostly at a similar level of well-
being as the borrowers themselves. However, loans from these sources tend to be small 
and short term. Kinship ties may provide the necessary loans during time of need but 
not without cost. Loans provided by better-off individuals in specific ethnic groups to 
poorer individuals in the same group are common. However, a loan of this nature is 
often attached to labour relationship conditions, usually a lower wage (LH7-S, LH12-
S). Accordingly, poorer individuals are able to cope in the short run but become trapped 
in a relationship that perpetuates their poverty in the long term. 
Formal financial institutions are usually inaccessible even to the majority of the 
‘Non-Poor’. For example, among all the households in the sample only 20% of the 
‘Non-Poor’ households in Siriha were able to borrow from formal institutions. The 
procedure requires personal collateral or security from borrowers, who often do not 
have the sort of capitals needed. Self-employed persons, therefore, turn to the more 
affluent people in their community for support but the accessibility of this option is 
governed by complex factors. Ethnic affiliations play an important role in supporting 
the start-up and running of a business. For example, in Siriha in particular, the Shana-
bela, an affluent Arabized ethnic group with established businesses in the city, are able 
to provide some of their members with credit and finance for the start up or develop-
ment and growth of their small businesses. Small-business operators in Siriha represent 
the best-off group in the neighbourhood. However, while such networks play an impor-
tant role in livelihood strategies for some, they also succeed in keeping the benefits 
within a small circle. Moreover, outsiders can be exploited due to their desperation for 
funds, since the group represents the only viable source of funding in the area. These 
types of relationships often force ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households to 
accept unfair and risky terms of trades, lower payments and to enter into bonded labour 
relationships where business owners claim their labour and/or attach conditions in case 
of the loss of merchandise (LH12-S 2003-2007). People in the sector lack representation 
and a voice, except for the small group of women food vendors in Soque Libya who 
have a union. These factors have heightened the social exclusion and the highly unpre-
dictable working conditions of ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households.  
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Access to urban services  
Access to water supply  
Households vary in their access to the sources and types of water they use. Water 
sources include an in-house tap, water vendors, fetching water directly from borehole, 
or from neighbours or relatives. Piped water is considered cheaper, safer and more 
convenient than the other sources. All the neighbourhoods have access to piped water in 
some parts except for Dar es Salam. Water is provided by different bodies including the 
government, the private sector and NGOs. However, access to an in-house piped water 
connection is very limited and is mostly confined to ‘Medium Poor’ and ‘Non-Poor’ 
households. The majority of ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households in the 
four communities do not have access to in-house/single-family taps, nor do they have 
access to safe, sufficient and reliable water supplies (Chart 9:2). On the other hand, the 
majority of the ‘Medium Poor’ and ‘Non-Poor’ households have access to private in-
house taps that grant them access to a relatively safe and cheap water supply (Chart 
9:3). With just under 30% of the ‘Always Poor’ households in Siriha and less than 20% 
of their peers in Al Baraka having direct access to private in-house tap, all ‘Non-Poor’ 
households in the same neighbourhoods have access to private in-house taps.  
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Squatters are not entitled to any water connection and there are no water connections 
in certain areas in the neighbourhood. However in practice, a water connection can be 
accessed illegally through social relations or intermediary personnel. This practice is 
widely used in ‘Medium Poor’ and ‘Non-Poor’ households. Connecting to water supply 
through legal channels is expensive and unaffordable for the ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Some-
times Poor’ households. For example, water in Al Baraka is supplied by a private 
company (the National Industry Corporation) on behalf of municipal governments. A 
household is required to pay a connection fee of SP 390,000 ($156) plus a flat monthly 
rate of SP 10,000 ($4) for consumption. Although the monthly fee is much lower than 
buying from water vendors, paying the connection fee up-front is not feasible for 
‘Always Poor’ households who are unlikely to have any savings and typically lack 
access to credit markets. The policy that some households from the same ethnic groups 
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adopt is to pool resources and share one tap that is connected in the house that is at a 
convenient distance for all members. As many as 15 households can share a single 
private tap. Women and children from ‘Always Poor’ households who have no access to 
tap water walk miles to fetch water directly from the well, or from a relative who 
resides far a way. Water is carried to the household in buckets or open containers 
carried on heads.  
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Having access to piped water does not provide a sustainable supply a household can 
rely on. The supply varies from one neighbourhood to another. Mayo, for example, can 
be completely dry for long periods and in Al Baraka and Siriha, the water supply has 
poor pressure or an inadequate flow during the day. Low pressure is more than just a 
nuisance. On average women from three ‘Always Poor’ households from Siriha spend 
three hours a day collecting water which they store in recycled containers. In Dar es 
Salam where there is no connection to piped water, all households have to buy their 
water or rely on relationships to access water. In all neighbourhoods and across all well-
being categories, the majority of households use water bought from donkey carts as 
their primary source, even if they have access to tap water.  
Those who have access to tap water paid far less than those who bought water from 
water vendors. Water prices usually depend on the time of year and on how scarce water 
is. During the summer and the rainy season, the water price goes up and prices decrease 
in winter. The price of water also depends on the quality of the water sold. Water prices 
also vary between neighbourhoods and areas within the same neighbourhood. For 
example, vendors in Al Baraka and Mayo charge much higher rates than vendors in the 
other two neighbourhoods. However, on average, water vendors sell water for between 
SP 2,000 and SP 3,000 ($0.80 to $1.20) per twenty litres (an average daily household 
supply). On the other hand, those connected to taps pay SP 333 ($0.10) for their daily 
supply. In comparison, those who buy from vendors pay around nine times the amount 
paid by a consumer connected to the mains. Water vendors themselves are burdened by 
high tax. For a donkey cart to operate in the neighbourhood, an annual license of SP 
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31,000 ($12.40) is charged and in addition there is a monthly licence of SP 7,000 
($2.80) that has to be paid or the cart is confiscated.  
There are two types of water sold; potable water and lower quality water that is unfit 
for human consumption. The quality of the piped water in Mayo and Al Baraka is also 
low, ‘salty’ or ‘ferruginous’. Lower quality or salty water is used for washing and 
cleaning, while potable water is bought for drinking and cocking. However, when 
members of ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households are forced to choose 
between buying potable water and buying food, they would buy food and if there is any 
money left they would buy lower-quality water. Those who have no other option but to 
consume low-quality water indicated that they had often suffered the debilitating effects 
of water-borne diseases like diarrhoea, gastroenteritis and cholera. In other cases, people 
borrow small amounts for drinking from neighbours and relatives but this is not a 
sustainable method of water supply. Water-saving practices are important and are used 
when resources are limited or water is not readily available. People try to consume as 
little water as possible. Some older people from rural areas were also unfamiliar with 
modern sanitary practices and had a predisposition against them for cultural reasons. 
During the rainy season when water is less available and more expensive, ‘Always 
Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households collect rainwater in large open vats. Most of 
these containers are uncovered and within hours the rainwater will become polluted 
with algae, dust and bird droppings. Water pollution and incidences of water-borne 
diseases are higher among ‘Always Poor’ households. 
Yard taps in Mayo can become scenes of tension and conflicts between individuals 
wanting to get their turn. Conflicts are usually personalized and take on ethnic or 
regional lines and grow out of all proportion. Such conflicts are increasingly resulting in 
psychological, verbal or physical violence. Sometimes not only the inhabitants of the 
neighbourhood are party to the conflicts but also external actors who manipulate 
conflicts to serve other purposes. These conflicts have far-reaching consequences for the 
social cohesion of society as a whole since they divide the community into factions f 
those powerful enough to deny others access, and those less powerful who are denied 
access. The ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households usually belong to the 
latter group.  
In summary, the ‘Always Poor’ in all the neighbourhoods are the most disadvantaged 
because they lack access to an adequate, reliable and safe water supply. Lack of finan-
cial and social resources often forces them to use unsafe water, which results in an 
increase in ill health and disease. A large number of the poor (particularly in Mayo) are 
coming to view access to water as a more critical problem than access to food, health 
care and education.  
 
Access to health care  
Access to medical services is essential to the survival of members of the ‘Always Poor’ 
and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households. Each neighbourhood has a wide array of health 
facilities provided by various actors. Health care is provided by private voluntary 
organizations in the form of clinics and community-based primary health care projects, 
government clinics and pharmacies, midwives and traditional healers. None of the four 
neighbourhoods has a hospital and as hospitals are far away, people rarely use them. 
The selection of channels of health care depends on the resources a household com-
mands and can use for non-food items and the cost of the service. The majority of the 
NGO healthcare providers offer a much more affordable service than that provided by 
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the government or private practices. According to people’s perceptions of those services 
(FGD-B15, FGD-B6, FGD-B19, FGD-B19), NGO services are much closer to them 
than the services provided by the government. Traditional health practitioners (includ-
ing herbalists, religious healers, birth attendants, Zarr sheikh, etc.) represent important 
sources of health care and advice in the four communities. They are much more attrac-
tive because they are affordable and relate to prevalent cultural beliefs and practices. 
Within the four neighbourhoods, the number of traditional healers has always been far 
greater than the number of health agents, nurses and doctors available to the commu-
nity.  
Although most health clinics are within reach of the majority of the people, people 
from the ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households will not seek medical help 
from them most of the time. The cost of a consultation and medicine is the major deter-
rent for people. Medication usually costs anything from between SP 7,000 ($2.80) to 
numbers no one could afford for a recurring illness such as malaria. If people require 
more intensive treatment in hospital then this option is frequently dismissed or replaced 
by a more affordable option. Although the cost of admission to government hospitals 
tends to be lower than private ones, only ‘Medium Poor’ and ‘Non-Poor’ households 
that have medical insurance can afford it. A person without insurance has to pay SP 
20,000 ($8) for each night spent in hospital, excluding the cost of medicines. If causal 
labourers who receive SP 5,000 ($2) per day are admitted to hospital then they have to 
have savings of at least four working days to cover one hospital night. There are also the 
costs of food and transport to and from hospital as well as the cost of medication if 
required. The option of hospitalization is, therefore, beyond the reach of ‘Always Poor’ 
and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households. The high cost of treatment and transportation to 
cover the journeys to the medical facility imposes a serious threat for the survival of 
other household members. The illness of an ‘Always Poor’ family member overburdens 
the rest of the household members and leads to a loss of income, especially if the sick 
person is the main breadwinner.  
Hawa, (AP) is a 42-year-old single mother with five children who sells vegetables and spices in the 
local market, and from time to time gets an evening assignments as a cook for occasions that are 
taking place in the neighbourhoods or the city. The family depends on her income most of the time, 
but since she has recurring malaria condition, her sixteen-year-old son has become the only breadwin-
ner when she is sick. When her condition is bad, she cannot lift a finger and depends on her small 
children and neighbours for help. During the past six months she had three severe malaria attacks and 
two mild ones. She was taken to the doctor only once when she went into a coma. Her son works as a 
loader in the vegetable market and receives between SP 3,000 and SP 5,000 ($1.20-$2) a day but he is 
likely to have only 18-20 days work a month. Any money earned goes first to the mother’s treatment. 
What is left is usually not enough for two meals so they buy bread and tomatoes for the evening meal. 
(LH34-M)  
Expensive and limited access to health care and drugs renders otherwise treatable 
conditions, such as malaria, fatal for many of those who cannot afford treatment. Being 
so familiar with malaria, it is very rare for household members to seek medical help. 
People from ‘Always Poor’ households use traditional treatments bought from local 
market, while people from ‘Sometimes Poor’, ‘Medium Poor’ and ‘Non-Poor’ house-
holds may buy over-the-counter malaria tablets. Members from ‘Always Poor’ and 
‘Sometimes Poor’ households have to pay for treatment out of their own resources. 
National health insurance schemes cover a very few pensioners, government employees 
and a few industries and individuals with health coverage belong mainly to the 
‘Medium Poor’ and ‘Non-Poor’ categories.  
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The difficulty of obtaining adequate and affordable health care undermines the health 
of many residents in the four neighbourhoods. The problem is particularly acute for the 
‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ groups that are, though more susceptible to 
disease, less frequent users of medical facilities than ‘Medium Poor’ and ‘Non-Poor’ 
households. ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ groups tend to rely on their own 
experience and use local medication. Members of the ‘Always Poor’ households from 
Mayo are the least likely to seek formal medical advice compared to their peers in other 
neighbourhoods. As Chart 9:4 indicates, the majority of households’ first choice would 
be their own experience in treating the disease. Secondly, they would consult a tradi-
tional healer or Faki and thirdly they would go to an NGO clinic in the area.  
Even ‘Medium Poor’ and ‘Non-Poor’ households would not seek help at a public 
hospital except as a last resort and when all else has failed. Seventy per cent or more of 
households from the ‘Always Poor’ group did not make use of NGOs clinics because of 
the costs involved and even though these were lower than at government facilities, they 
were still high for them.  
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While the majority of ‘Non-Poor’ households agree that the cost of medicine is too 
high, they are likely to use NGOs and government health facilities more frequently than 
the other groups (see Chart 9:5) because those working for the government and private 
firms and some pensioners have a National Insurance Health Card that entitles them, 
and in some cases their families too, to free or lower fees for medical consultations. It 
also entitles them to a discount on certain medications but having a medical insurance 
card does not guarantee that individuals will not go bankrupt because of medical 
expenses, since obligations for other members within the household are not covered and 
can erode households’ financial resources. ‘Medium Poor’ and ‘Non-Poor’ households 
are able to mobilize assets and social networks to access medical facilities (i.e. LH2-M). 
They also borrow money, pawn houses or cut food consumption. The ‘Always Poor’ 
were only able to cut back on food consumption or borrow money. Borrowing to cover 
health care expenses is extremely widespread in all categories.  
The majority of elderly members from ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ house-
holds had either ‘rarely’ or ‘never’ visited any formal health facilities. Elderly members 
from ‘Non-Poor’ and ‘Medium Poor’ households are more likely to visit them, particu-
larly when their illness relates to eyesight. Among the ‘Non-Poor’, and ‘Medium Poor’ 
households, men access health facilities more frequently when having malaria than 
women do. Overall, women are more likely to delay seeking health care because their 
symptoms are not considered severe but, more importantly, because of a lack of money. 
Even when women sought care, they were more likely to look for spiritual causes of 
physical ailments, and hence turn to traditional healers or Zar sheikhas.  
In summary, it was apparent that the availability of healthcare facilities within 
neighbourhoods did not grant poorer people access to them. Many individuals from 
‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households had walked passed the local formal 
health facilities to seek medication from a traditional healer in some other part of the 
neighbourhood. The majority relied on their own experiences first in diagnosing and 
treating illness such as malaria, chest infections, fevers, etc.  
Expensive and difficult access to health services has led many people to harbour a 
sense of grievance against the government. Many believe that the inaccessibility of 
health facilities is the main cause for them having malaria all year and for their children 
suffering and dying from simple malaria attacks, pneumonia and tuberculosis.  
 
Access to sanitation services and vulnerability to health hazards  
The neighbourhoods do not have particular problems with waste disposal. The Com-
pany of Locality of Khartoum undertakes garbage collection and each house or shack 
has to pay a monthly fee of SP 3,000 ($1.20) for garbage collection. However, ‘Always 
Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households cannot afford this and are thus not served with 
garbage collection, which impacts on the community as a whole. A lack of other sanita-
tion infrastructure, such as sewers, impacts on the livelihood of the inhabitants. Several 
of the most immediate threats to health are linked to environmental conditions at the 
household or neighbourhood level. The source of pollution is mainly the shallow-pit 
latrines and unhandled rain water. Access to sanitation differs between ‘Always Poor’ 
and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households and ‘Medium Poor’ and ‘Non-Poor’ households. The 
majority of ‘Always Poor’ households have no access to safe and convenient sanitation 
and the majority of the sample households used various forms of flimsy pit latrines. For 
example 87% of the ‘Always Poor’ in Mayo and 57% of their peers from Baraka have 
no pit latrines. Those with no private facilities defecate in the open but this carries 
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particular risks for people’s personal security. On the other hand, all ‘Medium Poor’ and 
‘Non-Poor’ households have pit latrines on their premises.  
People in all the neighbourhoods are more vulnerable to disease during the rainy 
season than any other time. Rain water washes across the ground and into the houses, 
carrying with it any uncollected garbage and the contents of pit toilets. Stagnant water 
from poor drainage and streams from open-pit latrines become breeding grounds for 
mosquitoes and other disease-carrying pests. The mosquito threat is distressing to 
members of all the categories but particularly for the poor who can not afford to pay for 
medication (WFGD-M9, FGD-M18). While inhabitants in all neighbourhoods are 
exposed to health hazards, the people in Mayo neighbourhood suffer most due to its 
location next to a sewage disposal site. More of its households members are affected by 
malaria than other neighbourhoods (see Chart 9:6). The majority of the ‘Medium Poor’ 
and ‘Non-Poor’ are also affected by malaria while the least affected were the ‘Non-
Poor’ households in Dar es Salam followed by their peers in Siriha.  
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All the neighbourhoods lack essential drainage channels for rainwater and during the 
rainy season everything comes to a standstill. After heavy rain it can take several weeks 
for muddy lanes to dry out. Water collects in the dips at the bottom of the road making 
it impassable for public transport and even donkey carts. This keeps the old and the 
children captive in their homes for days and workers have to walk long distances to get 
to their work since there is no transport.  
A lack of access to services that help preserve a healthy environment, particularly 
sanitation, increase the vulnerability of the inhabitants in the four neighbourhoods to the 
effects of vector-borne diseases. While the whole community is prone to these hazards, 
‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households are less well-equipped to cope with 
any repercussions due to their lack of access to health care.  
 
Access to energy  
The majority of the ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households rely on biomass 
for cooking, and candles and battery-operated torches to meet their lighting needs. 
Kerosene is the next most commonly used energy source of lighting, while for some 
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households, (mostly ‘Medium Poor’ and ‘Non-Poor’) electricity from the grid or a 
diesel or petrol-powered generator is an alternative. Electricity is not only considered a 
necessity but is also seen as a sign of power and well-being. Gas fuel and electric 
lighting are aspired to by all four categories of households.  
Electricity, either from the grid or a diesel or petrol-powered generator, is used 
mainly for lighting. Grid electricity is only available to a few households in Mayo and 
Siriha. Although the infrastructure for extending electricity access is already in place in 
these two neighbourhoods, the ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households were 
not able to connect to the grid because they could not afford the connection fees or 
monthly rates. Strong links exist between the energy used and poverty categories. In 
Mayo none of the ‘Always Poor’ households have access to grid electricity as opposed 
to 70% of ‘Non-Poor’ households who are connected to the grid. In Siriha, only 3% of 
‘Always Poor’ households have access to grid electricity, as opposed to 90% of ‘Non-
Poor’ households from the same neighbourhood who have access to grid electricity. 
Connection to the grid provides a source of power and authority for those connected and 
those with power and authority can access electricity using various methods (see the 
discussion on social capital). In Siriha some ‘Medium Poor’ and ‘Non-Poor’ household 
have managed to arrange illegal electricity connections with the help of junior employ-
ees or workers on site. In return, they make a payment or other form of compensation. 
These households are also able to rent out individuals lines of supply for neighbours and 
gain an important source of income (see the discussion on financial capital).  
However, even for those connected to the grid in Siriha and Mayo, electricity ex-
penses and the quality of supply means that ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ 
households connected either could not use it or, if they could, had to use it sparingly, 
such as lighting one or two bulbs a night. The majority of these households continue to 
meet their energy needs using multiple-fuel strategies. Some ‘Non-Poor’ households use 
electricity not only for lighting but also to operate TV sets, cassette recorders and 
refrigerators. The majority of those connected to the grid suffer poor-quality service 
with frequent blackouts and this forces the majority to keep an alternative energy source 
such as kerosene lamp to hand. ‘Medium Poor’ and ‘Non-Poor’ households that have no 
direct access to grid electricity may substitute that by having power generators or 
renting a line. This is more apparent in Siriha and Al Baraka, (where there is no grid 
electricity) where more than 40% of ‘Non-Poor’ households owned power generators. 
In general, none of the ‘Always Poor’ households has access to electricity from a 
powered generator. Within the sample, all ‘Medium Poor’ and ‘Non-Poor’ households 
that owned power generators have rented out lines of individual supplies to some other 
households on a daily or monthly basis (see the discussion on financial capital).  
All cooking and baking is done with biomass fuels like wood and dung or wood 
converted to charcoal. Cooking is performed over a smoky four-stone fire, over tin on 
charcoal or wood, or over rudimentary stoves in a poorly lit and badly ventilated 
kitchen. Burnt on open fires and rudimentary stoves, the emission of biomass fuels has a 
far-reaching impact on women’s health by increasing the risk of respiratory ailments. 
People use kerosene for lighting which is dangerous to the users and the community as a 
whole. Kerosene is burnt either in open wick lamps, usually with an open flame from a 
wick sticking out of a simple jar or bottle of fuel; and is surrounded by a glass chimney. 
During summer gales, open fires from kerosene lamps can catch the thatched roofs of 
the houses and burn them down. Among the most significant disasters that the commu-
nity remembers are those fires caused by kerosene lamps. Furthermore, kerosene lamps 
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provide very low lighting, below the level required to read. A lack of electricity lights in 
the street has contributed to making the streets a place of crime at night where robbers 
await their victims.  
Baking basic staples such as the daily bread (kisra) is done over firewood even 
among ‘Medium Poor’ and ‘Non-Poor’ households. ‘Medium Poor’ and ‘Non-Poor’ 
households are more likely to use charcoal and a very few have gas cookers. Poor 
households would rather use wood and dung energy collected from around the 
neighbourhood. Large numbers of people used to be engaged in wood-fuel production 
and trading. However, the conversion of scarce wood to charcoal has led to deforesta-
tion around neighbourhoods, particularly around Mayo and Al Baraka. Women from 
‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households fetch straw and dung over a 20-mile 
range or so around the neighbourhood. However, neither of these sources is available to 
them now. The scarcity of biomass has forced the majority to buy it and hence the 
‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households have to rely on energy sources bought 
from the market. Women from ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households have 
the sole responsibility of providing energy for cooking. That means if there is no cash to 
pay, the women has the duty of fetching it from around the neighbourhood, to borrow or 
to beg some for that day’s use. The responsibility for cooking energy among ‘Medium 
Poor’ and ‘Non-Poor’ households mostly falls on men or is a shared one. However, it is 
not unusual for women and children from ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ house-
holds to spend two or three hours a day collecting those items.  
Gas is far cheaper than charcoal and firewood. A sack of charcoal costs SP 30,000 
($12) and lasts an average family of six for about 20 to 25 days. Filling a gas cylinder 
costs SP 20,000 ($8) and lasts a family for about 45 days. Despite this difference 
‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households cannot use gas because they cannot 
afford to pay for the infrastructure needed for gas use (a gas cooker, cylinder and 
organizer). They also have no means to transport cylinder to and from filling stations. 
Therefore, ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households can spend up to half or 
more of their income on energy. However, saving on energy is common and people 
have innovative ways of doing so. Women may alternate fuel types, for example, they 
might use firewood for baking kisra and then use the charcoal produced from it for 
cooking. Women also shift to less-efficient energy sources such as cardboard boxes, and 
items collected from the garbage. Women from ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ 
households might only cook once a day to use less charcoal. Poorer women from the 
same ethnic groups share one stove and take turns in cooking. ‘Medium Poor’ and 
‘Non-Poor’ households buy fool, moyat fool (cooked beans or its soup) and bread from 
the local shop. ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households use raw vegetables and 
bread instead of a cooked meal. Women from all the well-being categories see a lack of 
energy as the main indicator of their poverty and differentiation.  
It makes you feel useless when you cannot make tea for your children before they go to school, 
because you don’t have charcoal or wood or because the rain has made the charcoal and wood wet and 
there is no way they will burn. (Azziza, a 26 year old female from Al Baraka) (LH20-B).  
To sum up, a lack of access to modern energy services strains household budgets, 
makes simple tasks like preparing a meal fraught with health risks, reduces people’s 
ability to conduct any activity after dark and increases environmental damage due to the 
use of traditional fuels.  
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Access to transport services  
The vast majority of the sample needed to make regular trips either to work, to school or 
to health facilities or they made social visits within the neighbourhood or outside it. 
People move between their respective neighbourhoods, the city and other places for 
various reasons (see Map 9.1).  
The ease and feasibility of these trips are determined by the availability and afforda-
bility of transport. Non-motorized transport (footpaths, cycle paths, donkeys etc.) are 
extremely significant to the poor particularly within neighbourhoods. Carts pulled by 
donkeys or horses account for a considerable proportion of public transport within all 
the neighbourhoods, including Siriha. Other means of transport are dominated by 
private buses and minibuses, rebuilt pick-up trucks and vans (Amjad), and tricycles 
(Rakshat). The deregulation of transport has resulted in monopolies as bigger operators 
have swallowed up smaller ones and services are run to minimum standards. Many 
vehicles are old, badly designed and poorly maintained.  
 
 
Map 9.1 Mobility Map (for men, women and children from Dar es Salam) 
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All the neighbourhoods suffer from a lack of internal transport and bad roads, 
particularly during the rainy season. Roads within neighbourhoods are not paved except 
for two in Siriha. In Mayo and Dar es Salam only the roads leading to the main city are 
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paved. In Al Baraka even the road leading to the main city is not paved. Most internal 
roads, as well as trails are impassable during the rainy season when water collects in the 
dips at the bottom of the roads and makes them impassable, even for donkey carts. 
Children and old people can be stuck in their houses for days and vehicles abandon poor 
routes altogether or at certain times of the day. In all neighbourhoods, there are some 
areas which become effectively ‘no go’ areas for transport services or are not even 
serviced by any type of transport at all. This matter has far-reaching effects for those 
working in the main city or even in the neighbourhood itself. Able-bodied people from 
‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households are forced to walk a long way to work 
when there is no transport. Others might lose their jobs because they cannot get to work 
on time.  
Transport used by different categories demonstrates a complex trade-off between the 
location and the remoteness of the area, as well as the cost of the transport used. Most 
‘Medium Poor’ and ‘Non-Poor’ households live in locations that are closer to transport 
routes. For example, all the ‘Non-Poor’ households in Siriha and Dar es Salam live by 
the main transport routes, while most of the ‘Always Poor’ households live far from 
these routes. Some live in areas that are not serviced by any type of transport including 
donkey carts and for these people it becomes difficult to access critical services on 
which their livelihood may depend.  
Better-off households use public transport frequently, and as their major means of 
transport to get to work, to access health care, to get to school and to maintain a network 
of social contacts around the city. ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households use 
public transport less frequently, mainly to get to work or in cases of medical emergen-
cies (see Charts 9:7 & 9:8).  
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‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households rarely use transport to maintain 
their network of social contacts beyond the neighbourhood, and rely on social networks 
in the immediate vicinity and that are accessible on foot. The cost of transport is a major 
deterrent that prevents poorer households from using transport. Transport costs within 
neighbourhoods and to the main city vary from one neighbourhood to the other. Trans-
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port to the main city is most expensive in Al Baraka followed by Dar es Salam while 
Siriha has the lowest fares. Within the neighbourhoods fares range from between SP 
500 ($0.20) to SP 1,000 ($0.40) for a single journey. For travel to the main city this 
goes up to three to ten times depending on the means of transport used and the time of 
the day, and also the season. For donkey carts, the fare is much lower but during the 
rainy season the cost of transport increases significantly. For ‘Medium Poor’ and ‘Non-
Poor’ households, the proportion of their income spent on transport seems to be much 
higher. For poorer households, transport is an item that a household tends to economize 
on, through different means, mainly by walking. Members from ‘Medium Poor’ and 
‘Non-Poor’ households use rakshat and minibuses on regular basis and members of 
‘Always Poor’ households walk first and then use donkey carts as second choice. To 
economize on transport costs, it is also common among ‘Always Poor’ households to 
use more than one means of transport for the same journey. For example, they would 
walk from home up to the main road and then take a bus from there to work and do the 
same on the trip home. Many of the ‘Always Poor’ from all neighbourhoods welcome 
working within the neighbourhood despite the low wages because they balance it 
against transport costs. New arrivals and mothers of young children often have 
difficulty with jobs in the centre of the city because of the travel costs and complex 
travel patterns needed to get to work.  
 
 
Chart 9:8 
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The difference in transport use is most pronounced during daytime medical emergen-
cies. Better-off households use taxis when transporting patients to medical facilities in 
the city. ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households use donkey carts and try to 
get lifts from private vehicles along the main route. For medical emergencies at night, 
all categories would wait until the morning due to a lack of any kind of transport after 
dark. The lack of emergency medical services in all areas, as well as the lack of trans-
port at night can cost people their lives.  
Lack of transport, inaccessible roads as well as the prohibitive cost of fares perpetu-
ate the geographical isolation of neighbourhoods and significantly contribute to the 
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sense of isolation and insecurity of the inhabitants. Members of ‘Always Poor’ house-
holds demonstrated with different examples the way they were held back by problem of 
transport from accessing work opportunities, education, healthcare facilities and contact 
with relatives and friends, and the way this impacted on their lives and livelihoods. Men 
from ‘Always Poor’ households in Dar es Salam and Al Baraka see transport problems 
as the most important issue, coming ahead even of water and health care. In Mayo, 
children who attended school in the Sahafa area ranked transport as the most important 
element that keeps them from achieving better results or continuing their education. 
Transport problems have, therefore, become part of the interrelated chain of other 
problems that includes housing, electricity, employment, to mention but some which 
interact to create barriers that make it difficult or impossible for people to participate 
fully in society.  
 
Access to school  
Responsibility for the provision of education at all levels is shared between public and 
private providers. Private education is provided by individuals from outside the 
community and some NGOs. The number of government schools is higher but the 
number of schools is usually far less than the demand. In neighbourhoods like Mayo 
and Al Baraka, a classroom can have up to 120 or 130 pupils in the middle of the week. 
The differential quality of primary schooling is an important issue that families are 
becoming concerned about. Private schools are less crowded and better staffed, but still 
a classroom in a private school can have up to 60 pupils. Public schools are run-down, 
many of them have no water or bathrooms, no windows or doors in the buildings and 
some are mud sheds with thatched roofs and no furniture. On the other hand, private 
schools are relatively better equipped, mostly with windows and doors and most of 
them have potable water and toilets. A lack of transport or the inability of a family to 
pay a daily cost severely limits the option of attending schools outside the neighbour-
hood. Therefore, schools in all neighbourhoods and particularly in Mayo and Al Baraka 
are extremely overcrowded. 
There are strong cleavages between staffing and the performance of pupils in private 
schools on the one hand and those in public schools on the other. Public schools in the 
neighbourhoods suffer acute shortages of trained teachers. Salary incentives and overall 
working conditions appear to have an important motivating effect on the decision of 
teachers to leave a neighbourhood school. For example, at the end of the 2002/2003 
school year, only 30% of the teachers at the Al Baraka primary school planned to 
continue teaching there in the following school year (LK, 2005-EN). Public-school 
teachers receive low salaries and payment is often delayed until the middle of the 
month. Therefore large numbers of qualified teachers choose to work for private schools 
or combine teaching with another more profitable activity (FGD-M18).  
Pupils in private schools achieve relatively better results than pupils in public 
schools. This is evident in the low performance of most public schools in the 
neighbourhoods (CM-M-1, CM-B2, CM-D3, and CM-S4). Pupils from Mayo were 
doubly disadvantaged compared to other neighbourhoods. For example the success rate 
of pupils in Grade 8 at Mayo primary school who sat the basic certificate exams in 
2004, was 0% for both boys and girls (LK, 2005-EN). By comparison, there are always 
some pupils in private schools who pass such an exam. The low success rate in public 
schools is a deterrent for parents and this concern was voiced several times in the 
community meetings by parents who thought that there was no point in wasting money 
 198
on children’s schooling if it would not qualify them to proceed any further (CM-M-1, 
CM-B2, CM-D3, and CM-S4). Very few of those attend school reach the last year of 
primary education. This matter also points to the intergenerational dimension of social 
exclusion; extensive barriers to educational access and the resulting poor educational 
results of ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households’ children today predict their 
continued social exclusion and poverty in the future.  
All ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households whose children attend schools 
go to government schools because these schools are far cheaper than private schools. 
Families with pupils in public schools are burdened with education expenses (CM-M-1, 
CM-B2, CM-D3, and CM-S4). The government, which has control over educational 
resources, provides the localities with little and irregular financial support for education. 
The localities in turns are asked to cover most of the costs of basic education, including 
paying teachers’ wages from their own limited resources. Therefore, schools suffer from 
an acute shortage of financial and administrative support, which is supplemented by 
fees. Fees in public schools vary between neighbourhoods and among the schools in 
each neighbourhood. Some schools in Mayo for example charge much higher daily fees 
per student than those in Al Baraka or Dar es Salam. Pupils in private schools pay 
between SP 25,000 ($10) to SP 45,000 ($18) per month. Pupils in government schools 
pay a basic fee of SP 3,000 ($1.20) to SP 10,000 ($4) per month. Additional fees are 
imposed according to a school’s long- or short-term needs. In general, pupils in public 
schools have to pay for text books, stationary, uniforms, chalk, chairs, desks, drinking 
water, etc. Pupils are also responsible for fixing schools structurally and undertaking the 
cleaning of the building. Therefore, a large number of children from ‘Always Poor’ and 
‘Sometimes Poor’ households cannot afford to go to school. For example, among the 
‘Always Poor’ in Mayo, 40% of children from the age of six to fifteen and 20% of their 
peers from Dar es Salam are unable to attend primary schools. The high cost of educa-
tion prevents parents from sending their children to school (CM-M-1, CM-B2, CM-D3 
and CM-S4) and sometimes also forces them to withdraw their children from school if 
their income is too low to pay their school fees. Some ‘Always Poor’ families may send 
one or two of their children to school while the reset undertaking income-generating 
activities. 
Most of the children enrolled in school from ‘Always Poor’ households can only 
attend school on a semi-regular basis depending on their household’s income in a 
certain season of the year and their subsequent ability to pay school fees. Some children 
attend school on a semi-regular basis while undertaking income-earning activities or 
assist their family in such activities. For example, in 50% of the ‘Always Poor’ house-
holds in Mayo there was at least one child who combined school with an income-
earning activity. This deprives children of the privilege of a good learning environment.  
Khameese (AP) is a 12-year-old boy who lives in Mayo. His elder brother is thirteen and is still very 
much at large and has never been to school. However Khameese is determined to attend school and 
finances his studies from his casual work. But when there is no work he cannot go to school. 
Khameese wakes up as early as five in the morning to transfer baskets of goods to the market, some 
weighing between 10 kg and 15 kg. He receives around SP 200 ($0.50) per load. He comes home, has 
some plain tea and bread, puts on his school uniform and walks four km to the Sahafa primary school. 
Khameese says that ‘the teachers don’t seem to be too happy about my progress; they say I am too 
lazy and I am always sleepy, but I want to be educated so one day I will be rich and can buy a van’. 
(LH18-M) 
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The life histories (e.g. LH18-M and LH10-S) show that combining school with 
income-earning activities is a short-term strategy that cannot be sustained and children 
eventually drop out and never resume their education.  
Public schools vary in their attitude towards socio-economically disadvantaged 
pupils. An exemption from paying fees is sometimes linked to pupils’ academic 
achievements but in the end, only a very few can qualify. Some schools require a 
certificate from the locality to exempt a student from school fees. Such certificates may, 
in turn, depend on other factors relating to networks and the power structure in the 
community (FGD-M18, FGD-B6, FGD-B19, FGD-B19). As established earlier in the 
section on social capital, the ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households are 
extremely disadvantaged in relation to these networks. Other schools make no exemp-
tions whatsoever. Pupils go to school in the morning expecting to be part of the group of 
learners, and are asked to leave if they are unable to raise the required daily or monthly 
fees. They are not allowed to show up again until they fulfil their financial obligations. 
The negative experiences that children have with rejection during the first years of life 
are likely to have long-lasting effects, form the basis of their future interactions and lay 
the ground for their social, language and intellectual development.  
For Adeela (SP) a single Fur (Africanized ethnic group) mother from Mayo, it is quite normal that her 
two younger sons aged 8 and 9 come home from school an hour after they have left the house because 
she cannot pay their school fees. Adeela was not successful in securing even a partial fee exemption 
for her sons and was told that there are much poorer children than hers at the school. Adeela works as 
a domestic helper and her salary usually lasts up to the middle of the month. Therefore, she pays only 
the first two weeks of each month when her children attend regularly. At other times her children 
cannot go to school because she is sick and cannot work. This arrangement has made her sons’ 
schooling a very complex and difficult endeavour particularly in light of their limited knowledge of 
Arabic. And even when Adeela has money, her children do not want to go to school or sneak out to 
play in the street. The two boys themselves said what they did not like about school is ‘that education 
is very tough and that there is too much money to pay’. Their mother would have liked them to 
continue their education on a regular basis but could not afford that. She spoke of her hopes for her 
children’s future and her bitterness that this will never materialize. (LH32-M)  
The quality of the educational programme impacts on the cognitive, social and 
emotional outcomes for children. Public and private primary schools – except for NGO 
schools – adopt similar educational curricula but their goals do not necessarily meet the 
actual needs or interests of the pupils from that community. A clear one is the fanatic 
adoption of an intensive Arabic and Islamic learning programme that hardly responds to 
the culturally diverse communities in the different neighbourhoods. A lack of profi-
ciency in Arabic can severely handicap a pupil’s ability to make progress in primary 
education. Using Arabic as the main medium of instruction clearly separates those who 
are able to speak and understand Arabic from those who are not. As the majority of 
‘Always Poor’ pupils are non-Arabic-speaking, it is expected that those children will be 
more disadvantaged than pupils from ‘Medium Poor’ and ‘Non-Poor’ households. 
Similarly, adult education programmes provided by the Ministry of Education are also 
geared towards the Islamic and Arabic norms and values that do not correspond with the 
reality of many of the adult learners.  
People have their own preference for the type of school their children will attend. 
‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households would prefer schools with relatively 
lower fees. Its location also matters and most households from all categories would 
prefer their children to go to a school close to their home that does not require using 
transport. However, better-off households can consider more expensive schools within 
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their wider area. ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households would consider a less 
expensive school which is far from where the family lives as long as the child can still 
walk (WFGD-M9, FGD-M18, FGD-B6, FGD-B19, FGD-B19). Pupils from ‘Always 
Poor’ households in Al Baraka and Mayo can walk up to eight km a day to attend a 
school in another area. If children from ‘Medium Poor’ and ‘Non-Poor’ households 
have no option but to attend a faraway school, they often take the bus or other means of 
transport such as a donkey cart to get to school. The decision as to which school 
children attend is not entirely in the hands of the parents. The school authorities can 
exercise significant discretion in selecting new pupils. Schools have the authority to 
determine class sizes and can turn away children to reduce the overall number of pupils 
per class. This is despite the law that stipulates the eligibility of every child who shows 
up at a school to be enrolled as a student there. In reality, many children are turned 
away from schools on grounds such as age (too old or too young) or a lack of readiness.  
Children from the neighbourhoods are disadvantaged in terms of access to education. 
It is assumed that their first line of support — their families — would be able to provide 
for their education but this is not true due to their poverty. Unfortunately, it is also true 
that public funds and services are not meeting their educational needs. With the high 
cost of education, many children from ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households 
are not attending schools, dropping out of school or are not able to benefit from the 
opportunity of being at the school. Children from ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ 
households attend schools that are not able to help them achieve academic success. Not 
being able to make progress in primary education will limit employment opportunities 
in the future. Men women and children were acutely aware of the need to have better 
access to schools and adult-learning institutions. They were also aware of the impor-
tance of having good-quality schools and teaching. They felt that they lacked leverage 
on the government and NGOs to allow them to voice their concerns and become active 
participants in the educational process.  
 
Security and access to justice  
A basic characteristic of all neighbourhoods is the high crime rate and the frequent 
conflicts between residents and the authorities. A lack of right to land, informal-sector 
activities and the prevalence of illegal activities such as sex work, the brewing of 
alcohol, weapons, drug dealing, theft and violence are all factors that put residents into 
constant friction with the authorities. Each neighbourhood has a police station with two 
or three staff. According to police reports (LK 2004- R2), rates of violent crime and 
property crime are much higher in Mayo, followed by Al Baraka. With mounting 
pressure to ban and criminalize all political activities in the neighbourhoods, residents 
who are caught holding or participating in any meeting are also considered to be under-
taking criminal activities. For these reasons, most inhabitants have frequent confronta-
tion with the justice system, whether they choose to or not. Within the sample house-
holds, most of the ‘Always Poor’ experience friction with the legal system related to the 
demolition of their shelters and the type of livelihood activities they undertake. 
Members of ‘Always Poor’ households had, therefore, more encounters with the police 
and the legal system than other groups.  
‘Medium Poor’ and ‘Non-Poor’ households’ main contact with the authorities relates 
to theft or break-ins. Most ‘Non-Poor’ and ‘Medium Poor’ households’ domestic 
conflicts and violence were solved through the mediation of ethnic group’s leaders or 
headmen. ‘Always Poor’ households from smaller ethnic groups often look to the police 
 201
and the courts to resolve domestic conflicts and neighbourhood tensions. Too often, 
poorer women who face domestic violence have no place to turn and find themselves 
caught between the traditional headmen and society, which legitimizes gender-based 
violence and the corrupt police force. Even when people reported cases to the police, 
they were extremely dissatisfied with the results. Cases reported were sometimes not 
registered on the grounds that stories were fabricated or full of lies. Cases might also be 
downgraded to minor cases to give an impression of low crime in the area because 
incidences of crime and conviction figures are used to evaluate the performance of the 
police station. In addition, the majority of ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ house-
holds have no resources to allow them to follow their cases any further so they are 
likely to lose whatever claims they have made. This is particularly likely if the accused 
is a man from a strong ethnic group and has better financial resources that enable him to 
pay his way before the case reaches court. 
At the entry point of the justice system are the police personnel who are authorized to 
arrest people using force if necessary. Women in any business, and particularly those 
involved in manufacturing, selling and drinking alcohol, are subject to strict codes of 
public morality as defined by the 2001 Public Order Law. The primary enforcement 
agents are the Public Order Police who invade and confiscate whatever merchandise and 
equipment the women have. According to community meetings (CM-M-1), in the 
absence of adults in the house, children are taken to the police station to force their 
parents to come there. Alternatively, people who are able to come up with pay-ffs can 
avoid such harassment, at least for a while. Bribes can protect goods from being confis-
cated or people from being taken to court, particularly those undertaking informal-sector 
or illegal activities. ‘Medium Poor’ and ‘Non-Poor’ households are able to pay bribes at 
certain points in their dispute but members of ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ 
households experience more difficulties in dealing with the police due to their inability 
to use this option. The opinion of ‘Always Poor’ households who sought police help 
was that it was a useless process and they were better-off not reporting incidents to the 
police. People from Mayo felt that the police responded very fast to matters that destroy 
people’s livelihood but never came when other assistance was needed. A community 
meeting in Mayo indicated the following: 
The contradiction is that if someone is injured in a fight or an accident, and you ask the police for 
help, they would tell you that you have to take the injured to the hospital yourself because they have 
no enough cars or fuel. But when it comes to arresting a poor woman who sells araki then there are 
plenty of cars and lots of fuel. (CM-M-1) 
‘Always Poor’ households’ experiences with the police and the justice system were 
marred by ‘rudeness’, ‘humiliation’ and ‘harassment’. Residents were subjected to 
beatings and detention in centres that failed to safeguard their basic human rights. Those 
who were detained in custody remained there without coming before a magistrate for 
varying lengths of time (CM-M-1, CM-B2, CM-D3 and CM-S4). The ‘Always Poor’ 
from Mayo and Al Baraka suffered the most, not just because they have fewer and 
indispensable assets but also due to the preconception held by the authorities and the 
city community about their neighbourhoods. Residents of these neighbourhoods are 
perceived as a potential source of crime and are thought to be slowing down develop-
ment. Residents are likely to be judged by the police and the legal system before any 
fair trial can take place. Certain ethnic groups have been associated with crimes and 
their members are usually the first to be interrogated, harassed and detained when a 
crime is committed anywhere in the city. Instead of protecting and facilitating the poor‘s 
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access to justice, the authorities’ abuse of power not only obstructs people’s access to 
justice but also obstructs their efforts to pursue their livelihoods. Therefore, a lack of 
trust in the justice system has led to the prevalence of informal, non-state mechanisms 
of social control that include revenge violence and extra-judicial types of justice such as 
Councils of Mediators or Majales al Judia, a committee that is formed locally of ‘wise 
older men’ for the purpose of solving certain problems and then is dissolves after 
fulfilling its purpose. Although these initiatives can serve to preserve community 
cohesion, they are mostly biased according to ethnic background. Women believed that 
Majales al Judia rendered their victimization insignificant when they have problems 
relating to intra-family disputes and violence. Men would rather have their problems 
solved through Majales al Judia than by a popular committee or the police.  
Women feel doubly disadvantaged. The basis for discrimination against women is 
laid out in Article 14 of the 1985 Sudan Constitution, which was ratified in 1989. 
Although it acknowledges the equal rights of men and women in all fields, it states that 
such equality should not contradict Sharia law (Badri 2004: 33). Women are now 
denied their major rights as Sharia law institutionalizes oppression and discrimination 
against women specifically in matters relating to marriage, domestic violence, inheri-
tance, travel and their participation in public life. Instead of protecting women from 
coercion and assault, the law is willing to punish the victims of such assault. Increasing 
numbers of women particularly from ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households 
have been flogged and humiliated in public, sent to prison for long periods of incarcera-
tion without charges being brought and their goods and equipments were confiscated. 
This has contributed to their increasing vulnerability.  
Angelina is 43-year-old woman, (SP) who lives in Al Baraka and whose husband works on a poultry 
farm nearby. But his income hardly meets the basic needs of the family of eight. Angelina has brewed 
and sold araki for the past sixteen years. She could not even remember how many times she was jailed 
or whipped during this period. However, in the past seven years she has been jailed six times. The 
longest period was for five months and the shortest was for eight days. She was whipped thirteen 
times, each time between fifteen and thirty lashes. She fell sick and needed medical care in five of the 
thirteen times. Every time she came out of prison she found that her children out of school, and that 
the household’s belongings had been sold to buy food. She usually resumes her work in brewing with 
other friends until she raises sufficient money to buy her own equipment. Angelina has never been to 
school, and she never knew any other job. Besides, she has a problem with her knees and cannot walk 
long distances or carry heavy loads without falling. She therefore keeps brewing. (LH39-B)  
The detention or imprisonment of women impacts on both the women themselves as 
well as on their families. The immediate impact is the loss of their scarce business 
resources and the loss of breadwinners when they are in prison. The long-term effects 
relate to children’s education being interrupted because of a lack of income to pay 
school fees and because of the need for their labour to assist in household expenses. 
Some NGOs, such as the Catholic Church, step in to help women who were detained 
and imprisoned for brewing alcohol by providing legal assistance but none of the 
women from the sample had received any support except from their family relations. 
When people stood before the criminal justice system, it did not uphold their rights 
or protect the vulnerable. Instead the vulnerable were the most unprotected and 
discriminated against. Members of ‘Always Poor’ households in particular experienced 
extreme difficulties in operating under the Pubic Order Act which restricts the only type 
of activities that is possible for them to undertake. Women expressed their fears for the 
future since they have no other training or skills to allow them to undertake alternative 
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activities. Men and women who work illegally without proper permits fear losing their 
livelihoods and the repercussions this will have on their families.  
Conclusion 
Poorer households have extremely reduced access to water, health care, education, 
energy, transport, security and justice. Despite the availability of these basic services, 
poorer households cannot benefit from them due to legal and financial barriers. The 
inability of poorer people to access resources is based on who they are, where they live 
and what they do. The ability of individuals and households to pursue certain livelihood 
strategies is defined by their status that derives from their position in their ethnic group, 
their gender or their level of well-being. Such factors have principally determined the 
amount of social and political capital necessary to access resources, ranging from finan-
cial support to building shelters and extending services such as water and electricity. 
For example, poorer people, and women in particular, tend to have reduced access to 
resources so the vulnerability of their households tends to decrease or increase accord-
ing to these factors. 
Reduced access to resources has spelled out a myriad of disadvantages for the poor. 
Lack of access to an adequate, reliable and safe water supply (due to a lack of financial 
and social resources) often forces poorer people to use unsafe water that results in 
increased ill-health and disease. Ill-health is compounded by a lack of access to services 
that help preserve a healthy environment, particularly sanitation. Many individuals from 
poorer households cannot access health care when they need to because they cannot 
afford it. This has impacted on their quality of their lives and their ability to pursue 
successful livelihoods. Lack of access to modern energy services has forced poorer 
households to resort to less-efficient and more-expensive energy sources. It also makes 
simple tasks, like preparing a meal, fraught with health risks and increases environ-
mental damage as a result of the use of traditional fuels. Children from poorer house-
holds are disadvantaged in terms of their access to education. With the high cost of 
education, many do not attend schools, drop out of school, or are not able to benefit 
from the opportunity of being at school. Children from poorer households attend 
schools that are not able to aid them in achieving academic success and at the same time 
burden them with high costs. Not being able to make progress in primary education can 
limit employment opportunities in the future and perpetuate the intergenerational aspect 
of exclusion.  
Poorer households are held back by problems of transport to accessing work oppor-
tunities, education and health care and contact with their relatives and friends. The 
physical distance and remoteness of their neighbourhoods compounded by a lack of 
affordable and accessible transport to the location of livelihood activities in the city 
considerably constrained ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households’ options and 
locked them in less-rewarding activities within their own neighbourhoods. Many people 
are not able to pursue a sustainable livelihood due to legal and financial barriers. A 
larger proportion are undertaking activities in the informal sector and occupy informal 
land, thus becoming extremely prone to shocks associated with regulations. However 
the people who undertake these activities have no other alternative and they need to 
generate cash for basic needs and vital services, such as water and health care. Those 
who lived on informal land were challenged by the costs and complexity of formaliza-
tion. As they grapple with decreasing profitability of labour, it becomes extremely 
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difficult for them to comply with the law without jeopardizing their immediate survival. 
Informal tenure status and informal activities expose households to a variety of actions 
that undermine their livelihood strategies by gradually eroding their forms of capital and 
their ability to generate income. The vulnerability of people with informal status is 
intrinsically linked to the application of informal-sector regulations that are not able to 
take their situation into consideration. The inability of the poor to comply with these 
rules is a clear indication of the failure of such regulations to cater for the reality of 
poorer people.  
When people come into contact with the criminal justice system, it does not always 
uphold their rights or protect the vulnerable. Instead, the vulnerable are the most 
unprotected and discriminated against. A lack of access to effective justice and other 
institutional services that can redress people’s entitlement to fundamental rights repre-
sents an important constraint that prevents them from using their agency and capabili-
ties to act and bring about change in their situation. Poorer women in particular have 
confronted numerous barriers to securing redress for their grievances through the legal 
system. This is because women’s rights are informed by society’s gender-based institu-
tional rules, norms and practices that prevent women from taking advantage of different 
livelihood opportunities. 
Based on the above, the livelihood strategies followed by poorer households offer 
lower returns and no upward social mobility because there are so many constraints on 
them that are preventing them from realizing their full potential. 
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Life paths and changing patterns  
of vulnerability 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the life paths of people within different well-being groups in 
order to understand how they have navigated their way through various institutional 
environments. The sustainable livelihoods framework that guides this study includes an 
analysis of vulnerability, the effect of trends and shocks that influence livelihoods, as 
well as the policies and institutions that determine who gains access to different re-
sources. Such an understanding is possible by examining the livelihood strategies that 
different households or groups pursue and the historical pathways they have taken. 
Livelihood pathways demonstrate strategic and unintentional behaviour and have 
emerged over time (see Chapter 6). Life histories are used here to demonstrate and 
explain factors behind long- and short-term changes and to shed light on the way power 
is constituted and reproduced in daily life, and how people negotiate its different levels 
and structures to attain the best feasible outcome for their livelihoods.  
Forty households provided detailed accounts of the major incidents and events that 
have shaped their lives over the past 25 years. The history of the current household 
refers to events that took place for the present household but also looks at the history of 
its members over the past twenty-five years. For households that did not exist twenty-
five years ago, reference is made to members of the same household. For example, 
young members might have been living with their parents and tin such cases, household 
histories might refer to their parent’s households rather than their current household. 
The level of analysis has been similarly increased to embrace changes in a livelihood 
not just as it changes year on year, but over entire lifetimes. This period was marked 
with common national events that took place, such as major droughts and the mass 
exodus of the rural population of 1984, the floods of 1988, times of demolition, out-
breaks of cholera, and major political events. The question as to why people came to 
live in a particular neighbourhood has brought about the history of events that pushed 
households to the area, and also provided the basis to discuss events that took place 
even earlier.  
The choices people make to enable them to cope with shocks and crisis were deter-
mined by where they lived. The patterns indicate that those who used to live in rural 
areas have taken different routes from those taken by urban households. Factors associ-
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ated with increased vulnerability and poverty of the households were specific to the 
geographical space and the livelihood that it was possible to pursue within that context. 
People came from diverse geographical places and few of them were from foreign 
countries. A typical answer people provided to the question about what caused them to 
be poor or what brought them to the specific neighbourhood were: job loss; the war, 
drought and conflicts; high rents in the city and price increases. An important thread 
between their various stories was that there were several problems that have being going 
on for as long as people can remember but they have been exacerbated by one major 
crisis such as drought, war and lack of security and hence led to the subsequent migra-
tion to the city.  
In-depth life history interviews that provided a retrospective view on trajectories of 
change were conducted with 40 households (1 member each) representing all social 
classes in the four localities. Ten households were selected from each neighbourhood.  
Although livelihood issues within rural or urban areas are wide and complex and it is 
difficult to group them into just a few categories, life histories were arranged in two 
categories for the purpose of this study according to broad livelihood means. These are: 
the livelihoods of those who came to the neighbourhoods from rural areas (23 life histo-
ries) and livelihoods of those who came to the neighbourhoods from urban areas (17 life 
histories). The rural sample was further divided into three groups which include: 
peasants from rain-fed agriculture (11 life histories), their peers from irrigated agricul-
tural schemes, namely the Gezira Scheme (9), and pastoralists (3). The next section 
details each of these groups, taking an example that demonstrates most of the common 
issues discussed by others.  
Before coming to the city 
Livelihood in rain-fed agriculture 
This part is constructed from 11 life histories of people: 6 women (LH26-B, LH27-B, 
LH38-B, LH17-B, LH15-D, LH31-B) and 5 men (LH30-B, LH9-D, LH3-B, LH7-S, 
LH33-B), 4 of them from Arabized ethnic groups and 7 from Africanized ethnic groups. 
The major common denominator is that they had all depended on rain-fed agriculture 
and the use of natural resources for their livelihoods. It refers to livelihood systems in 
the Kordofan and Dar Fur regions.  
 
Livelihood context 
Among the eleven life histories, the ability of a household to feed itself depended 
mainly on its own agricultural production, which was supplemented by farm wage 
incomes, livestock rearing and the sale of various products. Non-farm income was rare. 
Despite the abundance of land, access to arable land was the most critical issue and 
although every member of the ethnic groups from these regions were entitled to 
residential land and farmland, this was not as straightforward as it could have been. 
Until the 1970s, people’s lives were characterized by continuous mobility in search 
of arable land and water. This had shaped their access to land, their relationships with 
each other and their livelihood outcomes. Older people recalled times when they settled 
in a certain geographical spot as a group (fareek) of relatives with between three and 
five households. Their numbers continued to grow as a result of intermarriage and the 
arrival of others from the same ethnic group. Cross-ethnic marriages linked kin groups 
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of different ethnic origin to new social units and created affiliations and obligations 
between different groups across different geographical boundaries.  
The fareek then developed a larger sense of identity with the new locality or settle-
ment through members’ participation in traditional ceremonies, local festivals, commu-
nal meetings and social events. As the group grew into a village, they formed their 
internal power structure which comprised the headman of the village or the Nazir, 
Omda, Shartay or Sheikh according to the ethnic group. Their relationships with other 
fareeks from different ethnic groups were continually reinforced by patterns of mutual 
aid and reciprocal obligations guided by the headmen. The headman allocated and 
approved land use, took responsibility for deciding where to settle and when to move, 
and solved disputes within the community and those with other communities. He also 
validated and witnessed marriages and divorces. When a headman dies, his son becomes 
the headman and if he did not have a son, the closest male relative will take on his 
responsibilities. Sometimes headmen were appointed by the state but the position was 
never transferred to women under any circumstances.  
Members trusted the headmen more than any other government authorities. Access to 
land was controlled by the headman and was contingent upon ethnic group, fareek or 
village membership. People gained the right to use land by customary law and by 
inheritance. Although everyone had access to land, access to arable land for everyone in 
the community was not possible. Some households had access to arable land while 
others would have access to infertile land, which inevitably led to conflicts erupting 
within groups. Even after the enactment of the 1971 Local Government Act, the head-
men continued to govern access to land, define village boundaries and provide more 
land when it was needed. People disregard the administrative councils which were 
established by the Act and continued their reliance on the headmen. Even when the 
council were requested to resolve certain conflicts or allocate land, their decision was 
not considered final unless the headman indicated so. The only contact people remem-
bered with the local authorities related to collecting taxes (tulba, gibaya), on their 
livestock. After a certain period of time, the land around the settlement would have been 
over exploited and the group would move to look for new fertile land.  
Having access to pastures, water, forests and woodlands was detrimental to the 
survival of all but particularly to land-poor households. Some communal land had more 
resources such as those containing Acacia Senegal (hashab), the tree from which gum 
Arabic is collected and sold. Conflicts often erupted between the various groups 
competing for resources. Relationships with different ethnic groups were important for 
defining the way natural and physical resources were to be shared. Cooperation was an 
important value for households in their early stages of residence and could be so 
through the course of their life time in the settlement. However, people recalled that 
they were often moving from one place to another in search of more fertile land, and 
greener pasture, which reduced the opportunity to strengthen cooperation. On the 
contrary, the increased geographical mobility of people had often put them in positions 
of confrontation with other groups that assumed ownership of certain communal re-
source.  
Domestic conflicts flared up periodically. In the context of a lack of any form of 
formal administration, the group (whether fareek or village) as well as the ethnic group 
at large represented the main institutions that served and protected members’ interests. 
The outcome of these conflicts was mediated by the dynamic relationships between the 
headman and members of his groups with their varying levels of power and status and 
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was informed by the perceived power of the group. Smaller ethnic groups faced greater 
insecurity with poorer prospects of accessing land and thus obtaining a livelihood. 
Members of the bigger ethnic groups remember with pride how they conquered their 
opponents, prevented them from using resources and commandeered their livestock and 
resources. Older people from the smaller ethnic groups remember with bitterness the 
harsh times they experienced when they had to cope with aggression and a lack of 
resources with no protection from the state and with no allies among the other groups. 
Their members were often forced on to less marginal land, and they relocated to the 
mountains where they could see their enemy and protect themselves in caves. They also 
relocated to the borders where they could easily move to other geographical zones with 
more security. This was until there was no alternative but to come to the city.  
 
Livelihood activities 
During the early 1970s there was a broad range of livelihood activities that varied 
according to the asset base of households. People had relied more on farming and on 
raising livestock: livestock were raised for food, the market and for transport; and farm 
produce was used mainly for household consumption; with a little being sold locally 
after the harvest to purchase non-farm goods (e.g. sugar, tea, coffee, clothes, utensils) 
from local bazaars. Common natural resources provided an important source of living. 
For example, land-poor households collected fuel and fodder from common lands and 
they collected wild fruits and okra for consumption during the rainy season. Natural 
resources had a detrimental effect on a household’s survival in that changes in these 
resources affected its availability for all households and increased a household’s vulner-
ability to poverty and to famine. However, private holdings of productive assets (land, 
livestock, farm capital and human capital) had mostly complemented common pool 
resources or even substituted them at certain times. Therefore, better-off households 
(then) did not suffer as much as poorer household (then). The vulnerability of the 
household was essentially linked to this context of lack of other livelihood options.  
Although both poor and better-off households were reliant on agriculture as their 
main source of livelihood, better-off households had greater diversification, such as 
raising livestock and trading that took place between rural and urban centres. Commerce 
was limited to low weight, low volume, non-perishable and essential items such as 
sugar, salt, soap, etc. Diversification also occurred among poorer households, particu-
larly during the slack season when it was depicted as a sign of increased stress rather 
than progress out of poverty. These households grew subsistence and cash crops, 
worked on their own farms and on other people’s farms as wage labourers or according 
to the system of labour exchange. However non-farm activities tended to be extremely 
limited in the village and the surrounding areas.  
Wage labour intensified during peak agricultural seasons and involved poor casual 
wage labourers who were diverted from working on their own farms to those of better-
off households, or to the Gezira Scheme in central Sudan. Poorer households from 
smaller ethnic groups worked for wage on better-off households’ farms or established 
seasonal migration patterns to the Gezira Scheme during the cotton-picking season. 
Migratory labour opportunities to the scheme were pursued by all family members or by 
men who left the women to care for their rural-based activities, or they abandoned their 
own farm altogether. Men from better of households had migrated to the urban centres. 
Male remittances to their rural households were not always reliable and those who did 
not remit or return caused increased destitution among the women and children left 
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behind. In these situations, women undertook a wider range of activities to maintain 
food production for the household’s subsistence. Male migrants who managed to estab-
lish themselves in the city and found a stable source of income enabled their households 
in the rural base not only to survive but to improve their well-being.  
The labour, skill and organization required for productive activities within a farm 
household were usually provided by both male and female family members. Labour 
exchange was an important mechanism and members of related families worked 
together and for each other’s farms in constructing and repairing shelters. However, as 
more males left their communities for seasonal or year-round employment elsewhere, 
this cooperative pattern became steadily harder to follow.  
Women played an important role in sowing, weeding and harvesting, as well as in 
post-harvest operations such as threshing, husking, drying, grinding and storage. 
Women from households with no livestock often head-loaded their produce to local 
markets, which were usually far from the villages. In addition, women undertook animal 
husbandry and, vegetable gardening around the homestead during the rainy season. This 
was added to their usual domestic chores of cooking, taking care of children, the elderly 
and the disabled, fetching water and fuel, and cleaning and maintaining the house. Men 
undertook other agricultural operations, hunted together or individually during slack 
season and attended village meetings. Men had almost exclusive authority over deci-
sions concerning seeds, the buying and selling of livestock and agricultural products, 
what to grow and where to sell their produce. Women made decisions on poultry and 
contributed to decisions related to any small animals.  
Livestock was an important component of the farming system and the main charac-
teristic which differentiate between the poor and the better-off. Better-off, households 
were typically engaged in rearing livestock and agricultural commodity trading. Cattle, 
goats and poultry were the most commonly raised animals. Livestock had competing 
and vital uses: for meat, milk, manure and transport. Goats and poultry were raised as a 
source of cash income as well as for food. Poorer households usually had no livestock 
but they may have had small animals such as goats and poultry. 
Soil fertility was closely associated with the household’s well-being. Poorer house-
holds had less fertile land because they were not able to access the limited arable land or 
because of year-long droughts or because they had overused land as they were not able 
to rotate their crops. This resulted in the over-exploitation of village land as poorer 
people reduced their fallow periods, thereby reducing the long-term sustainability of the 
bush fallow system. They were not able to cultivate the optimal farm size because of a 
lack of finance to purchase inputs upfront. These households cultivated smaller plots of 
land that could not produce enough food to meet their subsistence needs. Poor house-
holds also sold part of their produce, although selling food at the market did not neces-
sarily mean the household itself had sufficient food. Poor households often sold their 
produce before it was even harvested.  
Better-off households were better equipped to maintain land fertility. They had 
relatively more fertile land and enough produce to meet their household’s subsistence 
needs. They used to sell any surplus at the market or stored it for time of food shortage. 
During difficult times, the stored grains were more valuable than any physical assets a 
household had. People recalled that the areas where they came from had suffered 
uneven rainfall distribution and frequent crop failure. Each drought brought crop failure, a 
loss of livestock and loss of pasture land. Poor households had no choice but to 
consume seeds meant for agricultural purposes because of a lack of food. Better-off 
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households relied on their stored grains from the previous season or sold some of their 
livestock. When the situation improved, poor households sought to borrow through 
different means but a lack of any form of credit constrained their subsistence production 
and was a major source of vulnerability for their survival. Credit was obtained through 
entering interlinked sharecropping contracts, land-leasing and labour arrangements with 
outsiders or better-off households. According to the agreement, the poor received cash, 
cereals and/or agricultural inputs in exchange for the future delivery of harvested crops. 
This arrangement usually resulted in greater food insecurity for poor households and led 
to a downward spiral. Any cash received was used mainly to buy food.  
When poorer households were confronted with the choice between pursuing further 
risky and low productivity agriculture and securing an immediate need for food, they 
chose the later since agriculture could be a gamble. The poor, therefore, were the first to 
abandon their farm and seek wage labour in the surrounding areas or to migrate to find 
wage labour somewhere else. Wage labour provided the cash that enabled poorer 
households to purchase food during a drought or after a harvest shortfall. When the 
decline continued and deepened during the late 1980s and early 1990s, there were few 
options for practical and forward-looking actions for households that were hovering 
around the minimum. Their set of choices became extremely limited in terms of how to 
pursue known and traditional coping strategies. Better-off households had their assets to 
serve as a buffer against shocks in the first stage. These households started to pawn 
belongings for the wealthiest group within the community and outside the community. 
Poor households had mostly sold their assets before the onset of the crisis that led to 
their migration. They were only left with their labour but at certain point the option of 
pursuing wage labour also disappeared simply because there was no more agriculture 
being practised. 
Poor households borrowed grain from better-off households in the hope that the 
situation would improve and they would be able to repay them. The crisis peaked and 
eventually culminated in a famine that hit the whole region. People dug seeds that did 
not grow and women dug up wild roots and searched for seeds around anthills. They 
could no longer borrow or sell and people grabbed food from whatever source. At that 
stage the better-off households became the most vulnerable group: their homes were 
ransacked and they were forced to give away food that did not exist. The very survival 
of women and children was jeopardized as stronger men began to dominate and take the 
little that weaker members could get hold of. Survival became more of an individual 
endeavour than a household goal as each member of the household was engaged in 
looking for food. Older people who were not able to fend for themselves suffered the 
worst consequence of malnutrition. Decisions on food allocation were some of the 
toughest that people took. People remember such decisions with great bitterness and 
how some household members, such as the old and women, had to take the least or none 
at all in order to allow the stronger members to survive. Some were able to make the 
journey to the nearest aid camps where food was distributed, others were not. Food aid 
came too late for many but also saved many people from starvation. Women recall 
songs that were sang depicting the changes that took place in their lives. These songs 
condemn the bad time that made them ‘extend their hands to ask others for food’ or 
living on food aid. They pitied themselves and those who became so impoverished that 
they were living off ‘Reagan sorghum’, which was aid from the US or any other 
country.  
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Before arriving in the city, men used to think of Khartoum as a place which offered 
numerous rewarding jobs. Young people imagined it as a new way of life, a freer and 
smarter way of life that they did not have in the countryside. Women who were not 
happy about migration took consolation in the fact that they wouldn’t have to worry 
about fetching water or about children being sick. They dreamed that their children 
would be educated and have good jobs. On arrival to the city, those with relatives in the 
city or other neighbourhoods joined them and those without remained in the camps 
around Khartoum, in particular Dar es Salam and Siriha. People’s initial encounters 
with the city were very disappointing. Young men could not secure jobs for a long time 
and if they did have a job they faced humiliation, low wages and discriminations on 
numerous accounts. When comparing their lives now with their early days in their 
villages, older people thought there were many drawbacks to living in the city. The lack 
of water and their inability to use health or education facilities was a big disappointment 
for all. Women who had thought that the city would provide a comfortable or at least 
less tiring way of life were proved wrong. Both men and women agreed that women’s 
workloads have increased and became much more complicated. They also agreed that 
the issue of household consumption has become extremely difficult. Better-off people 
thought that the city would offer opportunities for those who worked hard and had the 
right guidance and support. Older men thought that the city would make them lose their 
position and the authority they used to enjoy in the household. In particular, they refer 
to young working members’ independent decisions about using their resources. They 
also referred to the way women decide to allocate their income without consulting their 
male partners. 
 
The story of Digair 
Digair (SP) is around 80 years of age and lives in Dar es Salam. He is originally from 
Sherkeila village, East Kurdafan; and belongs to the Habbania1 ethnic group. Digair 
remembers when he was 6 years old how his family used to be cattle nomads but eventually 
they lost some of their animals due to drought and conflicts between them and other ethnic 
groups over water and land. They then became settled cultivators. They grew some dukhn 
(millet) and daura (sorghum) for consumption, and kept some small animals for household 
use. Although the whole group fareek lacked all the necessary services, the lack of water was 
the most important problem they encountered as settled cultivators because they could not 
move with the rain. Water consumption was extremely low, particularly in the dry season 
when it became very scarce. When Digair was 18 years old the whole group moved again to 
settle 5 or 6 km from Kadada, after a borehole was dug in 1950. The group selected the spot 
of land because of its location near permanent water supplies. The area later on attracted 
more people and animals and grew into a village. He remembers this period as a good and 
prosperous one. The households managed to grow and sell some of their crops for cash and 
to invest in animals. They also grew cash crops such as sesame and groundnuts as well as 
dukhn (millet) and daura (sorghum). But due to the limited rainfall in the area, they had little 
choice in terms of the crops they were able to grow. The good period lasted for about 8 
years. By that time he was married with 5 children, and most of his brothers were also 
married with several children. The area cultivated by his paternal household also corresponds 
with the increased family members. However, it was apparent that there was a limit to such 
an increase due to the shortage of arable land. The traditional system of rotation in 
cultivation was applied at first. But eventually, as the household continued to grow bigger, 
farm produce became hardly sufficient to meet their needs. His brothers opted for cultivating 
                                                 
1  Arabized ethnic group. 
 212
their own land away from the family. The farm became fragmented. Digair remained with 
his parents and younger brothers and sisters. Continuous cultivation led to increased soil 
degradation and loss of fertility. Although everyone was aware of this, there was no other 
choice for them. In addition, people and their animals from outside the village came to use 
the water points and added to the pressure on local resources, leading to over-grazing around 
the water points and the removal of vegetation cover. As a result, the whole village including 
Digair’s household suffered due to the lack of fodder for their animals. 
When a school and a temporary medical centre were established in Kadada in the late 
1960s, Digair decided to enrol two of his younger sons in the school. His decision was based 
on the fact that there was not much need for them in agriculture and enrolment was free. 
These facilities also coincided with the establishment of marketing facilities. These new 
services had also attracted people from different parts of the region and added to the pressure 
on water, land and services. Some of Digair’s animals died and others were sold to meet 
consumption needs. The household suffered periods of acute food shortage and indebtedness. 
Two of his sons and those of his brothers’ headed to the Gezira Scheme, to Rahad town and 
to Khartoum in search of wage labour employment. These migrants managed to send a little 
money on an irregular basis. Money sent was ploughed back into the land and food 
consumption.  
During the early 1970s Digair moved with his nuclear family to Sherkeila village where 
water sources and cultivation were still good. Sherkeila was also selected because there was 
a daily market, instead of the bi-weakly market in Kadada, that was visited by large numbers 
of cattle-owning nomads and other groups of people searching for water, pasture and health 
services. These visiting groups often bought products and required different services for 
cash. They also provided vital information about neighbouring villages and towns and the 
prospects there. However, the new location was not much better than the old village as land 
became exhausted as a result of continuous cultivation, and the demand for labour decreased. 
Digair and his family had to find alternative sources of income. Some of his sons worked for 
wages but wage rates were low as a result of the decreased demand for agricultural labour, as 
large numbers of farmers were withdrawing from agriculture due to lack of rain and land 
infertility. The little they earned from wage labour or received in remittances was spent on 
food.  
When the consecutive drought culminated in famine in 1984, the household had few 
assets left. They sold their belongings first. Tracing the narrowing range of options left for 
the household for securing adequate food, the only option left was to migrate to the city for 
employment or to seek food aid. Their migration-decision was agreed upon by all the 
household members but it took Digair longer to accept it. All family members migrated 
together and all hoped to find some employment in Khartoum where some of their family 
members were already working. Upon their arrival with several other households, Digair and 
his family considered themselves lucky to have relatives in Dar es Salam (then Abu Zied). 
Digair was old and had no energy for wage labour. He also had no training or education to 
enable him to work in jobs less physically demanding. Therefore, he depended on his 
children. His sons undertook different casual wage employments. Sometimes they pooled 
resources and sometimes they took turns to contribute to the household’s subsistence. 
However, this arrangement could not continue for long because of conflicts among them 
about the fact that some of them were able to contribute more than others due to the type of 
their jobs, while others were not able to contribute anything at all because they could not find 
job or because of the restriction on the type of activities they were able to do. The support 
provided to their father’s household was gradually withdrawn. As their own nuclear families 
grew bigger, it became clear that this arrangement could no longer sustain everyone. His 
sons eventually went their separate ways. Some of them sent him support in the form of food 
stuffs. However, they are no longer sending support but they allow him to stay in their house. 
Digair’s house has never been demolished because the land was bought by one of his sons. 
Digair has being left with one divorced daughter. During the early 1990s Digair started to 
 213
lose his eyesight. From 1994 he could no longer walk and depended completely on his 
divorced daughter for everything. His daughter works as a domestic worker in the main city 
and receives SP 200,000 ($80) a month, from which she spends SP 60,000 ($24) on transport 
to work. The amount left is sufficient to pay for the family’s food. She also gets 3 meals a 
day and has some food to bring home from time to time. She gets cloths for herself, her 
father and her two sons. During Eid she gets Zakat in the form of sugar and sorghum to bring 
home. Digair died in March 2006 and up to the time of his death his situation and that of his 
daughter remained the same. However, later on his sons came and claimed their house. 
Digair’s daughter with her two sons was moved out of the house. She erected a small shack 
on the outskirts of Dar es Salam, which was swept away by rain in 2007. She erected another 
one from the same materials. Due to the increased cost of transport, Digair’s daughter is 
unable to make the journey to her work on daily basis so she stays in her employer’s house 
and comes once a weak. On the day she stays with them, she cooks them food and washes 
their clothes. Her sons, now 10 and 11, live by themselves in their shack 6 days a weak and 
go around the neighbourhood looking for small jobs and food. (LH13-M) 
In summary, people from rain-fed areas were smallholder farmers who lived in low-
fertility regions and were reliant on uncertain rainfall. Their areas have traditionally 
been marginalized and they always struggled with deteriorating soil fertility, declining 
productivity and old agricultural practices. When drought hit, they were not able to use 
their traditional mechanisms to deal with it due to the continuous depletion of their 
assets. They therefore, become highly vulnerable to climatic variability and drought, 
and these made them incur a high social cost affecting livestock and crop production 
with serious consequence for their food security and livelihoods. Both the poor farmers 
and the better-off were driven into the landless labour market and came to the city to 
join the army of the poor. Landless workers who sold their labour during seasonal peaks 
also undertook seasonal or permanent migration to the city due to a lack of any produc-
tive assets or the availability of alternative employment options in rural areas. 
 
Livelihoods in the irrigated Gezira Scheme 
The findings below summarizes the main features of the life histories of six tenants: two 
females (LH13-B, LH14-D) and four males (LH10-S, LH28-S, LH11-M, LH24-S), and 
three male wage labourers (LH16-B, LH1-S, LH5-M) from the Gezira Scheme. These 
life histories show that people who lived in the irrigated schemes enjoyed relatively 
more stable livelihoods than their peers in the rain-fed agricultural zones. However, 
people from the irrigated Gezira Scheme experienced different forms of vulnerability 
that brought them to the neighbourhood. The Gezira Scheme has most of the services 
that are lacking in areas of rain-fed agriculture. The scheme had health and education 
facilities, credit and agriculture inputs and, most importantly, water for irrigation and 
consumption. However, infrastructure and services have been declining more or less 
continuously since the 1970s. People had to cope with other problems that were im-
posed by the tenancy system agreement, which impacted on both tenants and wage 
labourers. These problems were brought about by the institutional arrangements that 
control the process of crop production in the Gezira Scheme, such as the land tenure 
system, the cropping system and credit and marketing arrangements. The land tenure 
system was built on the compulsory land tenancy policy and although a tenancy can be 
inherited, according to the agreement farmers cannot sell, rent or sublet their tenancies. 
The agreement did not give the tenants the right to terminate the compulsory lease or 
cultivate their tenancies with crops other than those specified by the Gezira Board. They 
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also have no say in the choice of crop mix and crop rotation. Hence, from the start 
tenants were alienated from the processes that affected their livelihoods.  
Management, administration and services are also organized centrally. The manage-
ment is divided between the Ministry of Irrigation (MOI), which is responsible for the 
irrigation network, and the Sudan Gezira Board (SGB), which oversees agricultural 
operation and determines irrigation water requirements. Cotton was considered a strate-
gic product and is pre financed and marketed by the Gezira Board. At a later stage, it 
started financing the mechanical harvesting of wheat and provides cash advances, 
particularly for cultivation, weeding and picking of cotton. Tenants were allowed to 
grow other products such as lubia, sorghum and groundnuts outside the tenancy agree-
ment. The tenants pay the costs of all inputs provided by the Gezira Board for the 
production of cotton as well as other crops. The net proceeds are divided among the 
three parties in the agreement (the Ministry of Irrigation [MOI], the Sudan Gezira Board 
[SGB] and the tenants). 
Cash advances were often much smaller than the actual costs incurred by tenants for 
the various agricultural operations. Tenants were always confronted with the problem of 
securing additional cash loans to cover different agricultural operations. Issues of 
indebtedness have been one of the most cited problems in the discussion. Older farmers 
indicated that best time was during the 1960s and the early 1970s when services were at 
their best, credit was at its lowest and yields were good. There was plenty of food, 
which was accessed through their farms and the sale of livestock. Likewise, medicines 
and education were easy to access. The whole family worked on the farm and during 
cotton-picking sufficient labour could be hired. Seasonal workers were employed for 
three to four months depending on the needs of the farm, and not on the availability of 
cash. Tenants also got labour through labour exchange and kinship relations. The wage 
paid for the casual job was adequate and may be even satisfactory so labourers kept 
coming from all over the country during the seasonal demand for labour. For tenants, 
those days were marked by increased wealth, which was translated into more livestock, 
improved housing conditions, the establishment of new businesses (such as small 
shops), and the purchase of jewellery. Better-off households had more members to 
participate in agricultural operations and also had members who were engaged in wage 
employment (teaching, small administrative work and service jobs). Farmers who 
owned and operated small shops, cafes, milling machines and vehicles for transport 
were the wealthiest.  
Conditions during the early 1980s were not bad. Even when tenants had other busi-
nesses, the farm remained their basic source for income. Most farmers (or tenants) 
depended on agriculture and supplemented their income through livestock rearing and 
various products from the forests – most notably fuel wood and wood for construction. 
However, better-off and wealthy farmers had more livestock, particularly cows. Poor 
households mainly depended on wages from agricultural labour and may have owned a 
few small animals. A village wage labourer had a better income than the seasonal wage 
labourer. S/he also had the opportunity to work in off-farm wage labouring activities. 
People from better-off households were able to enjoy a sufficient level of food security 
– eating on average three meals a day and a variety of foods such as kisra (staple bread), 
vegetables, meat, beans, lentils, rice, eggs, milk, bread, coffee and tea. Poor households 
had always less to eat; they ate one or two meals with a staple food and went without 
the luxury of meat. Even when there was a shortage of food and the poor households 
had sheep or poultry; these were sold rather than eaten. These were more or less the 
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conditions until around 1980. In the mid-1980s the deterioration was so apparent that 
some farmers considered it as a blow. The deterioration of the scheme was most visible 
in the people and their livelihoods. The most difficult time farmers recalled was 
characterized by increased debts, deteriorating services, decreased labour and low 
productivity and tenants were not in a position to obtain break-even yields. The SGB 
and MOI were not able to deliver their part of the tenancy agreement. This was manifest 
in the increased silt in canals which led to clogged water flows and deprived farms of 
water. Repeated breakdowns in the telephone system meant a break in communication 
regarding processes of water movement. It was clear that a lack of financial resources 
was restraining the Ministry of Irrigation’s ability to fund the operation and mainte-
nance of machinery and equipment that were used to remove silt and clear weeds from 
the canals. The outcome was a lack of adequate irrigation for crops, which impacted 
significantly on yields and subsequently on tenants’ incomes.  
Tenants suffered low yields and food shortages that had only been a thing of the past 
became a daily reality. Tenants who had no livestock became desperately poor because 
they did not have the capacity to withstand the loss of food and income from crop 
failure due to a lack of water. The livestock economy was considered a more secure 
investment than the rigidly controlled crop economy of the scheme. Better-off tenants 
started to lean more toward the livestock economy, particularly those with nomadic 
backgrounds. Livestock also provided a more secure source of income for the non-
nomadic population. Better-off tenants with assets sold or pawned them. The first asset 
to be sold was smaller livestock, followed by large livestock. Jewellery was sold when 
loans could not be secured. Wage labourers sold their poultry and shoats, and then 
looked for loans. What aggravated the matter even further for both wage labourers and 
tenants were the national policies of the 1990s. Prior to the 1990s, cash advances and all 
services and inputs for tenants were financed by the government through the Central 
Bank and administered by the Gezira Board. With the adoption of liberalization policies 
in the early 1990s, the Gezira Board could no longer rely on the Bank of Sudan to 
finance production activities and foreign exchange. In 1993 a Consortium of Commer-
cial Banks was established to provide the finance required for the Gezira Scheme. The 
period that followed the implementation of liberalization policies witnessed further 
deterioration in production and infrastructure. The levels of fees paid by tenants for 
agricultural mechanical operations rose and the quality of the work performed by SGB 
deteriorated. Returns for tenants had become low even though they had spent so much. 
As services continued to deteriorate, cash loans provided by the SGB became too little 
to cover agricultural operations. A recurring theme was the issue of lack of cash to 
cover the costs incurred in various agricultural operations. Farmers indicated that the 
cash advances provided by the SGB were much lower than their actual need and they 
therefore had to find other sources of finance. If they could not secure additional cash 
loans for costly agricultural operations, they would not be able to cover their daily 
household consumption.  
Farmers with few resources lost the incentive to produce, although they were legally 
obligated to fulfil their production quotas for cotton. The situation worsened year after 
year moving from low yields in one year to complete crop failure in the next. Hired 
wage labour decreased and payments became smaller. An important problem tenants 
faced was their inability to supply all the labour needed for agricultural operations from 
their households but they had too few resources to pay for wage labourers. This im-
pacted on the low wages offered to workers and were forced to seek better job opportu-
 216
nities. Farms now operated with a minimum workforce. Tenants suffered delays in 
settling accounts and became heavily indebted to the SGB and moneylenders in the 
community. They resorted to arrangements which increased their vulnerability such as 
sub-leasing, and crop sharing. In emergencies, tenants used the system of Al Shail 
which is the selling of future crops to private traders at planting time in return for the 
right to purchase the whole crop (except cotton) at harvest time for price even lower 
than the market rate at that time. It has been indicated that even when the yield was 
good, debts could not be fully paid from one crop. Tenants thus became locked into a 
cycle of debts. Farm wage labourers also got credit from traders and better-off tenants 
between cultivation and harvest periods when the work decreased and when tenants had 
already used up their resources in cultivation. Credit from wealthy tenants tied labourers 
into predetermined rates that locked the labourer into a vicious circle of low wages. 
Women farmers who headed households had more difficulty in acquiring credit due to 
gender bias. The size of their harvest was often dependent on how much work on the 
farms they managed to squeeze into their already busy days, and how much labour they 
received under the system of labour exchange. Such inequalities were additional 
burdens for female-headed households, making them generally poorer and lacking in 
resources in comparison to other households. Better-off tenants still had assets and 
savings to rely on, but poor tenants and wage labourers seldom had this support and so 
fell quickly into a cycle of impoverishment. This was especially true for tenants due to 
their limited options in terms of using the last assets they had, namely land. The tenancy 
agreement with the SGB prohibits the sale of land and thus limits tenant land allocation 
choices, which affects their costs and financial situation substantially. Yet when 
confronted with extreme choices, poor tenants resort to selling their farms. Sales of land 
were made illegally to better-off or wealthy tenants and for very small amounts. 
By 1996, farmers had already suffered mounting debts and bad yields or crop failure 
at least three or four times. Farmers who were unable to depend on cultivation as a 
livelihood were now relying on non-farm income more than farm income. Landless 
agricultural labourers and poor tenants were affected badly and barely survived the late 
1980s and all of the 1990s. They were left with absolutely no savings which made them 
depend for survival on credit from wealthy households. The crisis afflicted all members 
of the community, not just tenants and wage labourers, because the community was tied 
into agricultural activities through their different activities, whether in trade, transport or 
services. Social services, such as health and education, followed suit and the introduc-
tion of user fees in all public-health facilities in 1993 made it difficult for tenants and 
wage labourers to access them. The availability of these services was an additional 
problem. At the same time, health conditions were deteriorating due to the increase in 
waterborne diseases such as bilharzia and malaria. 
In such a context, poor tenants and wage labourers migrated to faraway places like 
Medani and Khartoum in search of wage employment. The farms they left behind had 
the minimum or no labour. Female-headed households, for example, farmed less land 
and had less household labour but they were the last to migrate. Those who had rela-
tives in the cities migrated first. Labourers and poor tenants migrated for short periods 
at the beginning but as the crisis intensified, they never went back to their villages to 
farm. When comparing their current situation with their former one, young educated 
males thought they were doing much better now than before in the sense that they were 
earning more and doing less laborious work. Adult males thought that although migra-
tion to the city might have given them food to eat, they were no less poor than they 
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were. Women from poorer households thought that their life in the city had increased 
their workload and led to the break-up of their family and left older people with the least 
support.  
 
Maria’s story 
Maria (AP) is 56 years old, a Fur2 woman from La-auta village in the Gezira Scheme. 
During the early 1960s and before she got married she remembers life used to be much 
easier and better. Her father and three of her uncles were all tenants in the scheme. She also 
worked on a regular basis with them in all processes, and particularly during cotton-picking. 
In fact all her family worked in their hawasha including children on a regular basis. They 
also worked for their uncles’ hawashas from time to time, as did the families of their uncles. 
For Maria, the yield was often good judging from the way they lived compared to other 
people without hawasha and those who worked for wages. After each harvest her father 
bought some livestock as a way of investing the money. In 1966 they had so many livestock 
that they had to build a barn outside the village and her father and younger brothers took 
turns in looking after them. Milk was sold by her mother to the villagers and also used for 
household consumption. After her marriage, Maria continued to live in her father’s house but 
she became busy with her own family; she went to her father’s hawasha from time to time 
and during cotton-picking. However because her husband had no land, he worked with her 
father on a regular basis; he also marketed the milk products that Maria and her mother 
made. After Maria’s father died, most of the hawasha was inherited by her 5 younger 
brothers, while she and her 3 sisters got the least share according to the law. Her married 
brothers and sisters claimed their share in the livestock left by their father. Both Maria and 
her husband continued to do the same work they used to, since all the new owners were 
either married or working on their husband’s hawashas or they were young and going to 
school. Maria’s family had difficult times because of the division of hawasha income among 
the big family who lived in their separate homes. However, in the mid 1970s Maria’s family 
got engaged in the production of groundnuts, which had a good market then. They also 
planted sorghum for food and onions for sale while cotton and wheat provided the bulk of 
their income. Maria was able to buy a cow and 2 goats for her nuclear family. With the next 
crop, she bought more goats. They also allocated some money to agricultural labourers to 
free their younger members for schooling. However, during the late 1970s things started to 
change. Production decreased greatly in one year when water from the main canal did not 
reach the sub-canals due to silt build-up. Although most plots that relied on that sub-canal 
had being affected, the location of Maria’s hawasha, on the edge of the irrigation system 
made it more prone to drought. Increasing silt deposits, inadequate and delayed silt removal 
and the continuous deterioration of the irrigation network all resulted in very poor crop 
yields in the subsequent years. In 1984, the deterioration of the irrigation network 
accelerated rapidly, Maria’s farm used far less irrigation for crops than recommended, and 
took longer intervals. This resulted in crop failure and her inability to repay previous loans. 
                                                
Compelled to meet production requisites and consumption needs, she had no other option 
but to turn to the traditional, informal lending arrangement of Al Shail (selling future crop to 
private traders). Afterwards, Maria always marketed her produce through the shail system 
until she left the scheme. In the following season, Maria’s husband fell ill with bilharzia and 
she had to work singlehanded and hire more labour. The season that flowed was worse and 
lenders needed their money. Maria sold what was left of her livestock, paid off a small part 
of her debt and used the rest to pay for labour for the new season, and to meet some of her 
immediate consumption needs. In 1985/86, bad weather conditions decreased her 
productivity greatly, especially cotton, and she incurred greater losses that led to more 
borrowing. The hawasha arrangement remained the same, that she and two of her daughters 
 
2 Africanized ethnic group. 
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were the main workers as her husband was extremely ill, three of her brothers were working 
in service jobs in Wadi Shaeer, and her sisters were working with their husbands on their 
land and were unable to lend a hand. In the subsequent years, she had some good yields from 
time to time but was always in debt and had to pay back all the returns she received. She had 
to sell some of her household belonging from time to time. Due to her mounting debts, she 
was not able to pay for water and administration costs so the Gezira Board deducted a certain 
quantity of her products at harvest time to cover these cost. She remembers 1994 with great 
bitterness. She had 9 children by then but it was almost impossible to meet their needs. Her 
older sons would venture into the area for wage employments but it was rare and wages were 
meagre. The family had no livestock or small animals. Schooling was the first item that they 
decided to drop. The family’s main source of food then was asida and waika (sorghum 
porridge and wild okra). For those who were sick, she could only use herbs to maintain their 
health. In 1995 her husband’s condition deteriorated and he was transferred to Khartoum 
hospital for operation. She subleased land and entered into crop-sharing arrangements. When 
she received a cash advance from the Gezira Board to meet agricultural operations, she had 
no choice but to use it for her husband’s treatment. Leaving her children behind, she headed 
for Khartoum with her ill husband and two of her older sons. They stayed in the hospital for 
3 months until their cash came to an end. Her sons took wage employment in different places 
in the city, including the hospital to finance their stay. When she came back after the death of 
her husband, there was virtually nothing left to live on. The hawasha was taken on by her 
brothers and with her tiny share in land, she could no longer claim any yield. Eventually she 
illegally sold her share in the land, and headed back to Khartoum where she had left her two 
sons, but this time she brought all her children to stay. They ended up in Al Baraka where 
they lived with her sons who had a shack there. Three months later she built her own one-
bedroom house of mud and thatch. She was helped by the family and her close neighbours. 
Between April and September each year, she worked in agriculture in the Silate project. In 
the off-season, Maria made and sold traditional food from different places. Her unmarried 
sons were working in casual activities and assisted her from time to time. Maria had no right 
to the land she occupied. This presented a major source of insecurity for the family. In 
January 1999 her house was demolished and they had to stay in the open for two weeks 
before an NGO provided them with blankets and some food. Maria attempted to go back to 
La-auta because she did not want to go through the demolition experience again. But since 
she had no money to finance the return of the whole family, she went by herself first. She 
stayed with her brothers and worked for wages. However, the money was so little that she 
was hardly meeting her consumption needs let alone thise of her children in Khartoum. She 
used the money from her work to finance her trip back to the city. In the city, she started 
from a clean slate. She had to rebuild the house and compete for work in the project. Her 
smaller children were no longer going to school and were working or had run away. Selling 
traditional food became very difficult with the increased controls by the local authorities. 
Because of her few resources and the fear of police harassment, Maria cannot venture 
outside Al Baraka where there are better prospects. In January 2001, her dwelling was 
demolished again. The neighbours helped her erect a shack from what was left of her old 
house. The family was left destitute and Maria begs from strangers in the city for survival. 
Occasionally, her 15-year-old daughter teams up with her to work in Silate on a casual basis 
when they were given a chance to. The income from begging and from casual jobs is not 
enough to provide the whole family with food. By the end of 2004 Maria was introduced to a 
local NGO specializing in training and community development in parallel with credit for 
income-generating activities. After obtaining her loan, Maria invested it in food vending. At 
the same time, she received business training, which includes adult literacy and numeracy 
concerning loans and savings. Maria’s daughter also received training in different aspects of 
sewing and stitching, and after completing her training she started to work with a tailor in Al 
Baraka. During the first year of the loan Maria was not able to repay her loan instalments 
because she was not able to make good profits due to an oversupply in Al Baraka. However, 
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this situation was resolved after she obtained the necessary licences. Maria was also 
provided with practical information on how to establish business links to buy her raw 
materials at cheaper or wholesale market prices and with possible venues of sale in Bahari 
and the neighbouring areas. At first, Maria was reluctant to go beyond her neighbourhood in 
fear of incurring costs without being able to repay her loans; however, her experience was 
positive. Maria’s level of mobility outside the home has increased greatly because she also 
attends the monthly meetings of the NGO and goes to the NGO office to deposit savings and 
to repay loan instalments. Although Maria’s small savings did not enable her to graduate to a 
high-income activity, she believes that she has gone through a big change and that the 
security of her job and the new networks of relations and new skills she learnt make her life 
worth living. (LH13-B) 
In summary, farmers in the Gezira Scheme operated according to the tenancy 
agreement but this did not allow them to make decisions about processes that affected 
their livelihood. Furthermore, the withdrawal of state support coupled with a lack of 
appropriate institutional arrangements, poor maintenance and deteriorating services 
influenced both productivity and poverty levels. These problems led to a drastic decline 
in yields and increased debts. Over the years, these households depleted their assets 
while trying to compensate for the loss or declining production or returns on labour. 
Many of these households sought alternative sources of income outside agriculture and 
went to the city in search of wage labour.  
 
Pastoralists and agro-pastoralists 
The summaries below describe the main features of the life histories of one Nilotics 
woman (LH4-M) and two Nilotics men (LH2-M, LH29-B) from the Dinka3 pastoralists 
from the southern part of the country.  
Pastoralists and agro-pastoralists lived in areas that lacked basic social services such 
as health and education. Their life histories show that they both faced continuous 
insecurity due to their internal conflicts as well those related to external conflicts and 
the war between the government and the SPLA. They have become marginalized as a 
result of natural disruptions which resulted in the loss of their main source of livelihood. 
Pastoralists and agro-pastoralists almost always combine subsistence farming with 
raising livestock. The groups depend on agro-pastoralist subsistence and sheep, goats, 
cattle and either camels or donkeys for their livelihood. Livestock for many ethnic 
groups such as the Dinka are essential components of social relations, religious values 
and political institutions. Nilotics pastoralists and agro-pastoralists used to move or stay 
together in groups of two to fifteen households depending on grazing conditions. Their 
pattern of movements was imposed by the availability or otherwise of water and 
grazing. These groups were built according to clanship and were divided internally into 
several categories of age-sets or generation-sets that were made up of a number of age 
groups assuming and shedding rights and responsibilities according to these age-sets. 
Members of the group worked together, pooling their labour, allocating different 
pastoral work to members or taking turns in herding. Working together afforded them a 
way of complementing labour shortages among the group caused by temporary 
problems such as illness. The group usually adheres to some form of traditional rule. 
This could be within the group or from somewhere else. Headmen gained their position 
by demonstrating exceptional skills in managing conflicts within the group, mediating 
and solving problems with other groups, had the ability to launch raids and wars against 
                                                 
3  Africanized ethnic group. 
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other opponents and negotiate conditions for sharing pasture resources in territories of 
other agro-pastoralists. Headmen also had the power to divide and use the land. Groups 
maintained considerable mobility and flux in the composition of their settlements and 
camps. Many of the internal structures of the group, including age-sets saw changes due 
to conflicts and the conscription of youth into the army or militias, and increased 
women’s responsibilities for the livelihood of their families.  
Relationships between one group and other neighbouring groups took different 
forms. They either related to each other in a hostile or symbiotic manner, raiding for 
cattle, women and children or exchanging goods and sometimes intermarrying. Histori-
cally, customary arrangements managed to take care of the heterogeneity of interests 
within different groups, however, barriers to transhumant routes, civil conflict, the 
involvement of increased numbers of parties in conflicts and the proliferation and use of 
small arms and light weapons contributed to increasing insecurity and impunity, as well 
as the inability of pastoralists to use traditional systems to solve their problems.  
Historically, the pastoralist agro-pastoral zones in southern Sudan suffered periods of 
drought severely affecting its traditional systems of production. During the late 1970s 
and the early 1980s, the area suffered low rainfall, long dry seasons and a spatial incon-
sistency of water levels in seasonal ponds (hafirs). Pastoralists and agro-pastoralists had 
to travel longer distances during these periods. Travelling relatively longer distances 
with cattle in such regions always runs the risk that part of the herd will perish due to 
water or grazing shortages. The pastoralist and agro-pastoralists who live in variable 
environments have a tradition of respect for the land they rely on for their survival. This 
was reflected in the way they rotate grazing to avoid overgrazing and the way they 
follow certain routes in their movements to preserve the vegetation cover. However, 
they had no choice but to abandon such tradition because of the insecurity and war in 
the area. Overgrazing and the inability to rotate had a catastrophic effect on the 
environment and subsequently on agriculture and livestock. Agriculture was no longer 
viable and livestock were either decimated by famine or commandeered by different 
conflicts and warring factions leaving people in dire poverty. At a certain stage, these 
household put an end to what used to be their livelihoods in the rural areas and moved 
to the city for security and survival. What little livestock remained was left in the care 
of mainly older women and men who were not willing or able to make the journey.  
Those who had relatives in the city found accommodations and food for the first few 
days or months of their stay. Those who came from disaster areas and had no relatives 
to stay with lived in camps waiting for the opportunity to get a job, settle in the city or 
make money and move back to the rural base. Since pastoralists and agro-pastoralists had 
far less access to social services in their rural base compared to the sedentary rural popula-
tions, their expectation of life in the capital city was one of access to those facilities, as 
well as being less vulnerable to periodic famines. Poorer women believed that migration 
would give them the security they lacked in the past, but it also took their independence, 
and freedom as well as burdening them with the huge task of being the sole breadwinner 
for their families. Although these women shunned domestic labour if at all possible, 
since it bore a social stigma, becoming a domestic worker became one of the few 
options available to them. Women who work as domestic workers often felt deeply 
isolated and unhappy. Unmarried girls who took this work also worried about their 
future lives as this job defines the type of husbands they would be able to marry. For 
older males from better-off backgrounds, life in the city is a transitional period that 
enables them to save money, buy cows and go back home when the situation improves. 
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Males from poor background prefer to stay in the city and find more rewarding jobs 
than going back to where they came from. Young members who went to school were 
fascinated by life in the city. They were also impressed with aspects that their counter-
parts back in the village had never heard about. For them, the future is in securing 
regular salaried employment in the city and never going back to the rural base, except 
maybe for marriage.  
 
Malou’s story 
Malou (NP) is a descendant of a Dinka4 royal family from Bahr el Ghazel in southern Sudan. 
He was the headman of his pastoralist group until the mid-1980s when his household 
enjoyed a life of wealth and happiness. His household was then composed of around 32 
members but he had to abandon some, some also went their separate ways and daughters got 
married and joined their husbands’ households. Currently Malou has 6 sons, 4 daughters and 
3 wives living with him. His life and that of his household then revolved around cattle 
grazing and seasonal movements between specific areas. Malou has a sedentary family 
branch that settled in El Da’ein town where his cousins received their primary and secondary 
education and proceeded to Khartoum for further education or jobs. However, due to the type of 
pastoralist life that Malou’s father had followed, neither Malou, nor his older children had the 
opportunity for any education. Before coming to the city, Malou moved through a known 
territory on a seasonal basis, taking his cattle further to the swampy areas (toic) during the 
dry season and bringing them closer to settlement camps (baii) during the rainy season. His 
wives and younger children remained with the small animals (sheep and goats) closer to 
settlements during this time. In the rainy season the household cultivated cassava and 
sorghum for household consumption but also sold some in the local market or in the big 
market in Abyie. Immediately after selling farm products, basic household necessities (sugar, 
clothes, utensils and other necessities) were purchased. When mosquitoes and other insects 
increased at the beginning of the rainy season, Malou brought his cattle to the settlement 
camp to protect them. At the onset of the dry season, the cattle start to move away from the 
settlement camp until they reached the swampy area. Malou was using the same old routes 
that his father and grandfathers had used. Using the same route did not only have a cultural 
value, it was also a conscious action to protect both the environment and the livestock. 
Recurring livestock along the same routes leads to firming the clay soil such that it does not turn 
into mud that harms livestock hooves. At the same time it keeps the damage to the soil to a 
minimum. These basic facts explain the reluctance of his groups to open new routes when 
insecurity or other land users blocked their traditional path. Conflicts used to arise between his 
group and other groups even from the same ethnic background. These conflicts related to the 
use of resources. When there were spells of drought, the swampy areas and their 
surroundings became so crowded with livestock and people, friction between different users 
was usually unavoidable. That did not affect his life and that of his group in significant ways 
but the increased cattle raids during the early 1980s did. These were characterized by armed 
and violent attacks on groups which curtailed traditional migration patterns. Malou and his 
group were no longer able to follow traditional routes across certain zones to reach pastures 
or water resources in swampy areas. As access to large parts of grazing areas was lost and 
the whole rotational grazing system was disrupted, there was a loss of livestock. His group 
suffered badly and became weaker than before. While cattle raiders took cattle, they also 
destroyed others and killed some of the men in his group. Increasing numbers of people were 
displaced to areas around El Da’ein. Some lost all their animals and had to stay permanently 
in the village and supplement their income from farming by taking part in any other 
activities. If they succeeded, they invested any surplus in livestock and then readjusted their 
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life-style to suit the raising of livestock, and rejoined the group. However, Malou and few 
members of the groups maintained their traditional old lives with some changes. They sold 
cattle and bought arms to defend themselves when attacked. The fear of raids prompted 
Malou and his group to sideline crop farming since settling in one place for longer would 
make them an easy target for armed raiders. Their food security during dry seasons was 
therefore greatly affected. Malou loaned some of his cattle in what was known as the koei 
system to a close relative near Abyie. His relative was better equipped to provide protection 
for the cattle. When it seemed more secure again, he tried to acquire more livestock through 
purchases and breeding but it was still too little to match what had been lost. During 1984 
the theft of livestock became more frequent and having many cattle was a source of danger. 
More traditional grazing areas that became insecure were abandoned, causing more secure 
pasture to be badly overgrazed. Malou and his group encountered frequent losses of cattle 
due to droughts and the over-intensive use of land that led to desertification. They eventually 
suffered acute food shortages. Not being able to produce food, it was essential for them to 
sell or trade their small animals for food. However, prices for sheep and goats dropped 
sharply. Terms of trade also declined in 1986 compared to previous years when it was 
possible to trade a goat for a 50 kg bag of sorghum. But with the changing conditions in 
1986, Malou needed to trade at least three goats for a 50 kg bag of sorghum. It became 
difficult to trade small animal for food because everyone was selling or trading them and 
there was little cash left for buyers after prolonged periods of raids and droughts. The same 
thing happened when Malou and his group decided to sell their cattle. They were not able to 
do so not only because of the cattle’s weak physical condition but essentially because of a 
lack of interest and purchasing power. Again, most pastoralists and agro-pastoralists were 
following the same strategy at the same time, namely selling cattle.  
Malou found it difficult to sustain a big family in such a situation. He sent his wives and 
children to El Da’ein town, the nearest urban centre in the north. The women worked to 
harvest groundnuts and the children took different casual jobs. He remained with what was left 
of his cattle, still hoping that the situation would improve and he would be able to buy bread and 
more animals. He also knew that since he had many daughters, he would definitely receive 
cattle as dowries when they got married. However, the situations went from bad to worse. In 
1987 the escalating conflict, led to a massacre in El Da'ein, where his family resided, and 
spread across the region. Malou lost 4 members of his family, and the cattle raids, which 
increased with this incident, claimed all his livestock. Malou was only left with the few 
livestock he had left in the custody of his relatives near Abyie.  
Malou sold these livestock in Abyie and headed for El Da’ein to join his family there. In 
El Daein, the situation was tense among the Dinka as a group as well as between the Dinka 
and the government-supported militia. Malou found it difficult to settle in the town which 
became a scene of continuous conflict and clashes between these groups. He decided to 
move to Khartoum after the crisis had destroyed everything important to him. However, he 
took consolation in seeing his relocation as a way of saving money to buy cattle and coming 
back to his old way of life. Before moving to Khartoum, Malou bought cheap food products 
such as ghee and honey to sell in Khartoum, as he was advised by his relatives in the city. In 
Khartoum he stayed with one of his cousins in Sahafa. Two months later, his other cousin 
found him a job as a security guard in a vegetable oil and soap factory. This job enabled him 
to buy oil and soap from the factory ar wholesale prices and sell them to people in Sahafa 
and make a profit. His additional work enabled him to contribute money and groceries to his 
cousin who was putting him up. Most importantly, it enabled him to send money 
(irregularly) to his family in El Da’ein. A year later he was joined by his family and had to 
move to his own space since the family was too big to be accommodated in his cousin’s 
house. In Mayo he selected a piece of land near some of his relatives were he built two huts 
from mud and straw aided by his family and relatives and by people who knew his royal 
origins. Two months later, a flood swept through the neighbourhood took his huts with it. 
Malou also lost his merchandise in the flood. One of his cousins lent him some money and 
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other gave him grain. The family built a house in the same place using mud and wood from 
trees around and within Mayo. In June 1991, Malou’s house was demolished together with 
several other houses of his relatives. The factory were he worked provided him with a loan 
that was repayable in three years. The employees of the factory also contributed a small 
amount of money to help him rebuild his house. Malou was able to build a temporary house 
with the help of the community and using local material. Later on in 1993 Malou bought the 
land he then occupied with the money he saved. In 1996 he rebuilt his house from bricks and 
arranged water connections and electricity. Malou also bought various merchandise to sell 
from a small additional room that was built in the house. Most members of the households –
except the children- took turns in selling in the small shop. Being connected to mains 
electricity gave Malou an additional source of income. He rents two lines on an almost daily 
basis to different neighbours. Malou continued his work as a security guard but when he 
comes home, he checks on the items sold and keeps the money in a place that no one in his 
family has access to. Adult members of his family undertook different activities within the 
city and in Mayo itself. Six members of his family were able to attend school on a regular 
basis. Two of his wives brew Araki while three of his older sons used to cut wood from trees 
in the area and sold it in the neighbourhood and in the city. Later on, they took different jobs 
in the city and three of them had regular salaried jobs. Two of Malou’s daughters are 
engaging in handicraft activities or helping their mothers in their income-generating 
activities. Some of them also attend school and Malou does not put any pressure on them in 
terms of what type of activity to take. Although Malou works in the factory, it does not 
include any benefits in terms of health or education, but, being a royal descendant of sultans 
enabled Malou to assume a wider role in his community and this has strengthened his 
relationships with the authorities within and beyond his neighbourhood. These relations have 
helped him a great deal. For example, four of his sons and daughters were able to receive 
free education. When one of his daughters was sick and needed hospitalization, his contacts 
enabled him to provide her with all the required treatment for free. When four of his sons 
and daughters graduated and sought jobs, he managed to find them regular jobs in the same 
factory where he works and else where. On the rare occasions when his wives were taken in 
the kashat, he was able to bail them out in a very short time.  
Malou is the main decision-maker in terms of allocating members earnings. Income 
received from his wives’ work is used to buy food for daily consumption. Part of the income 
received from his children’s work as well as income from his job and profits from the shop 
are used to pay for school requirements and transport for all members. Older sons and 
daughters are given small bursaries from time to time in addition to transport money. The 
rest of the money is saved by Malou in a secure place or sent back home to buy cattle for 
when he returns. Buying cattle is an essential target for him and for his sons. Without cattle, 
a man from his group cannot marry. Therefore, his sons collaborate with him to reach this 
target but revolts often arise regarding the way he keeps tight control over their earnings. He 
does not allow them to enjoy the luxury the city provides, such as going to the cinema or 
buying better clothes or food from time to time. Between Malou and his daughters, the main 
source of disagreement lies in the way they conduct themselves and associate with people 
from minority ethnic groups. The worst conflicts in the household usually arise between 
Malou and his wives, regarding the way they use their resources. These are often started by 
him as he is always suspicions that his wives are either keeping some of their earnings for 
themselves or that they are spending money unwisely. However, most of the time he is able 
to suppress any revolt by his wives by using force (beating them up) or threatening to 
withdraw his support and protection as they would not be able to carry on their work without 
such protection. If after these conflicts a wife decides to leave the household, she always 
comes back after some time because of a lack of other options and because she is prone to 
the harassment of the authorities after Malou withdraws his protection, as well as, because of 
her children. Malou says his wives always come back ‘because [he] gives them the 
opportunity to live a good life’. Although Malou is content that life in the city has enabled 
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him to educate his children, he is reluctant to settle permanently and forsake his nomadic 
life. Malou reflects on his former good times through oral folklore and poetry, which depict 
his state of dissatisfaction with the current situation and his yearning to go back. As the 
situation started to improve in his province, the savings Malou and his household have are 
sent to relatives in the rural areas to buy them cattle. In early 2007, Malou went back on a 
short visit to his village to assess the situation for his possible relocation. On returning to 
Khartoum, Malou started to make the necessary arrangements to return, including selling his 
house. Two of his wives do not agree about moving back to the village and are planning to 
stay in the city. However, if Malou sells the house this would leave them with no option but 
to follow. Since the law gives Malou full authority over the household, his wives are not 
considering any legal action in this regard, however, they are thinking of suing him for 
separation maintenance. However, when an NGO offered to help them, they were reluctant, 
fearing that if they lose the case they will also lose Malou’s support forever. (LH2-M) 
In summary, pastoralists and agro-pastoralists lived in marginalized and remote areas 
that lacked access to basic veterinary services, and social services such as health and 
education. Mobility and flexibility were their coping mechanisms during seasonal 
droughts. However, state development programmes and land-rights policies have either 
undermined these rights or favoured certain groups over others and thus fostered 
tensions that have resulted in violent conflict between and among different groups. The 
possible strategies adopted led to depleted grazing lands among pastoralists who remain 
on the rangelands. The combined end-product was a sharp decrease in the ability of 
pastoralists and agro-pastoralists to survive and the subsequent threat of famine. The 
main strategy left for them was to move to the city in search for wage labour. 
Always lived in the city 
This section is based on the detailed life histories of 17 household members: 11 women 
(LH12-S, LH40-S, LH39-B, LH37-D, LH36-S, LH34-M, LH32-M, LH19-S, LH6-S, 
LH8-S, LH20-B) and 6 men (LH35-M, (LH22-B, LH25-M, LH18-M, LH21-B, LH23-
B), 6 from Arabized and 11 from Africanized ethnic groups. They have lived in the city 
for most of their lives and came to live in the neighbourhoods studied at some time in 
the past. 
Urban residents have diverse and complicated methods of pursuing their livelihoods 
that have been affected by several factors over the past 25 years. Older people referred 
with nostalgia to life in the 1970s as a time of plenty when their quality of life was 
much better than at present. Wages were seen as adequate to provide the basic needs for 
food and shelter then and ‘children were able to go to school for free, sick persons were 
able to seek free medical treatment from government hospitals, and transport cost did 
not chop off half of one’s salary’. However, they also recalled that they lived modest 
lives (mastora) and that their living conditions were much worse. For example, they 
were not able to access and enjoy the leisure and material luxuries such as TV sets, 
fridges, chocolates and supermarket bread that were enjoyed by people with better 
incomes. Wage employment provided them with their main source of income. The 
decline in living conditions for respondents started in the late 1970s and continued. This 
decline was marked by a loss of income and declining real wages and job opportunities 
as a result of the adoption of Structural Adjustment Policies in 1978. While some 
respondents considered what happened to them as being the result of bad government 
policy, others were acquainted with political jargon, such as ‘enslavement, debt, IMF 
and the World Bank’, and saw them as the main cause of what had happened. Workers 
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who were trade union members recalled those ‘useless’ demonstrations and condemned 
the new actions that impoverished workers. Women in particular recalled the songs that 
were sung to denounce those who were following prescriptions that made them ever 
poorer.  
Although for almost all respondents such policies had a detrimental direct or indirect 
impact on their livelihoods, their life histories reveal that even before the implementa-
tion of SAPs, respondents had a hand-to-mouth existence and that wages were barely 
adequate to meet all their basic needs let alone establish any savings for emergencies. 
Wages were only upgraded every five years and workers were constantly living on the 
edge. They were, therefore, easily pushed over the edge by sudden job loss, decreasing 
real incomes and an increase in prices. People were also affected by several other crises 
relating to work in the informal sector, severe health problems, increased user fees for 
public services, the death of the main or secondary breadwinners; personal insecurity 
and the loss of assets due to theft, robbery, cheating and marriage expenses. For some 
urban households, the crisis that was taking place in the rural areas affected them 
adversely by eliminating essential remittances that used to be received from there. 
These factors led to a partial or total income or asset loss. Though some of these crises 
were common to different households, their impact was distinct in each. Overall, the 
coping strategies that were adopted touched on nutrition, impacted on health and educa-
tion and contributed to unequal intra-household allocations. 
The period from the late 1970s onwards was one of momentous change for respon-
dents when they had to cope with difficulties in accessing food. The decline in real 
income was accompanied by an increase in food prices. Some low-priced food products 
that were important to the poor and which had once been affordable were no longer 
affordable or had disappeared from the market altogether. The price increase reduced 
access to people’s staple diet, which depended principally on sorghum or wheat. Whole 
sorghum and wheat or flour used to be a low-priced food until the early 1980s; by the 
end of the 1980s most respondents were no longer able to buy them. These grains could 
not be found in the market place, except for wheat bread which was sold according to a 
ration system. Women and children were usually the ones who took turns in queuing for 
rations and children either missed school or went without food for the whole day. 
Individual daily bread rations were cut to the minimum that would sustain life and 
people had to queue for hours to get their ration. Every time people went for their 
rations, they would be up to three or four hours in a queue, and people talked. They 
would relay their experiences of a raid, or talk about food and the different things you 
could do to stretch rations. The life histories show that the lack of bread and the experi-
ence of getting it went beyond the issue of consumption. For some people this marked 
the first time they had experienced real humiliation and a loss of dignity. The need to 
secure bread rations and the fear of being caught by the police for queuing during 
curfew hours were just some of the bad memories of that period. People talked mostly 
about their inability to extend the expected support to their close relatives who came to 
visit them from the rural areas because they were tied by the rations system. 
Cheap and partly subsidized food products at the start of this period were unavailable 
for the poor by the late 1980 when state subsidies on food and price controls were 
removed. Health care, education and transport, which had been free or highly subsi-
dized, had been subjected to large price increases together with a move to introduce pay 
principles. Although food availability did not appear to be a problem, the accessibility 
of food became the issue. Basic foods such as bread, flour, sugar and oil were sold in 
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supermarkets at prices that were beyond the means of those on a low income. People 
went onto limited food supplies to cut food costs. A great deal of effort was spent 
tracking down the best deals and the cheapest food so shopping started to consume 
much more time, particularly for women. Consumption and social services were cut to a 
minimum and some households even resorted to begging to make ends meet. 
People had far more need for a cash income to spend on food and non-food necessi-
ties. Wage labourers and government employees faced difficulties in stretching their 
incomes to meet the increasing prices of basic food and necessities. People in the 
private sector faced an unpredictable and risky time and, to a large extent, households 
had to depend on their own initiative to survive. They were compelled to engage in 
multiple economic activities and household survival was about being able to access new 
activities or put more working time into current ones. When a household had to confront 
the job loss of its main breadwinner or when jobs became less-rewarding financially, 
additional or new jobs were sought. How soon a new (or additional) job was secured as 
well as how profitable it would be were often the decisive matters in a household’s 
survival. Educated or trained workers were able to shift to other relatively profitable 
jobs or combined their job with other types of income-generating activities. Recollec-
tions reveal that new or additional activities did not provide adequate levels of income 
compared to the one lost or they were not able to meet the increasing need for cash. 
Members of poorer households engaged in increased work efforts, undertook multiple 
activities in multiple spaces and, in most cases, withdrew children from education to 
free them for income-earning activities.  
Social capital provided vital support during times of need. This support tended to be 
in the form of loans or contacts that enable people to access jobs. It also became impor-
tant when people were detained or imprisoned for reasons related to their involvement 
in political activities against the system or those related to informal-sector activities. 
However, poorer households have far fewer relationships of this type, and they were 
less able to draw upon informal networks of support provided by the wider family than 
in the past. Many talked about their inability to repay loans and reciprocate favours, 
which affected their ability to secure loans and other support. Some reported asking 
local government authorities for help in matters relating to land, educational or medical 
subsidies, but to no avail. The rural base provided critical support for those living in the 
city. People who had relatives in rural areas received support such as food grains and 
dried vegetables and fruits. People also sent their families to their rural base to cut down 
on their high living costs in the city but as rural areas were suffering an even more 
severe crisis, this support gradually decreased or diminished. After the mid-1980s, those 
who had close dependants in rural areas were expected to support them during the slack 
season and host them if they come to the city in search of temporary or permanent work. 
These trends imposed a huge burden on the limited resources of poorer households in 
the city.  
Tenants suffered the most due to increases in rent. Co-residing with family-related 
households was possible for short periods but as time went by people had to search for 
independent options. A strategy that was frequently used to cut down on rent costs was 
to relocate to an informal settlement and make a temporary or permanent shelter and 
reside there.  
When people from the city came to the neighbourhoods studied for the first time, the 
areas were made up of a few shacks made of boxes and sticks. Later on, the houses that 
were built were so small that they resembled small huts. Those who were government 
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employees or ex-government employees saw their residence in the neighbourhood as a 
temporary situation that would change when things got better. Women suffered the most 
because of a lack of water and electricity. Children found it difficult to access schools in 
the surrounding areas due to the high cost of transport or a lack of it. On arriving in the 
neighbourhood, the majority had few assets. They continued their former work activities 
in the city, while searching for new opportunities in the areas adjacent to the neighbour-
hood. Those who retired from government jobs depended mainly on their retirement 
fund but were also better off than the majority in the community. 
 
Massara’s story 
Massara (AP) is a 54-year-old Shaigeeia5 woman. She sells food in front of different schools 
and markets in Siriha and she weaves and sells baskets during the school holidays. Massara 
is a divorcee and has 9 children most of them are grown up and still living with her in the 
same house. When she was 12 she got married to Sabeel, a man whose parents lived in her 
village in northern Sudan, and came to live with him in Khartoum in 1958. Musara never 
went to school as there was no school in her village and she was never given any education 
beyond studying the Koran. Her husband Sabeel was a low-paid worker in the Ministry of 
Agriculture. The wage he got was barely enough to maintain the livelihood of his family. 
However during the early 1980s, the family had to struggle even more to meet their 
household needs. Inflation imposed a great burden on Sabeel’s family not only in terms of 
the cost of food and rent but also in terms of other necessities such as medical bills and 
education-related expenses. Sabeel’s parents in the village also expected him to remit from 
time to time. In turn, Sabeel received remittance once or twice a year from his rural base in 
the form of dried fruits and grains, which helped a great deal during difficult times.  
The salary Sabeel received in 1984 could barely last the family for two weeks, food alone 
wiped out the entire salary. Remittances from the rural areas became rare. Although Sabeel 
was brought up in a tradition where women’s work is considered unworthy, as the situation 
worsened he had no choice but to allow Massara to undertake income-earning activities 
outside the home. Massara weaved baskets and sold them to neighbours as well as in the 
nearby market. Her earnings were low and many days she would not sell any thing at all. 
Whatever earnings Massara made was used to buy food either for the entire family or for the 
smaller children only. The family was not able to pay the rent for the two-room house they 
occupied so they were eventually kicked out of the house and had to look for an alternative. 
Since it was not feasible for them to rent, the decision was taken by Sabeel to send Massara 
and the children back to the village. All the families’ belongings were sold to cover the cost 
of the trip back to the village, and to finance their initial stay there in 1986. Sabeel remained 
with two of his older sons in the city. In the village Massara and her children stayed with her 
in-laws and worked in agriculture with them. In return, they she received grain, dates and 
shelter. In the city her husband moved to the outskirts of Khartoum where he erected a shack 
and lived with his sons. His sons were doing different jobs in the informal sector. Sabeel 
continued his work at the Ministry while also sneaking few hours from work to work as a 
loader in the nearby market. The two branches of the family maintained close relations with 
each other. The city branch sent the village a cash payment early in the agricultural season 
and the village branch sent the city dried vegetables and fruits after the harvest season in 
October. Sabeel came to visit his family in the village once a year and brought with him 
clothes, sugar and medicine for the sick. He also took his third son to the city and found him 
a job with his older brothers.  
The family maintained this arrangement, for about nine years despite the mounting 
pressure on each side due to price increases and their inability to feed a large family. During 
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this time the family income was hit by the older son’s alcohol addiction because whatever he 
earned was used to support his addiction. To make things worse, in 1992 Sabeel was re-
trenched with several other workers. Sabeel tried his best to find another regular job while 
maintaining his informal job, but didn’t succeed. He had limited skills and education to 
compete for better jobs. With the redundancy money Sabeel received, he bought a donkey 
and cart and worked in transporting water in Al Baraka. The income he received was very 
small and variable and he was not able to send money to his family in the village. At the 
same time, flooding kept sweeping through the village and its surrounding area and this hit 
agricultural production there. The smaller children were no longer going to school and there 
were no jobs available for them. It became impossible for the family in the village to 
maintain its livelihood, let alone send remittance to the family in the city.  
In 1994 Massara decided to join her husband and sons in the city where she and her 
children could earn cash. She took the older children with her, leaving three of her younger 
ones with their grandparents. Her in-laws were happy to see her go so they lent her money 
for transport. In the city the whole family stayed in the shack that Sabeel and his sons had 
built. Her 12-year-old son joined his three older brothers and father in the informal sector. 
Massara started her day by looking for wage employment in the nearby agricultural projects. 
Most days she were not successful as demand for this type of job was very high, and 
supervisors preferred to employ women who had worked on the project before. Massara also 
weaved mats and baskets and sold them at the market. Her work was less rewarding than the 
men’s work. Five or six days would pass without her selling anything at all. She wanted to 
go to the main city to sell her products but the transport costs were too high. Her two 
daughters were not able to find job since they had never had any education. Massara 
depended for her living and that of her two daughters on her sons and her husband. This put 
great pressure on the men in the household. When her younger son became critically ill with 
malaria, there was no money for his treatment, Massara asked the local authorities for help 
but she got nothing. As most of their relatives and friends were just as poor as themselves, 
the family could not borrow money. Sabeel sold the donkey and the cart, to meet his son’s 
treatment costs. When his son died Sabeel did not have the money for a funeral but a 
religious NGO helped cover the cost.  
Their life as one family afterwards was characterized by continuous conflict and stress. 
Their situation was complicated further as their shack was razed by government bulldozers a 
year after their arrival in the city. The family did not have much inside the shack but Massara 
lost the opportunity to work on the irrigated project. The family moved to the industrial area 
and constructed a shelter from sacks and sticks. Sabeel and his sons resumed work or 
searching for daily work in the area. Massara also looked for jobs but could not find 
anything. She begged sometimes and got food for her daughters. Living in the new area 
allowed the family to search or to undertake daily work without incurring transport costs. 
They rarely went hungry at this time but five months later, their shack was again destroyed 
by the authorities. The family moved to Siriha in 1996 where they constructed a small shack 
from sacks and sticks. Massara sought work within the neighbourhood, such as making kisra 
(traditional bread) or helping wealthy neighbours with domestic chores. After a long working 
day, she would come home with a little kisra and no cash. Sabeel and two of his sons were 
mostly hired by wealthy neighbours to do different jobs, such as house maintenance, 
operating water carts or selling cigarettes, candy and toys in the city. However at the end of 
the day they were paid a small amount of money that was barely sufficient to feed one 
person. At times when they lost their merchandises to the local authorities, their employers 
would demand they work for free until they could pay back the cost of the merchandise lost. 
The men in the household contributed very little to the subsistence of the family. Their 
contribution was confined to occasional small sacks of grains or sugar and tea. After a long 
working day, the family only shared the shelter; the men ate outside home and Massara and 
her daughters shared what she had been able to get. When Massara was not able to secure 
food for her daughters and she asked her sons or husband for money, they would get angry 
 229
and quarrel with her. On one of these occasions, Sabeel decided to leave home and start a 
new life of his own without such obligations. He divorced Massara and left. Although his 
contribution had not been that great, after he left and her sons had loans to repay due to lost 
merchandise, Massara and her daughters suffered the most. However, all of a sudden 
Massara’s daughters found rewarding jobs in the city although she did not know the 
whereabouts or the nature of their work. Massara’s sons suspected that their sisters were 
working as prostitutes, which led to continuous violence against the two girls who had to 
stay at home for days until their wounds healed. The money Massara and her two daughters 
made was usually used to buy the household’s daily food but the alcoholic son often forced 
them to give him their money or he would beat them up and threatens to kill them. Massara 
and the girls would go without food sometimes. Massara turned to the popular committee 
and to the police for protection against her son’s violence but she was asked to discipline her 
daughters first, and no words were directed at the boys. When the two girls were able to 
work, they gave most of their income to their mother and kept a little for transport. Although 
her sons were no longer contributing to the households on the grounds that their sisters were 
not behaving well, they still shared whatever food is available in the house before any of the 
women did. Massara’s income improved and she was selling food in front of schools and 
during the school holiday she could afford to take transport to sell in the market. Although 
from time to time she faced harassment from the municipality and on two occasions she lost 
all her merchandise, she saw that her income was improving. Massara sent a little cash to her 
in-laws who were keeping the rest of her children in the village. Massara’s goal was to be 
able to buy land, build a mud house and bring her children from the village to live with her. 
However, she was worried that she would never be able to fulfil such a goal given her 
difficult circumstances. However, with her daughters’ earnings and the profit she made from 
selling food, Massara managed to save some money and bought a plot of land on the edge of 
a new development area in 2006. She erected a shack on it and moved with her family. Later 
on, she expanded the house by adding 2 mud rooms and a toilet. She also brought her 
children from the rural areas and one of them is enrolled in primary school. For Massara, her 
biggest achievement was brining her children from the village and sending one of them to 
school, something that she could not dream of before. Although Massara now has better 
financial resources and manages to save a little, she and her daughters feel deeply sad, 
unhappy and rejected. On her own initiative, Massara decided to avoid any close contacts 
with people around her for fear of rejection and stigmatization due to her daughters’ sex 
work. Massara is also scarred due to her previous experience in Siriha when she faced daily 
rejection, accusations, abuse and contempt by the community, to the extent of being thrown 
out of the neighbourhood by angry wealthy neighbours who refused to have sex workers 
living next to their ‘respectable’ families. Even within the households and at different times, 
Massara’s sons and brothers-in-law either urge the two girls to make Zawage Oorfie (tempo-
rary marriage) as a kind of cover for their work or to commit suicide to prevent bringing 
more shame upon the family. (LH12-S) 
In summary, urban people have employed diverse and complicated methods in 
pursuing their livelihoods. These methods have been affected by several factors over the 
past 25 years but the real decline in respondents’ living conditions started in the late 
1970s as a result of the adoption of Structural Adjustment Policies. However despite the 
detrimental impacts of these policies, life histories reveal that even before the imple-
mentation of SAPs, respondents were existing on a hand-to-mouth basis and wages 
were barely adequate to meet all basic needs let alone setting aside savings for emer-
gencies. People were, therefore, easily pushed into poverty by shocks, trends and 
seasonality.  
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Conclusion 
This chapter has examined both short- and long-term changes in household positions 
and the historical processes that lead to such changes. In particular, it examined the 
major changes for people over different periods, and the effects such events have had on 
their livelihood strategies and the factors that have shaped these processes. It revealed 
the processes that allowed some households to escape poverty and maintain successful 
trajectories, and identified those that hindered others. The route a household takes is 
always governed by the wider structural context, the nature of the institutional environ-
ment, access to various assets and intra-household relations and decision-making proc-
esses. The descent into poverty and long-term or severe poverty for the majority started 
in the early 1980s and has continued through the 1990s until the present. Poverty always 
accompanies losses in the quality of life and the destruction of natural resources when 
people lack the rights and means to respond to changes adequately. Many of the factors 
that have caused households to plunge into poverty have been at play for decades and 
households have always used whatever means they have available to cope with them. 
However, the continuous loss of assets compounded by a lack of opportunity and time 
to rebuild these assets has left some people extremely poor. They have thus suffered 
from cumulative disadvantages and while their current conditions reflect their past, 
poverty tends to be passed on to the next generation. When confronted with more 
changes to their livelihoods, poorer people can no longer employ their traditional coping 
strategies that were pursued and tested over many decades. In the face of adversity, the 
type of strategies they have been able to purse have almost always not been secure or 
sustainable. While the poor have lost their assets before landing in the neighbourhoods 
under study, many government policies continue to deny them the opportunity to 
develop new assets by restricting their access to shelter; markets, infrastructure and 
education. Their new strategies in difficult times have by necessity been determined by 
market forces and contra-poor state policies. In the process of developing new liveli-
hood strategies themselves, some households have been less successful in their endeav-
ours than others. The vulnerability of these households is intimately linked to the 
context of their lack of means to respond adequately to adverse events. 
Overall, livelihood strategies of poorer households were never a result of choice. The 
life histories have highlighted two important factors in their poverty; the constraints on 
their choices, and their diminishing ability to respond and cope with adversity. To 
pursue a certain livelihood strategy, people need to bargain with the different institu-
tions that mediate resources beyond the household. Lack of access to resources was 
detrimental to a household’s response to adversity. The structures of power within the 
society have played a key role in determining people’s access to or exclusion from the 
most vital resources for survival and the route they have eventually taken. Control over 
livelihood resources is mediated through complex identities, power structures or 
disparities and vice versa. Such factors have principally determined roles, rights, and 
obligations for men and women, and influenced actions, perceptions and structured 
opportunities and constraints for livelihood strategies. These factors have become both 
resources for accessing capital, networks and information, as well as, sources of vulner-
ability and exclusion. The groups that apparently had no meaningful strategy in 
response to adversity were made up of women and men from minority ethnic groups 
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who were denied access to political resources and representation in neighbourhood 
governance and were not able to represent themselves or have their voice heard.  
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Summary and conclusions 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The last sixteen years in Sudan have witnessed massive socio-political upheavals that 
have affected people’s lives and livelihoods. Shifts in institutions and ideologies have 
had harsh negative effects on poverty in the country as a whole and in Khartoum, the 
capital, in particular. War and environmental crises have added to the already-existing 
economic crisis. Until recently, poverty was synonymous with rural conditions but the 
rapid urbanization of the country has given rise to a large class of urban poor. 
Government policies have not only failed to improve the rural problems but have 
contributed to undermining peasant economic production systems and the survival of 
natural resources for most Sudanese people. 
As they are more integrated into the cash and wage economies and more dependent 
on food and other social-sector subsidies, the majority of Khartoum’s residents have 
been badly hit. Their access to human and physical capitals, particularly urban services, 
has been significantly reduced. Some groups were already marginalized and these seem 
to have been affected the most by these changes, while others have benefited from their 
intricate networks of kinship and political affiliation. This study set out to investigate 
the options available to poor households to pursue sustainable livelihoods in the light of 
these changes. 
The basic questions investigated included the following:  
1. Who are the poor and who are the better-off? What capital do they have, and 
how do they construct their livelihoods?  
2. What are the key institutions and processes, including rights, that are concerned 
with providing and/or denying access?  
3. What have the major changes been for people in different periods and what 
effects have these had on their livelihood strategies? And what factors have 
shaped these processes?  
By understanding these questions, it is hoped that the research will contribute to the 
understanding of urban livelihood systems in Khartoum within the wider context of 
socio-economic and political processes in Sudan.  
Theoretical background and analytical framework of the study 
This study reviewed key poverty approaches that are relevant to the debate. To start 
with, poverty is conceptualized as a dynamic and multi-dimensional phenomenon that is 
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much broader than income deprivation alone. Poverty results not only from a lack of 
material resources but essentially from constraints on people’s capacities and choices, 
which leads to increased vulnerability. The study conceptualizes poverty in terms of 
vulnerability or the inability of people to respond adequately to shocks and hazards. A 
variety of economic, social and environmental concerns makes an individual or group 
vulnerable or at greater risk of social ills. The notion of vulnerability thus goes beyond 
mere exposure to shocks and hazard and underlies people’s capacity to deal successfully 
with them. There is an intrinsic and reinforcing relationship between poverty and 
vulnerability, and vulnerability can be both a cause and a symptom of poverty. This 
suggests that the prospect of lower well-being is associated with greater vulnerability. 
Vulnerability and subsequent deprivation in any form are linked to the imbalance of 
power relations in a specific society and influence people’s capacity to make full use of 
the resources available to them. In this regard, social exclusion can generate and 
increase people’s vulnerability. 
The concept of social exclusion is seen as enabling to understand relations of power 
and control, and underlies the process through which some groups in society are 
marginalized and impoverished. Exclusion occurs to certain groups, often the ones with 
marginal significance to those who hold the economic and political power. Excluded 
individuals usually have certain social traits that locate them outside the dominant social 
and political power. Disadvantaged groups with less-favoured traits (class, ethnicity, 
religion, gender etc.) who are denied the opportunities available to others to enhance 
their livelihoods are likely to become less able to respond to shocks and trends.  
Social exclusion places centre stage questions such as who the excluded are, what 
exactly they are excluded from and who the formal and informal custodians of mem-
bership and inclusion are. The terms on which people gain access to resources are 
always linked to issues of power distribution within a society. Institutions and behaviour 
that reproduce and enforce prevailing social attitudes and values, particularly those of 
powerful actors in society, work to exclude some people. Hence, vulnerability and 
subsequent deprivation in any form are intrinsically linked to the imbalance of power 
relations in a specific society that restricts people’s capacity to make full use of the 
resources available to them. 
The social exclusion of the poor and their lack of power in relation to the powerful in 
society clearly indicate the need to create new mechanisms to enable them to regain 
power and control over their destiny. It has been argued that the fundamental shift and 
transformation of power for the poor starts with the poor themselves. The extent to 
which the poor are able to combat social exclusion is determined by factors within 
themselves (agency) as well as by societal factors. The poor’s consciousness/under-
standing (power within) is seen as a prerequisite for effecting change not only on the 
individual level but also at a group or collective level. The study is anchored in the 
premise that questions of empowerment require being located within the individual 
actor’s social, cultural and historical context. Poor people cannot successfully change 
the rules without power enshrined in formal institutions. In this context, it is also useful 
to distinguish empowerment, in the sense of actors’ capacities from rights. Rights can 
empower the poor and marginalized groups to combat social exclusion on an empow-
ered footing. Hence rights and empowerment approaches can be mutually supportive. 
It is in this sense that the concepts of vulnerability and social exclusion were used to 
construct a more comprehensive understanding of the factors underlying relative disad-
vantage, disparities and the well-being of the poor in Sudan. 
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To better understand the factors that influence people’s livelihoods in the urban 
context, this thesis discusses the specific nature of urban livelihoods and the context-
specific vulnerabilities of the urban poor. It also highlights the interrelationships be-
tween urban and rural livelihoods in order to understand the particular constraints that 
the urban poor face in maintaining their livelihoods. Wages and employment are crucial 
to livelihood sources for the urban poor and the chief dimension in their vulnerability is 
the issue of labour markets, for example, insecurity of employment and/or casual labour. 
Several constraints are imposed here by both the national and international context. A 
lack of economic opportunities and the blocking of channels through which people are 
equipped with capacities that allow them to seize opportunities is very important in this 
respect. Housing and tenure security are also identified as a source of vulnerability. It 
has been argued that housing is a key asset to the urban poor but it can also become a 
key source of vulnerability. Ownership of, or secure access to, housing is central to 
ensuring access to other resources, such as income-generating activities, education and 
health, as well as political rights such as being able to vote. However, overlapping land 
rights and the plurality of property systems and institutions create conditions of in-
creased vulnerability. Housing vulnerability is often magnified by a general lack of 
access to urban services. State provision is important to the urban poor but is subject to 
local and national political processes. State machineries can be biased and are likely to 
replicate wider social powers so that socially excluded groups are also less likely to gain 
access to social services offered by the state. Informal provision is mostly inadequate or 
expensive. Social-service provision in poor areas is mostly undertaken by NGOs that 
are largely funded from external sources. The thesis looked at the role of social 
networks (in particular grassroots organizations) and the extent to which they are able to 
penetrate and mobilize urban communities. It was argued that this role is dependant on 
various political actors and their different vested interests, goals and ideals. Problems of 
plurality, polarization and conflict of interests are all part and parcel of the existence of 
social networks. In Africa, due to factors related to the political context, grassroots 
organizations are less able to represent the interests of the urban poor. Hence, solid net-
works of civic involvement are not a sign or a source of definite support. For all these 
reasons, the options for the urban poor become extremely limited due to their lack of 
support mechanisms. 
The sustainable livelihoods approach is considered more relevant to the study of 
urban livelihoods. Therefore, the thesis reviewed this approach and highlighted the 
points that make it relevant to the study. In addition, a framework for analyzing poverty 
in Khartoum was formulated and the methodological approach was presented. Concep-
tualizing poverty, as mentioned above, provided the guiding principles informing the 
study of poverty in the context of Khartoum. The tool through which such an under-
standing was translated into practical steps is the sustainable livelihoods framework. It 
was argued that this approach is flexible and dynamic and focuses on aspects that most 
matter to people in a holistic manner and provides a tool for understanding the con-
straints on achieving them. The approach also takes into account the interrelationship 
between forms of vulnerability of the poor and the systems of support available to them 
to deal with negative situations successfully.  
While the sustainable livelihoods approach is just one tool for examining the main 
aspects related to poverty, it is not the only approach and it needs to be adapted to suit 
local circumstances as well as to overcome some of its perceived shortcomings. While 
this approach’s main elements have guided the study, other issues, which are not 
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covered explicitly by the SL framework but impact on poverty, were incorporated in the 
adapted framework. It has been argued that the existence of capitals is not enough for 
households to build sustainable livelihoods but what is critical is accessibility to these 
capitals and this is largely determined by power and politics. These factors were made 
explicit within the modified framework that also reflects on the specific characteristics 
of urban situations, taking on board the key contextual factors that are specific to urban 
areas. It treats them as mutually interrelated in the final outcome of poverty.  
With respect to the methodology of the study, Participatory Poverty Analysis (PPA) 
methods were used for data collection and analysis. This is in line with the framework 
that seeks to understand the opinions and analysis of members of the community, and 
especially poorer men and women, in matters that concern their own realities and their 
ideas about ways of addressing these issues. Four neighbourhoods were selected to 
monitor the diversity and dynamics of livelihood activities and possibly compare 
patterns. The study then chose to explore the full continuum of well-being levels within 
the communities under study. Households were classified into four broad levels of well-
being: those who are ‘Always Poor’ (tabaneen) and usually require assistance to cope; 
the ‘Sometimes Poor’ or (nus nus); the ‘Medium Poor’ (wasat) and finally the ‘Non-
Poor’ (murtaheen). This classification relied mostly on the type and stability of 
employment and the duration of poverty as the most important criteria. Using a strati-
fied sampling technique, 70 households were selected from each neighbourhood, repre-
senting these levels of well-being. Various techniques were used including a household 
survey, a community survey, focus-group discussions and interviews. Interviews and 
meetings were semi-structured and open-ended questions and topics for discussion were 
prepared in advance. In-depth life history interviews, which provided a retrospective 
view of trajectories of change, were conducted with 40 households representing the four 
well-being categories. The life history interviews were geared towards generating 
information about what had determined certain routes in individuals’ lives and the 
availability or absence of options. Officials and leaders of mass organizations at district 
and provincial level were interviewed. Secondary data was collected at different levels, 
notably local statistics and provincial strategy documents. Both qualitative and quanti-
tative data were generated. Collective perceptions and estimates obtained from partici-
pants’ own life experiences formed the basis of the analysis. On-site analysis was made 
by the participants through visual diagrams, maps, matrices and calendars. 
Context of the study 
It was argued in Chapter 1 that the challenges facing Sudan cannot be separated from 
those facing the African content as a whole. These include environmental degradation, 
war and conflict, the HIV/AIDS pandemic, malaria and other diseases, and the chal-
lenges of democracy and good governance. With the powerful forces of globalization 
moving fast in running the macro-economics of the continent, it has become crucial for 
African states to reshape their economic system and address the importance of sustain-
able poverty reduction. 
Although Sudan is endowed with rich natural resources, the country has been unsuc-
cessful in using these in an efficient and equitable way. Poverty in Sudan is largely a 
result of structural factors; particularly those that influence modes of ownership, 
production and distribution of productive capitals, each with its own dynamics. Ill-
conceived development policies that neglected rural development, erratic macro-econo-
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mic polices and poor management of resources have set the Sudanese economy on a 
downward spiral. Furthermore, land-tenure systems have allowed inequitable land 
distribution among different groups. The scarcity of productive land and mounting 
demographic pressures have transformed land into a highly sensitive issue along ethnic, 
intra-ethnic and class-lines. Five decades of marginalization, mismanagement, military 
rule, corruption, patronages and the alienation of civil-society organizations from 
participating in the country’s affairs have contributed to intensifying conflict and war in 
different parts of the country. However, prospects for peace grew stronger with the 
signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that recognizes southern 
Sudan's right to self-determination. However, the success of the CPA and its imple-
mentation may be judged by its capacity not only to deliver peace and security but also 
to effect radical social change through an informed, critical and active citizenry.  
This study was conducted in Greater Khartoum, the largest and most affluent city in 
Sudan. Chapter 3 provided background information on the city, pointing out that 
Khartoum city has seen steady population growth since the colonial era, although most 
of this growth has occurred in the last two decades. Population growth has been the 
result of an increased influx of people pushed out of their home areas by civil strife, the 
collapse of the peasant farming economy and successive waves of drought and desertifi-
cation. As in other cities affected by the crisis, the poor gravitated toward those areas 
where some wealth still existed. Poorer populations have settled illegally on government 
land in informal squatter settlements where they face problems relating to the availabil-
ity and accessibility of water, health and education services and unequal access to these 
services, especially for the poor and women. This massive urban migration has fuelled 
poverty and congestion, and has placed a huge strain on the city’s traditional infrastruc-
ture and service-delivery system. The mass relocation to Khartoum took place in a 
context of declining employment opportunities in the formal sector and agriculture and 
with no industrial jobs emerging to fill the gap. In addition, the cost of living for 
families in Khartoum has continued to rise substantially, resulting in tighter conditions 
for workers whose incomes on average are only a fraction of the nominal cost of living.  
Four neighbourhoods were selected for the study and their characteristics were 
discussed in Chapter 7. Although the neighbourhoods share common features; they are 
also intrinsically unequal and different. They are located over a wide and complex 
geographical area on the outskirts of Greater Khartoum. They were not officially in-
cluded in the city structure and thus there is no provision of basic urban services – 
water, electricity, sewers or paved roads – except in small areas. Some of these neigh-
bourhoods have become partially formal although there are also variations in terms of 
the size of the formalized space in each neighbourhood. Houses in these neighbour-
hoods are made mainly from mud and thatch and many have used flimsy scrounged 
materials such as plastic sheets, cardboard or scrap metal or the cheapest construction 
materials for roofing. However, their appearance has significantly changed during the 
course of the study (2003-2007), with improvements in the way people build their 
houses and the overall appearance of the neighbourhoods.  
Major findings and contributions to the debate  
Policies, institutions and processes were discussed in Chapter 7. The inhabitants of the 
four neighbourhoods are mainly the poor working in the informal sector, many of whom 
lack titles or deeds to the plots of land they occupy. Their access to productive assets 
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and livelihood opportunities is mediated by a complex matrix of formal and informal 
policies, institutions and processes that work to create opportunities and/or constraints 
on access to resources in numerous ways. These include; localities (Mahalyat), Popular 
Committees (PCs), and regulations on small-scale and micro-enterprises, Zakat (Social 
Development Fund), the land-tenure system, NGOs and community-based organizations 
(CBOs), traditional headmen, ethnicity and gender. 
The informal or illegal status of the poor limits their rights to influence formal politi-
cal processes. Land tenure is one of the major institutions that affect people’s liveli-
hoods and to which they attach high importance. However, legalizing land involves high 
costs that are required one instalment and is beyond the capacity of the poor. In 
addition, it involves complex and bureaucratic procedures. Therefore, the only option 
available to the poor is informal land and housing that may well be prone to demolition 
without compensation. Most poor people undertake their livelihood activities without 
proper permits and have no legal status. These groups become exposed to fines under 
the Public Order Act and the 2001 Act that specifies fines and taxes on small businesses 
as well as procedures for legalizing activities. This Act has concentrated mostly on the 
treatment of negative manifestations of informal activities rather than their root causes. 
The Act’s application has effectively deprived the poor of their hard-earned income and 
savings, and every possible source of livelihood. The lack of an efficient and reliable 
social safety net to protect households from a loss of assets, unemployment and poverty 
has left poor people without any form of support. The only government-run safety net, 
Zakat, did not help the poor to overcome difficult times or rebuild their lost assets. 
Neighbourhood residents lack the means to participate in decisions that affect their 
lives. By virtue of their marginalization and exclusion, the poor are not represented in 
decision-making bodies. When they were included; it was only to legitimize the 
decision and policy process rather than to genuinely listen to their opinions or allow 
them some control over their lives. The cosmetic participation of the community is 
undertaken through the appointed PCs and supporting the traditional powers of the 
headmen within the communities. The locality is the main formal institution that is 
concerned with the direct governance of the neighbourhoods through the PCs. The 
localities are not able to fill the role of the community institution responsible for 
programme design and service delivery. What characterizes their governance of the 
neighbourhoods are centralization and penetration. Centralization has allowed control 
over the economy and the political system, while penetration has enabled control down 
to the neighbourhood level. The locality’s staff and leadership from the lowest level to 
the top are controlled by the central authority. Operating within a very limited budget, 
with low-capacity human resources and being accountable only to their hierarchical 
superiors, the localities are not in a position to respond to local needs nor to tap into 
local traditions of cooperation and participation. 
Compared to the rest of the city, the classic form of governance has undergone 
significant transformations within the neighbourhoods. There is a clear move away from 
an increased role by the state in the city, towards systems of ethnicity and traditional 
leaders in running everyday affairs in the neighbourhoods. These traditional authorities 
have a formal nature that they are assigned by formal state institutions and are given the 
mandate in some critical domains. However, they are deprived of any autonomy through 
policies of state corporatism. Traditional headmen in the community uphold and 
maintain the status quo because they are aware that they will lose power and authority 
unless they adapt their institution to accommodate the mandate of the broader political 
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context. PCs too are created by the state as a mechanism of cooption and controlled 
inclusion and there is, therefore, no space for popular participation. The power and 
authority of PCs and traditional headmen have helped institutionalize rigid hierarchical 
patterns of political participation, excluding large segments of the population from 
economic and political power. Several NGOs are working in the areas, substituting the 
diminishing role of the state. However, the potentially constructive influence of these 
networks has been hard to realize under the strong control of the state and the weakness 
of these organization. Some CBOs have been successful in penetrating and mobilizing 
the community but they have not been successful in making demands on the state or 
influencing state actions. 
Gender and ethnicity are important determinants to the way populations are included 
or excluded from societal resources, power and opportunities. Gender is defined by 
practices and ideologies, and in interaction with other structures of social relations such 
as class, and ethnicity. In general, it denotes an unequal division of labour, power, 
responsibilities and rights between men and women. On the other hand, ethnicity results in 
an extremely heterogeneous and complex mixture of the population, with extreme 
disparity in social status. These have provided the base of everyday interaction between 
people as well as a means to access political and economic resources. 
The thesis provides an in-depth overview of the basic characteristics of the sample 
households and the quality of the capitals they have and their livelihood activities. It 
addresses the question of: who the poor are and who the better-off are. It also considers 
what capitals they have and how they construct their livelihoods. The analysis started by 
enumerating the characteristics of different well-being categories proposed by the 
communities. These categories were set with reference to the ways people make their 
livelihoods and the security or vulnerability of their efforts. Security of tenure also 
supported such categorization. People’s classifications of their households into different 
well-being categories reflected social differentiation and the inequalities between people 
within neighbourhoods. It also reveals strong linkages between poverty and the compo-
sition of households in terms of gender, ethnicity and age. The ‘Always Poor’ are 
mainly made up of households that belong to minority ethnic groups, are headed by a 
woman and have more young members in them. The ‘Non-Poor’ are predominantly 
made up of households that belong to dominant ethnic groups, headed by males and 
have fewer dependent members within them. While the ‘Sometimes Poor’ group may 
share some of the characteristics of the ‘Always Poor’ households, they may have other 
measures that lessen their vulnerability.  
The vulnerability of households is closely related to livelihood activities and, in 
particular, is closely related to being informally employed, being a woman, being a 
child and being poor. For each of the poverty categories, there are specific sets of 
vulnerabilities that are imposed by the nature of the work and people’s access to various 
capitals, which may have provided them with varying degrees of livelihood sustainabil-
ity. Better-off households have a larger portfolio of capitals and men’s stocks of capitals 
are bigger than women’s. Interlocking social relations produce poverty amongst women 
and processes that constrain the range of opportunities these women can draw on. 
Hence, the economic contribution women make does not materialize into better well-
being of their household. Therefore, households headed by females are much poorer 
than households headed by males within the same groups due to their lack of access to 
male portfolios. Poorer households have lower human capital due to multiple barriers to 
health care and education. These households also have extremely low valuable physical 
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capitals and lack tenure security. Average household income differs across categories 
and these differences, combined with lower unpredictable and fluctuating incomes from 
the informal sector activities, help to explain the nature of the vulnerability faced by the 
poor. Poorer households, and particularly the ‘Always Poor’, have generated a largest 
proportion of their income from casual and self-employments in the informal sector. But 
these sources are neither steady nor predictable. The exclusionary economic setting 
ensures that women and some minority ethnic groups’ activities remain very limited or 
confined to menial, difficult and hazardous work that makes it even harder for them to 
gain access to the resources they need to earn a living. Better-off households generate a 
higher percentage of their household income from regular employment, regulated self-
employment, pensions, assets and remittances. Incomes obtained by poorer households 
are often inadequate and indeed too little to maintain a household’s livelihood, cope 
with emergencies or pursue small investments. In addition, poorer households lack the 
types of capital that could be liquidated to cope with adversities. Low income has made 
it necessary for workers from these households to carry out multiple activities and 
involve more household members in their livelihood activities. Household levels of 
poverty often compel children to work, in most cases, undertaking work that is not 
appropriate for their age and maturity. This work traps them in a destructive cycle of 
exhausting tasks and does not allow them access to formal education, let alone recrea-
tion. Evidence points to the intergenerational dimensions of social exclusion: extensive 
barriers to essential livelihood capitals today predict the continued social exclusion and 
poverty of these households in the future too.  
Borrowing by ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ households was almost always 
linked to meeting emergency consumption needs, healthcare expenses, school expenses 
and, most importantly, meeting the expenses of building and rebuilding their shelters. 
They therefore, confront an unprecedented level of debt that makes them not only less 
equipped to deal with the current situation but also vulnerable to even harder shocks in 
the future. They have the fewest choice in terms of livelihoods strategies and thus are 
the most vulnerable when confronted with adversity. Poorer households have the least 
capitals and the most unpredictable activities. On the other hand, better-off households 
are relatively in a better position in terms of capital holdings and activities. 
The analysis identified the reasons preventing poorer households from accessing 
important capitals and thus determining the type of livelihood strategies they can 
pursue. It addressed questions about key institutions and processes including rights 
concerned with providing and/or denying access. It has been argued that the role of 
institutions and policies are critical to the livelihood strategies of the poor, where PIPs 
often operate on the basis of having a dahar, or having strong ties with more powerful 
individuals within and beyond one’s neighbourhood who could provide access to 
various livelihood assets. The basic and most important ones are family ties, which 
provide the crucial social safety net. However, it is almost always those social relations 
beyond the immediate family that typically count for meaningful support. Access to 
various livelihood resources has been a determining factor in the vulnerability of house-
holds. Access to resources is interlinked. Several critical assets that are needed to pursue 
a livelihood or to decrease vulnerability, such as health, education and skills, are 
dependent on access to a range of household assets (e.g. access to financial, social 
capital as well as physical assets). 
Access to financial capitals varies between different categories. The ‘Always Poor’ 
have small and unpredictable financial resources from casual work, unregulated busi-
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nesses and occasional food donations. This is in contrast with ‘Non-Poor’ households 
that have stable sources of income driven from employment, a pension, regulated busi-
nesses and/or remittances. On the other hand, the ‘Sometimes Poor’ have fluctuating 
sources of income from employment, food donations and Zakat. This differs from the 
‘Medium Poor’ poor who have stable sources of income coming from employment, a 
pension, regulated or unregulated businesses and remittances. Borrowing helps house-
holds overcome different types of shocks and stresses but the majority lack access to 
formal borrowing, savings and insurance services. Unlike the ‘Non-Poor’, the ‘Always 
Poor’ experience increased difficulties in securing loans through informal financial 
systems within neighbourhoods. Their loans were mostly in kind and linked to labour or 
other conditions. The ‘Sometimes Poor’ were more successful in securing cash loans 
compared to the ‘Always Poor’. 
Different households have different access to a water supply, health care, education, 
energy, transport, security and justice. Within the four neighbourhoods, there is an 
almost total reliance on private operators and the informal provision of essential 
services. Informality of service and land delivery often increase costs for the poor. 
However, the ‘Always Poor’ have neither the income to purchase them or the access to 
services subsidized by the NGOs or the government. For example, while ‘Non-Poor’ 
households own an in-house tap or were able to buy clean water, the ‘Always Poor’ 
could only access water from unreliable public hand pumps or by borrowing or begging 
from neighbours. A lack of financial and social resources often forces these households 
to use unsafe water, which results in increased ill health and disease. Ill health was 
accentuated by a lack of access to services that help preserve a healthy environment, 
particularly sanitation. Many individuals from poorer households could not access 
health care when they needed to because they could not afford it. When they sought 
medical help, this often overstrained their budget and impacted on their ability to pursue 
sustainable livelihoods. None of the ‘Always Poor’ households have electricity, while 
all the ‘Non-Poor’ and some of the ‘Medium Poor’ households have access to electric-
ity. Lack of access to modern energy services forced poorer households to resort to 
more expensive and less efficient alternative sources and this impacted negatively on 
their health and produced increased environmental damage.  
Unlike members of ‘Non-Poor’ households, the ‘Always Poor’ were held back by 
transport problems from accessing work opportunities, education and literacy pro-
grammes, health care and contacts beyond the neighbourhood. Although the ‘Non-Poor’ 
live in the same neighbourhood, they were usually centrally located, closer to transport 
roots and were able to regularly get to work and school. The ‘Always Poor’ live in the 
remote corners of the neighbourhoods, and could just walk or divide the journey 
between different means of transport, and were only able to access jobs and schools 
within the neighbourhood. The children of the ‘Always Poor’ and ‘Sometimes Poor’ 
categories were disadvantaged in terms of their access to education. With the high cost 
of education, many are not attending school, dropping out or not being able to fully 
benefit from the opportunity of being at school.  
The tenure status of the ‘Always Poor’ is always not secure; they live in small, 
makeshift and unsafe dwellings that are extremely prone to weather conditions. Though 
the ‘Sometimes Poor’ may live in similar conditions, they were able to access safe 
and/or legal shelters for longer period of times than the ‘Always Poor’. On the other 
hand, it was evident that the legal right to land has resulted in increased security and 
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livelihood opportunities for the ‘Non-Poor’ and ‘Medium Poor’ households, allowing 
them to pursue long-term livelihood strategies and maximize their incomes.  
The presence and operation of regulatory constraints on small businesses have 
varying impacts on households in the different well-being categories. The state often 
abused poorer people’s civil rights and deliberately deprived them of possible means of 
livelihood. The ‘Always Poor’ category has frequent contact with the police and the 
legal system due to their informal status concerning land and activities. Although the 
‘Medium Poor’ may practise activities in the informal sector they were able to come up 
with pay-offs to avoid punishment. On the other hand, the ‘Non-Poor’ had less contact 
with the police and the legal system and when they did they were able to defend them-
selves and to take their cases to court. In addition, both the ‘Medium Poor’ and ‘Non-
Poor’ were able to access informal means of justice within their communities. The 
notion of gender provides important insight into the social and power relations that 
govern access to and the use of resources. Women across the well-being categories – 
including the ‘Non-Poor’ – were the most unprotected and discriminated against in the 
face of the law. They confront numerous barriers in securing a redress of their griev-
ances through the legal system. Overall, the absence of a culture of rights is worsened 
by the structural constraints that prevent the translation of formal rights, even poorly 
defined, into actual rights that will be applied and respected. 
The differences that exist between the different well-being categories can be verified 
in terms of the existence and levels of social and political resources a household 
commands. ‘Always Poor’ households are less able to speak for themselves, have fewer 
and weaker social networks, and no formal institutions and collectives to draw on. Some 
of the networks they could access have acted as an obstacle, locking them in unequal 
patronage relationships, and further increasing their vulnerability. At the other end of 
the scale, ‘Non-Poor’ households have more influential members who are able to make 
beneficial relations that provide credit and were able to make decisions for themselves 
and others. While the ‘Sometimes Poor’ could rely on supportive networks to a limited 
extent, the ‘Medium Poor’ were able to make beneficial relations and speak up for 
themselves and express their opinions. Individual biography and life events are relevant 
to a household’s ability to access resources. Women tend to suffer decreased access to 
resources than men within their respective categories. Therefore, household vulnerabil-
ity tend to decrease or increase according to the gender of the household head. More-
over, individuals who belong to social groups whose ethnicity and culture enjoy the 
least amount of recognition, influence and power in society (the ‘Always Poor’) suffer 
more access failure than others. Access to resources is almost completely dependent on 
the household’s social position in the community, with ethnic and gender identities 
being very influential factors. Such identities principally determine the amount of social 
and political capital necessary to access resources and cope with adversity. Based on the 
above, the livelihood strategies followed by poorer households offer lower returns and 
no upward social mobility. 
Chapter 10 examined the historical pathways of 40 different households in an at-
tempt to understand how they navigated their way through institutional environments. It 
considered the major changes for people in different periods and what effects these have 
had on their livelihood strategies and the factors have shaped these processes. Life 
histories were used to explain factors behind the long- and short-term changes that took 
place over time to shed light on the way power is constituted and reproduced in daily 
life, and how people negotiate within its different levels and structures to attain the best 
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feasible outcome for their livelihoods. This had also helped to understand the processes 
that allowed some households to escape poverty and maintain successful trajectories as 
well as processes that hinder other households. It became clear from the discussion that 
the path that an individual and/or a household takes is determined by a set of interlock-
ing factors. Decent into poverty always accompanied losses in quality of life and the 
destruction of natural resources when people lack the right and means to respond to 
these changes. But these were not a one-time life event, as people continue to experi-
ence intense shocks and crisis. Many government policies continue to deny them the 
opportunity to develop new assets by restricting their access to shelter; markets, infra-
structure and education. Continuous loss of assets, compounded by a lack of opportu-
nity and time to rebuild these assets had left some individuals and groups extremely 
poor.  
In the face of adversity, households at different levels of well-being needed to resort 
to alternative strategies instead of those that had failed. Several livelihood strategies 
were followed by households depending on external as well as internal factors. Some 
households were able to make up the difference through new strategies, and utilizing 
their capitals. These have enabled them to recover more rapidly and to protect them-
selves from further shocks such as the demolition of their house. They managed to 
maintain a relatively successful livelihood trajectory but in the process of developing 
new livelihood strategies, some households were less successful in their endeavours 
than others. The vulnerability of these households was intimately linked to the context 
of their lack of means to respond adequately to adverse events. Overall, the strategies 
these households were able to undertake were characterized by uncertainty and due to 
their insecure rights and access to resources, they tend to generate little return and 
expose people to harmful long-term consequences. While people were aware of this 
outcome, their options were exceedingly constrained. The structures of power within the 
society have played a key role in determining their access to or exclusion from most 
vital resources of survival and the route they eventually take. It is clear that individuals’ 
and households’ abilities to effectively carve new strategy are determined by their 
various identities. Many of the limitations they experienced were imposed by their 
lower social position compared to the other groups in the community. In the face of 
adversity, the type of strategies they are able to purse are almost always neither secure 
nor sustainable. Although some of these strategies allow them to cope in the short run, 
they become more vulnerable in the long term. Their vulnerability keeps changing over 
time according to changes in their employment or access to resources, and shocks and 
trends. They thus suffered from cumulative disadvantage because while their current 
conditions reflected their past, it also tends to be passed on to the next generation.  
As a contribution to the poverty and livelihoods debate, the thesis has succeeded in 
adapting and using a structured and consistent conceptual framework (sustainable 
livelihoods framework) and to successfully developing and implementing research 
methodologies in a complex setting. Since few researches have attempted to examine 
vulnerability in the context of urban Sudan, this study’s contribution is in developing an 
analytical framework that captures the livelihood situation of the urban poor in Sudan, 
and indicates the potential that this can have in informing policy formulation and inter-
ventions.  
The study explored the specific characteristics of the urban poor’s vulnerability 
within key contextual factors that are specific to urban areas as well as people’s ability 
to respond to them adequately. By exploring the way access is negotiated, attained or 
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denied, this thesis has offered insight into the role of power in shaping people’s liveli-
hoods. 
One of the contributions of this study is a deepen understanding of the specific nature 
of interrelationships between different capitals in urban areas and an indication of the 
combinations required for different livelihood strategies. It has also taken into consid-
eration the dynamic and historical context within which various livelihood capitals are 
combined and has demonstrated that the livelihoods of the urban poor are constructed 
from multiple and dynamic portfolios of capitals (and activities).  
More research with concrete findings and realistic recommendations needs to be 
carried out in urban areas to explore the complex linkages and dynamic interactions of 
rural-urban populations and to gain insight into the interdependence and vulnerability of 
the two contexts. 
Policy notes 
The thesis shows that the livelihoods of poor people have been severely constrained by 
both formal and informal institutions. They have not been able to achieve their desired 
outcome due to the lack of an enabling environment that would allow them to access 
capitals and choose the way they want to utilize them. The concept of vulnerability is 
seen as central to this debate. The descent into poverty has always accompanied losses 
in quality of life and the destruction of natural resources when people lacked the rights 
and means to respond adequately to changes. A continuous loss of capitals, com-
pounded by a lack of opportunity and time to rebuild, has left some people extremely 
vulnerable. People became vulnerable not only because they were exposed to adversity 
but also because they did not have the capacity to deal successfully with it. The root 
causes of vulnerability and its return over time reflect the exercise and distribution of 
power in society. The inability of the poor to gain access to essential resources, which 
left them in dire poverty, has always been connected to factors beyond the poor’s 
control since power creates constraints or imposes limits on what people can achieve. 
As society is made up of diverse social groups, the ability of the individuals that belong 
to marginalized groups to access resources is significantly eroded, leaving them more 
vulnerable to poverty than others. The results suggest two important factors that lead to 
poverty: constraints on the choice of livelihood strategies, and a diminishing ability to 
respond to and cope with adversity. Policies geared at reducing poverty need to take 
these factors into consideration. 
In identifying the most important resources that have prevented the poor from trans-
lating their capital base into effective agency, it is necessary to return to the Participa-
tory Poverty Analysis activities and people’s conceptualization of their own priorities. It 
also requires revisiting the basic assumption of this study that overcoming exclusion is, 
basically, in the hands of the poor themselves and a function of their awareness. It has 
been argued that the social exclusion of the poor and their lack of power in relation to 
the more powerful actors in society clearly indicate the need to create new mechanisms 
to enable them to regain power and control over their destiny. It is also believed that, in 
its true sense, empowerment should lead to self-determined change. But that change 
should be made possible by transforming the environment in which poor people operate 
to enable them to build and mobilize their own resources.  
Accordingly, the following policy recommendations suggest two inter-related re-
quirements: the importance of supporting the ‘power within’ of disempowered people 
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and facilitating the building of their inner strength and self-worth, and the need to trans-
form the dominant patterns of access to and control over vital livelihood resources or 
the institutions and structures that reinforce and sustain existing power structures.  
  
1. Challenging the mediating structures that justify social inequality. Empowerment 
should seek to shift political, social and economic power between and among 
individuals and social groups in a way that challenges the ideologies of gender, 
ethnicity and class. The poor would have a greater possibility to influence decision-
making under conditions of good governance (i.e. a system of government and a 
culture of governance that is participatory, inclusive, consensus-oriented, based on 
the rule of law, responsive to the needs of the population, efficient, transparent and 
accountable). At present, radical social change is constrained by the authoritarian 
regime that is based on a vacuum of social consensus. However, there is an oppor-
tunity for democratic transformation that could effect fundamental social change. 
The history of Sudan shows that the people, particularly the poor, have routinely 
stood up to oppressive structures and have twice thrown out regimes that were 
failing their interests and needs. This is a clear indication that the poor are capable 
of making radical changes towards building a political commitment that addresses 
their needs and priorities. The recent Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) has 
paved the way for such change. In the light of this, there is a need to strengthen 
individual and collective capacities in order to generate responsive social policy and 
to influence the peace process.  
2.  Knowledge transmission practices in the community should reflect this orientation. 
People need to build on their knowledge, skills and rights so that they can use their 
own resources to bring about change. Improved access to education is pertinent 
here. There is a strong correlation between poverty and school enrolment, poor 
educational experience and attainment. For this reason, investment in human capital 
should be a key responsibility for the government to assume in order to reduce 
poverty. The government could create positive incentives for school attendance by 
eliminating school fees and providing educational materials. In addition, educa-
tional curricula and strategies should be geared towards creating new spaces for the 
poor to collectivize shared experiences of poverty and exclusion. 
3.  Improving access to urban services. The current provision of urban services in poor 
areas is left to residents to handle on their own. However, the high costs of these 
services, compounded by the high cost of living, prevent the poor from accessing 
these services. To turn the tide, there is the need for more responsive institutions – 
formal or informal – to extend services to informal and poor settlements. Building 
partnerships between local service providers and the localities would encourage 
local service providers to deliver a more affordable and adequate service to the 
urban poor. Local government can play a key role in this concern as it is in a better 
position to deliver urban services. 
4.  Improving access to formal credit. The inaccessibility of formal financial institu-
tions has impacted negatively on the sustainability of the livelihoods of the poor. 
This is particularly critical when it comes to housing or business finance. Therefore, 
it is important that credits and loans be provided through the state, cooperatives and 
a controlled private sector and be integrally linked with community-managed 
savings and loan schemes. 
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5.  Identifying who the poor are. A key issue is identifying accurate profiles of who the 
poor are to determine the way they can effectively be reached by support pro-
grammes such as Zakat and other mechanisms. 
6.  Enhancing citizens’ ‘rights’ to resources and institutions. Rights can empower the 
poor to combat social exclusion on an empowered footing. The challenge of the 
new regime should be to uphold equal political and civil rights of different groups, 
and effectively translate these rights into appropriate policies and effective practice. 
It should also ensure effective redress for citizens against violation by more power-
ful individuals and groups. Property rights can endow people with considerable 
normative power.  
7.  Tenure-insecurity has been shown to be one of the most important constraints on 
people using their resources effectively. It is important to undertake institutional 
reforms that would allow secure tenure of land already occupied as well as putting 
in place measures that would allow formal land markets and land-allocation systems 
to serve the poor. Any professional interventions designed to address tenure insecu-
rity should seek to inject greater bottom-up input into policy processes and involve 
local communities in negotiating land security and in identifying and planning sites.  
8.  Changing regulations in the informal sector. Informal-sector regulations have 
contributed significantly to undermining the poor’s livelihoods by eroding their 
various forms of capital and their ability to generate income. The current laws and 
regulations will need to be changed in a way that takes into consideration the needs 
and constraints of the poor. The local authorities should reform their laws to reduce 
the costs of regularization and at the same time raise the benefits for people of 
legalizing their activities. All levels of government can help facilitate an enabling 
environment for the poor that would allow them to pursue sustainable livelihoods. 
Knowledge of rights and political alternatives is an integral part of and a precondi-
tion to the above-mentioned processes. 
9.  Power sharing. The new regime needs to create a supportive environment so that the 
poor can take control of their lives and their environment by ensuring open and fair 
competition for power on the basis of popular votes. It has the opportunity to effect 
democratic transformation, open up more space for community-based organizations 
and provide a better environment for organized labour and trade-union participa-
tion. Local government could consider an alternative vision for community govern-
ance that would permit the participation of the community in their own governance 
and act as a platform for voicing demands and building rights awareness. For exam-
ple, local leaders could be nominated through a transparent process that would 
allow the whole community to voice their views and opinions.  
 
Central concerns remain, however, regarding the feasibility of putting these policy 
recommendations into practice in the current stifling political regime. Democratic 
change is fundamental and a prerequisite to any actions that may be geared at improving 
the livelihoods of the poor. The scope of the policy recommendations offered in this 
thesis is, therefore, linked to the type of regime that can entrench democratic govern-
ance and build a culture of democracy to advance economic, social and political inclu-
sion with a diversity of actors. In this respect, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
(CPA) offers a good opportunity for the Sudanese people to break the cycle of poverty 
and conflict if it is genuinely implemented. 
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Summary 
 
 
 
 
In the last two decades Sudan has witnessed massive socio-political upheavals that have 
affected people’s lives and livelihoods. Shifts in institutions and ideologies have led to 
greater poverty in the country as a whole and in Khartoum, the capital city, in particular. 
People living in Khartoum have been hardest hit because they are generally more 
integrated into the cash and wage economy and more dependent on food and other 
social-sector subsidies than those in the rural areas. Their access to urban services has 
been significantly reduced, with some groups appearing to have been more marginalized 
than others. This study investigates the ways in which these people have been 
marginalized and the options available to them for a sustainable livelihood. 
 
The research questions included the following:  
? Who are the poor and who are the better-off? What livelihood capitals do they have 
and how do they construct their livelihoods? 
? What are the key institutions and processes, including rights, that are involved in 
providing and/or denying them access to a sustainable livelihood? 
? What have been the major changes for people in different periods, and what effects 
have these had on their livelihood strategies? What factors have shaped these pro-
cesses? 
 
Theoretical framework  
The key approaches to poverty that are relevant to the debate are reviewed. Poverty is 
conceptualized as a dynamic and multi-dimensional phenomenon that is much broader 
than income deprivation alone. Poverty results not only from a lack of material re-
sources but essentially from constraints on people’s capacities and choices that increase 
their vulnerability. The study conceptualizes poverty in terms of vulnerability or the 
inability of people to respond adequately to shocks and hazards, arguing that there is an 
intrinsic relationship between poverty and vulnerability. Vulnerability and subsequent 
deprivation in any form are linked to the imbalance of power relations in a specific 
society and this affects people’s capacity to make full use of the resources available to 
them. In this respect, social exclusion is seen to generate and increase people’s vulnera-
bility. Institutions that reproduce and enforce prevailing social attitudes and values and 
thus the position of powerful actors in society work to exclude some people. It has been 
argued that the fundamental shift and transformation of power for the poor starts with 
the poor themselves. The study is anchored on the premise that questions of empower-
ment need to be located in the individual actor’s social, cultural and historical context. It 
is also useful to distinguish empowerment, in the sense of actors’ capacities, from 
rights.  
The study details the specific factors that influence people’s livelihoods in the urban 
context. Establishing strong interrelationships between urban and rural contexts, the 
centrality of issues of wages and employment, housing and tenure security, access to 
urban services in the light of the absence of effective community-based and grassroots 
organizations are highlighted.  
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Analytical framework 
The tool used to translate this into practical steps is the sustainable livelihoods approach. 
This is a flexible and dynamic approach that focuses on issues that matter to people in a 
holistic manner and providing a tool to understand the constraints on achieving them. 
The approach also takes into account the interrelationships between the different forms 
of vulnerability facing the poor and the systems of support available to them so that they 
can deal successfully with these vulnerabilities. While the sustainable livelihoods 
framework guides the study, other issues that are not explicitly covered by it were also 
incorporated. Emphasis has been placed on access and power, and the importance of 
key contextual factors in urban areas, as explained above.  
Participatory Poverty Analysis (PPA) methods were used for data collection and 
analysis. Four neighbourhoods were selected in Khartoum to monitor the diversity and 
dynamics of livelihood activities and for comparative purposes. The study then explored 
the full continuum of well-being levels in these communities. Participants classified 
households in four broad levels of well-being: ‘Always Poor’, ‘Sometimes Poor’, 
‘Medium Poor’ and ‘Non-Poor’. Using a stratified sampling technique, 70 households 
representing these categories were selected from each neighbourhood for further 
analysis. Various techniques were used including household and community surveys, 
focus-group discussions and interviews, and in-depth life history interviews. Secondary 
data were also collected. Both qualitative and quantitative data were generated.  
 
Context  
The challenges facing Sudan cannot be separated from those facing the African content as 
a whole and include environmental degradation, war and conflict, the HIV/AIDS pande-
mic, malaria and other killer diseases, and the challenges of democracy and good govern-
ance. For Sudan, poverty is largely a result of structural factors; particularly those in-
fluencing modes of ownership, production and the distribution of capital. Many of these 
factors have contributed to rural populations relocating to urban centres, particularly 
Khartoum. This massive wave of migration has taken place in a context of declining em-
ployment opportunities and at a time when no industrialized positions have been emerging 
to fill the gap.  
The four neighbourhoods studied cover a wide and complex geographical area on the 
outskirts of Greater Khartoum. They are not included in the city’s official structure and 
thus lack basic urban services such as water, electricity, sewers and paved roads, except 
in certain small areas. Some of these neighbourhoods have been partially formalized but 
there are also variations in terms of the amount of formalized space available in each 
neighbourhood.  
 
Major findings 
The role of Policies, Institutions and Processes (PIPs) that occupy a central position in 
the analytical framework and in the geographical and historical context in shaping ac-
cess became clear. Internally, the communities are organized in hierarchies based on 
ethnicity, gender and the well-being of the household. In general, the PIPs did not 
reflect the conditions and needs of the poor and none of them translated into political 
agency. The institutions that are supposed to serve the poor often played a negative role 
in their livelihoods and the poor are not represented in decision-making bodies. If they 
were included; it was only to legitimize the decision-making and policy process rather 
than to hear their opinions or allow them some control over their lives.  
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The thesis provides an in-depth overview of the basic characteristics of the sample 
households, the quality of the capitals they have and their livelihood activities. There 
appear to be strong linkages between poverty and household composition in terms of 
gender, ethnicity and age. The vulnerability of households is closely related to liveli-
hood activities, in particular to being employed in the informal sector or being a woman 
or child. Poor households have a smaller portfolio of capitals and men’s stocks of 
capitals are bigger than women’s. Incomes generated by poorer households are often 
inadequate to maintain their livelihood, cope with emergencies or pursue small 
investments. They have extremely low valuable physical capitals, lack tenure security 
and therefore confront an unprecedented level of debt that makes them not only less 
equipped to deal with the current situation but vulnerable to future shocks too. There are 
marked internal inequalities in access to water supply, health care, education, financial 
resources, energy, transport, security and justice. Poorer households are less able to take 
advantage of livelihood strategies that offer greater upward mobility due to their lack of 
social capital. Policies, institutions and process are very critically in this regard as PIPs 
often operate on the basis of strong ties with more powerful individuals within and 
beyond a person’s neighbourhood and who could provide access to various livelihood 
assets. Women tend to have less access to resources than men within their respective 
categories of well-being. Therefore, the vulnerability of a household is likely to de-
crease or increase according to the gender of the household head. Moreover, individuals 
who belong to social groups whose ethnicity and culture enjoy the least recognition, 
influence and power in society tend to suffer more access failure than others. It has been 
argued that access to resources is almost entirely dependent on one’s social position in 
the community, with ethnic and gender identities as very influential factors too. Such 
identities principally determine the amount of social and political capital necessary for 
accessing resources and coping with adversity. 
Life histories indicated that the path an individual or household has taken is deter-
mined by a set of interlocking factors. Life histories of selected cases show that poverty 
always accompanied a decline in the quality of life and the destruction of natural re-
sources when people lack the means and the right to respond to changes. The structures of 
power within society play a key role in determining their access to or exclusion from most 
vital resources of survival and the path they eventually take. Overall, the strategies these 
households were able to undertake were characterized by uncertainty due to insecure 
rights and access to resources, and they tended to generate few returns. The continuous 
loss of assets, compounded by a lack of opportunity and time to rebuild, has left some 
individuals and groups extremely poor.  
The study demonstrates that the poor cannot achieve the desired outcome of their 
livelihood activities due to the lack of an enabling environment that would allow them to 
access capitals and choose the way they want to utilize them. This suggests two important 
factors that lead to poverty: constraints on choice, and the consequences of a decreased 
ability to respond to and cope with adversity. Policies geared towards poverty reduction 
need to take these factors into consideration by transforming the environment in which 
poor people operate and by enabling them to build and mobilize their own resources. 
 
Samenvatting (summary in Dutch) 
 
 
 
 
In Soedan hebben de laatste twee decennia grote institutionele and ideologische ver-
anderingen plaatsgevonden die hun weerslag hebben gehad op de livelihoods van de 
bevolking. In het hele land, en in het bijzonder in de hoofdstad Khartoem, is de 
armoedesituatie verslechterd. Juist de meerderheid van de inwoners van Khartoem is 
hard getroffen, omdat zij meer geïntegreerd zijn in de geldeconomie en de arbeidsmarkt 
en meer afhankelijk zijn van voedsel- en andere subsidies. Bovendien is hun toegang tot 
urbane voorzieningen aanzienlijk afgenomen. Ook zijn er tekenen dat sommige groepen 
meer gemarginaliseerd zijn dan andere. Deze studie heeft tot doel te onderzoeken op 
welke wijze deze groepen gemarginaliseerd zijn en welke opties ze nog hebben om een 
sustainable livelihood te bereiken. 
 
De belangrijkste onderzoeksvragen voor deze studie zijn: 
• Wie zijn de armen en wie is er niet arm? Welke livelihood capitals hebben ze en hoe 
organiseren zij hun livelihood? 
• Welke zijn de belangrijkste instituties en processen, inclusief rechten, via welke zij 
wel of geen toegang kunnen verschaffen tot een sustainable livelihood? 
• Wat waren in verschillende perioden de belangrijkste veranderingen en welke gevol-
gen hadden die op hun livelihood strategieën? Door welke factoren zijn deze pro-
cessen gevormd? 
 
Theoretisch kader 
Allereerst worden in deze studie de belangrijkste benaderingen van het armoedevraag-
stuk besproken. Armoede is geconceptualiseerd als een dynamisch en multi-dimensio-
naal verschijnsel, dat veel breder is dan gebrek aan inkomen. Armoede is niet alleen het 
gevolg van gebrek aan materiële hulpbronnen, maar met name van beperkingen van 
capaciteiten en keuzes van mensen, waardoor hun kwetsbaarheid toeneemt. De studie 
conceptualiseert armoede in termen van kwetsbaarheid of het onvermogen van mensen 
adequaat te reageren op schokken en gevaren. Hiermee wordt aangegeven dat er een 
intrinsieke relatie is tussen armoede en kwetsbaarheid. Kwetsbaarheid en de daarop-
volgende deprivatie in welke vorm dan ook, zijn verbonden met ongelijkheid in machts-
relaties in de samenleving, waardoor het vermogen van mensen om volledig gebruik te 
maken van livelihood hulpbronnen wordt aangetast. In deze zin bevordert sociale uit-
sluiting kwetsbaarheid. Instituties, die sociale attitudes en waarden in de samenleving 
reproduceren en versterken, en dus ook de positie van machtige actoren, sluiten bepaal-
de mensen uit. Echter, fundamentele veranderingen en transformatie van machtsverhou-
dingen ten gunste van de armen beginnen ook bij de armen zelf. Deze studie vertrekt 
daarom vanuit de premisse dat het vraagstuk van empowerment gelegen is in de indivi-
duele sociale, culturele en historische context van de actoren. In dit verband is het ook 
nuttig om een onderscheid te maken tussen empowerment, als een capaciteit van actoren, 
en rechten. 
Vervolgens gaat de studie in op enkele specifieke factoren die van invloed zijn op 
livelihoods in een urbane context. Hoewel urbane en rurale contexten sterk met elkaar 
verbonden zijn, gaat het in de urbane context in het bijzonder over lonen en werkgele-
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genheid, over zekerheid van huisvesting en grondbezit, en over toegang tot urbane voor-
zieningen en zulks in een situatie dat effectieve gemeenschaps- en basisorganisaties niet 
bestaan. 
 
Analytisch kader 
Door middel van het sustainable livelihood-kader worden bovenstaande theoretische 
overwegingen vertaald in praktische onderzoeksstappen. Dit betekent een flexibele en 
dynamische benadering van livelihoods die zich richt op aspecten die voor mensen op 
een holistische wijze belangrijk zijn en op hun beperkingen om die te bereiken. De 
benadering richt zich ook op de relaties tussen verschillende vormen van kwetsbaarheid 
van armen en de ondersteuning waarover ze kunnen beschikken om die de baas te 
worden. Hoewel gebaseerd op de sustainable livelihood-benadering, legt deze studie 
daarnaast nadruk op kwesties van ‘toegang’ en ‘macht’, die anders onderbelicht zouden 
blijven. Ook worden een aantal belangrijke factoren die te maken hebben met de urbane 
context van het onderzoek, zoals hierboven reeds uitgelegd, benadrukt. 
De studie gebruikt de Participatory Poverty Analysis (PPA) als methode van dataver-
zameling en analyse. Vier buurten zijn geselecteerd in Khartoem om de diversiteit en 
dynamiek van livelihoods in beeld te brengen en patronen daarin te kunnen vergelijken. 
De studie richt zich op de exploratie van het volledige continuüm van welzijn. Huishou-
dens zijn daarom in vier categorieën van welzijn geclassificeerd, namelijk ‘altijd arm’, 
‘soms arm’, ‘gemiddeld arm’ en ‘niet arm’. Door middel van een gestratificeerde steek-
proef zijn 70 huishoudens uit deze categorieën per buurt geselecteerd voor verder 
onderzoek. Verschillende technieken zijn gebruikt, zoals surveys van huishouden en 
buurten, interviews en discussies in focus groups en diepte-interviews over levensge-
schiedenissen. Ook secundaire data zijn verzameld. De verzamelde data zijn zowel 
kwalitatief als kwantitatief. 
 
Context  
De uitdagingen waarmee Soedan geconfronteerd wordt zijn dezelfde als waarmee heel 
Afrika te maken heeft. Dat zijn: milieudegradatie, oorlog en conflicten, HIV/AIDS, 
malaria en andere dodelijke ziekten en de uitdaging van democratie en goed bestuur. 
Armoede in Soedan is vooral het resultaat van structurele factoren, vooral die welke 
vormen van eigendom, productie en verdeling van livelihood capitals beïnvloeden. Veel 
van deze factoren droegen bij aan de trek van de rurale bevolking naar de steden, 
Khartoem in het bijzonder. De massale vestiging in Khartoem vond plaats in een tijd 
van dalende werkgelegenheid en er ontstonden geen banen in de industrie, die het tekort 
konden opvullen.  
De vier onderzoeksbuurten zijn verspreid over een groot en complex geografisch 
gebied aan de randen van Groot-Khartoem. Ze zijn officieel geen onderdeel van de 
organisatie van de stad en daarom zijn er, enkele kleine uitzonderingen daargelaten, 
geen basisvoorzieningen als water, elektriciteit, riolering en geplaveide wegen. Sommi-
ge van deze buurten zijn gedeeltelijke geformaliseerd geworden, maar de mate waarin 
varieert sterk per buurt. 
 
Belangrijkste bevindingen 
Op de eerste plaats werd de werking van het cluster Policies–Institutions-Processes 
(PIPs), die een centrale positie inneemt in het analytisch kader, en van de invloed van de 
geografische en historische context in het bepalen van ‘toegang’ verhelderd. De 
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gemeenschappen zijn hiërarchisch georganiseerd op basis van etniciteit, gender en 
welzijn van huishoudens. In het algemeen weerspiegelden de PIPs niet de behoeften van 
de armen en geen enkele kon politieke agency bevorderen. Instituties die verondersteld 
werden de armen te bedienen speelden vaak een negatieve rol in hun livelihoods. De 
armen waren ook niet vertegenwoordigd in hun besluitvormingsorganen. Als dat toch 
het geval was, dan was het alleen maar om de besluitvorming te legitimeren en niet 
omdat men oprecht geïnteresseerd was in hun mening of om hen in staat te stellen 
controle over hun leven te krijgen. 
De studie geeft een grondig overzicht van de belangrijkste kenmerken van de huis-
houdens in de steekproef, de kwaliteit van hun livelihood capitals en hun livelihood 
activiteiten. Er lijkt een sterk verband te bestaan tussen armoede en de samenstelling 
van het huishouden in termen van gender, etniciteit en leeftijd. Kwetsbaarheid van het 
huishouden is sterk gerelateerd aan livelihood activiteiten (met name informeel werk), 
aan vrouw-zijn of aan kind-zijn. Arme huishoudens hebben een kleinere hoeveelheid 
capitals en die van mannen is groter dan die van vrouwen. Inkomens van armere huis-
houdens zijn vaak onvoldoende om een bepaalde livelihood vol te houden, om met 
noodsituaties om te gaan of om kleine investeringen te doen. Ze hebben ook extreem 
weinig fysiek kapitaal en het ontbreekt hen aan zekerheid van huisvesting en grondbezit. 
Daardoor kijken ze tegen ongekend hoge schulden aan, waarmee ze in hun huidige 
situatie al problemen hebben en ook kwetsbaarder zijn voor schokken in de toekomst.  
Er bestaat ook een duidelijke ongelijkheid in de toegang tot water, gezondheidszorg, 
onderwijs, financiële ondersteuning, energie, transport en veiligheid en justitie. Door 
hun gebrek aan sociaal kapitaal zijn armere huishoudens minder goed in staat om profijt 
te trekken van livelihood strategieën die een grotere opwaartse mobiliteit opleveren. Het 
cluster policies-institutions-processes is hierin erg belangrijk. PIPs opereren vaak op 
basis van sterke banden met machtige individuen binnen en buiten de buurt, die op hun 
beurt weer toegang kunnen verschaffen tot verschillende livelihood capitals. 
In de verschillende categorieën van welzijn hebben vrouwen meestal minder toegang 
tot hulpbronnen dan mannen. Daarom hangt de kwetsbaarheid van huishoudens samen 
met de gender van het hoofd van het huishouden. Bovendien hebben individuen die tot 
etnische en culturele groepen behoren met weinig erkenning, invloed en macht in de 
samenleving, minder toegang dan anderen. Daarom wordt geconcludeerd dat toegang 
tot hulpbronnen bijna geheel afhankelijk is van de sociale positie in de gemeenschap, 
met etniciteit en gender als de meest invloedrijke factoren. Deze identiteiten bepalen de 
hoeveelheid sociaal en politiek kapitaal die nodig zijn om toegang te verschaffen tot 
hulpbronnen en om te gaan met tegenspoed.  
Levensgeschiedenissen geven de weg aan die een individu of een huishouden heeft 
genomen onder invloed van een aantal met elkaar samenhangende factoren. Levensge-
schiedenissen van een aantal geselecteerde respondenten laten zien dat armoede altijd 
vergezeld ging met verlies in kwaliteit van leven en vernietiging van natuurlijke hulp-
bronnen als het mensen aan het recht en middelen om te reageren op veranderingen 
ontbrak. De machtstructuren binnen de samenleving speelden een sleutelrol in het 
bepalen van hun toegang tot of uitsluiting van de meest essentiële hulpbronnen voor 
overleving en de weg die ze uiteindelijk hebben gevolgd. Over het algemeen werden de 
strategieën die deze huishoudens konden nemen gekenmerkt door onzekerheid, van-
wege onzekere rechten op en toegang tot hulpbronnen en door het weinige dat ze op-
brachten. Voortdurend verlies van middelen, verergerd door het gebrek aan mogelijk-
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heden en tijd om ze weer op te bouwen, heeft een aantal van hen in extreme armoede 
gebracht. 
De studie heeft aangetoond dat de armen niet de gewenste uitkomst van hun liveli-
hood activiteiten kunnen bereiken door het gebrek aan een omgeving die hen daartoe in 
staat stelt. Die omgeving zou hen in staat moeten stellen om toegang te krijgen tot 
livelihood capitals en hun de keuze moeten laten hoe die te gebruiken. Dit suggereert 
twee belangrijke factoren die tot armoede leiden: de beperkingen op de keuze voor, en 
de gevolgen van, de beperkte mogelijkheid om te reageren op tegenspoed. Beleid dat 
gericht is op armoedebestrijding moet daarmee rekening houden door juist de omgeving 
waarbinnen armen opereren te transformeren, opdat de armen hun eigen hulpbronnen 
kunnen opbouwen en mobiliseren. 
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